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

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Magnanimous or Marauding? Towards a New Framework of Aberrant Insurgent Violence Against Civilians

Dylan Jones

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Foreword

Dear Reader,

It is my pleasure to welcome you to Volume XXXV of the Social and Political Review. 35 years ago this journal was established to provide space for undergraduate students to engage with the social and political issues and contribute to the fields of Sociology and Political Science. It is an honour to add to this long-standing line of publications, with this latest volume. We hope you are inspired, captivated, and left curious by our journals' contributors.

There is a wide reaching selection of papers in this year's volume, which continues to demonstrate the value of the publication of undergraduate work. It contributes to the literature on conflict studies through Dylan Jones' provision of a new framework of aberrant insurgent violence against civilians. Additionally, Prachi Tailor investigates peace negotiations in Kashmir and Conall Dullaghan's paper looks at post-civil conflict 'collective memory' construction in Sri Lanka. In sociological contributions, Shane Burke interrogates the failure of May 1968 through social movement theories and Aengus Gilligan offers an analysis of the classlessness narrative of Ireland through the lens of Bourdieu. Finally, we turn to interdisciplinary analysis, with Eva Hendly's historico-political exploration of the post-independence formation of the Irish identity in relation to sexual purity and Giorgia Carli's political philosophy paper, which asks whether culturally pluralistic societies can maintain a friendship between a state and its citizens.

A year of hard work, enthusiasm and passion brought this journal to life. I must extend my absolute gratitude to this year's Board; to Eva, Prachi, Nazar, Ashling, Shane, Lara, and Jude, for their dedication, patience, and expertise in editing; to Reina and Róisín, for their detailed and accurate copyediting; to Alannah, for her management and for securing funding

for the journal; to Diana, for the beautiful journal layout, cover art, the design of our new website, and her work on publicity; and to Shurooq, for her organisation of events throughout the year, including the journal launch. Without you, this publication would not exist. Thank you also to the Sociology and Political Science departments, as well as TASC, Trinity Trust, Trinity Publications, and Grehan's printers for their continued support of the journal.

This year, we moved to change our website provider in line with divestment principles, and, in February this year, we launched our new website with a paper reading event. We also worked to return the launch of the journal to the Graduates Memorial Building Chamber. This was a step necessary due to the growth of interest in the publication, as demonstrated by our receipt of an unprecedented 70 high-quality submissions to the journal, the attendance at our annual writing workshop, and our engagement with students at the two drop-in sessions we ran in the Trinity Arts Block. We also formalised our relationship with the Political Science and Sociology department, ensuring clear and continued engagement between the journal and the department points of contact, Richard Layte and Constantine Boussalis. The fervent work of the Board this year has ensured the growth and flourishing of the journal beyond this year.

It has been an honour to lead the 35th Volume of the SPR and to see this publication come to fruition. It has been a highlight of my university experience working on three SPR volumes and this one has been the cherry on top. I hope you enjoy it and take something from this most recent iteration, I certainly did.

Is mise le meas,
Tara Dempsey
Editor-in-Chief

Magnanimous or Marauding? Towards a New Framework of Aberrant Insurgent Violence Against Civilians

Dylan Jones

Abstract

It is often taken as inevitable that civilians suffer violence at the hands of insurgent groups. This is misleading; there are huge discrepancies in the levels of violence across these conflicts. In some cases, insurgents inflict violence brutally and indiscriminately on civilian populations, while in others, civilians are explicitly protected or selectively targeted in limited cases. This paper seeks to understand the underlying causes of this profound divergence. It is argued that insurgencies with high economic endowment commit violence at a higher rate than those with low economic endowment, although the latter is also likely to commit violence against civilians if and only if they expose a 'hardline' ideological approach towards issues of security. The policy implications of this project are self-evident; International and Non-Governmental Organisations will be better equipped to protect civilians in danger of insurgent violence if the typology of which insurgencies are liable to commit such acts is better understood.

Despite claims of global humanitarian progress, one million civilians have been deliberately killed by armed groups during civil conflicts in the last 30 years (Pettersson and Öberg, 2020). Notwithstanding a swathe of new research, our current understanding of inter-insurgency variation of insurgent violence against civilians (and the broader problem of predicting insurgent behaviour) remains unsatisfactory. Many theories adequately point to either individual or systemic factors, but a lack of integration

often leaves us blind to scenarios in which they overlap (and, importantly, those in which they do not). Despite calls to leave behind the substantial 'macro- and micro-level divide' that dominates the literature (Balcells and Stanton, 2021), conceptual frameworks for understanding these processes nevertheless tend to concern one or the other. This paper, therefore, seeks to propose a model of variant Insurgent Violence Against Civilians (henceforth IVAC) incorporating two variables: resource endowment (macro-level) and ideology (micro-level), aiming to synthesise the theories of Weinstein (2009) and Leader Maynard (2022), using the theoretical strength of the former, but bolstering it with the unwieldy but substantial explanatory power of the latter. This paper argues that when economic endowment is high, insurgencies commit high levels of IVAC. In contrast, when economic endowment is low, the IVAC committed by insurgencies depends on their ideological approaches to security politics; insurgencies with 'hardline' ideologies are more likely to commit IVAC than those with 'limitationist' ideologies.

The following paper begins by examining Weinstein's theory and argues that although broadly correct, it cannot convincingly operate without ideology as an implicit causal mechanism (giving credence to the suggestion to explicitly include it). Subsequently, it will examine Leader Maynard's theory of ideology in explaining mass killing, explaining the deficiencies in taking it as a 'first port of call'. Following this, a subset argument is employed, demonstrating that Weinstein's exclusion of ideology from his model leaves him unable to comment on the empiric fact of vastly divergent levels of IVAC between similarly-endowed groups (using Al-Qaeda in Yemen and the Communist Party of Nepal as contrasting case studies). This highlights the need to integrate the two theories, using Maynard's as a secondary explanatory variable that helps in both reinforcing the causal mechanisms for Weinstein's theory and in giving further predictive power in the subset of groups with low economic endowment.

Weinstein - Resource Endowment

Weinstein argues that disparate IVAC is caused by the endowments that insurgent leaders have at their disposal at the outset of their movement. He describes a 'resource curse' (Weinstein, 2005, p598) analogous to that which resource-rich states sometimes face; if insurgency leaders have high economic endowment, this can be used to recruit and motivate insurgents to join the cause. This endowment can manifest itself in numerous ways; for example, an insurgency may have control of valuable assets and their trade, most commonly goods such as oil or narcotic plants. Other versions of economic endowment may be liquid capital generated from taxation, which is common among insurgencies headed by warlords (Azam, 2006), or from foreign support from state or non-state actors (such as diaspora communities). Economic endowment can even be as simple as the ability to effectively loot resources from nearby populations. The recruits attracted by any variant of economically endowed insurgencies are categorised as consumers by Weinstein; they are not motivated by the cause itself but rather by immediate material benefits that can be reaped through their involvement in the insurgency (Weinstein, 2009, p. 102). Such insurgencies are, therefore, demarcated as opportunistic rebellions. In such cases, we see high levels of IVAC as recruits are uncommitted, motivated by self-gain, and seek to continually extract resources from civilians. This paper borrows Weinstein's broad definition of violence, which includes not only homicide but looting, coercion, and all forms of sexual violence (ibid. p 199-200). High IVAC is thus attributed to insurgencies who commit such acts at a high frequency and/or in high intensity. In opportunistic rebellions, higher-ups must permit (or at least tolerate) such behaviour in order to retain their military capacity (ibid. p10). Other research has confirmed that behaviour like looting is self-perpetuating (looting begets looting), as it disincentivises production among small communities, leading former producers to begin looting too (Azam and Hoeffler, 2002). Although violence may be indiscriminate, it is nonetheless strategic. The finding that civilian violence is always strategic, that civilian harm is not simply 'collateral damage', is widely shared throughout the literature (Azam, 2006; M Wood, 2010; Valentino, 2014). Weinstein's conclusion

that economic endowment leads to increased IVAC is similarly widely accepted, even by those who posit different causal explanations (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2016).

Alternatively, where economic endowments are not present, insurgency leaders cannot offer would-be insurgents immediate material benefits. Instead, they recruit using social endowments, specifically pre-existing ethnic, religious, or ideological ties. Potential recruits are guaranteed utility, whether that be power, capital, or structural change, if and only if the insurgent group is successful in their aims. Thus, these insurgents are investors; they are significantly more dedicated to the cause of the insurgency than their consumer counterparts. Weinstein denotes these as activist rebellions (Weinstein, 2009, p. 10). Due to resource limitations, activist insurgencies have to rely on civilian populations for goods, including shelter, arms, and provisions. They can make up their resource deficit by striking cooperative bargains with civilians (ibid.). They are, therefore, disincentivised to commit violence against civilians. For pragmatic purposes, such insurgencies will henceforth be referred to as low endowments (although social endowments are usually high).

Although Weinstein may construct his model without reference to ideology, it is nonetheless implicitly included. In low-endowment contexts, ideology is a necessary motivator for activist insurgencies. For example, cases of ethnic ties should also be encompassed under Maynard's conception of ideology as "distinctive political worldviews" (Maynard, 2022, p. 17); it is a distinctly political worldview to view ethnic divides as salient to suggest that groups are fundamentally different and to believe that members of such a group should cooperate. Similar argumentation can be used for other manifestations of social ties, such as class or religion (justification for viewing religious ties as ideological is presented later).

Weinstein's theory, although causally credible and has shown significant empiric backing, is nonetheless imperfect; as he himself speculates, it "may be too simple" (Weinstein, 2009, p. 327). The primary reason for this is its

strict dyadism; it cannot explain altering behaviour within the subset of low endowment, an empiric reality which this paper attempts to illustrate. While it is widely held that economic variables are the main driver of the insurgency itself (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004), it should be clear from the empirical examples below that an absence of political and social variables paints a highly imperfect picture of behaviour within those insurgencies.

Despite what Weinstein may assert, IVAC is not consistent among insurgencies with low economic endowment. This paper will focus on two cases: firstly, the Communist Party of Nepal, which, in accordance with Weinstein, uses violence seldomly, and secondly, Al-Qaeda in Yemen, a movement that subverts Weinstein's prediction, committing high levels of IVAC, despite having undeniably low endowment. In order to understand this discrepancy, we shall turn to Leader Maynard's concept of ideology's role in mass killing.

Leader Maynard - Ideology

This paper, along with Leader Maynard's book, diverges from the majority of the political violence literature in taking ideology seriously as a rigorous explanatory variable; this literature tends to over-emphasise economic variables (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004) to the detriment of equally effectual social and political ones, making ideology a particularly 'unfashionable' approach to explaining the social world. This is, on some level, understandable; it, in particular, is a notoriously difficult concept in the soft sciences. Issues arise in creating a practical, predictive theory, even if one agrees on the fact of what it is (presupposing, of course, that it is at all). Major disagreements originate in the simple question of whether our conception of ideology is narrow or wide.

Firstly, there are obvious issues with narrow conceptions of ideology. Such 'traditional ideological perspectives' (sometimes called 'true believer' models) are extensively criticised by Maynard (2022, pp. 30-32). They conceptualise ideology as a rigid, unchanging, and systematic worldview. This is unhelpful; rigid definitions of ideology (denoted by labels such as

'liberal' or 'fascist') are wildly inconsistent predictors of group behaviour. We need only look to Weinstein's (2009, pp. 81- 95) discussion on the differing conduct of two distinct branches of the Sendero Luminoso, firstly in Peru's southern highlands and secondly in the Amazonian jungle. Despite both factions identifying as Maoist (an undeniably ideological self-demarcation), their behaviours are highly contrasting. While the former created institutions and protected civilians, using violence only to further their political aims (ibid., p. 88), the latter, due to its economic endowment of access to large coca plantations and thus a lucrative drug trade, exerted restrictive control over civilians, wielding violence far more often, and far more indiscriminately (ibid., p. 95). Evidently, ideology in this narrow sense cannot and should not be used as a primary unit of analysis, as even sects of the same ideologically labelled movement act in highly disparate ways.

Maynard (2022, p. 4) therefore rejects this conception. Instead, he proposes a 'neo-ideological' model. Here, ideologies are less easily quantified, defined as "distinctive political worldviews" (ibid., p. 17). This is far more accurate; ideology is a nebulous concept, affecting a presumably incalculable range of positions and actions. For Maynard, however, the necessary facet of ideology that pertains to violence is its function in producing 'justificatory narratives' (ibid., p. 5). These create the necessary conditions for violence before, during, and after the act itself by perverting familiar notions of security politics (the need for certain measures to ensure the protection and flourishing of the state or movement) in times of crisis into justification for violence. Specific examples of justificatory mechanisms range from threat construction, in which certain individuals are deemed dangerous, and thus retaliation operates as self-defence (ibid., p. 154), to deidentification, in which the shared identity between in-group and out-group is denied or suppressed (ibid., p. 161).

An organisation that is liable to act in such a way is characterised as pushing a 'hardline' ideology (ibid, p. 98). Alternatively, 'limitationist' ideologies portray violence as ineffective, costly, and normatively undesirable (ibid,

p. 100). Thus, the salient difference in ideology that explains mass killing is not a traditionally simplistic social or economic left-right axis but rather an axis that measures diverging approaches to security politics, placing limitationist policy on the left and hardline policy on the right, as visualised in figure 1 (ibid, p. 101), with poles defined as the excesses of total pacifism and ultra-hardline.

Figure 1



Source: Leader Maynard, 2022, p. 101

Although Maynard exclusively focuses on mass killing (ibid, p. 46), the same mechanisms simultaneously function in explaining the occurrence of lower-intensity manifestations of IVAC, such as homicide, rape, looting and coercion. Thus, the further to the right of the above spectrum an insurgency falls, the more likely it is to commit high levels of IVAC, even if they have low endowment. It should be noted that further left (more limitationist) ideologies and further right (more hardline) ideologies are later referred to by their consequent characters as non-violent and violent ideologies, respectively.

While compelling, this account scarcely resembles a theory; it is descriptive, not prescriptive. Its inductive nature limits its predictive power; by explaining everything [that ideology can do], it precludes us from predicting anything (Waltz, 2004, p3). To illustrate this, we can examine Maynard's discussion of Interahamwe leader Juvénal Habyarimana, who was popular amongst his militants for promising "jobs and good times" (Maynard, 2022, p. 279). This is an obvious example of the power of high-endowment movements to create highly violent outcomes without the need for ideology. This illustrates two crucial facets of this paper's argument. The first is that ideology is not essential in motivating in high-endowment contexts (thus, this subset is excluded in the revised model below). The second is that wide conceptions of ideology, like

Maynard's, should not be used as our 'first port of call', as the concept is too unwieldy and nebulous and can be used to derive what is quite simply the 'wrong explanation' of almost any occurrence, including the above. Using Maynard's conception, we could validly assert that this behaviour was ideologically driven, that the pursuit of capital (or even utility) at the detriment of civilians was a hardline ideological perspective created by Hutu elites and justified through propaganda. Yet, while plausible, this is an inaccurate way to view the phenomenon. Maynard's theory, in its current conception as a 'first port of call', is essentially unfalsifiable (Popper, 1963). Thus, it should be evident that ideology, especially the neo-ideological view proposed by Maynard, undeniably affects IVAC. However, this wide conception of ideology is overly permissive; it 'lets too much in'. We, therefore, cannot use it as our primary unit of analysis. It does, however, function well in explaining discrepant IVAC among low-endowment insurgencies (the major flaw in Weinstein's theory), as the following sections will illustrate.

Accordingly, we will now examine two contrasting case studies to demonstrate that Weinstein's theory, due to its exclusion of ideology, fails to predict huge discrepancies in similarly endowed but ideologically differing groups: the Communist Party of Nepal and Al-Qaeda in Yemen.

