



Social & Political Review

Trinity College Dublin



Volume XXXII



Published in 2022 by the Social and Political Review, Trinity College Dublin

C/O DU Publications Committee
6, Trinity College
Dublin 2
Ireland

www.trinityspr.ie

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A catalogue record for this journal is available from Trinity College Library Dublin.
Printed by Grehan Printers, Brunswick House, Dublin 2

Social & Political Review

TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN

VOLUME XXXII

Social & Political Review

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This edition of the Social and Political Review
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Ellen McHugh

VOLUME XXXII

Foreword

The foreword of each new issue of the Social and Political Review reads like a laundry list of chaos and destruction. Financial crashes are followed by revolutions and wars in Syria, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Yemen, Ukraine, are followed by Trump and Brexit, are followed by a worldwide pandemic that many foresaw but few predicted. Each Editor-in-chief has claimed that this year, their edition is “more important than it has ever been before”. What’s unnerving is that each of them has probably been correct. What role in this polycrisis for academia? It’s difficult to know who or what to respond to. Once marginal disciplines are suddenly catapulted to prominence; the study of the radical right, public health policy, military logistics. Written in medias res, the articles in this issue each speak both to contemporary issues (the rise and rise of China, state-building in Africa) and the long span history (labour relations in 1930s Louisiana, the symbol of the Flanders poppy in Ireland). They are also consciously interdisciplinary, combining approaches from sociology and political science with those of law, English, and history. Firstly, a thank you to all of the authors who submitted their pieces. This year we received a record 50 articles, which is reflected in the quality of the finished journal. Secondly, a thank you to the 23 senior, junior, and copy editors, and Meghan, Marius and Jack, without whose consistent hard work and dedication this journal would not exist. And finally, a thank you to all those reading this edition. We hope that the articles in this journal will provide a mooring among the storms of upheaval.

Oz Russell
Editor in Chief

A Comparison of the Role Played by the Power of State Leaders in Determining Reform Outcomes During the Period of Structural Adjustment in Tanzania and Uganda (1970-2000)

Rudy O'Leary

The experience of African states during the 20th Century has been marred by economic struggle. External forces explaining these struggles abound; the colonial-era misappropriation of economic production, post-independence political instability, and a disadvantaged insertion into the global economy are but a few. The need for reform was made clear by widespread high inflation rates, large budget deficits, and correspondingly high levels of debt. The political institutions that were required to carry out these reforms were shaped by the colonial experience of 20th century African states. As a result, powerful and often autocratic regimes came to dominate (see Cheeseman & Fisher, 2019). The IMF devised a structural adjustment programme (SAP) intended to resolve the economic crises being experienced by African states. This comparative case study analyses the effect that the power held by State leaders had on the state's capacity to achieve meaningful reform through IMF sponsored SAP. Meaningful reform will be defined as reform that improves prosperity across the entire population. Uganda and Tanzania have been chosen for comparison. The institutional structure of both of these states afforded State leaders significant power. The principal difference between the leaders was that Tanzania's Julius Nyerere held strong socialist ideological views while Uganda's Yoweri Museveni allowed pragmatism to guide his economic policy-making. This would prove to be pivotal in dictating how each regime negotiated with the IMF on its proposed neo-liberal reform programme. Nyerere's ideological views empowered him to reject the IMF's conditions, while Museveni's pragmatism made him a willing adopter. However,

the power of State leaders would ultimately prove to be of secondary significance compared to the structural forces that led both states to adopt similar reforms; reforms that served the interests of the international community and the State leaders at the expense of the wider domestic population.

Basis of power: Uganda and Tanzania

In terms of institutional structure and executive prerogative, the power allocated to State leaders in Tanzania and Uganda was similar. During the period which saw the introduction of SAP (the 1970s and 1980s), both Nyerere and Museveni operated without formal political opposition. Nyerere headed the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in an authoritarian one-party state while Museveni was the president of the National Resistance Movement (NRA) in an authoritarian military oligarchy (Bratton and Van de Wall, 1994, p. 473). Both rulers centralised responsibility for structural adjustment to the presidency, granting them full control over the domestic implementation of policy and negotiations with the IMF (Van de Walle, 2001). In both Tanzania and Uganda, State leaders had near-absolute power vis-à-vis their constituents and political opponents from an institutional perspective. However, when ideological factors are considered it becomes evident that the actual extent of the power elites were able to exercise differed crucially between Nyerere and Museveni.

Nyerere held strong socialist ideological principles which imposed constraints on the political avenues available to him, while Museveni allowed economic pragmatism to guide his decision-making process. Both Nyerere and Museveni rose to power on the back of socialist-nationalist economic programmes (Mwenda & Tangri, 2005, p. 452). In spite of this, Museveni made an agreement with the IMF and World Bank just a year after taking power to implement structural adjustment, a neo-liberal economic reform programme (*ibid.*). Nyerere, on the other hand, remained vehemently opposed to structural adjustment which he viewed as a form of neo-imperialism that directly undermined his socialist principles (Hyden & Karlstrom, 1993, p. 1399). These contrasting levels of ideological commitment served to empower and constrain Nyerere and Museveni in opposing fashion. Nyerere's principled approach emboldened him in the face of the IMF as he sought to avoid adopting measures that would undermine the public good, but also bound him to a narrow range of domestic economic policy tools. Museveni's pragmatism allowed him a wide range of policy tools but meant that the policy-making process was largely transferred to the IMF which did not always

have the welfare of the Ugandan public at heart. These contrasting forms of power and constraint had a direct impact on the ability of each leader to achieve meaningful reform in their respective countries.

Tanzania under Nyerere (1974-1985)

Nyerere's socialist ambitions led him to stave off accepting conditional aid from the IMF for a long time, but when economic conditions continued to worsen his ideological convictions restricted him from implementing the necessary policy measures. The impact that the conditions of Nyerere's power had on his inability to achieve meaningful reform will be analysed under Hyden & Karlstrom's (1993) model of policy-making. Between 1975-79, Tanzania avoided accepting any conditional funding from the IMF because unconditional funds were sourced through the Oil Recovery Fund and national coffee export revenue increased sharply following the destruction of Brazil's coffee crop in 1976 (Biermann & Wagao, 1986, p. 92). During this period, Hyden & Karlstrom (1993) described the policy-making process as being 'technical', meaning it was low in conflict and ambiguity.

This began to change when the short-term factors that had been driving economic prosperity came to an end in 1980. At this point, the structural weaknesses caused by Tanzania's inability to produce sufficient economic surplus to sustain its extensive public spending programmes became evident. This was compounded by a series of external shocks, including a simultaneous drop in coffee prices and oil shock which drove Tanzania's terms of trade down by 40% between 1978-82 (Hyden & Karlstrom, 1993, p. 1398). Despite the rapid decline in Tanzania's output revenue, government spending continued to rise. This led to a widening fiscal deficit that was being financed by the central bank. In the absence of increased output, the increasing money supply led to rapid inflation (*ibid.*). It became evident that monetary policy adjustments, such as adjusting the nominal exchange rate and interest rates, was needed to offset the short-term effects of inflation. However, to Nyerere and his colleagues, using price as a mechanism to allocate resources was seen as a sign of profiteering. Their commitment to a fixed nominal exchange and nominal interest rate had become a matter of national sovereignty (*ibid.*, p. 1398-9). The battle lines between the Tanzanian government and the IMF were drawn up and the policy-making process had become 'political', high in conflict low in

ambiguity. Nyerere's government could not make the necessary adjustments, believing they would equate to political suicide.