Communist Party of Nepal

The Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) refers here to the Nepalese Maoist social movement and later mainstream political party (although the name is also used by a related but non-aligned Marxist-Leninist party). The CPN is a quintessential example of a low-endowment group; the poverty of the areas in which the group originated both informed their ideological mission and prevented them from attracting 'consumer' militants (Hachhethu, 2009, pp. 48-49); recruits could not gain material benefits quickly, and therefore had to be committed to the long-term advancement of the cause, whether for ideological reasons or simply for economic and political benefit, which would only occur after a sustained commitment to the movement's aims as a whole (Weinstein, 2005, p. 10).

The CPN, as predicted, are highly selective in the use of IVAC; despite launching a lengthy guerrilla warfare campaign, sometimes in highly populated areas (Sijapati, 2004), they are estimated to have killed "fewer than 1,000 people in nearly 10 years of fighting" (Weinstein, 2009, p. 5), exactly as Weinstein's model predicts. This (relatively) pacifist approach towards citizens (with violence targeted directly at state instruments) was not exclusively a rationalist choice based on material constraints; it was a normative, ideologically informed choice from insurgent leaders, who held strong preferences for a peaceful transition to power (Ogura, 2008, p. 45), and thus should be considered as limitationist, on the left of the spectrum in Figure 1.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula

The Yemeni branch of Al-Qaeda, which self-identifies as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), is a similarly low-endowment group. Al-Qaeda's ideology has been described as significantly stronger than its material capacity and, thus, its ability to threaten international security (Bugeja, 2015). Their success in mobilising militants has emanated from their ability to exploit social norms, such as religion and ethnicity, to mobilise recruits (International Crisis Group, 2017). However, we see contrasting behaviour to that which Weinstein's model would predict for such a lowly endowed group; instead of limited violence, we find high levels of IVAC (Carboni and Sulz, 2020).

Although it has been argued that the social endowments utilised by AQAP are explicitly tribal or ethnic rather than ideological (Batal al-Shishani, 2010), this view is likely a remnant of outdated primordialist thought. Research has shown that such divides (in and of themselves) are rarely the cause of political violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Instead, it is elite activation that makes these divides salient (Posen, 1993), namely through processes like deidentification, as described by Maynard (2022, p. 161). AQAP's name itself elucidates this ideological activation; Salafi-jihadist ideologues like Faris al-Zahrani urge to cast off "colonial divisions" and focus on the links between "proud tribes, who God has favoured with

Islam" (Batal al-Shishani, 2010, p. 7), thus the stress on Arabian Peninsula, not Yemen.

One may argue that AQAP's social endowment is, in fact, derived from religion, not ideology. However, this paper suggests that doing so creates a false dichotomy; if using Leader Maynard's definition of ideologies as "distinctive political worldviews" (Maynard, 2022, p. 17), religion should instead be conceptualised as a subcategory under ideology. This approach has considerable precedent in political sociology, particularly in the work of Marxist theorists such as Gramsci (Forlenza, 2019). Proving such a view is certainly beyond the scope of this paper, yet even if one is unwilling to accept that all religions disseminate a "distinctive political worldview", AQAP's fundamentalist interpretation of the Quran undeniably does, explicitly teaching its followers that "violent jihad is the only way to protect the Islamic world" (Vasiliev and Zherlitsyna, 2022, p. 1241).

Weinstein fails to consider that AQAP is reliant only on those civilians proximate to insurgents. It is rational and strategic to commit violence against civilians physically removed from AQAP, like those in neighbouring or western states. Like CPN, AQAP use violence selectively in order to fulfil their aims. However, unlike CPN, these aims are informed by a particularly violent ideology, one that interprets ideas of security and self-preservation (of a distinctly Islamic worldview) in a particularly hardline manner. Therefore, despite AQAP's low endowment, this manifests as high levels of IVAC.

Synthesised Model

As has been demonstrated, within low-endowment groups, ideology has an inextricable role in determining IVAC levels. Although this paper does not have the scope to formalise a theory for using ideology as a predictive variable under the low-endowment subset, it should be summarised as such: in the case of low-endowment groups, violence of ideology affects IVAC. If a low-endowment insurgent group is constructed around a violent or hardline ideology, we will find high IVAC (as seen in AQAP). If a low-

endowment group is constructed around a non-violent or limitationist ideology, we will find low IVAC (as seen in CPN). This model is visualised in Figure 2 below.

IVAC as Determined by 1) Endowment Type and 2) Ideology

Figure 2



Thus, by using Maynard's conception of ideology as a causal mechanism within Weinstein's strict dyadic theory and applying it explanatorily only in the low-endowment subset, ideology can be validly incorporated into resource-endowment theory without sacrificing said theory's simplicity and predictive value. This allows it to function effectively as an "instrument … useful in explaining what happens in a defined realm of activity" (Waltz, 2004, p. 2). Ideology is importantly considered as secondary to endowment type in the temporal chain of causality due to the issues with using it as a 'first port of call', as explained above. This model is, therefore, still predictive, yet more nuanced and dynamic, granting the theory greater explanatory power.

It is, however, in its current state, an 'informal' model. Undoubtedly, a brief classification of two case studies has certain limitations; it would be a severe overestimation to affirm the universality of the given argument on such limited research. However, this paper is instead aimed specifically at establishing that the current models for explaining aberrant IVAC levels fall flat. Case studies, both greater in number and in detail, which, as previously noted, are outside this paper's scope, would be beneficial in confirming the validity of the model. Further research must be undertaken in addition to this, namely confirming empirically the causal mechanism proposed by Maynard and the explicit quantification of both variables, in order to transition this paper's proposal into a formal model, which should, if the theory is correct, make accurate predictions concerning which insurgencies are likely to commit IVAC.

Conclusion

This paper has presented a more comprehensive model for explaining disparate levels of insurgent violence against civilians, using Weinstein's resource endowment framework but including ideology as a secondary deciding variable under the subset of low-endowment groups. This is supported by a sharp distinction between two case studies, the Communist Party of Nepal and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as informed by their disparate ideological views, borrowing the broad neo-ideological lens used by Leader Maynard. If successful, it is believed that this model will move us towards a more comprehensive understanding of insurgent violence against civilians, allowing the global community to work towards the protection of innocent civilians or innocence in danger around the world.

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How to veto peace? Examining the influence of veto players' ideological commitments on Kashmir's peace negotiations

Prachi Tailor

"I don't know about the people, but I still believe in solidarity, old-fashioned as it sounds, and I still believe that the root of solidarity lies in the common inheritance of our bodies – which remain subject, however unequally, to sickness, loss, old age and death."

Olivia Liang, 'Funny Weather'

Abstract

This study examines how veto players' ideological commitments influence peace negotiations in the Kashmir conflict. Drawing on veto player theory, the analysis identifies three key factors impeding successful conflict resolution: 1. The high number of veto players involved, 2. Internal fragmentation within stakeholder groups, and 3. Significant information asymmetries in assessing relative bargaining power. Through detailed case studies of the 2001 Agra Summit and 2004-2008 Composite Dialogues, the analysis demonstrates how multiple veto players—including state governments, military establishments, and militant groups—reduce the set of mutually acceptable agreements. The study reveals that while internal cohesion and clear negotiation frameworks can facilitate peace processes, the complex web of competing interests and ideological positions has led to significant information asymmetries and spoiler dynamics, consistently undermining peace initiatives. This research enriches the existing literature by examining the persistent Kashmir conflict through the analytical framework of veto player theory, addressing a notable gap as previous works on political violence theories

have largely overlooked the later wars and unsuccessful negotiations in Kashmir's modern political landscape.

Introduction

The Kashmir conflict remains one of the most intractable territorial disputes in modern history, characterized by cycles of violence and failed peace initiatives spanning over seven decades. While numerous attempts at resolution have been made, the complex web of actors involved has consistently complicated efforts to achieve lasting peace. Specifically, the presence of multiple veto players – actors whose agreement is necessary for changing the status quo – has created particular challenges in reaching successful negotiated settlements.

This analysis examines how veto players' ideological commitments have influenced peace negotiations in Kashmir through two relatively recent case studies: the 2001 Agra Summit and the 2004-2008 Composite Dialogues. These cases were selected for their contemporary relevance and clear illustration of veto player dynamics in modern peace processes.

The research reveals three critical factors impeding successful conflict resolution: the high number of veto players involved, internal fragmentation within stakeholder groups, and significant information asymmetries in assessing relative bargaining power. Through a detailed examination of the selected case studies, this analysis demonstrates how multiple veto players – including state governments, military establishments, and militant groups – have consistently reduced the set of mutually acceptable agreements.

Understanding these dynamics is crucial for future peace initiatives in Kashmir and similar conflicts. The analysis at hand shows that successful conflict resolution requires not only addressing core territorial disputes but also managing the interplay of veto players' ideological commitments and institutional relationships.

Background

The Kashmir conflict emerged from the complex partition of British India in 1947 when princely states were given the choice to join either India or Pakistan. Despite Kashmir being a Muslim-majority state, its Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, chose to join India, leading to immediate conflict and the first Indo-Pakistan war over the territory (Malik, 2019).

The subsequent UN intervention in 1949 established a ceasefire line that later became the Line of Control (LOC), effectively dividing Kashmir between the Indian and Pakistani administrations (Malik, 2019). Nevertheless, the 1965 war broke out with Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, aimed at inciting rebellion in Kashmir. However, it escalated into a broader conflict when Indian forces crossed the international border (Malik, 2019). Subsequently, the 1971 war, while primarily focused on East Pakistan's independence, added another layer of complexity to the Kashmir dispute and resulted in the Simla Accord, which established the Line of Control (Khan, 2009). In 1999, the Kargil War, though geographically limited, gained significant international attention due to nuclear concerns (Malik, 2019). Essentially, the failure to implement the UN-mandated plebiscite in 1948, initially agreed upon by both countries, has contributed to this cycle of conflicts, with each war further complicating the prospect of a peaceful resolution (Malik, 2019).

With regard to the socio-political context, the conflict evolved from a territorial dispute between nations to an internal insurgency within Indian-administered Kashmir by 1989 (Khan, 2009). The violence severely impacted Kashmir's syncretic culture (Kashmiriyat), which had historically emphasized religious harmony and shared communal values. Specifically, the conflict resulted in the mass exodus of Kashmiri Pandits in 1990, fundamentally altering the region's demographic composition (Khan, 2009). Though peace initiatives emerged in the 2000s, tensions persisted. In recent years, the region has experienced heightened tension due to surgical strikes following 2016 and skirmishes such as the Galwan Valley clash in 2020 (Gettleman, Kumar and Yasir, 2020; Malik, 2019).

Literature Review

Theory

Veto player theory provides a crucial framework for understanding peace negotiation dynamics and outcomes. In particular, Tsebelis' seminal work on veto player theory (2011, p. 19) defines veto players as "individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo", whether through institutional or partisan positions. Subsequently, these actors significantly influence policy stability and negotiation success through their number, ideological positions, and internal cohesion.

Moreover, peace negotiations become increasingly complex when multiple veto players are involved, as changing the status quo requires unanimous agreement from all parties. Cunningham (2006) demonstrates how this complexity manifests. First, the set of mutually acceptable agreements shrinks due to each veto player's distinct preferences. Secondly, bargaining can break down if even one veto player overestimates their probability of victory.

Furthermore, ideological commitments play a central role in shaping negotiation outcomes. Specifically, as the ideological distance between veto players grows, policy stability increases, and the effectiveness of agenda-setting diminishes (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Choi, 2010). Consequently, countries with many veto players holding divergent ideological positions typically experience high policy stability, thus making it extremely difficult to alter existing arrangements.

In addition, internal fragmentation within movements creates additional challenges for peace processes. As a result, when groups fragment over dissatisfaction with organisational structure or internal competition, this often leads to "spoiler" dynamics where certain factions actively undermine negotiations to protect their interests (Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012). This fragmentation can create opportunities for states to strategically exploit divisions, sometimes co-opting rebel commanders individually

(Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012). However, Findley and Rudloff's research (2012) has shown that fragmentation can occasionally facilitate shorter conflicts since the resulting weaker combatants may be more conducive to cooperation.

In comparison, Nilsson's bargaining theory (2008) suggests that actors behave strategically based on others' actions, with warfare serving as a mechanism for revealing information about capabilities and resolve. However, actors consistently miscalculate both the capabilities and preferences of their opponents, leading to bargaining failures (Cunningham, 2013). Through this process of combat and negotiations, parties gradually discover each other's minimum acceptable terms, thereby potentially enabling settlement rather than continued costly conflict. This process becomes more complicated when multiple veto players must evaluate outcomes not only against immediate opponents but also relative to other actors in the broader conflict (Cunningham, 2006).

Similarly, the effectiveness of peace negotiations often depends on institutional mechanisms that address security concerns. For instance, power-sharing arrangements serve as crucial tools by guaranteeing all groups a stake in state power and in theory minimize the risk of any party becoming dominant (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003).

Unfortunately, papers on political violence theories fail to adequately address the Kashmir conflict. While some mention the partition war and the subsequent negotiations (Cunningham, 2013; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012), they tend to overlook the later wars and unsuccessful negotiations surrounding the conflict – elements that are particularly salient in the current political landscape of Kashmir.

The Kashmir Context

Building on these theoretical frameworks, an examination of the Kashmir conflict provides a concrete case study of how these dynamics manifest in practice. The period from the Agra Summit to the composite dialogues

represents an evolution in India-Pakistan engagement on Kashmir - from single-event summits to sustained structured dialogue. Specifically, the 2001 Agra Summit represented an important post-Kargil War attempt at bilateral engagement between India and Pakistan. In this regard, Baral (2002) notes that while the summit failed to achieve a breakthrough, it succeeded in bringing the two adversaries to the negotiating table. Moreover, the key point of contention was Pakistan's insistence on treating Kashmir as the "core issue," while conversely, India preferred a composite dialogue approach addressing multiple issues simultaneously (Khan, 2009). As a result, this fundamental disconnect in approaches contributed to the summit's failure to produce even a joint statement.

Subsequently, the period following the summit saw a transition to a more systematic dialogue process. In particular, as documented by Misra (2007), the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) initiated in 2004 marked a significant shift from earlier issue-specific negotiations to a structured framework covering eight key areas, including Kashmir. Consequently, this new format helped make the dialogue more resistant to disruptions and setbacks.

Furthermore, a key development during the 2004-2008 period was Pakistan's gradual move away from its traditional "Kashmir-first" stance. Pakistan demonstrated greater flexibility in discussing other bilateral issues while maintaining Kashmir's importance (Gul, 2008). As a result, the dialogue produced several confidence building measures (CBMs) including increased people-to-people contact and cross-LoC trade initiatives (Khan, 2009).

However, scholars note that fundamental differences persist. For instance, Yusuf and Najam (2009) argue that while there was growing convergence on elements like autonomy for Kashmir and "soft borders," moving from broad agreement to specific solutions remained challenging. Additionally, the dialogue process also remained vulnerable to disruption from terrorist incidents, as evidenced by its suspension following the 2006 Mumbai

train bombings (Malik, 2019).

As evident above, while numerous papers exist on each topic individually, there has yet to be a comprehensive analysis of the Kashmir conflict through the lens of veto player theory.

Factors hindering negotiations

High number of veto players

The presence of multiple veto players is the primary factor that complicates civil war negotiations. Specifically, each additional veto player brings distinct preferences to the table, which consequently reduces the set of mutually acceptable agreements and shrinks the bargaining range. Cunningham (2006) argues that this challenge is compounded by strategic behaviours, as each veto player has an incentive to hold out and be the last to sign an agreement, allowing them to secure better terms. Statistical evidence strongly supports these theoretical expectations, with analysis showing that conflicts containing more veto players are harder to resolve – notably, adding one veto player under strict criteria leads to a 0.66% decrease in the probability of conflict ending in any given month (Cunningham, 2006). This suggests that the effect is significant as increasing the number of veto players notably decreases the probability of war ending in any given month, leading to considerably longer civil wars. Thus reinforcing that veto players' ideological commitments create fundamental barriers to peace negotiations.

Internal Fragmentation

At the member level, internal fragmentation – operationalised by satisfaction with organizational structure – influences how different factions approach negotiations. Specifically, Pearlman and Cunningham (2012) explain that when they are satisfied with existing organizational arrangements, they unite to overcome challenges. However, when dissatisfied with institutional structures, they may use external pressures as opportunities to challenge the status quo. Consequently, this creates varying levels of commitment to peace processes. This is evident in

Northern Ireland, where the IRA split into multiple factions, including the "Official", "Provisional", "Continuity", and "Real" IRA, due to perceived imbalances in authority and representation (Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012). Additionally, when examining fragmentation specifically, computational models demonstrate that as the probability of fragmentation increases, the duration of wars ending in settlement decreases (Findley and Rudloff, 2012). Therefore, each splinter group brings its own modified ideological position to the negotiating table.

Subsequently, "spoiler" behaviour complicates negotiations when certain factions actively undermine peace efforts to protect their interests. The relationship between internal fragmentation and "spoilers" is bidirectional - fragmentation can create conditions for spoiling, while anticipated spoiling can drive fragmentation (Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012). This dynamic is particularly challenging as the incentive to act as a spoiler can arise from both defensive and offensive motivations - defensively protecting existing power or offensively seeking to expand influence (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Therefore, peace processes need to account for both structural fragmentation and strategic spoiling.

Information asymmetries

Cunningham (2013) builds on the above point by stating that internal divisions in opposition movements create significant information asymmetries by generating multiple competing claims about what the movement wants, ultimately hampering effective negotiation and increasing uncertainty about potential settlements. As a result, such an information asymmetry makes it difficult for veto players to determine the true capabilities, preferences, and reversion points of the opposition. Moreover, in this "fog of war", combatants struggle to obtain reliable estimates of their opponents' troops and capabilities (Findley and Rudloff, 2012). This uncertainty makes it difficult for veto players to agree on relative bargaining power.

Additionally, when beliefs about capability distribution diverge signifi-

cantly, the duration until settlement increases, as veto players cannot easily determine whether they should settle or continue fighting. Furthermore, Cunningham (2006) reveals that the dyadic nature of battles means veto players must interpret outcomes not only against immediate opponents but also relative to other actors in the broader conflict. This establishes that, since only one veto player needs to overestimate their probability of victory, the risk of bargaining breakdown increases with more parties.

Factors that facilitate the negotiations

Power-Sharing Arrangements

Power-sharing arrangements play a crucial role in facilitating negotiations by providing multiple layers of security and protection for all veto players involved. Specifically, Hartzel and Hoddie (2003) assert that the arrangements ensure that no single veto player can dominate state power after the conflict by distributing control across political, territorial, military, and economic dimensions. Consequently, this multidimensional approach creates mutually reinforcing safeguards that enhance overall security and protect against the failure of any single provision. Moreover, the effectiveness of power-sharing is evident in its widespread adoption, with 97% of studied settlements including some form of these arrangements and each additional power-sharing provision reduced settlement failure probability by 53% (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). This demonstrates that these institutions are particularly valuable because they address core security concerns that bring veto players to the negotiating table and help move discussions through various phases, from initial talks to implementation.

Clear Negotiation Framework

Clear negotiation frameworks facilitate negotiations by providing a structured, phased approach to conflict resolution. In particular, according to Hartzel and Hoddie's (2003) research, peace agreements typically progress through three distinct phases: pre-negotiation to bring parties to the table, framework development for resolving core issues, and implementation planning. This systematic approach helps parties navigate

complex negotiations by establishing clear objectives and progression paths.

Subsequently, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) break down the framework of successful negotiations into three critical frameworks: local source of hostility, local capacities for change, and international commitment available to assist. As a result, the framework allows for evaluating key factors like faction characteristics and hostility levels to design the right negotiation approach. For cases with high hostility or multiple factions, more intensive international coordination and assistance may be required to overcome implementation challenges.

Internal Cohesion

Internal cohesion among veto players significantly enhances the prospects for successful peace negotiations through several key mechanisms. First, cohesive veto players are better positioned to make credible commitments and implement agreements. For collective groups to function effectively as veto players, they must possess mechanisms to overcome internal collective action problems and maintain consistent positions at the bargaining table (Cunningham, 2006). Subsequently, strong internal cohesion enables parties to credibly commit to and carry out any promises or threats made during negotiations (Cunningham, 2006).

Second, greater cohesion reduces informational asymmetries that can derail negotiations. In multiparty conflicts, individual battles are typically dyadic, making it difficult for parties to interpret battlefield information and form realistic assessments of their probability of victory (Cunningham, 2006). When groups are internally cohesive, they can more effectively process and respond to this information.

Third, cohesive movements are more likely to receive substantive concessions from states. Research shows that unified movements tend to present stronger challenges to states and thus can secure larger concessions (Cunningham, 2011). In contrast, internal divisions often

weaken movements by diverting resources to internal conflicts rather than advancing their broader objectives (Cunningham, 2011).

Finally, internal cohesion helps prevent the emergence of spoilers who might undermine peace processes. When movements are fragmented, excluded factions may continue fighting even after others sign agreements (Nilsson, 2008). Strong institutional structures that coordinate different factions reduce this risk by enabling more comprehensive participation in peace processes (Nilsson, 2008).

Case Studies

The following analysis examines two critical junctures in Indo-Pakistani diplomatic relations: the 2001 Agra Summit and the 2004-2008 Composite Dialogues. The first case demonstrates how the absence of a clear negotiating framework and conflicting views on fundamental issues led to diplomatic failure, culminating in the 2001 Indian parliament attack. In contrast, the second case reveals how aligned ideological positions and stronger internal cohesion during the Composite Dialogues facilitated more productive negotiations, though not without their own challenges.

Case Study 1: The 2001 Agra Summit

The Indo-Pak Agra Summit, held on July 15-16, 2001, was a significant diplomatic meeting between Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistani President Musharraf. Though it generated optimism as the first major dialogue after the Kargil War, the summit ultimately failed to achieve a breakthrough. The influence of competing ideological commitments among veto players is clearly demonstrated by this summit's failure in two distinct ways. First, the summit ended with a formal agreement due to the absence of a clear negotiating framework. Specifically, Pakistan rejected India's request for ministerial-level preparatory talks and agenda-setting before the summit, instead insisting on an open-ended summit format, thereby departing from normal diplomatic practice (Baral, 2002). Moreover, India and Pakistan had conflicting views on the "primary source of hostility" (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). In particular, Pakistan

insisted that Kashmir was the "core" issue central to Indo-Pak relations, while conversely, India maintained that cross-border terrorism was the primary problem that needed addressing (Baral, 2002). In addition to this, the summit failed to adequately address "local capacities for change" (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000), as there was no substantial discussion of nuclear security matters. Instead, the focus remained on historical grievances rather than contemporary security challenges (Gupta, 2002). Therefore, the veto players' different commitments hindered negotiations.

Second, the 2001 Indian parliament attack revealed how competing ideological commitments can manifest in violent outcomes. While some scholars acknowledge the success of the summit in bringing veto players to the negotiating table, the attack ultimately sealed its failure. Specifically, groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, blamed for the attack, showed a willingness to act independently of state preferences. This undermined official Pakistani interests, making them a veto player in these negotiations despite their absence at the summit.[1]

Moreover, this internal fragmentation within Pakistani veto players proved to be a significant obstacle to successful negotiations. The timing of the attack (December 2001) immediately following the failed Agra Summit suggested these veto players felt excluded from the political process. Subsequently, literature on "terrorism" suggests that attacks on civilians serve as a way to signal through surprise violence (Cronin, 2009). In this case, Pakistan's military establishment, as a direct veto player, had vested interests in perpetuating conflict with India (Baral, 2002), thus

[1]While some may contend that terrorist organizations and the Pakistani government function as a single entity, I argue that they are distinct veto players who may occasionally align on certain issues. This distinction is underscored by their "highly schizophrenic relationship," in which the Pakistani military government has pursued an ambiguous policy of cooperating with religious extremists to counter domestic secular pressures (Cronin, 2009). However, this strategy ultimately backfired, as evidenced by two assassination attempts on President Musharraf in December 2003 by disgruntled extremists.

creating tension between military objectives and diplomatic initiatives. Furthermore, this fragmentation was evidenced by the fact that only about 18% of terrorist groups typically engage in negotiations, highlighting how most groups prefer to maintain their independent violent campaigns rather than submit to state authority or negotiate settlements (Cronin, 2009). Hence, the attack revealed the complex web of relationships between veto players where each pursued their own agenda, sometimes at cross-purposes with their nominal allies, thus complicating efforts at conflict resolution.

The Agra Summit ultimately failed due to competing ideological commitments, lack of structured negotiation frameworks, and internal fragmentation among Pakistan's veto players. In contrast, the 2004-2008 Composite Dialogues would demonstrate how aligned positions and stronger internal cohesion could produce more promising results.

Case Study 2: The 2004-2008 Composite Dialogues

The 2004-2008 composite dialogues began when President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee met at the 2004 SAARC summit in Islamabad. The process completed four rounds of talks, covering areas like peace and security, terrorism, Kashmir, and economic cooperation. The dialogues demonstrated how aligned ideological positions and strong internal cohesion among key veto players can facilitate negotiation success. First, the dialogue process benefited from strong leadership commitment between principle veto players, starting with President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee's initial agreement at the 2004 SAARC summit (Rashid, 2017). Subsequently, when the Indian government transitioned from BJP to Congress, there was remarkable continuity as the new administration "religiously followed" the agenda of 12 CBMs set by the previous government (Gul, 2008). Moreover, President Musharraf's unique position as a military leader showed "extraordinary openness" and willingness to move beyond traditional Pakistani positions – with his military background providing stability and authority to the peace process (Rashid, 2017, p. 95). Furthermore, both sides demonstrated

sustained commitment through multiple rounds of dialogue, completing four successful rounds despite occasional interruptions (Gul, 2008). The establishment of a formal mechanism like the Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism showed institutional buy-in from both sides (Gul, 2008).

However, while the success of the composite dialogues during this period is evidenced by several concrete achievements, such as the establishment of multiple transportation links and implementation of trade initiatives, major issues of Kashmir remained unsolved. Specifically, the dialogue process involved various veto players: government representatives from both India and Pakistan, military establishments, Kashmiri separatist groups including moderate elements like the Hurriyat Conference, and multiple political parties across both countries (Rashid, 2017). Consequently, while engaging in diplomatic dialogue, the Pakistani government maintained a complex position. Although it officially participated in peace talks and supported the dialogue process, it simultaneously continued supporting militant veto players, creating a "double-edged policy" (Misra, 2007). As a result, this created increased uncertainty in negotiations. For instance, in 2006, the Mumbai train bombings killed around 200 people, leading India to suspend foreign secretary-level talks and expel diplomatic staff (Gul, 2008). While Pakistan officially condemned these attacks, India continued to accuse Pakistan's ISI of involvement in subsequent incidents, including the Ajmer and Hyderabad bombings (Gul, 2008).

These incidents demonstrate how militant actors could effectively derail diplomatic progress, even as official channels remained nominally open. Ultimately, the complexity of having multiple actors led to a situation where progress became increasingly difficult as each party had to evaluate immediate bilateral gains against a broader constellation of involved parties and their potential reactions.

Conclusion

The veto player theory provides a compelling framework for understanding the persistent challenges in Kashmir peace negotiations. Through this

theoretical lens, we can identify several critical factors that have consistently impeded successful conflict resolution in the region.

First, the multiplicity of veto players - including India, Pakistan, various Kashmiri factions, military establishments, and militant groups - has significantly reduced the set of mutually acceptable agreements. As demonstrated in both the Agra Summit and Composite Dialogues, each additional veto player brings distinct preferences and ideological commitments, making consensus increasingly difficult to achieve.

Second, internal fragmentation within key stakeholders has created substantial barriers. Pakistan's complex relationship with militant groups, as evidenced by the 2001 Parliament attack, demonstrates how fragmentation can undermine official diplomatic initiatives. The presence of multiple actors pursuing independent agendas has led to "spoiler" dynamics that frequently derail peace processes.

Third, information asymmetries arising from the dyadic nature of conflicts have complicated negotiations. The difficulty in interpreting battlefield outcomes and assessing relative bargaining power has made it challenging for parties to form realistic expectations about potential settlements.

These factors have created a situation where, despite numerous attempts at negotiation, achieving lasting peace remains elusive. While this analysis has focused primarily on veto player dynamics, the role of international actors - including the UN, the US, and China - presents a promising avenue for future research. Understanding their potential influence could offer new perspectives on resolving this enduring conflict.

Finally, the experience of Kashmir demonstrates that successful conflict resolution requires not only addressing the core territorial dispute but also managing the complex web of veto players' ideological commitments and institutional relationships. Future peace initiatives must account for these dynamics to have any chance of success.

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Human Rights, Norm Socialization and Civil War Victory in Sri Lanka: A Tale of Dichotomous Persuasions and Collective Memory Manipulation.

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Abstract

This paper critically examines the 'spiral model' of human rights diffusion with particular focus on post-civil war regimes. Utilising Sri Lanka as a case study, it argues that civil war victory grants states the unrestricted ability to propose an 'official' collective memory of war which sanctions human rights denial. This collective memory allows for a dismissal of 'moral consciousness raising' by transnational human rights networks as undue foreign interference. Additionally, civil war victory also allows for repression of a 'strong and coordinated' domestic opposition necessary for internalisation of human rights norms. This paper also explores how coordinated domestic demands for accountability may be contingent on economic grievances not moral persuasions. The findings suggest that human rights diffusion models, in PCW contexts, may be inadequate explainers of state behaviour. It proposes increased investigation into these unique contexts to arrive at a more revised explanatory framework.

Introduction

Ensuring compliance with internationally recognised human rights obligations is a thorny issue. International non-governmental organisations (INGOS) may—on account of the paucity of legal enforcement mechanisms—find it hard to keep repressive actors genuinely aligned with their human rights obligations. The 'spiral model' of international human rights norms (Risse and Sikkink, 2017) is often lauded as a seminal constructivist-driven explanation to this puzzle.

This paper adds nuance to the theory in order to address a previously unanswered question: what effect do civil wars have on the socialisation of human rights norms? Utilising Sri Lanka as the central case study, it will show that civil war victory often allows states to frame and condition 'official' collective memories of the war and its events, which helps sanction rhetoric of human rights deniability and is suggestive of a lack of actual norm internalization. Additionally, it allows for legislative repression of a "strong and coordinated domestic opposition" (Murdie and Davis, 2011, p.3) and aids in delegitimizing transnational 'moral consciousness raising' (Risse and Sikkink, 2017). Finally, it will be posited that unified 'demand' for human rights accountability—in ethnically diverse states—may be conditional upon wider economic grievances.