The flip side to Nyerere's ideological resolve was that, when combined with his skill as a diplomat, he was able to garner sympathy and financial support through various bilateral agreements. The most noteworthy funding came from Scandinavia, where Nyerere's platform of state intervention to achieve egalitarian ends resonated strongly. While this helped Nyerere remain in power, it was not enough to offset the deeper economic issues that pervaded the Tanzanian system. There was a 50% decrease in real income per household over the 15 years preceding 1984 and a 65% decrease in living standards among the urban population (Bevans et al., 1988). By 1985, when Nyerere resigned as president, minimal reform had been implemented but the state's control over policy-making remained intact.

Uganda under Museveni (1986-1996)

Museveni had none of the ideological reservations of Nyerere and was quick to agree to conditions of structural adjustment in return for IMF funding. Museveni inherited a state that was in economic disarray after the Amin dictatorship, and within a year of taking power his regime faced the threat of a growing rebellion in northern Uganda. The fragility of his political control and lack of alternatives forced Museveni to approach the IMF for financial assistance. With minimal bargaining power, Museveni agreed to adopt far reaching neoliberal adjustment measures in return for funding that would average \$500 million per annum (Mwenda & Tangri, 2005, p. 452). Between 1986 and 1996, Uganda's GDP increased by approximately 40% (albeit from a very low baseline following the Idi Amin dictatorship) (CEPR, 1999). This would suggest that Nyerere's power to refuse IMF funding and conditions while enduring an extreme economic downturn stood in the way of Tanzania achieving as much economic growth as Uganda did. However, Uganda's GDP growth paints only part of the picture.

The downside to Museveni's eager adoption of SAP was the transfer of policy control to the IMF and the creation of an economic system reliant on foreign resources that disproportionately benefited a small economic elite. The IMF believed Uganda's budget deficits required a demand management

solution, while the problem of insufficient supply required the establishment of more competitive export markets. For these measures to be successful, the propertied 'entrepreneurial' class needed to be empowered by transferring resources from the public to the private sphere and markets needed to be liberalized (Mamdani, 1990, p. 430). However, the IMF failed to recognise that, due to how the Ugandan state was structured, the proposed reforms were likely to achieve economic development at the expense of further entrenching economic inequality and its economic dependency on foreign states.

The state Museveni inherited was shaped by the 'economic war' of 1973 under the Amin regime which was responsible for transforming the Ugandan state from one of the most efficient political apparatus in Africa into a corrupt and overextended organisation. Of particular importance to the trajectory of the Ugandan economy was the "state-created, state-protected" group of powerful proprietors known as the mafutamingi (Mamdani, 1990, p. 434). The state's absorption of these wealthy land/business holders both economically empowered them and excused them from tax collection. State revenue streams declined sharply after this, as they became limited to income tax from the working class, export taxes on coffee (the peasant crop), and sales taxes on mass consumption goods (*ibid.*). Income tax dropped from 16.5% of GDP in 1969/70 to 4.8% by 1982/3 and excise tax dropped from 14.61% to 5.4% over the same period (*ibid.*). Mamdani (1990) argues that the fiscal deficit inherited by the Museveni regime was being generated by the state's economic system that enabled the mafutamingi to represent the largest share of import demand while avoiding taxation. This structural configuration stood in the way of meaningful economic reform in Uganda and the IMF adjustment programme Museveni agreed to would serve to exacerbate these conditions.

The trade-off generated by SAP, which favoured short-term economic growth at the expense of long-term economic development, is evidenced by the key policy area of inflation management. To reduce inflation, the IMF proposed a demand-side solution known as a credit squeeze. This measure reduced the amount of credit available to the public and forced interest rates up. In turn, this reduced the demand for domestic goods and drove prices down. While this was effective at quickly reducing inflation, it caused domestic markets to contract which created problems for industries that were reliant on domestic consumption. The scale of the impact is reflected by the Background to Budget

survey of 1987 which found that the number of employees in selected manufacturing firms fell by more than 50% compared to the level in 1982 (Government of Uganda, 1988). This could have been avoided if inflation had been reduced by increasing the domestic supply. While supply-side policies are admittedly more difficult to implement and less effective in the short-run, the economic interests of the IMF must be recognised as a key determinant of the policy choices that were made. In 1998, the United States, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and France collectively controlled approximately 40% of the votes in the IMF (IMF Members' Quotas and Voting Power, 1999). By weakening domestic markets, Uganda grew increasingly reliant on foreign capital. This served to further entrench Uganda's position in the global economy as a supplier of commodities and buyer of manufactured goods from developed nations. The shape of economic reform in Uganda is thus a reflection of the weak bargaining position Museveni held when negotiating IMF aid funding. With that said, Museveni's power within the Ugandan state allowed him to manipulate the implementation of the SAP and further consolidate his regime.

The IMF sought to improve the overall efficiency of the state by reducing its capacity to engage in neo-patrimonial practices but the political instability this would have brought about was so great that State leaders were forced to circumvent it. The conditions of IMF funding required the Ugandan state to reduce the number of state enterprises and the overall size of the state as a measure of employees. The rationale behind these conditions was that, by reducing the size and scope of the state, there would be fewer opportunities for neo-patrimonial practices and efficient economic practices would be able to replace them. However, if these conditions were to have been comprehensively implemented they would have severely undermined Museveni's capacity to maintain favour with his political power base, the mafutamingi. For this reason, when privatization began in 1992 it was carried out slowly at first and with great hesitancy (Mwenda & Tangri, 2005, p. 453). It only began to pick up pace during the mid-1990s once political elites had figured out how the process could be coordinated so as to replace the neo-patrimonial function that the distribution of state resources previously served. The privatisation of state-owned enterprises was directed so that buyers were political allies, semi-autonomous agencies were established to distribute jobs to supporters while avoiding bans on civil service hiring, and the largely classified military budget became the subject of misappropriation (Mwenda & Tangri, 2005). In this case, the domestic power structure enabled the

maintenance of inefficient economic practices. However, the alternative option was for Museveni to voluntarily dismantle the basis of his political support which would have led to political instability and jeopardized the entire reform programme.

Tanzania under Mwinyi (1985 - 1999)

In 1985, Nyerere stepped down as President and his successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, adopted the IMF conditioned structural reform programme. Mwinyi followed a similar policy programme to the one implemented in Uganda, only he faced greater internal political resistance than Museveni. After resigning as president, Nyerere assumed the role of party chairman and continued to oppose structural adjustment policies. This turned the policy process into what Hyden & Karlstrom (1993) refer to as 'ideological', meaning the issue was high in conflict and ambiguity. This, along with the weakened state capacity caused by years of economic crisis, served to slow down the implementation of the SAP. Nevertheless, Mwinyi pushed forward with adjustment measures and during 1986, the Tanzanian Shilling was devalued in three stages from 16 shillings per dollar to 40 shillings per dollar (Biermann & Wagao, 1986, p. 99). The absence of political uproar as Nyerere had anticipated acted as a strong indication that the public was prepared for policy reform (*ibid.*, p. 100). This shift continued through to the end of the 1980s, at which point Nyerere resigned from his position as chairman and any remaining interest in socialist policy withered away. At this point the policy-making process entered the 'institutional' phase. It had become widely accepted that economic reform was necessary and as political views aligned the focus shifted to improving the institutional capacity needed to carry out said needed reforms.