Motivation for study

Two dichotomous sentiments compete for relevance in a Post Civil War (PCW) atmosphere. In the first instance, the victors are eager to impress a sense of legitimacy upon the international community. This would explain why, after the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa issued a joint statement with United Nations secretary Ban Ki-Moon on "accountability for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law" (Conte, 2012, p.2). It also helps demystify the 'official' framing of the wars final offensive by the Sinhala-dominated Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL)—after the breakdown of peace negotiations—as a "humanitarian operation" in which the army adhered to a "Zero Civilian Casualty" policy (Ministry of Defence: Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 2011, p.3). Opposingly, in a post-civil war situation, where future intentions of the adversary are unknown (Walter, 1997), anxiety over security prevails and may necessitate further repression. This helps illustrate why NGOs have often been portrayed by the GoSL and Sinhala nationalists as 'imperial agents' undermining state sovereignty (Barrett, Indi Ruwangi and Simpson, 2017) and why civil society and transnational groups, who questioned the governments 'humanitarian' narrative, were labelled as 'terrorists' themselves (Bala, 2015). Such an atmosphere no doubt

informed the cultivation of a new 'Non-Governmental Organisations (Registration and Supervision) Act' which, if passed, would "severely curtail civil society" (Human Rights Watch, 2024). It would allow GoSL to regulate and interfere with all non-governmental activity (Chamara, 2024). Such is particularly potent, not only because a vibrant, coordinated, and independent civil society is indispensable for checking government repression and fostering democracy (Diamond, 1994), but also because it is a necessary tool for consolidating human rights pressure "from below" (Risse and Sikkink, 2017, p.136). These dichotomous persuasions in PCW politics—outward legitimacy and inward repression—appear to vindicate a reappraisal of the parameters of the 'spiral model'.

Problems with existing knowledge and Theoretical Justifications

Inherent in the development of human rights socialisation theory is the "empirical failure of approaches emphasising material structures as the primary determinants of state identities, interests and preferences" (Risse and Sikkink, 2017, p.121). These constructivist-led explanations coalesce around the 'moral force' of rules (Janicka, 2013) and focus on how states are persuaded—by transnational and domestic advocacy networks—to adjust their value-structures (Risse and Sikkink, 2017). It locates—in the "centrality of principled ideas or values" (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p.89)—the crucial explanatory mechanism driving states to alter their behaviours, and speaks particularly to the 'pressuring' or 'leveraging' of target states through publicly shaming their non-conformism (Janika, 2013). Empirical studies have uncovered tangible, albeit contradictory, attestations of the success these networks enjoy. It has been demonstrated that 'outing' perpetrators for their abuses corresponds with an improvement in political rights (Hafner-Burton, 2008). Nonetheless, this improvement often holds fast company with an increase in certain types of violations (Hafner-Burton, 2008). Further studies have shown that internationalised human rights conventions improve some states' human rights practices, yet other governments often ratify human rights treaties 'as a matter of window dressing' (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005). It is also posited, in

harmony with the spiral model, that the success of shaming by INGOs is conditional upon a strong domestic NGO presence (Murdie and Davis, 2011). Some studies, however, find more clearly delineated positive effects of human rights persuasion by INGOs, showing statistical proof that putting perpetrators in the spotlight reduces the severity of extreme atrocities (Krain, 2012). What existing scholarship fails to account for, however, is the uniqueness of PCW regimes. I qualify this 'unique' label on account of the more pronounced ability for PWC regime leaders to manipulate the collective memory of recent conflict. This permits a deliberate and politicised obfuscation of the binary between wartime consequence and genuine human rights abuse, delegitimising the 'moral conscious raising' of transnational advocacy networks.

Sri Lanka and the Spectrum of PCW Human Rights Deniability

With an estimated death toll of 70,000 (Matthews, 2009), the Sri Lankan civil war certainly does not marry amicably with the humanitarian principle of "responsibility to protect" or R2P (Kurtz and Jaganathan, 2015). A UN panel of Experts found both sides guilty of egregious human rights abuses in the latter stages of the war, including indiscriminate shelling by the GoSL and civilian entrapment by the LTTE (Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 2011). Despite this, some commentators have eulogised the 'Rajapaksa model' of counterinsurgency (Kurtz and Janganathan, 2015) and it has inspired scholarly publications proposing 'all out war' as a means of ensuring peace (Diaz and Murshed, 2013). The cause of this apparent ambivalence lies in the uniqueness of PCW politics and the apt space for collective memory manipulation which it offers. Indeed, in post-Dayton Bosnia for example, only 4% of ethnic Serbs believed that trials in the International Criminal Court were fairly conducted (Kostic, 2012). This dismissive sentiment no doubt influenced the annulment—by the government of Republika Srpska—of a 2004 report recognising the Srebrenica massacre as genocide (Subasic, 2021). As such, it is clear that the collective memory of civil war for this autonomous statelet in Bosnia & Herzegovina involves state-led denial—even 'celebration'—of flagrant human rights abuse (Simic, 2024). Indeed, in post-civil war Lebanon—

another war which ended in negotiated settlement—a collective memory of amnesty and silence on human rights abuse was institutionalised (Abou Assi, 2011,) which transformed former warlords into government officials, maintaining a status quo of absolution (Saadeh, 2021). In all of these instances, the states have been 'shamed' by INGOs and other states but to seemingly no avail, a rather sobering rebuff to the power of the 'moral consciousness-raising' and socialisation theory.

The Sri Lankan case follows a similar narrative. Emerging as victors in the civil war granted the GoSL a uniquely unchallenged mandate to manipulate war-time collective memory into a comfortable binary of victims against perpetrators (Schubert, 2013). They shrewdly utilised international 'war on terror' and 'securitisation' discourses to label the LTTE as nothing more than 'terrorists' (Fernando, 2014). Former president Maithripala Sirisena claimed he would not allow any member of the armed forces who "fought to eradicate LTTE terrorism from our country" to be taken before an international tribunal (Seoighe, 2016, p.368) and his predecessor Mahinda Rajapaksa further claimed that "no school of war could face up to the savage military strategies of the terrorists of the LTTE" (Schubert, 2013, p.9). It monopolised the history of the conflict and ignored Tamil desires for self-determination, branding them instead as hostages to 'ruthless terrorists' (Schubert, 2013), valiantly liberated by the 'heroes' in the army (Ministry of Defence: Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 2011). Doing so helped create a rhetorical nexus between those who cast doubt on this narrative and the terrorists these 'heroes' defeated (Bala, 2015). It further helps explain why, despite issuing a joint statement on accountability, Rajapaksa decried the UN's "unwarranted and unnecessary interference with a sovereign nation" (Cronin-Furman, 2020, p.136) and why he dismissed the possibility of "an imported solution" (Schubert, 2013, p.17) to post-conflict reconciliation. In other words, an imported solution was a solution created by international 'Tiger sympathisers' (Amarasuriya, 2015), thus the only amicable solution for the Sri Lankan population—following governmental framing—was a domestic one.

Further evidence of resistance came in 2020, when Sri Lanka withdrew from its commitments to the UNHRC resolution 30/1 promoting accountability for human rights violations (Subedi, 2022). A year later foreign minister Dinesh Gunawardenna claimed that Human Rights Council resolutions were part of an "unprecedented propaganda campaign" against Sri Lanka (Al Jazeera, 2021). If the precepts of the 'spiral model' were indeed to hold, it follows that Sri Lanka—in response to this coordinated 'shaming'—would be persuaded to adjust value structures and incorporate moves toward accountability. But it appears little in the way of genuine norm socialisation has taken place. Such is pertinently exemplified by the fact that sentiments in a 2014 UNHRC resolution "promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka" (United Nations Human Rights Council 2014,), are mirrored almost identically in a report ten years later to advance "reconciliation, accountability and human rights" (United Nations Human Rights Council 2024). No progress has been made on this beyond the government's domestic investigation, 'The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission' (LLRC) (Government of Sri Lanka 2011). This did not allow for any "thorough and independent investigation of alleged violations of international humanitarian and human rights law" (International Crisis Group, 2011) and concluded that it "does not attach blame to any Sri Lankan Army member" (Government of Sri Lanka, 2011). Clearly therefore, in an atmosphere rife with 'ethnic outbidding' (DeVotta 2002)—where embracing such accountability measures would be labelled as 'pandering to the enemy'—domestic political security took precedence over genuine inculcation of human rights norms.

Counter-tendencies, 'Loser' Agency, and the 'Demand' Side of Memory Construction

Despite civil war victory empowering a monopolization of 'official' conflict memories, the voice of the 'losers' has not been silenced unequivocally. Diaspora groups consistently articulate the grievances of the Tamil community to international bodies and often 'perform' acts in order to sustain international critique toward the GoSL (Thurairajah, 2022). This has succeeded in preserving and consolidating a counter

narrative which INOGs like Amnesty and Human Rights Watch broadcast consistently.[1] Despite this however, GoSL continues to evade such critique and uses legislation to control the narrative of the war and repress civil society. Indeed, the draconian 'Prevention of Terrorism Act' (PTA) indiscriminately arrested 212 people in 2020 including ten Tamils at a memorial event for "commemorating the LTTE" and a Tamil doctor who served as a medical witness in human rights cases (Castle, 2022, p.11). Furthermore, any organized protests calling for human rights accountability which are permitted must align with the 'official' collective memory of the war. For example, a Tamil-dominated civil society group seeking justice for missing relatives was prevented from travelling to Colombo by the police; a counter protest for Sinhala missing persons on the same day was allowed to proceed (Seoighe, 2016). The 'spiral model' contends that, despite instrumental adaptation at first, processes of calling-out by "the international human rights community" will—after initial repression—result in persuasion to genuinely internalize human rights norms (Risse and Sikkink, 2017, p, 128). Sri Lanka subjects this pattern to rather acute scrutiny. Clearly the impact of "strong and coordinated domestic opposition" (Murdie and Davis, 2011, p.3) and the actions of transnational advocacy networks had little effect on norm socialization within the GoSL. Nearly twenty years after the cessation of violence, the UNHCR still speaks of "long overdue reforms to advance human rights" (United Nations Human Rights Council 2024). Succinctly put, if tangible socialisation on human rights norms had occurred, coordinated efforts to work with the recommendations of international human rights bodies would have—by this stage—been forthcoming.[2]

[1]See for Example: Human Rights Watch 'Sri Lanka: Crisis of Rights and Accountability' (2023) or 'Open Hands and Mounting Dangers: Blocking Accountability for Grave Abuses in Sri Lanka (2021)

[2] The author recognises that the recent election of Anura Dissanayake—and the victory of the centre-left National People's Power coalition (NPP)—constitutes a major realignment in Sri Lankan politics. As such, it may indeed offer up the potential for a clean break from the quasi-dynastic rule of the Rajapaksa family and their associates who have ruled consistently since the war was ended and a more conciliatory stance accepting war time abuse. However the recent nature does not provide with apt analytical evidence to fully engage with for the purposes of this piece.

This rather sober prognosis notwithstanding, recent events suggest a shift in the 'demand' side for nationalist narrative constructions among the majority Sinhala population. Such populist-nationalist constructions of a 'Sinhala community' and a 'Tamil threat' were used to buttress political support amongst the Sinhala population (Subedi, 2022). Similar narrative framing was used to diagnose an 'evil' Muslim 'other' by the Budo Bela Sena (BBS) and other Buddhist Nationalist groups, the height of which being the Anti-Muslim Riots of 2019 (Gamage,2021). But recent anti-government protests in 2022—known collectively as Aragalaya—assumed a more ethnically unified design. Of particular note is the distinct failure of Sinhala nationalism to co-opt the direction of frustration toward Muslims and Tamils. Attempts by former ministers and politicians to incite such a shift were rejected by many Sinhala Buddhists on social media (Hasangani, 2024). Protestors united in their demand for accountability on "the prolonged economic crisis, corruption and human rights violations" (Amnesty International, 2024). As the previous example on 'disappeared' protest movements alluded to, however, this united reception did not exist before the onset of economic recession. Prior to this human rights accountability fell firmly along ethnic lines. Such is suggestive of accepting, if not enthusiastic, 'demand' for 'official' government narratives amongst the Sinhala population. It speaks, therefore, to the notion that unified demands for human rights accountability may often be conditional upon wider material grievances.

Conclusion

This paper sought to appraise the applicability of human rights 'socialization' theory to post civil war political regimes. It has demonstrated—using Sri Lanka as a case study—that civil war victory uniquely positions victor states to cultivate an 'official' narrative of the war which legitimizes denial of human rights violations. This allows victor states to further control the 'official' narrative and repress domestic pressures for accountability by the 'losers'—through government-sponsored legislation—and to delegitimize attempts at 'moral consciousness raising' as undue interference by foreign powers. This demonstrates a clear lack of norm internalization and no

evidence that socialization has infiltrated domestic practice. Finally, brief consideration was granted to the idea of conditionality of human rights and economic concerns, illustrating how united demands for human rights accountability were ultimately contingent on wider economically-conditioned grievances. Ultimately, this paper speaks to the notion that models of human rights diffusion, utilized in isolation, may not always provide adequate explanations for state behavior. By interrogating the precepts of the 'spiral model' against a recent case of human rights crisis, it has been shown how easily international pressures for human rights cooperation and retrospective abuse recognition can be delegitimised and undermined by states. Considering how the operational logic of the 'spiral model' depends on diffusion of international moral pressures, the relative ease with which GoSL have been able to depict this as 'unwarranted interference' proves this model does indeed have explanatory limitations which must be further investigated and scrutinised.

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May 1968: The Anticlimactic Revolution

Shane Burke

Abstract

This paper examines the rapid mobilisation and subsequent decline of the May 1968 movement in France through the lens of two competing social movement theories: Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) and Political Process Theory (PPT). The movement's initial success was driven by the state's repressive response, which expanded political opportunities and fostered solidarity among students, workers, and unions. While RMT explains the rational aggregation of resources and initial mobilisation, it struggles to account for why workers continued striking despite material concessions. Instead, PPT provides a stronger framework by highlighting the perceived political instability that enabled continued mobilisation. However, the movement's lack of internal organisation, as analysed using Tarrow's framework, ultimately led to its rapid collapse once the state recalibrated its strategy. This case study suggests that RMT is more applicable in politically stable contexts, whereas PPT better explains mobilisation during generalised political instability.

The purpose of this paper is to adjudicate between two competing theories of movement mobilisation, using May 1968 as a case study. The paper analyses this movement with reference to (1) its rapid mobilisation, (2) its lack of organisation, and (3) the response of the state, which acted as a fulcrum around which the movement both rose and fell. The paper begins with an account of the background to May 1968. The paper continues by outlining contrasting theories about how movements mobilise and will

show how Political Process Theory (PPT) and, to a lesser extent (until after May 30th, to be discussed later) Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) are supported by the mobilisation of social movement actors in May 1968. The paper then discusses the movement's rapid decline as a function of its lack of organisation, using Tarrow's (2011, pp. 123-124) three factors of movement organisation as an analytical framework. The essay outlines how the response from the state initially created political opportunities which enabled the rapid mobilisation of resources and created some sense of solidarity among movement actors. However, once the state had the opportunity to re-evaluate its strategy, particularly after receiving a relative vote of confidence from a countermovement (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996; Reader and Wadia, 1993), it could effectively dismantle the social movement by exploiting the cracks in its organisational structure.

Background to May 1968

May 1968 was a social movement that took place in France, in May 1968. The movement followed years of discontent among students and workers in France (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 5). The student population increased by 224% between 1958 and 1968, but resources did not increase adequately (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 5). In 1966, at the University of Strasbourg, a radical group of students took over the students' union, but this takeover was overturned in court (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p.6). On the side of the workers, housing problems were rampant, and strikes, such as the January 1968 strike at the SAVIEM factory in Caen, increased in frequency and intensity (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 7). The decisive moment for the movement occurred in March 1968, when the Minister for Youth and Sport visited the University of Nanterre to mark the opening of a swimming pool. He was accosted by a student, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, for making no mention of sexual problems in his recently published book on the French youth (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 8). Student protests and grievances were not exclusively related to the university system. The Vietnam War also acted as a point of contention for students in 1968 (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 8). Cohn-Bendit and a group of other students, including Trotskyists of the Jeunesse Communiste

Revolutionnaire (JCR), occupied the administrative block of Nanterre University, aiming to transform the 22nd of March into a "day of anti-imperialist debate and struggle" (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 8). This series of events seems random and disconnected, but when a committee was established to discipline the student protestors on the 6th of May, a collection of initially small-scale student protests began in support of the students who had occupied the Nanterre campus in March. When the police acted violently to repress the first of the protests on the 7th of May, using tear gas and baton charges, the students fought back with stones and constructed the first barricade of May 1968 (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 10). The brutal police response acted as an impetus for further protest action. Between the 6th and 14th of May 1968, these small-scale protests transformed into a large-scale political movement. The national students' unions (both secondary and university), the largest national trade unions (CGT and CFDT), individual factory workers (Renault and Sud-Aviation), as well as left-wing politicians (Mitterrand, Mendès-France, etc.), became involved through strike action and solidarity marches (Reader and Wadia, 1993). May 1968 quickly mobilised resources and movement repertoires (building barricades, occupying university buildings, striking) (Mann, 2011, pp.207). At the height of the movement, millions of France's workers were on strike, the government had ceased to work effectively, and De Gaulle, the president, had left the country (Reader and Wadia, 1993). The movement actors broadly disliked one another, with the unions generally disliking the students and the students generally disliking the politicians (Mann, 2011, pp. 210-211). A large group of Gaullists marched in Paris in an unexpected countermovement, and De Gaulle returned to France on the 30th of May, vowing to regain control of France. Most unions accepted the concessions of the Grenelle agreement, a pay and work conditions agreement between trade unions and the government, and workers began to return to work (Seidman, 1993, p. 266). The movement ended within a few weeks of its beginning.

Can We Say that the Movement Failed?

The argument of this paper relies on a conception of May 1968 as a failed

movement. Were it not a failed movement, then it would make little sense to analyse the breakdown of the movement and the role that the state played in this breakdown. Before May 1968 can be judged to be a failure, its goals must first be presented. The goals of May 1968 could be construed as the "smashing [of] capitalist society" (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 46), in which case, the movement unequivocally failed. The goals could be construed as the attempt to repair an "ossified university" to end the "university crisis," in which case, its success or failure is up for debate (Fomerand, 1977). Some (Domenach, 1968 as cited in Reader and Wadia, 1993) argue that the "sense" of May 1968 was aimed at a new form of civilisation, not at a new form of political organisation, and as a result, the maintenance of the old political and economic structures after May 1968 does not necessarily reflect the latter's failure. The manifold interpretations of May 1968's goals and causes would make this paper unwritable, thus, the paper will tentatively take it that while May 1968 began as a student strike against an ossified university, it expanded to a larger strike with overt political aims, most of which (excluding some trade union victories) were not realised.

Resource Mobilisation Theory as the First Explanation of May 1968's Mobilisation

Several theories attempt to explain how such rapid mobilisation of movement actors occurs. Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) begins from the idea that individuals will not incur the costs of working towards a collective goal in isolation; they will only engage in collective behaviour which incurs personal costs if the collective behaviour (1) rationally aggregates resources, (2) is somewhat organised, (3) can involve actors from outside of the collective behaviour, (4) competes for the limited supply of social movement resources, and (5) is sensitive to costs and rewards for individual and organisational involvement (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973). This theory partly helps to explain the rapid mobilisation of social movement actors in May 1968. It seems as if criteria 1-3 were fulfilled by May 1968 as a movement, but it is not clear if criteria 4-5 were. It appears as if resources were rationally aggregated,

for workers made use of their power of striking and students made use of tactics gained from previous protests, bringing these together to effectively bring the state to its knees. Furthermore, the movement was somewhat organised, particularly the trade unions who were able to act collectively and rapidly. The movement was also exceptionally effective at including actors from outside of itself, involving politicians, other student groups, and workers when it initially was composed of a few hundred university students. However, with regard to criteria 4-5, if the collective behaviour of workers was sensitive to costs and rewards for individual workers, and considered the limited supply of resources that the movement had (both individual resources, such as subsistence wages, and collective resources such as group solidarity), then why did the workers (initially) broadly reject the Grenelle protocol when it granted them increased wages, decreased hours and greater union rights? The RMT theorists would predict that the workers would accept this proposal, knowing that continued strike action would impose higher costs upon workers and would possibly reduce the future supply of resources from the state. However, this did not happen.

To account for why this did not happen, the paper contends that RMT is better suited to account for social movements that exist in fields of power wherein there is no generalised political instability. That is, fields of power wherein social movements are "weak challengers" — such as NGO challengers in the migrant field of power in Ireland, as described by Landy (2014) — and must compete with other weak challengers for resources, particularly those provided by the state. RMT is best able to account for the mobilisation of resources of normalised (Piven and Cloward, 1991) or institutionalised social movements. This paper contends that May 1968 was a moment of generalised political instability. Therefore, a different theory is required to account for why May 1968 mobilised social movement actors so quickly.

Political Process Theory as the Second Explanation for May 1968's Mobilisation

One such theory is the Political Process Theory (PPT), which stresses the

importance of political opportunities for social movement mobilisation. McAdam (1999, p. 42), a PPT theorist, argues that expanded political opportunities can augment the possible political actions of challengers in a field by either (1) undermining the stability of the entire political system or (2) increasing the political leverage of a single insurgent group. The increased political opportunity for students to undermine the entire political system was a product of the harsh repression of students by the French police: it provided them with greater legitimacy to act. This repression, in turn, severely weakened the state's legitimacy and provided greater popular support for the students (Joffrin, 1988 as cited in Reader and Wadia, 1993), in a positive-feedback loop for the movement. The trade unions only got involved when they witnessed the violence against the students by the police (Zancarini-Fournel, 2016, as cited in Davis, 2018). Thus, to reformulate McAdam's two claims, in May 1968, the stability of the entire political system was undermined, but it was undermined because of the increased political leverage of a single insurgent group: students. This broadly fits the political opportunities theory above, as well as Tarrow's (2011, p. 33) argument that "contentious politics is produced when threats are experienced and opportunities are perceived, when the existence of available allies is demonstrated, and when the vulnerability of opponents is exposed". It is not enough to consider RMT alone. The political opportunities played a vital role in the rapid mobilisation of students and workers in May 1968, and the subjective perception of opportunities, that is, the perception that the state was at the point of breakdown (Kurzman, 1996, p. 154), allowed the usually rational evaluation of costs and rewards in a field of power in which there is generalised political stability to be discarded. The generalised political instability of May 1968 allowed social movement actors and organisations to ignore questions of the supply of resources, as the actors saw the state as so weak to the point that their demands superseded the state's ability to supply resources (Seidman, 1993, p. 265).

McAdam (1999) argues that Political Process Theory (PPT), in contrast to traditional theories such as RMT, is based on the notion that political

opportunities can develop incrementally and do not need to be the result of dramatic changes (social, economic, political) in the period preceding the expanded political opportunities. In the case of May 1968, there were indeed social changes in the period preceding May 1968, such as the fact that 1967 was worse economically for France than any other year in that decade (Reader and Wadia, 1993, pp. 39-40), with four times more workers claiming unemployment benefit in February 1968 than in 1964. Furthermore, there was massive social change in universities, with the number of students in French universities quadrupling in the fifteen years before 1968 (Reader and Wadia, 1993). Whether these changes are incremental or dramatic is up for debate. In either case, expanded political opportunities were created in 1968. Similarly, whether or not there were "structural" opportunities as opposed to subjectively perceived opportunities is irrelevant. For instance, in the Iranian revolution of 1979 (Kurzman, 1996), the protestors' perception of political opportunities clashed with the state's structures and ultimately forced the latter to give way, so that structural breakdown may have actually been the outcome of mobilisation (due to perceived breakdown), rather than the other way around. Thus, either way, opportunities were created and produced in a positive feedback loop following the state's response to the student protestors.

Up to this point, the state's repressive response to the student protesters created political opportunities for both students and workers to engage in contentious politics. However, even though millions of France's workers were on strike, the government had ceased to work effectively, and De Gaulle had left the country (Reader and Wadia, 1993), the movement still managed to dissipate as quickly as it formed by the end of May and early June 1968. This essay argues in the following section that it was the movement's lack of internal organisation that ultimately led to the movement's failure, and that this lack of organisation was exploited by the state in order to regain order.

Lack of Movement Organisation as Cause of the Movement's Failure

Tarrow (2011, pp. 123-124) argues that movement organisation has three general features or meanings: (1) the organisation of collective action at the point of contact with opponents, (2) an advocacy organisation (making public interest claims or representing an interest group), and (3) connective structures or interpersonal networks that link leaders, followers, etc., together. It is clear from what has already been discussed that the first feature was present in the May 1968 social movement; social movement actors mobilised quickly and organised against the police repression, exemplified by the unions holding a solidarity strike with the students against the police. It is less clear, however, that features (2) and (3) were present in the May 1968 movement, and the movement can then be characterised as organisationally defective.

However, it is not well established that a formal, hierarchical organisational structure is necessarily better for social movement success. Piven and Cloward (1979) argue that formal organisational structures are inherently conservative insofar as their formalism and accountability structures enable collaboration with the political establishment, or indeed co-optation by the political establishment (Molnárfi, 2023). Others, such as McAdam (1999), argue that formal organisation accounted for the success of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, and that without a clear structure and centralised direction, the movement's effects became localised and ineffective. However, May 1968 was characterised by a coalition of organisations, some of which were formally organised (CGT, CFDT, etc.) whilst others were strictly against the notion of formal organisation, such as the anarchist student groups and their figurehead Cohn-Bendit (Reader and Wadia, 1993). Thus, while it exhibited some level of organisation, that is, it could organise collective action, it did not contain many connective structures (3) above)) between movement actors and coalition partners. In fact, the CGT (closely connected to the Communist Party – PCF) tended to dislike and disagree with the student movement, seeing it as the "sons of bourgeois" trying to "bring revolutionary theory to the

working class" (Mann, 2011, pp. 210-211). Similarly, the social movement did not advocate for a single interest group (feature (2) above); it was a coalition of groups with varying desires and goals. As a result, when the Gaullists marched in Paris in an unexpected countermovement, and De Gaulle returned to France on the 30th of May, vowing to regain control of France, most unions representing workers perceived that their political opportunity had shrunk and accepted the concessions of the Grenelle agreement: workers began to return to work (Seidman, 1993, p. 266). The considerations of the supply of resources, costs, and rewards, as in RMT above, began to be seriously reconsidered as the political opportunities for radical victories shrank. The unstable coalition began to fall apart once there was a change in the political environment (Meyer, 2004). It was the response of the state that precipitated the movement's dissolution, but the structural reason behind its dissolution was the movement's lack of internal organisation. It was too fragile a coalition between ideologically, organisationally, and demographically different groups, and the state recognised this, used this to its advantage, and effectively regained control over France.

Conclusion

To conclude, it is difficult to determine whether the movement failed or succeeded due to the wildly differing interpretations of the movement's goals. Whilst workers and trade unions benefited somewhat, for instance, the Grenelle agreement, the aspiration of "a government for the people" (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 14) failed to materialise, with De Gaulle gaining even more power in the next general election. The state played a pivotal role in both the rapid mobilisation of students and workers who perceived increased political opportunities in the light of the state's repression, as well as in the equally rapid dissolution of the movement due to its lack of internal organisation. That is, the state acted as the fulcrum point around which the movement both rose and fell. However, the movement may not have fallen were it not for the poor organisation of the movement actors. The case of May 1968 has shown that RMT is successful at accounting for the mobilisation of movement actors when

there is no generalised political instability. In this situation, movements are focused on costs and benefits and aim to maximise the use of their limited resources. PPT is a useful theory for analysing movements that take place within generalised political instability, where the perception of opportunities becomes more important than the consideration of costs and benefits. The combining of these two theories was necessitated by the case study of May 1968, and the discovery of the place of generalised political instability in mediating between them was made.

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A Touch of Class: Challenging the Classless Identity of Ireland

Aengus Gilligan

Abstract

The idea of Ireland as a classless society permeates a significant part of the discourse surrounding the development and running of the state. This paper seeks to understand this narrative of classlessness, and why and how it originates before challenging its merits. The notion of a classless society stems in part from the lack of industrialisation that occurred in Ireland, a process that made up an integral part of class formation in Europe. This made room for a unitary, classless identity to be pursued both in group formation and electoral politics, allowing the notion of classlessness to take hold. Such a narrative serves to mask the genuine class cleavages that exist. In order to see these cleavages within Ireland, this paper argues that the cultural capital framework offered by Pierre Bourdieu provides the best lens for the structures of class reproduction, using the education system as its example. In this manner, the paper posits a break from the Marxian dichotomous model of class reproduction, which applies to the industrialised continent from which Ireland escapes, allowing the classless narrative to take hold.

Introduction

In 20th century Ireland, the subject of class was, "as sex was, a subject best avoided in polite company" (Walsh, 1998). The common conception existed that the issues of stratification that permeated discourse in Europe could not apply to an Irish state, a state heavily rooted in agriculture. This is reflected in the notion of Ireland being a "two-and-a-half" party state

in which politics was centred around civil war disputes instead of class cleavages, as was the case on the continent (Kavanagh, 2015). However, the absence of class-based analyses in political and social discourses ignores the very tangible class divisions that have existed historically and currently exist in Ireland. This paper will argue that Ireland is not a classless society, by first examining how the narrative of classlessness has developed, before showing how social stratification and social class in the Bourdieusian sense is present in contemporary Ireland, particularly how it is legitimised and reproduced by the education system. As it is difficult — particularly in analysing its development — to treat coherently the two very different states present on the island (Tovey and Share, 2000, p. 79) in one paper, my analysis will focus mainly on the twenty-six county republic.

Social Class in Ireland

The idea that Ireland is and historically has been a classless society stems from both external reflections on an absence of hardened cleavages due to a lack of industrialisation, and also internal dynamics pursuing a unitary identity. These narratives are based on a false understanding of the mechanisms through which class both exists and operates in Ireland.

I will first discuss the external narrative of Ireland as a classless society. The notion of social class has existed for as long as there have been material interests. Contemporary understandings and interpretations of social class were originally borne out of an analysis of the Industrial Revolution. In the Marxist sense, certain characteristics of social class are "confined to modern industrial society" through a dichotomous division between wage-owners and capitalists (Dos Santos, 1970). This is reflected as a feature of modernisation theory, a theory that centres around a linear progression of society that includes a process of industrialisation with Western capitalism as its endpoint (Cousins, 1997). The notion of Ireland as a "classless society," then, originates from Marxist conceptions of class and the absence of industrial development in the country to which the Marxist development of class sees its characteristics. The initial Ireland, since the period of state foundation, was not centred around the capitalist

means of production. Instead, it was characterised by an almost entirely agricultural environment, with local dependence on neighbours as a requirement to survive. James Connolly saw classes in Ireland as "homogeneous economic units," following the more conventional conception, but he also envisioned a small farmers and workers alliance (Hazelkorn, 1998, p. 147). This breaks with the dichotomous European model that would have opposed these two groups based on property ownership. Unlike in regions where class analysis was conducted, in Ireland, the peasant farmers had a special affiliation with land and property. The case of Ireland did not employ the "unidirectional, progressive and gradual" that modernisation theory indicates (Cousins, 1997, p. 225). Ireland, in its development, did not exist within the confines of 'individualism' nor did it ascribe to the process of breaking existing social ties while shifting towards markets and bureaucracy that modernisation theory espouses (Goorha, 2010). Arrensberg and Kimball saw an early Ireland emboldened by strong collective ties with a dependence on others within this small community as a requirement to survive (Gibbon, 1973). Therefore, as Cronin (2007, p. 34) points out, the Irish context proves problematic, "if class is delineated in the Marxist sense by an individual's relationship to the means of production". In other words, Ireland is not confined to conventional understandings of class analysis and development within the Marxist sense, allowing the notion of classlessness to perpetuate.

However, it is not solely the nature of the means of production in Ireland that assists this classlessness narrative. The internal dynamics of the state, particularly with regard to the structuring of the economy and electoral politics, amounted to a deliberate effort to form a unitary identity where class cleavages were hidden or ignored. In the 1970s, the nature of work in Ireland began to shift fundamentally to a service-based economy. Absolute social mobility increased due to the decline of manual and farming occupations alongside Foreign Direct Investment and the Celtic Tiger, which substantially boosted the number of people working in managerial and professional occupations (Whelan and Layte, 2007). Despite this shift in the nature of work, the narrative of classlessness in Ireland persisted.