What does this case study tell us about meaningful reform in Africa?

Both Uganda and Tanzania ended up acquiescing to the conditions of the IMF in order to access valuable aid assistance. The IMF reform packages were designed to rapidly improve economic indicators and restructure African economies so that they could play a productive role in the global economy. By accepting these measures, both states forewent the possibility of achieving reforms that were designed with the long-run development of their nations at heart. However, Nyerere's reign demonstrated that even when the well-being of the population is made the priority, many African states lacked the necessary resources and capacity to achieve meaningful reform without aid

assistance. Had Nyerere lacked this power and accepted the IMF's conditional aid, the policy route Mwinyi went down would have simply been expedited.

Museveni's lack of power during his initial negotiations with the IMF led him to agree to structural adjustment outright. The power that he did possess, vis-à-vis the Ugandan public, enabled him to manipulate the implementation of SAP so that it replaced the neo-patrimonial function formerly provided by state resources. This maintained the neo-patrimonial character of Ugandan politics which produced economic inefficiencies. However, the maintenance of the neo-patrimonial order was a necessity because a sudden dismantling of it risked the complete collapse of political stability. Had Museveni lacked the power to use structural adjustment for neo-patrimonial ends, it is unlikely the policy measures would have been adopted at all because they would have directly undermined his ability to remain in power. This would have limited Uganda's capacity to carry out reform at all and an outcome similar to Nyerere's experience of severe economic depression could have been expected.

Ultimately Uganda and Tanzania arrived at similar economic outcomes, despite having rulers with contrasting power profiles, demonstrating that structural factors dominate variations of State leader power. African leaders faced a catch-22 situation. They lacked the financial power and state capacity to implement meaningful reform independently, as evidenced by Nyerere's failures. Yet the only way to access the necessary financial support was by agreeing to a reform package that reinforced the corrupt and unequal nature of economic power in their country.

Conclusion

The power held by State leaders had minimal impact on the outcome of reform in Uganda and Kenya, and didn't serve to change how meaningful the reform that occurred was. Nyerere's ideological reservation had the greatest impact on the way reform was implemented, serving to prevent IMF prescribed reform from being adopted in Tanzania during his rule. However, this power became insignificant when Mwinyi adopted the programme shortly afterwards. Museveni's weakness vis-à-vis the IMF led him to adopt SAP but the existing conditions in Uganda meant that the programme primarily benefited a narrow group and furthered the state's dependency on foreign actors. His

power within Uganda allowed him to implement SAP while retaining the ability to continue neo-patrimonial practices. In both cases, very similar reform packages were implemented and in neither case can the reform be considered meaningful given that the economic system primarily served the domestic elite and the IMF's powerful actors.

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“We know how gods are made. Comes now the time to make a world”: Rewilding the Self and the World in Jack London’s *The Call of the Wild*.

James Murray

In their landmark 1998 article, “Rewilding and Biodiversity: Complementary Goals for Continental Conservation” (p.22), Michael Soulé and Reed Noss define “rewilding” as the restoration of the wilderness through the reintroduction of large predators, for their regulatory function. At its heart, rewilding concerns the return of nature to itself. It seeks to restore ecological integrity and vigour to the world. In his book, *Feral: Rewilding the Land, Sea, and Human Life*, George Monbiot (2014) suggests that people have come to exhibit a sort of ingrained ennui as a result of modern life. He terms it “ecological boredom” and argues that many people in the 21st century long for a return to nature – a reignition of an existence at one with the world. Thus, he avers, not only is the physical environment in need of rewilding – humans are as well (London, 1915). These missions, though ostensibly separate, are fundamentally linked. Both people and the world stand in need of rewilding; we need to immerse ourselves in the natural world as much as the natural world needs the biodiversity to which it once staked a claim. This imperative is taken up by Jack London in his celebrated dog story, *The Call of the Wild* (1903) (hereinafter *Call*). *Call* traces the development of Buck – part St Bernard and part shepherd dog – as he is uprooted from his life of comfort in the Santa Clara Valley in California and cast into the wilderness of Alaska and the Klondike region of Canada. His return to the wilderness engenders his transformation to a more authentic, wolfish existence. This essay argues that such a transformation can also be effected in humans: reconnection with the natural world is integral to remedying the spiritlessness and restrictive routine of modern society.

“According to London,” Jonathan Berliner asserts, “the individual must return to an environment

that will engage him directly with the innermost self” (p.66). The environment in which Buck realises this innermost self – his lupine self – is the wilderness. Wilderness stems from the Old English term *wildēornes*, which translates as “self-willed land” (Foreman 2004, p.1); it is this state – in which the land governs its own development – to which rewilding as an ecological process aspires. Soulé and Noss put forward three features of the contemporary rewilding project: large, protected reserves in the wild; interconnectedness among habitats; and keystone species (pp.23-24). The goal of rewilding is not to preserve stasis in habitats; rather, it seeks to reduce humans’ part in ecosystem management to a passive role, thus favouring their organic development (including disturbances like natural disasters and diseases) (Ceausu et al. 2015). It opens up the possibility of valuing nature for itself rather than regarding it solely as instrumental in society’s ends – corporate, capitalist and corrupt. Rewilding, for humans, shares a kindred goal: just as it seeks to minimise human influence in the ecological community, it also aims at reducing society’s influence in the lives of individuals. In a society in which issues such as alcohol and drug abuse, crime and delinquency, mental health difficulties and even suicide have been correlated with deep-seated boredom (Brissett & Snow pp.237-38), the project of rewilding seems more vital now than ever before. It is in the wilderness that people are freer from contemporary societal constraints; located as it is beyond the bounds of civilisation, the wilderness is the site wherein humankind can reawaken its more primitive self. There, the demands of modern life are absent; there, people may find a sort of haven. Sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson (1984) coined the term “biophilia” to describe human beings’ innate and genetically-determined affinity with the natural world. He argues that people possess an “urge to affiliate with other forms of life” – the need to escape domesticity and return to a wilder state of being (p.85). In order that people can return to themselves in the wilderness, its integrity is paramount. Restoring the wholeness of ecosystems will in turn create spaces in which people can reclaim their own integrity, independent of social pressures.