Throughout this period, intellectual life was dominated by "deep-seated consensualism that had roots in Catholic corporatist values" (Lynch, 2017, p. 16). There was little challenge to the practices of the state on the basis of class. While the nature of work was fundamentally changing, the idea of a unitary, classless identity in Ireland was very much kept alive. This was especially clear in the group interests that existed. Institutions that were deeply intertwined with the fabric of the state sought to keep the status quo, and the formation of class consciousness as an idea was suppressed. For example, the farmers' union, an entity capable of drawing up class consciousness by identifying material grievances and class antagonisms, sought to blur the lines between labourer and landowner (Cronin, 2007). This narrative was successfully planted in the minds of the farm labourers who spoke of seeing themselves and the farmers on an "equal footing" despite differences in material resources and workload (Cronin, 2007).

Furthermore, within the political landscape, such classlessness also dominated the narrative electorally. The "catch-all nature" of Fianna Fáil, who traditionally performed quite well in predominantly working-class areas, effectively "acted as a dampener on the development of a significant class basis" in Ireland (Kavanagh, 2015, p. 78). In addition to this, the Labour Party, whose foundation by Connolly aimed toward a working-class revolution, developed to view socialism as a form of "social unity," not "class solidarity": even in Irish left political thought, a narrative of class was replaced by a unitary identity (Hazelkorn, 1998). This has led to the narrative that class politics is absent in Ireland as "no party... has sought sufficiently hard to persuade such an alignment [of class solidarity]" (Mair, 1992). The 2020 election, however, led to an energisation of class politics. First, it represented a clean break from the 'two-and-a-half' party system of civil war politics that has governed the state since its inception, with Sinn Féin emerging as the largest political party. Second, the most salient issue of the campaign was housing, a predominantly class-based issue. There were clear ideological differences in the proposed solutions to the housing crisis by the main political parties. For example, Sinn Fein's approach on the narrative of class contributed to record popularity in work-

ing-class areas, serving as a marked difference to the 'catch-all' nature of politics that had existed in these areas previously (Webber, 2021).

However, despite an increasing awareness of class cleavages in the context of the 2020 general election, the narrative of classlessness still occupies swathes of contemporary Ireland, particularly in the media. The term 'middle-Ireland' hides the extent of material and social inequality through a process of 'overstating' the migration into the bourgeoisie that takes place and the shared cultural habitus of the population at large (Free, 2024). The notion of 'middle-Ireland' is therefore perpetuated by the media, such as with the elision of the class divisions that exist within the Irish rugby team, or the framing by political commentators of the Irish economy during the Celtic Tiger as a "middle-class nation" or a "contented majority" (Allen, 2007). This unitary framing masks the "absolute increase in levels of economic vulnerability" across the wider class spectrum during the Celtic Tiger (Whelan et al., 2017) and serves to hide the very real class cleavages that exist. I will demonstrate the existence of these persistent class divisions using the context of education.

Social Stratification Through Education

The formation of a unitary identity that served to obscure class cleavages in Ireland and the lack of industrialisation to clearly define these social classes requires the examination of other ways in which class exists and is perpetuated. Bourdieu critiques the Marxist interpretation of class as being based exclusively on economic goods and the struggle that comes with it while ignoring or neglecting other forms of dispute (Joas and Knöbl, 2009). Bourdieu, therefore, proposes the framework of cultural capital, which can be seen as the value assigned to tastes, skills, awards, and patterns of consumption (Webb et al., 2002, p. x), providing us with a better insight into the class structures of Ireland.

Cultural capital, therefore, significantly contributes to social stratification, with education in Ireland acting as a significant vessel through which this is performed. The Irish educational system is often billed as a meri-

tocracy, with former Taoiseach Leo Varadkar referring to it as the "great leveller" (Oireachtas, 2018). However, the system itself is "managed and controlled by those who are already the successful beneficiaries of that system" (Lynch, 2022, p. 2). While it is not necessarily the economic elite who see their status derived from possessing the most economic capital, the cultural elite (although with which there is heavy intertwinement), perpetuate a system which ensures that their kin may be successful and their class position can be maintained (Mijs, 2016). When changes to the system are proposed, these cultural elites mobilise to hinder changes to the current levels of educational class reproduction. For example, by lobbying against plans to scrap legacy admissions (Lynch, 2022).

The ways in which the education system perpetuates intense social stratification can be analysed through Bourdieu's framework. First, the system of academic qualifications inherently creates class divisions. Education for Bourdieu (and Passerson, 1977, p.153) finds its purpose in "concealing social selection under the guise of technical selection." legitimising the reproduction "of the social hierarchies by transmuting them into academic hierarchies". Those who do not succeed in the supposed meritocratic system are encompassed by a moral failing and a feeling of worthlessness, attributing their failure to individual fault rather than more structural factors. As Bourdieu states, "in matters of culture absolute dispossession excludes awareness of being dispossessed" (Bourdieu and Passerson, 1977, p. 210). In Ireland, this meritocratic notion of education is often held up in the media with constant referrals to the leaving cert as having a "relatively level playing field" when compared elsewhere while highlighting the "integrity of the system" (Barra, 2019). If there is equality of opportunity within education in Ireland, as the classless narrative proposes, the fluctuation in earning outcomes can be legitimised. However, such equality of opportunity is an illusion, for, as shown by Courtois (2013), the elites of society are overwhelmingly from fee-paying school backgrounds. In this regard, the perception of a unitary, classless Ireland with substantial equality of opportunity can be maintained, while education really serves to stratify the population at large.

It is not only through academic grades and institutionalised social capital that class inequalities are reproduced. The further cultural divide and habitus that exists within the various tiers of schooling in Ireland serve to alienate students further. A clear variety of habitus, or systems of durable preferences or dispositions (Bourdieu, 2002, p. 27) that form embodied cultural capital, can be seen across all levels of the Irish education system. These dispositions range from the types of uniforms being worn, to the specific accents of students and the sports being played. For example, of the Irish national rugby team at the World Cup in 2023, 56% attended a fee-paying school despite fee-paying secondary schools representing 1% of the North and 7% of the South of Ireland, respectively (Free, 2024). Despite this reality, the media often portray the team as a representation of wider society "where the materiality of class is underplayed, invisible or repudiated" (Free, 2024, p. 939). Irish private schools serve to construct a 'collective elite identity,' and the affinity to a small number of fee-paying, predominantly male private schools reinforces notions of superiority (Courtois, 2013). It is through these fee-paying schools that significant amounts of bridging social capital, which links people of heterogeneous social groups (Putnam, 2000), are developed, allowing attendees to easily achieve high occupational status in the fields of consulting or business. Fee-paying schools have high barriers to entry, and thus, the populations tend to be "socially homogeneous" in a reinforcing cycle through familial ties to the attending students and the school itself (Courtois, 2013). Thus through the multi-tiered Irish education system, the myth of meritocracy can be maintained, legitimising the entrenched cultural capital in the system, which serves to stratify a supposedly unitary and classless population.

Conclusion

For James Connolly, "Capitalism was the most foreign thing in Ireland" (Hazelkorn, 1998). In a similar vein, the traditional unidimensional mechanisms of modernisation theory were foreign to any analyses of Irish development. In skipping the industrial stage, the social classes of Ireland were not hardened in the manner of other European countries, which

facilitated a false, unitary vision of a classless Ireland. This led scholars to state that Ireland is "characterised by [its] denial of class relationships" (Courtois, 2018, cited in Free, 2024, p. 927). However, in analysing the education system of contemporary Ireland, the existence of class cleavages and their perpetuation becomes clear. The tiered system of education, propped up through cultural capital, is the main factor that both legitimises and reproduces social stratification. Therefore, while Ireland does not strictly follow the dichotomous model of class as espoused by Marx, education exposes the distinct cleavages that exist. These cleavages are also beginning to enter the realm of public discourse as shown by the break from the civil-war based politics of the past century towards a rise in the salience of class-based issues such as housing deciding elections.

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'The Fair Fame of Irish Womanhood for Purity': National Identity, Sexuality and Womanhood in Early Twentieth Century Ireland

Eva Hendly

Abstract

A cursory glance over church and state discourses in the Irish Free State reveals great concern with the sexual purity of Irish women. This paper explores the way in which such concern reveals a deep association between notions of sexual purity and Irish national identity, such that sexual immorality is seen as a foreign "contaminating" force in Irish society, and in many cases, nothing other than the effect of British influence on Irish society. By looking at the portrayal of sexual purity in ecclesiastical and state discourses and paying attention to their invocations of notions of "Irishness", this paper argues that the clerical and governmental drive to regulate sexual behaviour was not merely a matter of conservative social norms operating on their own but was bound up inextricably with the drive to consolidate Irish national identity.

In March 1918, following the arrival of thousands of American soldiers into Cobh Harbour, Bishop Colohan reminded Irish girls to "remember and esteem the fair fame of Irish womanhood for purity" (Borgonovo, 2012, p. 103). Colohan was particularly worried that the hordes of Americans entering Cork via Queenstown would corrupt the local women, leading them to a life of sexual deviance. His fears were not entirely unfounded – a contemporary noted that "one could see bands of girls waiting for American sailors" (ibid., p. 95), and although the records are unclear, there was at the very least an increase in casual sex and/or prostitution in the area following the soldiers' arrival (ibid., p. 90). While Colohan's attitude towards casual sex is hardly surprising given his status as a Catholic

Bishop, we may want to look a little closer at his appeal to the "purity" of "Irish womanhood". If it were Irish women who were flocking en masse to meet American soldiers, how is it that their behaviour, in the ideological constructions of early twentieth-century ecclesiastical discourse, was considered not "true" to the character of Irish women? How is it that there could be such a gap between Colohan's idea of "Irish womanhood" and the actual behaviour of Irish women? To what extent did the construction of Irish national identity in ecclesiastical and political discourse in the early twentieth century rely on the assumption of a uniquely Irish sexual purity, particularly with respect to Irish women? To answer these questions, I begin by looking at the ways in which ecclesiastical discourse constructed sexual crimes as a violation of a (public) moral superstructure rather than a violation of the rights of individual women. I then look at the language of contamination in both ecclesiastical and political discourses, drawing out the ways in which sexual purity is repeatedly associated with "Irishness" in opposition to the perceived sexual degeneracy of English society. Ultimately, I argue that notions of sexual purity and womanhood were just as important as notions of "Irishness" and national identity in such discourses.[1]

In her analysis of sexual regulation and attitudes towards female sexuality in the 1920s and 30s, Maria Luddy suggests that the female body was understood as inherently immoral or unchaste in some way, such that it required regulation from a church or state body (Luddy, 2007). She notes that,

> "what was to emerge from the early 1920s was a belief […] that the real threat to chastity and sexual morality resided in the bodies of women. Thus moral regulation, by Church and State, attempted to impose, particularly on women, standards of idealized conduct that would return the nation to purity" (ibid., p. 80).

[1] This essay, as stated, is concerned primarily with the treatment of sexual morality in ecclesiastical and state discourses. Its arguments could not be extended to the views of the general Irish public without further investigation — indeed, as we will see, it seems that "normal" Irish people were aware of the discrepancy between state discourses and actual sexual behaviour.

However, the words of Irish clergy referenced by Luddy herself support the idea that the female body was actually associated with sexual purity rather than immorality but that modern Irish women had "fallen" from this natural state due to the influence of modern culture. The very next paragraph includes this line from a 1926 sermon:

> "There was a time in Ireland when the prevailing type of woman was the sister of Mary Immaculate, but, unfortunately, in recent times there has been a kind of falling off" (ibid.).

And later, from Luddy herself:

> 'The Irish Independent noted in 1925 that there were 'mothers who preferred the fashionable and crowded thoroughfare to their own quiet home; there were mothers who preferred talking on a platform or in a crowded council chamber to chatting to their children in a nursery'. It was evident that such pursuits were 'unnatural' and unsuited to the role of women as wives and mothers" (ibid., p. 81).

Already, we can see a distinction between the "natural" state of purity ascribed to Irish women and their having "fallen" to immorality in recent years. The "natural" state of purity is rendered pre-discursive; that is to say, the "purity" of Irish womanhood is positioned as the natural, neutral state of affairs which has been contorted rather than being a gendered construction in its own right. The impression that purity was "natural", despite the behaviour of actual Irish women, was so strong that witnesses testifying to the Carrigan Committee in the early 1930s suggested that the developing sexuality of adolescent girls was "in many cases violent" (Riordan, 2011, p.438), amounting to what Susannah Riordan describes as a "pathological psychology" (ibid.). Such comments position what are ostensibly normal developments in adolescent sexuality as dangerous pathologies. As such, what is "normal" in human sexuality was not understood in terms of statistical prevalence, what was most common, but rather in terms of normativity, which transcends common human

behaviour. Sexual deviance could, therefore, be interpreted as an attack on the apparent moral superstructure governing Irish society, evidenced by the very common use of the term "outrage" to describe, among other violent crimes, sexual assault in a variety of contexts ranging from newspapers (Earner-Byrne, 2015, p.85) to official government documents. "Outrage", used such as in the phrases "Outrages on Irish Women" (The Irish Times, 1921) or "outrages upon young females" (Finnane, 2001, p.534) to describe sexual assaults, suggests that sexual violence is not wrong because it is a violation of female bodily autonomy, but because it is a violation of a wider social morality. The term blurs the line between sexual violence and sexual immorality, suggesting that rape was not seen as a moral crime against women as such, but one among many ways in which sexual norms could be elided – as Lindsey Earner-Byrne notes, the term places emphasis on "moral outrage rather than an understanding of the devastation of sexual violation" (Earner-Byrne, p.85). Further exemplifying this, in Earner-Byrne's analysis of the rape of one Irish woman, "Mary M.", she points out that, in a letter to her archbishop seeking counsel following her assault, Mary mentions that she "confided [her] secret out side [sic] the confessional to a Holy Franciscan Priest" (ibid., p.88). Mary not only treated her sexual assault as she would any other sin, dealing with it in the realm of the "confessional", but viewed it as an attack on Irish women in general. By pleading with her archbishop to "pray for the purity of Our Irish Girls" (ibid.) rather than her own wellbeing, Mary emphasises the public nature of the crime. The lines between sexual immorality and sexual violence are, once again blurred, such that even victims of sexual assault considered their experiences of violence with respect to the moral codes of the time prior to their own suffering.

Contamination in Ecclesiastical and Political Discourses

With there often being a conflation between sexual immorality and sexual violence, it was not uncommon for both women and children to be treated as complicit in their own sexual abuse. A memorandum from the Department of Justice stated that "A child with a vivid imagination

may actually live in his mind the situation as he invented it and will be quite unshaken by severe cross-examination" (Smith, 2004, p.224) and Garda Commissioner Eoin O' Duffy attributed low rates of prosecution for sexual abuse to aspects of the legal system which required multiple witnesses to testify in order for an accusation to be taken seriously (ibid.). As such, when a woman sought legal action against a sexual abuser, it was more often to protect her honour rather than to seek justice (Byrne, p. 87) since the prevalent conflation of sexual immorality and sexual violence meant that even a victim of abuse could be interpreted as having "fallen" unless she proved the constancy of her moral character. Writing on this, Earner-Byrne suggests that immorality was understood as contagious, such that even victims of sexual abuse could be seen as "contaminated" (ibid.). Of course, this notion of "contamination" is only relevant if the initial state is understood as uncontaminated, hence presupposing an innate sexual purity to Irish womanhood.

The language of contamination is extremely relevant in ecclesiastical and governmental discourses regarding sexuality, particularly with reference to foreign influences on Irish women, who were themselves "pure", and the stability of the nation. In 1926, Archbishop Gilmartin of Tuam stated that "the future of the country is bound up with the dignity and purity of the women of Ireland" (Ferriter, 2009, p. 100); the year after, in a secular context, the widely read *Irish Times* published the following:

> "Throughout the centuries, Ireland has enjoyed a high reputation for the cardinal virtues of social life. She was famous for her men's chivalry and for her women's modesty. Today, every honest Irishman must admit that this reputation is in danger … our first need is full recognition of the fact that today the nation's proudest and most precious heritage is slipping from its grasp" (ibid. p. 101).

A clear link between the "high reputation" and "precious heritage" of Ireland and strict gender roles pertaining to sexual purity was established here. This link was not entirely new to the twentieth century — as Averill

Earls points out (Earls, 2009), beginning in the nineteenth century, sexual purity was a fundamental part of the way Irish national identity was constructed in opposition to Britishness, as evidenced by the great differences in portrayals of sodomy trials in Irish nationalist newspapers, depending on whether the accused was Irish or English. If he were English, it was an example of English degeneracy, a "homosexual scandal" which could be used to delegitimise British rule (Conrad, 2001, p. 127); if he were Irish, he was either innocent or the first of his kind in Ireland, since sodomy was understood as something that just did not happen in Ireland. James Munroe, who was tried for sodomy in the early nineteenth century, was described in the staunchly nationalist Freeman's Journal as "the only Irishman, we believe, who was ever brought to trial for such an abominable and disgusting propensity" (Earls, p. 411), the same journal later suggesting that sodomy cases in Ireland were the "new importations of Englishmen" (ibid., p.413). John Borgonovo notes that prostitutes in Cork were often described as being from England, with one newsletter stating that "it is also known that 99%, if not all of [the prostitutes], are English women who have come over here within the past two years" (Borgonovo, p. 97). There was a clear association between Irishness and sexual purity, such that any deviation from the sexual norm had to be seen as the product of foreign influence.

With the idea that the natural state of Irish womanhood was one of sexual purity in place, there was great fear of this purity being tarnished. For example, in 1921, the parliament rejected a bill which would criminalise lesbianism, worried that the bill would make more women aware of the possibility of homosexual relations and actually increase instances of sexual deviance (Ferriter, p. 163). The assumption that women do not engage in sexual acts out of their own desires but because of external influence is implicit in this argument. Fears of contamination and the spreading of sexual perversity were also greatly amplified by the venereal disease crisis of the 1920s and 30s. The dominant belief at the time was that it was almost exclusively prostitutes who carried venereal disease. Dublin City, with its red-light district of Monto, was seen as having the

"lowest reputation amongst the cities of the homeland as a contaminating centre" (Howell, 2003, p. 325). The use of the term "contaminating" is notable, again suggesting an external interference on an otherwise pure state. Moreover, the prevalence of prostitution and venereal disease were themselves often interpreted as products of the British garrison stationed in Ireland, and it was assumed that, following independence, such sexual immorality would no longer be an issue. The Jesuit social reformer Fr. Devane mentioned, for example, that the issue could be solved "with comparative ease" (Ferriter, p. 148) following the British soldiers' leave. If there was a problem, it was confined to Dublin; if there was a problem in Dublin, it was mostly because of British influence. Irish people were supposed to be uniquely sexually pure, such that incidents of sexual immorality could only be explained as undue British influence. However, the truth of the matter was very different. The reports of the Inter-Departmental Committee of Inquiry Regarding Venereal Disease showed that the vast majority of cases of venereal disease in Ireland were not passed on by prostitutes, but regular Irish women, and that venereal disease was present even in the remotest Irish-speaking parts of western Ireland. The committee describes these women as sexual "amateurs" (Luddy, p. 86), who were not "fallen" unmarried mothers nor prostitutes but promiscuous women who simply had a lot of sex for no apparent reason (or at least, no apparent reason with respect to the sexual norms of the time). Not only this, but many of them came from "respectable classes" (ibid.), meaning that venereal disease was "conveyed by apparently decent girls throughout the country", with the report going on to mention that "there is a considerable danger to the innocent sections of the community, because these so-called amateurs mix with all sections and include nurses, maids, cooks, etc." (Ferriter, p. 156), suggesting once again that the "normal" Irish girl could only be brought to engage in casual sex if she was influenced by somebody else.

Immorality in Political Discourse: The Carrigan Report

While the report on venereal disease showed that sexual diseases were transmitted by regular women who were not prostitutes, the

1931 Committee on the Criminal Law Amendment Acts and Juvenile Prostitution, better known as the committee behind the Carrigan report, showed that all kinds of sexual immorality were rampant in Ireland, a fact which was so distasteful to its commissioners that the findings of the report were suppressed. The Minister for Justice, James Fitzpatrick, appointed the committee in 1930 with the general goal of investigating the Criminal Law Amendment Acts of 1880 and 1885 (specifically targeting the age of consent and juvenile prostitution), seeing twenty-nine witnesses testify over the course of a year, including Garda Commissioner Eoin O'Duffy, eighteen women and six members of the clergy (Smith, p. 225). It did not only deal with prostitution, however — in the face of data collected by O'Duffy from 1924 to 1930 on the prevalence of sexual offences in Ireland — it became apparent that sexual immorality was a much bigger problem than was expected (Finnane, p. 533). O'Duffy reported that "there was an alarming amount of sexual crime increasing yearly, a feature of which was the large number of cases of criminal interference with girls and children from 16 years downwards, including many cases of children under 10 years", most shockingly suggesting that only 15 per cent of cases of sexual abuse were prosecuted a year (Smith, p. 223). This contradicted the nation's official crime statistics, which was pointed out by one of the female witnesses who testified to the committee, stating that they failed to reflect "the actual conditions of the country" (ibid., p. 224). Ultimately, the report claimed that "the moral condition of the country has become gravely menaced by modern abuses, widespread and pernicious in their consequences, which cannot be counteracted unless the laws of the state are revised and consistently enforced so as to combat them" (Finnane, p. 523). O'Duffy stated that, "The present state of the law is disgraceful in a Christian country, and the whole question of morality crimes should be now dealt with from an Irish point of view" (Smith, p. 223). The emphasis on the "Irish point of view" is further exemplified by how the findings of the report were suppressed. The invocation of "Irishness" as a mode of dealing with sexual immorality suggests a particular aversion to sexuality that, for O'Duffy, was unique to Ireland, further buttressing the association between sexual purity and Irish national identity.

Debate over whether to publish the findings of the two reports ensued. While the members of the venereal disease committee agreed that it should be published, the archbishop and wider government disagreed (Ferriter, p. 158). The controversy surrounding the Carrigan report was much more extreme. In 1932, James Geoghegan, appointed Minister for Justice that year, suggested to Cosgrave that a committee be formed to oversee the debate regarding the Carrigan report "with a view to avoiding as far as possible public discussion of a necessarily unsavoury nature" (Smith, p. 216). Similarly, Rev. Michael Brown advised Geoghegan that publication of the report "would not create a good impression […] Religion has failed to neutralise the aphrodisiac influence of cinema, drama and literature on a great number of young people" (Finnane, p. 526), and the department of justice noted that "[the report] contains numerous sweeping charges against the state of morality of the Saorstát and even if these statements were true, there would be little point in giving them currency" (ibid., p. 526). The findings of the report clearly contradicted the prevailing assumption that Irishness, and particularly Irish womanhood, was in some sense innately pure. The report could not be published if the image of Ireland as a sexually moral nation was to be maintained in official state discourses.

The prevalence of the idea that Irish society had been "corrupted" from the outside is further evidenced by the fact that the Carrigan report states that many immoral young women were found "in the streets of London, Liverpool and other cities and towns in England" (ibid., p. 524), subtly suggesting that their degradation was due to British influence, and as such maintaining the idea that any sexual immorality could not stem from characteristics of Irish society, but must instead be a result of foreign influence. Similarly, the report blamed "Dance Halls, Picture Houses of sorts, and the opportunities afforded by misuse of motor cars" (ibid., p. 525) for the moral degradation of young women, suggesting again that it was only aspects of modern culture which had caused such increased rates of promiscuity, not something stemming from the desires of Irish women themselves. Ultimately, the findings of the report were

suppressed by the committee, indicating that, as Mark Finnane notes, they "proved profoundly uncomfortable for the political and clerical elites that governed Ireland" (ibid.). Irish society was, problematically, not as morally pure as the commissioners thought it should be, contradicting the prevailing beliefs in church and state about the sexual nature of the Irish citizen in a clear and dramatic manner. The contrast between the image of womanhood aroused in references to the "fair fame of Irish womanhood for purity" and the sexual lives of Irish people became extremely apparent and, ultimately, impossible for the state to deal with, resulting in the report's suppression.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this essay, I have largely focused on sexual discourses as they relate to the church and state in Ireland. There is much to be said about the experiences of "regular" Irish people, but as of now, there is very limited literature on the matter. I cannot suggest that such views as described in this essay were necessarily the popular views of Irish people – in fact, the previously mentioned comment of one of the Carrigan Report's female witnesses that official government statistics on sexual abuse did not reflect Irish society in any way, suggests otherwise, that is, that Irish people may have been aware of how greatly the official statistics on sexual immorality did not match reality. I would like to suggest that more work be done in the field of popular attitudes towards gender and sexuality in the early decades of the 20th century, since it was clear in my research that the field is underdeveloped. Nonetheless, I hope to have presented one of the dominant trends in the official sexual discourses of modern Ireland — it is evident from my analysis that the clerical and governmental obsession with the "purity" of Irish womanhood had little to do with the behaviour of actual Irish women but relied on a strict moral superstructure which was understood as reflecting fundamental aspects of Irish national identity. When the impurity of Irish women was pointed out, such as in the inquiry on venereal disease and in the Carrigan report, the response was not to change the understanding of what it was to be an Irish woman but to impose strict moral regulation to reinstate the original, "natural"

purity of Irish women. The perceived need to regulate sexual behaviour was, therefore, not just a matter of conservative attitudes seeking to restrict sexual freedoms for their own sake but reflected a more complex apparatus through which national identity was defined in terms of sexual morality and vice versa. With this, I have shown that there was a clear link between belief in the strong moral character of Irish women and the construction of an Irish national identity in the early twentieth century. To quote Philip Howell on the matter, "it is hard to avoid the assessment that social purity, here as elsewhere well down the path to the regulation of sexuality, was the indispensable adjunct to the Irish post-colonial state" (Howell, p. 341). It is equally hard to avoid the assessment that, despite their intensity, the regulatory efforts of church and state were not overwhelmingly successful – the belief in Irish women's purity was more myth than fame.

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The Reality of Authoritative Power & Political Hierarchy: Why Your Political Representatives Are Not Your Friends

Giorgia Carli

Abstract

In the heated whirlwind that is contemporary politics and public debates, it is paramount to investigate whether culturally pluralistic societies - societies where citizens hold different cultural perspectives - can guarantee a relationship of friendship between their citizens. Much of the relevant literature has notably examined this civic friendship between regular same-state citizens. Nevertheless, said literature shows a significant lack of analyses of the relationship between state representatives and regular citizens. This paper, then, aims at contributing to bridge this gap. I will argue against the instantiation of civic friendship between state representatives and their citizens and instead show how the former's authoritative power over the latter accounts for a relationship of political hierarchy. On this matter, I will also re-evaluate the significance of democracy as our only way to judge our states' actions and, consequently, to fully own our status as citizens.

Introduction

In recent years, political thinkers have shown renewed interest in the civic friendship shared by same-state citizens (Schwarzenbach, 2009; Lister, 2011; Leland and van Wietmarschen, 2017; Ludwig, 2020). Yet, what seems to be missing is an equally detailed study of the relationship between a state and its citizens. This paper will thus contribute to this topic and enquire as to whether the relationship between a state and its citizens constitutes political friendship. I will reject this claim and instead

argue that their relationship is best defined as a political hierarchy. In addition to this, I will defend that the exercise of democratic practices - such as voting, protesting, attending public debates, and so on - is our only way to hold the state accountable for its actions and to maintain our status as citizens. , In this respect, I will consider the noun "state" to refer to the actual representatives of a country – its officials, delegates, and, more generally, its leaders - rather than an abstract form of government.

In Section 1, I will present Catarina Neves' account of civic friendship. I will concentrate particularly on her conception of relational reciprocity and elucidate how, in her perspective, it can be sustained only if citizens are friends with each other. Whether Neves' account accurately represents the relationship between citizens is beyond the scope of this essay, so, for its purposes, I will simply grant that it does. In Section 2, I will disclose that Neves' thesis can legitimise the relationship of political friendship between state representatives and their citizens on the basis that state representatives are citizens of the state they represent. In this case, I will take "political" to merely designate a relation between these parties. In Section 3, I will investigate whether such an assumption holds. I will argue that state representatives must exert authoritative power over their citizens to preserve civic political agreement but that such power entails civic collective unfreedom. I will, therefore, conclude that such a relationship is too unbalanced to constitute political friendship and that it is more truthfully understood as a political hierarchy. I will advance last year's US Palestine encampments as a case study. Lastly, in Section 4, I will consider a significant critique against my thesis, claiming that it leaves no space for democracy. I will reject it by resorting to Van der Zweerde's interpretation of the adjective "political" as "essentially contestable" (2007, p. 35). I will thus offer an interpretation of democracy not as an institutionalised polity but, rather, as the citizens' role as political judges towards their state. In this respect, I will reformulate the aforementioned case study of the Palestine encampments

Neves' Relational Reciprocity & Civic Friendship

In her article 'Understanding Reciprocity and the Importance of Civic Friendship'), Catarina Neves (2023) maintains the significance of civic friendship under cultural pluralism, that is, in polyethnic countries where citizens have different conceptions of the good and their own, individual comprehensive moral, philosophical, and religious outlooks (p. 2). Her starting point is the Rawlsian notion of civic reciprocity in both its formulations, as 1) the criterion of reciprocity and 2) the principle of reciprocity (ibid., p. 6). On the one hand, the criterion of reciprocity (CR) establishes that citizens are themselves capable of proposing political values, rules, and obligations that everyone can accept because of their reasonableness (ibid., p. 3). This element of "reasonableness" contributes to acknowledging citizens as free and equal. It shows that citizens come to endorse such standards not because they are being coerced or manipulated – by the government, for instance, or by their inferior socio-political status – but because they recognise it is reasonable to do so (ibid.). As a result, citizens willingly discount their individual comprehensive outlooks in favour of shared values and expect everyone else to do the same (ibid., p. 3). These agreed-upon values, then, come to inform a common conception of justice that is both founded and obeyed by citizens. In this way, CR explains how agreement on political tenets (such as equality, human rights, freedom, and so on) is accomplished under cultural pluralism (ibid., p. 6). On the other hand, the principle of reciprocity (PR) depicts civic reciprocity as a disposition between self-interestedness and altruism (ibid., p. 6). This means that, in upholding shared values, citizens respect the interests of other citizens and, in turn, gain personal benefit from having their own interests analogously respected by others. This kind of disposition motivates citizens to trust one another, thus reinforcing the very stability of their political agreement (ibid.). As a "compound" of both CR and PR, Rawls' overall notion of civic reciprocity ensures both the achievement of political agreement between citizens and their cooperation and promotion of it over time (ibid.).