Conjuring images of scorched deserts, formidable tundra and verdant expanses, the meaning of wilderness has changed considerably through history. It entered the North American lexicon in the nineteenth century as a state of nature which needed protection from rapid technological development. In the American imagination, the wilderness came to represent liberation, natural beauty and a refuge from the dangers and temptations of modern life (Ceausu et al. 2015, p.26). It was

against this backdrop that Jack London's *The Call of the Wild* was published in 1903. Retrospectively, *Call* was prescient in its characterisation of nature as brimming with rewilding potential, symbolised by Buck's ultimate return to the natural world. It is when Buck crosses the boundary between the camp (a vestige of civilisation in the vast wilderness) and the forest that John Thornton recognises the "transformation" that takes place in Buck; "[a]t once he became a thing of the wild" (p.80). Such is the effect of the wilderness on Buck: he gains agency and reverts from canine to a truer, more archaic lupine self. London was aware of the hostile majesty of the wilderness; he termed the vast expanse of wilderness in the Northland "The White Silence", characterised by coldness, austerity and inviolability. In his first novel, *A Daughter of the Snows*, he would say of it,

...in the young Northland, frosty and grim and menacing, men... stripped likewise much of the veneer of civilisation – all of its follies, most of its foibles, and perhaps a few of its virtues. ... but they reserved the great traditions and at least lived frankly, laughed honestly, and looked one another in the eyes (p.202).

In order to survive in such a harsh clime, London maintained that people must adapt; divested of the trappings of civilisation, virtues such as fraternity and courage are of prime importance in the wilderness. Earle Labor (1962) credits London with striking a positive note about our place in the wilderness and our potential to impact it: according to Labor, London believed that "man... must become a self-appointed guardian of the wilderness, protecting it against all attempts to assault and corrupt morally or materialistically" (p.155). This position is exemplified in the character of John Thornton – the only human character in *Call* who is in touch with his inner wildness. A seasoned gold prospector, Thornton lives in close proximity to nature and is versed in the ways of the wilderness (he urges Hal, Charles and Mercedes not to venture out on the ice as it is melting and will not bear their weight, p.57). It is clear from the novel that people may benefit from their relationship with the wilderness and indeed enter into a kind of symbiosis with it, as when Buck, at the close of *Call* (when he has truly become one with the wilderness), roams the vastness of the North, carefree and empowered: "It was a boundless delight, this hunting, fishing, and indefinite wandering through strange places" (p.74).

It is not only the natural landscape which London attempts to rewild in *Call*; in his return to the natural world, Buck's psychic landscape is also rewilded. London's mission is made plain in the epigraph with which *Call* opens:

Old longings nomadic leap,
Chafing at custom's chain;
Again from its brumal sleep
Wakens the ferine strain (p.5)

Deep within every individual, it suggests, there lies a “ferine strain” which can emerge at any moment. The “brumal sleep” to which the verse refers intimates the dormancy of such primitiveness; it lies in hibernation and will awaken when needed, when called upon by circumstance – when one is unfettered from the constraints imposed by society. Taken from John Myers O’Hara’s poem, “Atavism”, the lines epitomise the process which Buck undergoes over the course of *Call*. From the moment he is deracinated and cast into the wilderness of the Northland, Buck is said to be able to “adjust himself to changing conditions”; he “unconsciously... accommodated himself to the new mode of life” (p.21). Via free indirect discourse, it is with Buck that readers are aligned for almost the entirety of *Call* (save for a few moments in which John Thornton is the focalising character). In a vignette with which the opening chapter draws to a close, Buck experiences snow for the first time (having lived in sunny California until then, he has had no experience of it). London deliberately withholds the labelling of the snow, however; as Buck experiences “this white stuff” (p.14) for the first time, it is defamiliarized and readers experience it anew alongside the callow Buck. It is a pivotal moment for the young wolf, as he encounters an element of nature with which he will have to contend for the rest of his life. In such moments, London advocates a sort of ontological reset; unity with the environment can bring people back to a foundational existence, from which a greater consciousness – of the self and the world – can be sought.

Buck attains a new identity over the course of *Call*, one which is greatly at odds with his former self

under Judge Miller. W. C. Harris (1997) acknowledges the lengths to which Buck goes to formulate his rewilded identity: “He [Buck] labors at his new sense of himself – he actively engages with new urges and thoughts: sometimes he resists; sometimes he obeys. Buck is learning something, certainly, and learning it by engaging with it” (p.96). It is Buck’s forbears whose fierceness he comes to embody as he reconnects with his inner wildness. On cold nights, as Buck points his snout toward the moon and howls, wolf-like, “it was as though his ancestors... [were] pointing their noses at the stars and howling down through the centuries with him” (p.23). This moment of affinity with his ancestors foreshadows the long-drawn howl Buck hears repeatedly as his transformation nears completion. As he lives a life of devotion to John Thornton, Buck often wakes from sleep with a start, to a sound “like, yet unlike, any made by a husky dog” (p.76). Eventually succumbing to the call, he follows it to a glade where he spies a lean timber wolf howling at the sky. After uniting with this wolf (his “wood brother”, p.78), he runs through the forest with him – he has answered the call of the wild. Buck’s inner rewilding manifests in his responding to the howls of his lupine brothers: his forming an alliance with them represents his reunion with the wilderness and his primitive ancestry. Buck “[comes] into his own again” as the “ancient song” of his forbears surges through him (p.23). In his book, *The Nature Principle*, Richard Louv urges reconnection with the environment in which we evolved, in order to recover a primal element of our humanity. He notes that in prehistory, humans evolved in hunter-gatherer societies and therefore unity with the environment inhered in their survival (as they killed and foraged for food) (p.228). Modernity – its individualism, urbanisation and technologisation – is marked by its remoteness from the natural world; like Buck, answering an atavistic call can enable us to uncover a more “authentic” self, as Louv maintains.

Thus, by the close of *Call*, Buck is rewilded. The former domesticated dog is now unshackled and free. He leads a pack of wolves and becomes mythic in proportion. Herein lies an example of rewilding; Buck’s re-establishment in the wilderness is emblematic of the potential of the rewilding project to reinvigorate the natural world and the people within it. In “Rewilding and Diversity”, Soulé and Noss (1998) put forward two non-scientific justifications of rewilding: human responsibility and the restoration of the ‘wildness’ of the wilderness. They argue that the essence of nature is undermined when it is devoid of its natural hierarchies and wildlife dynamics; it is “incomplete, truncated, overly tame” (pp.23-24). Taking their thesis as his point of departure, Monbiot suggests that we – humanity

– are afflicted with a sense of dissatisfaction arising from contemporary life, its superficiality, busyness and pleasure-seeking. In order to reconnect with our inmost selves, we must strive to immerse ourselves in the natural world. This is the achievement of London's protagonist in *The Call of the Wild* – though it is not of Buck's own accord that he is thrown into the wilderness of the Northland, he adapts nonetheless. By the close of the novel, Buck has not only answered the call of the wild; he has become the wild. With respect to humankind, rewilding is principally concerned with restoration: succeeding the 'back to the land' movement of the 1970s (Dunn 2016, p.38), it seeks to heal the wounds caused by modern civilisation. In his introduction to Upton Sinclair's *Cry for Justice* (a volume of writings on the struggle of humanity against social injustice), London commented: "We know how gods are made. Comes now the time to make a world" (p.11). His comment is particularly germane to the project of rewilding, for it is fundamentally about the creation of a new world in which the self can be truly realised.