Neves (2023) agrees that reciprocity is a disposition between self-interestedness and altruism, yet argues that, as it stands, it needs further

justification. This is particularly evident when considering the cultural pluralism that Rawls' reciprocity aims to incorporate (p. 6). Indeed, in multicultural societies, this notion of reciprocity would require citizens to factor in interests that might be different from – and, oftentimes, contrasting with - their own. However, it is unclear how citizens could successfully maintain this arduous disposition solely on the basis of a political agreement (ibid.). Instead, civic reciprocity seems to demand that citizens be socially close to each other to the degree of permanent new friends (ibid., p. 10). This is why, Neves claims, Rawls' reciprocity must be interpreted as relational, thus implying that citizens appreciate some sort of relationship with each other (ibid., p. 7). This relational reciprocity (RR) then exhibits four fundamental characteristics. First, as Rawls purported, it is a disposition between self-interestedness and altruism. Second, it requires citizens to be in close relationships with each other. Third, it is entertained only by those citizens who stand in such relation and only when and insofar as they do (ibid.). Lastly, it allows for the nature of their relationship to influence the modalities of reciprocation (ibid., pp. 7-8). That is, RR must determine when reciprocation should be balanced and returned in a timely manner, but it must also allow for unbalanced, delayed, or even unrequited exchanges without jeopardising their relationship (ibid., p. 9).

In Neves' view, then, it is the persistence of a relationship among citizens that efficiently motivates them to engage in RR. The question then posed is precisely which kind of relationship would sustain such a conception of reciprocity; Neves contends that it is civic friendship (ibid., p. 8) and proceeds to list the three criteria that it must involve. The first two, evoking Rawls' CR and PR, are equality (ibid., p. 9) and a non-prudential concern towards each other's interests (ibid., p. 10). In regards to the former, citizens who recognise each other as equals are more inclined to trust one another, therefore developing a more intimate connection. Through this connection, in turn, citizens come to tolerate unrequited exchanges more freely and more often (ibid.). On the latter, showing concern for others' interests through actions of caring increases the sense

of awareness that citizens feel towards each other as equal citizens. As a result, this solidifies their willingness to share political values despite their different comprehensive outlooks (ibid., p. 11). Nevertheless, while both these criteria are necessary for civic friendship to sustain civic reciprocity, neither is sufficient because neither clarifies what can persuade citizens to partake in such friendship in the first place. This is why Neves introduces the third criterion for civic friendship, namely, shared experiences (ibid., p. 13). These shared experiences, as Neves highlights, implicate shared livelihood and shared cultural/historical narratives that bring citizens socially closer and encourage them to cooperate with each other (ibid.). She indeed recognises that, while reciprocation and friendship might be universally understood, the means through which we engage in such activities are culturally sensitive and change depending on our cultural backgrounds (ibid., p. 15). In this light, shared experiences and conviviality become essential in multiculturalism and can effectively open citizens to each other's differences and build the strong foundation that civic reciprocity entails (ibid., p. 16).

Neves' tripartite civic friendship therefore aims at more efficiently sustaining civic reciprocity, thus warranting the stability of justice, political agreement, and cooperation between citizens.

The Assumption of Political Friendship

I have clarified Neves' account of the connection between relational reciprocity and civic friendship under cultural pluralism. I will now explain the assumption that her account can be ascribed to the relationship between a state and their citizens. Neves' thesis has notably revived an ideal of civic friendship in times when the concept of friendship frequently depicts private, confidential settings. This, in turn, incentivises the assumption that, perhaps, her account could equally hold for the relationship between a state and its citizens. Indeed, Neves' argument is susceptible to such an assumption since the representatives of a state still classify as citizens of said state and could therefore be liable to share relational reciprocity with the other citizens. To thoroughly assess Neves'

outlook, then, it is necessary to examine the relationship between state representatives and their citizens, too.

On this topic, the interactions between a state and its citizens do seem to resemble all four characteristics of relational reciprocity. First, both parties can be said to exert a disposition between altruism and self-interestedness towards the other. For example, by enforcing its citizens' shared values, the state advocates for their welfare (altruism) while maintaining its own stability (self-interestedness). Analogously, citizens accept being ruled over by their representatives (altruism) while still demanding that they enact their shared values (self-interestedness). Second, a state and its citizens are bound to stand in relation to each other. Third, their relation accounts for unbalanced or unrequited reciprocation. In particular, the state is entitled to more power to administer its citizens (unbalanced), yet precisely for this reason, it is also regarded as responsible for their general security and well-being. In this light, then, citizens who are socially less advantaged can benefit from state resources – be they grants, tax reliefs, medical assistance, or others– that might not necessarily demand a return (unrequited). Fourth, these conditions apply only if, when, and insofar as the state and its citizens preserve their relationship and trust each other. Indeed, it is precisely when their reciprocal disposition dissolves that each party tends to become indifferent toward the other and starts behaving only on behalf of their personal interests. This would then lead to a national fraction or, in extreme cases, to open hostility and revolutions.

According to these considerations, the suggestion that a state and its citizens function on relational reciprocity emerges as entirely satisfactory. If this is the case, then we must be prepared to follow through with Neves' reasoning and concede that the relation shared between a state and its citizens is that of political friendship. Consequently, we must also accept the tripartite criteria of civic friendship to be ascribed to the relationship between a state and its citizens. As a result, both the state and its citizens would have to mutually recognise the other as equal; both would have to show concern for and keenly promote the other's interests; and both

would have to intensify their social kinship by sharing a common cultural narrative.

Authoritative Power & Political Hierarchy

In the previous section, I introduced the assumption of political friendship between a state and its citizens. It is now crucial to examine whether such an assumption holds. In what follows, I will argue that it does not. Despite its primary appeal, the idea that the relationship between a state and its citizens constitutes political friendship seems to bear some tension. How can we, as citizens, make sense of being friends with our state representatives? Perhaps our hesitancy springs from a common modern conception of friendship as something intimate and familiar, as I mentioned above. We would simply need to re-adjust our intuition on what friendship is, and the tension would dissolve. Yet, the problem appears to lie on a much deeper level than that of mere semantics. Indeed, the idea of political friendship between a state and its citizens strikes more oddly than that of civic friendship among citizens, and both greatly challenge our immediate understanding of friendship. As such, there appears to be something inherent in the former that renders it not only implausible but also – almost – contradictory. This is due to a subtle inconsistency arising from the consideration of reciprocal returns between a state and its citizens. The argument analysed in section 2 asserts that state representatives are expected to exercise more power to govern different individuals. This exercise of power is then interpreted as an unbalanced exchange favouring the state, which, in turn, recompenses it by defending the citizens' political agreement and welfare. Nevertheless, neither the nature of such power nor its justification as an unequal measure of reciprocity are elaborated on, and both these issues remain open. Resolving them will then pinpoint more precisely where the inconsistency rests. In what follows, I will carry out this strategy.

The first open issue relates to the definition of 'power'. In its interpersonal implication, this term is itself identified as a *dispositional* concept. Much like Neves' relational reciprocity, power is a disposition entertained by

two agents; yet, unlike Neves' relational reciprocity, it entails the exercise of influence by one agent over the other (Hamilton and Sharma, 1996, p. 22). Following this view, the way the influencing agent fulfils its influence depends on its control over the influenced agent. That is, the former has authority over the latter and can constrain their actions by exerting either visible or invisible pressure (ibid., p. 23). In short, having power equals having authority over someone else. Henceforth, I will refer to this definition of power as *authoritative power.* In the case at hand, the state is the entity with authoritative power. The state has authority over its citizens and can constrain their actions through the exercise of visible or invisible pressure. This is precisely how the state manages to preserve the political values and conception of justice shared by its people. Consequently, the authoritative power that representatives hold over their citizens is necessary to retain their collective standards and reciprocity. In this light we can conclude that this interpretation of power is cogent with Neves' account and that the alleged inconsistency does not arise at this stage.

Instead, the inconsistency seems to originate when the definition of authoritative power is applied to the second open issue, namely, how it is to be justified as an unequal measure of reciprocity. For this matter, it is crucial to reflect on the genesis of such authoritative power. As I have outlined above, a state has authoritative power over its citizens because it can constrain their actions through more or less tangible measures. To perform such constraining, the state must be able to interfere with citizens' freedom to act – that is, with their *positive freedom*. Positive freedom relates to our achievement of self-mastery and to the restraints imposed on such practice (Berlin, 2016, p. 43). The state limits citizens' positive freedom by ruling over them. This is evident in the different degrees of sanctions that the state perpetrates on offenders of civic laws. Representatives restrict citizens' positive freedom by, for example, imposing fees, as usually happens when somebody is caught not observing speed limits. In extreme cases, the state can also demolish citizens' positive freedom by arresting and incarcerating them. All these measures, in turn, withdraw some degree of positive freedom from citizens. Fined

citizens are not free to use their money in the way they see fit, as they will have to devote it to the state. Analogously, and in a much stronger sense, incarcerated citizens are forced to comply with the imposed regulations of prisons. As these examples demonstrate, the degree of withdrawn freedom can vary depending on the offence and on the situation, but it nonetheless always results in a lack of positive freedom from citizens. We can therefore conclude that, for the state to rule over us and therefore for its authoritative power to be established, each citizen is expected to hold some level of *positive unfreedom.*

In this formulation, however, there is no sign of how the dichotomy between authoritative power and positive unfreedom might jeopardise the alleged political friendship between a state and its citizens. It could very well still be interpreted as an unbalanced exchange that citizens must accept to safeguard their political agreement. Citizens must be prepared to be interfered with by the state if they break its laws and, with that, their own shared values. Yet, the issue thickens when we acknowledge that citizens can be interfered with not only when they break the law but also when they do not. For, to interfere in the occasions when citizens break the law, the state must already be capable of doing so. In other words, the state must always have the *potential* to exercise its authoritative power against citizens' positive freedom. This consequently means that the state can potentially exercise its authoritative power even in circumstances that do not demand it. It, therefore, becomes evident that state authoritative power potentially threatens citizens at all times and, therefore, reduces them to a permanent condition of collective unfreedom. This unfreedom, then, is no longer positive. Rather, the citizens' collective unfreedom is a *republican* kind of unfreedom, which states that an agent is unfree when they can be constrained *arbitrarily* by another agent (Pettit, 2016, p. 224). Republican unfreedom, then, entails both the potential for state authoritative power and the idea that authoritative power can be employed at the state's discretion – thus, even in situations where it is not needed. Since the state necessarily holds potential authoritative power, and the latter is directly responsible for citizens' unfreedom, we can conclude that

the very own subsistence of political representation engenders collective republican unfreedom in its citizens.

This scenario, however, conflicts with all three criteria that Neves appoints as necessary for political friendship. First, as I examined, it admits of a disparity that is too wide to be justified as a merely unbalanced exchange. Indeed, it does not even represent an unbalanced disparity, but, rather, a proper hierarchy, based on a unilateral distribution of 1) authority and freedom to the state, and 2) subsequent unfreedom to its citizens. Second, this hierarchy consequently prevents the state and its citizens from not merely recognising each other as equals but also from being equals. As such, although they are citizens de jure, state representatives exercise a kind of control over other citizens that regular citizens could never hold over one another. Third, it legitimises the state to both enact its own interests instead of civic ones and to abuse its power. And since the actualisation of these hypothetical circumstances depends strictly on the decision of political representatives, this further corroborates the idea that the welfare of citizens is at their mercy and not necessarily respected. One of the most significant examples of this regards the encampments that took place last April across multiple U.S. universities, where students stood in solidarity with Palestine and demanded their institutions divest from Israeli ties. The response received from the state was of utmost brutality: police intervened in most of these campuses – Columbia, UCLA, and Emerson University are but a few cases – arresting and harming defenceless students with stun guns, rubber bullets, and pepper balls (Ahmedzade et al., 2024). These episodes clearly show how the state sometimes chooses to act for its own benefit – in this case, economic benefits – without concern for the citizens' welfare. This consequently impoverishes both relational reciprocity and the acceptance of cultural pluralism between the state and its citizens. For, citizens who disagree with their state feel more penalised — and potentially endangered — by their unfreedom than citizens who do.

According to these considerations, the assumption of political friendship

between a state and its citizens is utterly contradictory. On the one hand, indeed, authoritative power is necessary for the state to upkeep civic justice and shared values. On the other hand, however, such authoritative power inevitably leads to the collective unfreedom of its citizens, which conflicts with Neves' account of civic friendship. As such, I argue that their relationship is more accurately represented by political hierarchy.

Objections: Democracy to Political Judges

After introducing my thesis on the political hierarchy between a state and its citizens, I will now consider and respond to an objection against it. In light of this discussion, one might argue that my thesis endorses a radical and unacceptable conclusion. If citizens are kept permanently unfree by the state, then they would cease to partake in political life. Even if they engaged in it, their engagement would still become utterly meaningless because it would not entail any real possibility for change or civic expression. Rather, it would appear as a mere propagandistic concession that the state allows to further control its citizens, to keep them unaware of their unfreedom. However, since much of citizens' political engagement revolves around conventional democratic practices, such practices would also become null and useless. Accordingly, my thesis would ultimately portray a society where citizens are no longer exercising their civic duties and rights and where there is no space left for democracy. This is too cynical a scenario, and it risks undermining the significance that citizenry and democracy play for many citizens – especially those who feel unrepresented by their state.

This is an extremely serious objection to refute. This task can be accomplished by implementing my account with a different definition of the adjective "political". So far, I have employed it as merely remarking a relation between a state and its citizens. Instead, I will now consider Van De Zweerde's interpretation of "political" as an umbrella term encompassing all those settings that are dependent on human decisions and, therefore, essentially contestable (2007, p. 35). When ascribed to the hierarchy existing between a state and its citizens, this understanding of "political"

enables the coexistence of civic collective unfreedom and meaningful democratic practices. On the one hand, in fact, it asserts that such hierarchy originates from human decisions – in this case, from citizens' voting in elections. By doing so, citizens indeed decide which political representatives to keep conceding authoritative power to and, thus, which political representatives they trust more with their unfreedom. In this sense they are actively alimenting both their unfreedom and political hierarchy. On the other hand, Van der Zweerde's definition legitimises that the outcomes of such elections are contestable. What this translates to is that if citizens are disappointed with the winning party and feel unrepresented by their state, they are, to some extent, free to express this. And they do so precisely through conventional "democratic practices", such as protesting, voting, and holding public debates. By partaking in these activities, citizens actively remark their opposition to their state's operation, thus validating the existence of culturally plural perspectives. It is in this sense, then, that democratic practices regain their meaningfulness: they become the only way for citizens to protect their interests and their (more or less partial) freedom against state authoritative power. The example of the US student encampments acquires a new, more positive connotation – it looms as a powerful manifestation of citizens exercising their freedom of being political, reclaiming their role as active judges of their state. In this light, democracy no longer belongs to the realm of polities; it can no longer be institutionalised in the hands of authoritative power. Rather, it returns to its first holders, the citizens, embodying their long-lost freedom to be political judges, to hold their state accountable for its actions against them. As such, not only does this account restate the significance of citizenry and democracy, but it also encourages people to partake in democratic traditions – that is, to exercise their role as political judges. Only by doing this can citizens preserve their nature as citizens.

According to this final discussion, I trust that my implemented thesis can now be successfully maintained.

Conclusion

In this paper, I argue that the relationship between a state and its citizens constitutes a political hierarchy rather than a political friendship. In Section 1, I outlined Neves' conceptions of relational reciprocity and civic friendship, which I then applied to the relationship between a state and its citizens in Section 2. In Section 3, I then demonstrated why such a relation conflicts with Neves' criteria for civic (political) friendship: the state necessarily holds authoritative power to inevitably engender collective republican unfreedom among its citizens. Lastly, in Section 4, I considered an objection against my thesis; I replied by supplementing the latter with the more meaningful concept of democracy as citizens' freedom to embrace their role as political judges.

There are multiple questions that my thesis could further investigate. For instance, could international alliances and laws restrict a state's authoritative power? Or would they function in the same application? Can the relationship between international states constitute a political hierarchy? If so, is it still definable in terms of collective republican unfreedom? Unfortunately, these lie beyond the purpose of this essay; for now, I trust that it has offered persuasive reasons to support the political hierarchy existing between a state and its citizens but also to engage in democratic practices and maintain our status as citizens.

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