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Defining Intersectionality in the Social Sciences

Devin Liss

From a relatively obscure legal concept to a viral social justice buzzword, the term ‘intersectionality’ was originally coined by Kimberle Crenshaw thirty years ago. The first mention of the word in her article *Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Gender* is seen in this quote: “[b]ecause the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which Black women are subordinated,” (1989 p. 140). By this definition, Crenshaw is proposing intersectionality as a framework through which to view inequality, one that asks us to rethink discrimination not as the sum of its parts (racism, sexism, etc.) but rather as a multitude of factors that must be critically analysed at their intersections. However, as the term takes its place in academic discourse, there is a call for a firmer understanding of intersectionality’s intention and potential. Many scholars have debated whether it belongs to theory, method, or should be defined simply as a lens. “In scholarly work, ‘methods’ are practical hands-on steps for doing research,” (Schneider 2014) such as; coming up with a hypothesis, collecting data, and selecting an answer to the research question given that data. Whereas, a theory is “a set of ideas that provides an explanation for human society,” (Trueman 2015). These are chosen ideas, based on proposed significance, which offer a specific view of reality. Theory can be thought of as background knowledge for an experiment and method as how the experiment is conducted. Given intersectionality’s unresolved methodological issues, its simplification of power relations, and scholars’ tendency to stretch the term too thin, it is most reasonably argued that intersectionality is currently a lens that, through honing its methodology and praxis, has the potential to become a critical social theory.

Although the term intersectionality is relatively new, its concept is not. In the 19th century, Sojourner Truth’s experience as a woman and a black person during the time of slavery is summarized by

her line “Ain’t I a Woman?” (1851). Speeches such as these would lead future feminists scholars to question the lack of anti-racist discord in their own field. It was time to let go of the ‘either/or’ mentality - or in more academic terms, the unitary approach. Prior to intersectionality, researchers focused on one axis or another which didn’t provide a full picture. To remedy these holes, different approaches were adopted. In *When Multiplication Doesn’t Equal Quick Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm*, Hancock outlines these approaches (2007). She starts by criticising the multiple approach for locating categories as fixed and unchanging. Similarly, she claims the additive approach pits minorities against each other by constructing experiences as separate and summative. Moreover, each of these approaches fail to account for the possibility that someone’s social location could both empower and oppress them depending on the context. So what categories should social sciences consider? McCall (2013) answers this question by identifying approaches that help to further the intersectional goal of disrupting the belief that identities are static or perpetual (Hillsburg 2013). However, she recognizes that these approaches all present their own shortcomings. Anticategorical complexity, for example, aims to deconstruct categories as they are seen as too restrictive. Meanwhile, an intercategorical approach would argue identity categories need to be understood as long as they are recognized to be in flux. Lastly, intracategorical approach focuses on the dangers of categorizations while stopping short of dismissing them (McCall 2013). Clearly, the problem persists: “how to ask questions about experiences that are intersecting, interdependent, and mutually constitutive...” (Bowleg 2008, p.314).

This lack of a consensus on how to frame intersectional study is preventing it from being seriously considered as a critical social theory. Therefore its conflicts must be addressed, especially since conflict is how intersectionality came to be. Division was central to feminist analysis and therefore power relations were brought to the forefront. Salem notes how hiding intersectionality’s conflicts also hides its analysis of power relations, and instead paints it as just a field of general diversity (2018). To remedy this, power relations must be consistently analysed through the theory of social stratification. Social stratification, as defined by Yuval-Davis, “relates to the differential hierarchical locations of individuals and groupings of people on society’s grids of power,” (2011 p.162). This falls on intersectionality as it must be recognized, like identity categories, to be constantly in flux. So not only must these inequalities be analysed on the national, international, and regional levels, but they

must also be viewed at the intersections of time, of when the oppression was experienced. Hillsburg recognises some of the above problems as owing to the complexity of the multitude of categories and how to account for them in a research project. At the same time she recognizes that diffusing these categories can lead to further oppression of those currently marginalised (2013). To address this, she proposes three axioms to help guide researchers to find a middle ground. Firstly, it is important that the researcher, though they must define their project from the outset, does not imply or push identity categories onto the subject. Instead of isolating one facet of their identity, discuss which are most important to the research project in order to allow for self-identification. This will help researchers avoid falling back on preconceived ideas. For example, much of the research out there today places minority groups in the centre of majority spaces. Whereas in reality, the majority of black women, to provide an example, live in black societies. This is crucial to take into account since portraying black women as exclusively oppressed does not allow consideration of discrepancies in privilege within an ethnic or gender group (Nash 2008, p.12). Secondly, Hillsburg draws on Derrida's idea of 'différance' to explain that these categories are not always fixed nor readily apparent - therefore they must be referred back to throughout the research process. One way to enforce this is through asking what Mari Matsuda calls 'the other question'(1991 p. 1183). For example, Matsuda suggests if you see something that looks racist, look for the patriarchy within that, or the class interests in something that looks homophobic, and so on. This helps to clear up the often critiqued complexity of intersectionality while showing that it can still be studied critically. Lastly is to accept that every human is vulnerable, and to account for your own position of privilege. This allows each subject to be understood as belonging to an 'interlocking network of oppression', a concept that can dismantle harsh distinctions between oppressor and oppressed. These axioms are important guidelines to allow marginalised people their own voice, instead of speaking for them.

Much of today's confusion surrounding intersectionality stems from an initial misunderstanding of its objectives. Some scholars thought it meant to privilege certain minorities over others or simply point out existing areas of limitation within the field. In reality, intersectionality serves to provide a whole new perspective of identity, or at least to bring to light the experiences of unrepresented voices. This is why it is crucial to clear up any remaining confusion on intersectionality's aims. Its methods must be standardised in order to utilise it to its fullest capacity, as a critical social theory. However,

there are fears that broadening intersectionality's scope to account for its potential will take away from those who currently benefit from its popularity. Specifically, Alexander-Floyd noted how black women are subject to a paradox of invisibility; they are often viewed as prominent cultural symbols but are simultaneously seriously underrepresented in research and social policy. In fact, from 1970 to 1985 no full length political science journals with titles or abstracts relating to black women were published (2018 p.9).

Progressing from this exclusionary history, intersectionality has helped black women advance from visible symbols to having visible needs. Further conceptualising intersectionality could prove exclusionary. Not only this, but trying to understand all of intersectionality's potential instead of focusing on its success with raising black female voices, could render it ambiguous and therefore less appealing to academia. "It is these moves to stretch intersectionality and make it an approach that fits all feminist ontologies that has undermined its radical potential," (Salem 2018). Rather than continuing to stretch out the term, perhaps it is best to see the power it already wields. It is thus far an internationally recognized term, with sweeping acceptance from feminist scholars. Using its quick success in social justice efforts may be the real key in progressing intersectionality from a lens to a theory employed in practice. For example, with the recent state-wide abortion ban in Texas, intersectionality activists would consider how particular communities, take Mexican-American women, would be impacted by these new barriers. In this example alone so many factors - from the affordability of driving out of state to receive care, to hesitancy to ask for help depending on citizenship status - require looking at intersecting barriers as well as their solutions. Concerns regarding over-conceptualising intersectionality, along with a focus on achievability and value, have led some to argue that the debate should centre wholly around what intersectionality does rather than what it is.

From this perspective, focusing on intersectionalities' performativity may do more than probing at concepts and theories. Such probing also causes fear over erasing intersectionality's beginnings in black feminism, or, in other words, whitening it. This sort of political side-lining, seen through voter suppression and keeping black women from office, as well as taking credit from black thinkers and activists, is still common and should be watched out for. Intersectionality has exposed some of these

atrocities and has the power to keep the focus on multiply marginalised people. The aforementioned caution is especially relevant given that intersectionality first emerged as a response to Eurocentric feminist studies centred around white middle class women. It proposed a solution, or an attempt rather, to make feminism a more complete movement. However, while intersectionality has tackled some structural oppression in the US through passing the microphone to black women, it also has the potential to predict changes through its unique perspective of looking at identity in flux. By placing intersectionality in different contexts, amongst different groups in different parts of the world, it can uproot micro and macro systems of oppression through its variability.

In the spirit of defining intersectionality through what it does rather than what it is, Sara Salem (2018) took on the role of tracing how the concept has moved from its origins in the United States. Firstly, through its travel to Europe, Salem argues that intersectionality's critical potential diminished due to Britain and Germany's decoupling of the term from its anti-racist roots, employing a Eurocentric understanding of race. Of course, anywhere you travel will have different ideas of race, gender, and class but the case of Germany is especially harmful where there was a tendency to silence women of colour within feminist discourse. To account for these differences shaped by geography, intersectionality risks being turned into a 'catch-all' approach. Salem proposes the field reclaims its radical beginnings by focusing on what change intersectionality can and has enacted in the US instead of delving into its methods and getting caught up in academic language. However, inequalities in the US and elsewhere necessitate greater attention to intersecting experiences of diversity. More than just daily interactions, people are embedded in multiple systems and each layer requires evaluation. Despite its complexity, it is not impossible to hone intersectionality's methodology to standardise it for practice. For example, determining how groups utilise technology and control in both legal and cultural domains is one way to understand exclusion and marginalisation. Given that identity is interconnected with power, this could be a crucial first step toward challenging institutions and politics. Along with this, answering key questions about who is included within a study, what role does inequality play, and looking at similarities and differences, intersectionality can be applied to developmental science while still being careful to rightfully credit black feminists for its origin (Santos and Toomey 2018).

With the aforementioned tweaks to intersectionality's methods of analysis, it could be considered a critical social theory with the potential to influence policy through its praxis. That being said, intersectionality as it stands now as a lens, is asked to do a lot. From an aspiration to a movement, Crenshaw's term has given hope to many in its quest to redefine identity and inequality. There are so many spheres of being, it only makes sense to have a theory that examines every intersection of those spheres. Humans are complex, multifaceted beings that cannot be understood from unitary and additive approaches employed by the social sciences previously. Intersectionality as a theory can illuminate difference, sameness, oppression, and power, in cultural, legal, economic, and social systems. Intersectionality put into practice can build coalitions, set agendas, and change policies. In other words, by resolving intersectionality's methodological issues, its simplification of power relations, and truly focusing the term within the social sciences, what is now a lens can quickly develop into critical social theory.

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The Political Calculus of Huey Long: Labour Relations in 1930s Louisiana

Christopher Pawlak

On September 8, 1935, Senator Huey Long was shot dead in the Louisiana State Capitol in Baton Rouge. The perpetrator was likely one Carl Weiss, son-in-law of a state judge that Long sought to oust from his position (History.com Editors 2009). As a left-wing former governor and senator from a conservative state, Long made a number of enemies, feuding not only with judges, but also with establishment politicians, newspapers, and the Standard Oil Company (Jeansonne 1994). However, one enemy stands out from the rest: organised labour. Throughout his time in office, Long passed a series of leftist reforms, raising taxes on the wealthy to fund free textbooks and infrastructure programs, and limiting the power of influential corporations (History.com Editors 2009). Despite this, on the issue of labour, a traditional ally of left-wing movements, his position was decidedly conservative (*Long* 1930; *Randsell* 1930; *Labor* 1930). Long devoted a large portion of his years in office to the empowerment of the “working man,” yet throughout this period his relationship with union forces was at best disinterested, and at worst outright hostile. In this essay, I explore the complex relationship between Louisiana’s most famous left-wing demagogue and the power of labour. I argue that organised labour’s weakness in the state informed Long’s choice to eschew the working class as a campaign partner and instead develop his own private political machine. Following his arrival in gubernatorial office in 1928, Long’s unconventional rejection of pro-union policies along with his support for robust public works programs and powerful state-owned enterprises represents a uniquely Louisianan take on left-wing populism and not a betrayal of the progressive cause.

The Louisiana political economy of the early 1900s was characterised by the centralisation of authority in the hands of a conservative political elite and the development of divisions between the state’s wealthy urban and poor rural inhabitants. In 1877, following the Reconstruction Era, in which the federal government intervened in Southern states to forcibly provide African Americans with

civil rights, the general trend in the South was that of kneecapping state governments in order to weaken the enforcement of these rights in the future. Louisiana, however, rejected this trend, instead strengthening gubernatorial power so much that governors could directly appoint individuals to positions as local as county commissioners (Powell 2012). Historian Lawrence Powell notes two significant reasons that the state was uniquely positioned to support such centralised authority. One was the effect of French and Spanish colonial rule of Louisiana as a plantation colony, under which the state experienced a more prolonged and active enforcement of direct monarchical authority than other Southern states. The other was the powerful influence of New Orleans on the rest of the state (Powell 2012). As Powell asserts, “unlike the Chesapeake, where scattered slave estates dominated social and political life, plantation life [in Louisiana] orbited around a town,” and that town was New Orleans (Powell 2012, p.390). This proclivity for centralising power in the hands of the governor gave Long the ability to exert unprecedented control over the entire state. Instead of focusing on maintaining authority over his “empire,” Long’s main priority became keeping a winning coalition together for election years. This coalition was to be found in part thanks to the unequal distribution of economic power in the state. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, growth stagnated in rural regions of Louisiana due to a lack of industry diversification. Rural Louisiana’s economy was primarily based in cash crops, a set of industries whose potential had been nearly maximised. In the same time period in urban areas of southern Louisiana, however, industrial production began to grow (Jeansonne 1994). This created a stark economic divide between the rich and expanding, but still relatively small (roughly 40 per cent) urban population and the large, poor, contracting rural population. Long used this divide to build a base among the state’s numerous rural poor inhabitants strong enough to keep him in power.

Organised labour in Louisiana, as in most of the South, was much less prevalent than in the industrial North. As a result, Southern labour organisers had substantially less of the influence necessary to push forward their agenda in state politics. In 1939, state union members per every 100 non-agricultural workers averaged 10.8 in the South, and 22.3 in all other U.S. regions (Friedman 2000). This reflects a general trend in Southern labour history of weaker unions as compared to non-Southern states throughout the post-Reconstruction Era (Friedman 2000). Were agricultural workers to be factored in, this discrepancy would likely be much larger. The lack of union participation among the

Southern populace had important, tangible effects on labour's ability to engage in political advocacy. For example, look to a report from the U.S. Department of Labor in 1932 containing a section on laws passed protecting workers' wages on public works projects. It found that during that year, Southern states, such as Alabama and Tennessee, implemented just a single wage protection statute each, while Northern states such as Pennsylvania and Michigan implemented 5 or more that year (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1932). On average, more laws protecting workers' wages were passed in non-Southern states with powerful unions than in Southern states, which tended to have weak unions. The reason for this is that in order to get elected in the North, politicians had to court the influential labour vote by giving unions the laws they wanted, but in the South, the labour vote was simply not important enough to court. Because of this, Southern unions rarely received the laws that they wanted. For Huey Long, the weakness of labour created both a problem and an opportunity. It created a problem in that he had to campaign without the organisational strength of labour unions, but also created an opportunity in that he was not forcibly beholden to their interests.

Instead of attempting to earn the endorsement of the conservative Old Regulars of the Louisiana political establishment or the marginally relevant union forces, Huey Long campaigned directly to the agrarian and industrial workers of Louisiana, with an emphasis on large-scale speaking events and propaganda. Because Long could not rely on unions to organise sufficient working class support for him to win any significant election, he did such organising work himself. Campaigning for governor, both unsuccessfully in 1924 and successfully in 1928, Long made stump speeches throughout rural Louisiana. For candidates associated with the Regular Democratic Organisation, or the Old Regulars, the New Orleans political machine that dominated Louisiana politics, campaigning in the rural north of the state was rarely even considered due to the region's comparatively low rates of participation relative to the more urban south of the state (Vaughn 1979). By simply showing up and campaigning to them directly, Long made himself immensely popular with a group of Louisianans who felt alienated, both from their own labour in the Marxist sense and from the elitist environment of state government in the political sense. To capitalise on this sense of alienation, Huey Long created his own weekly newspaper in 1930, titled *The Louisiana Progress*, to keep his supporters updated and involved in advocating for his political goals (*The Louisiana Progress* 27 March 1930). Having been in office for two years once he began publishing his paper, Long already possessed a large number

of political appointees who served at his discretion. He forced these appointees to contribute a portion of their salaries to support both the operation of Long's newspaper and his campaign (*The Times-Picayune* 1 April 1930). This generated a feedback loop in which the financial support of Long's government loyalists allowed him to expand his popular support through the paper, and this expanded popular backing allowed Long to fill even more government positions with people who would contribute to his campaign and paper.

While Long's campaign tactics were generally focused on the empowerment of the poor and the working class, these strategies rarely applied to the disenfranchised African American community, who Long's campaign regularly used as a wedge when politically beneficial. In late August and early September of 1930, Long's Louisiana Progress began ramping up attacks against Senator Joseph E. Randsell in anticipation of the Democratic primary election on September 8 for one of the state's two senate seats. Long, Randsell's main opponent in the primary, had generally avoided race-baiting tactics in his previous campaigns. However, anticipating a tight race and with the resources to widely disseminate attacks through his newspaper, Long began permitting the use of openly racist language in his propagandised assault against his opponent. In one article of the *Louisiana Progress* titled "Randsell's Political Love Letter to the Negro Walter Cohen," Long claimed that Randsell "use[d] his time getting fat jobs for other negroes that white men are trying to get" (*The Louisiana Progress* 4 September 1930, p.1). This was in reference to a letter Randsell sent to state politician Walter Cohen requesting that he provide a job for one of the senator's black associates. Interestingly, the paper finds a way to mix racist rhetoric with Long's own personal support for the working class. Though obviously a racist attack, Long's campaign couched it as an appeal to "the right of labor" for white Louisianans (*The Louisiana Progress* 4 September 1930, p.1). In another article published that same day, Long used similarly racist rhetoric to attack New Orleans newspapers who were highly critical of his campaign, and once again justified his racism as an ostensible defence of the working class. In this article, the *Progress* attacked the "ring papers," the term Long's campaign gave to the *Times-Picayune*, the *New Orleans Item-Tribune*, and the *Daily States* newspapers, for providing legal defence to the African American perpetrators of a prison mutiny in a state penitentiary (*The Louisiana Progress* 4 September 1930). In concluding the article, the *Progress* wrote, "So there you have it: The newspapers... and the widow of the ni--er hi-jacker have all now a common cause in furthering

the design and purpose of the Ringster who doesn't want anybody to work at the penitentiary" (*The Louisiana Progress* 4 September 1930, p.1) Here, Long again took advantage of the racial biases of his voting base while centring his critique on the consequences it would have for his working class supporters in the prison industry. Despite what some historians have claimed, Long did not in any way avoid using racism and other social wedges to motivate voters. Instead, he found ways to tie racial biases to real economic issues in ways that made his left wing economic policies seem more reasonable.

Once Long entered office, he rarely endorsed pro-labour legislation, instead focusing on public works programs that would indirectly empower workers due to these programs' broader base of support and less targeted benefits. In an article from the *New Orleans States* editorial board, republished by *The Shreveport Times*, the paper attacked Long as a hypocrite for claiming to support the working class while maintaining and promoting anti-labour policies in Louisiana. It claimed that Long's support for prison labour, his backing of an anti-union judge against one promoted by the American Federation of Labor, and his decision to call in troops to break a transit union's strike were all evidence that Long was in fact hostile to the interests of labour (*The Shreveport Times* 4 September 1930, p.4). Though the *States*, like most Louisiana newspapers at the time, was often biased against Long, these actions show a strong opposition to labour in his decisions as governor. On the other hand, many of Long's larger initiatives show a powerful, albeit less direct, support for the working class. Long promised to build 3,000 miles of paved highways in Louisiana, connecting underserved rural communities to larger towns and cities. His paper claimed this would "Plac[e] a hard-surfaced road within one mile of the door of seventy-five per cent of the people in the state" (*The Louisiana Progress* 27 March 1930, p.1). By the end of his term, Long's government built over 9,700 miles of roads, as well as 111 bridges (Rosen 2020). These programs were instrumental in connecting rural communities to each other and to major centres of industry, setting the stage for more effective union organisation efforts in the future. In addition to this, Long pushed for legislation providing free textbooks for schoolchildren, and adult literacy courses that drastically reduced illiteracy in the state (Rosen 2020). Increased rates of literacy allowed the people of Louisiana to educate themselves politically, creating a populace more willing and able to advocate for their own interests in the future.

Huey Long and his allies recognised that the weakness of organised labour in Louisiana meant that though much of their support would be derived from the working class, it was not politically beneficial to take explicit action to show support for the labour movement. Instead, Long advocated for workers by defending state owned companies and public works projects. In response to accusations that *The Louisiana Progress* used labour in Mississippi instead of Louisiana to print newspapers and that this made Long anti-labour, an article in the *Progress* mounted a defence of their use of the Mississippi factory. Instead of arguing outright in favour of using Mississippi labour, Long's campaign claimed that none of the workplaces in Louisiana capable of handling the volume of newspapers they produced were union shops, and that providing good wages to workers was more important than doing so in Long's home state. The article claimed that "The printing industry of Louisiana has been so stifled and stomped upon by the capitalistic methods of the New Orleans newspapers... that fair prices and good work is almost impossible to obtain." Thus, "Louisiana organisations having printing work to do on a large scale where big presses and giant modern machinery are needed are forced to go out of the state" (*The Louisiana Progress* 17 April 1930). Long recognised that though he might have wanted to support the union effort, it was too weak in Louisiana at the time for such actions to be politically or fiscally wise. Instead, he found other ways to empower the working class. One of these was through his defence of the public ownership of the Port of New Orleans. In an article for *The Progress*, Long's campaign showed opposition to the privatisation of some of the port's functions (*The Louisiana Progress* 10 April 1930). By supporting public ownership without mentioning the negative consequences that unions would suffer under privatisation or the port's complex race relations, Long is able to show implicit support for unions without making any statements that might be politically controversial. Here, Long shows support for unionisation not directly, but as a result of his allegiance to state operated enterprise.

Long's stated support for labour on a larger scale as demonstrated through his paper, *The Louisiana Progress*, shows his anti-union actions to be a political tool and not a representation of his ideological position. In an article titled "Reds Protest Prayers Said by Christians," Long's *Progress* is highly critical of the anti-religious aims of the Soviet Union (*The Louisiana Progress* 27 March 1930, p.3). However, following this article on the same page is a much more positive piece reporting on a peaceful day-long strike in Cuba (*The Louisiana Progress* 27 March 1930, p.3). The juxtaposition of these two

readings shows Long's support for labour movements abroad, but also his willingness to capitalise on the interests of the deeply Christian population of Louisiana whose votes he needs. In *The Progress'* articles on the Soviet Union, the paper avoids mentioning their economic policies, instead critiquing their social position on religion. This is crucial to understanding Long's ideological stance. He ties together left wing economic policies which appeal to poor Louisianans and the religious social conservatism of his voters to create a leftist message that can appeal to a populace unaccustomed to such radical ideas. Long encapsulates this subtle appeal in his paper's mission statement, in which he claims, "It believes in a square deal for business. But it believes that the business of the farmer is as important as the business of the merchant, the manufacturer and the banker." The paper announces that "it believes that cities and towns should be prosperous, but it knows they cannot prosper unless the country is prosperous first" (*The Louisiana Progress* 27 March 1930, p.4). Here, Long mixed the collectively accepted priorities of Louisianan society with those of his own agrarian allies without threatening those living in urban areas. Long believed that labour should be prioritised, but only as much as was politically realistic.

The power of labour has a substantial impact on how ideology is expressed within a given state. Without a strong presence of organised labour, any left-wing movement benefits from centralisation and top-down control over its organisation, as Long's actions in Louisiana demonstrate. Without any powerful local organisations in place to help with his efforts, the only way that Huey Long was able to make a substantial difference in the level of education and financial power of ordinary Louisianans was by eschewing labour as a potential ally and instead developing an independent political machine to support programs aimed at empowering the working class of Louisiana through state sponsored programs in the fields of education and infrastructure, and reigning in the power of corporations such as the Standard Oil Company. In order to be successful with these tactics, Long relied on a number of factors relatively unique to the Louisiana government and economy. Among these were the centralisation of power in the hands of the governor, the white population's antagonism towards Louisiana's black and anti-religious communities, and most importantly the weakness of organised labour. Long used the centralisation of power to appoint loyal officers throughout the state and county governments, increasing his control throughout the state. He took advantage of the religious and racial biases of the white Christian population through articles in his newspaper,

adding enough social conservatism to his left-wing economic positions to make them tolerable to traditionally conservative Louisianans. Finally, Long depended on the weakness of organised labour at every point from his campaign for governor to his exertion of control over every level of Louisiana state government. Labour's inability to provide him the votes he needed to win election to the governorship allowed him to create the independent campaign body that he needed to keep winning elections in the state. It also allowed him the personal discretion necessary to force political patrons to contribute to the running of his campaign and newspaper. Finally, labour's inability to advocate for laws in the political sphere was an important reason that Long, as friendly to organised labour as he claimed to be, was unwilling to pass legislation or executive orders assisting labour organisation.

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Developing a theoretical framework for understanding the effect of drug use by insurgent groups who forcibly recruit child soldiers on levels of sexual violence in conflict.

Daniella Williams

Introduction

While drug usage and sexual violence are both used as socialisation mechanisms by armed groups who rely on abduction to boost their numbers, there is a significant lack of research into the links between the two. Anecdotal accounts of drug use and sexual violence occur frequently in political violence literature, but the relationship between the two remains unaddressed. This article offers avenues for future research to address these shortcomings and identify the relationship between drug use in conflict zones and sexual violence. It reviews the literature regarding sexual violence in conflict and criminological literature concerning drug use to establish a link between the two variables, then sets out a pair of hypotheses and methodology to potentially test this relationship. Finally, this article suggests Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo as two possible case studies to test this theory.

Literature Review

Until the early 1990s, the primordialist explanation of political violence was dominant in the literature. These theories claimed that most violence against civilians was arbitrary and senseless, motivated by irrational and inevitable ethnic hatreds between groups with monolithic social and economic preferences (Huntington 1993; Kaplan 1993). However, this primordialist framework was recently replaced by a more nuanced explanation of violence against civilians, which argued that

political violence in ethnically diverse, “conflict-prone” areas was extremely rare (Fearon and Laitin 1996; Chiozza 2002) and that violence served a strategic purpose (Valentino 2014). Consequently, two approaches explaining variation in insurgents’ violence against civilians emerged: firstly, that the organisational structures of insurgent groups predict their levels of violence, and secondly, that this violence resulted from strategic decisions made by leaders within insurgent groups.

Theories of sexual violence in conflict have followed a similar pattern to theories of violence against civilians. While sexual violence was previously believed to be caused by opportunity, hormone increases, and a desire to reinstate patriarchal norms, these theories have been replaced by explanations that posit that sexual violence is used as a strategic tool in combat for ethnic cleansing and inflicting terror upon civilians (Goldstein 2001; Wood 2006; Rakisits 2008; Cohen 2017). Furthermore, the levels of sexual violence in conflict vary between organisations. Brutal sexual violence was rife in some organisations with weaker norms and leadership structures such as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone (Wood 2009). In others, such as among the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka, sexual violence was rare due to strict codes of conduct enforced by the leadership’s draconian punishments against perpetrators (Wood 2009). Theories claiming that all men will engage in sexual violence if provided with the opportunity, the hormonal impulses, and a desire to reassert collapsed patriarchal norms closely mirror primordialist theories of violence. Both sets of theories assume that the outcome they attempt to explain, whether ethnic or sexual violence, is inevitable. Thus, we understand sexual violence not as an irrational, sadistic act perpetrated by all insurgents, but rather, as a tactic chosen by certain leadership groups for strategic gains in conflict.

Cohen (2017) proposes the argument that sexual violence, especially when committed in groups, serves a key strategic function in socialising new recruits. Gang rape is a particularly powerful socialisation tool for several reasons. Firstly, it poses extremely high barriers to entry: not only do soldiers risk sexually transmitted infections from the victim or other perpetrators (Cohen 2017), they must also transgress deeply inculcated social norms against gang rape (Mitton 2015). Because engaging in gang rape is a brutal, horrific act, soldiers fear they might be shunned if they confess to or attempt to describe their experience to anyone external to their unit; thus, they bond more closely to their unit (Franklin 2004; Mitton 2015; Cohen 2017). Secondly, through embodying

masculinity in the most violent and brutal way possible and exerting power over a defenceless victim (Brownmiller 1975), soldiers harden their hyper masculine identity and take on a new, more violent identity (Goldstein 2001; Baaz and Stern 2009). Partaking in gang rape allows soldiers to assume the role of a strong, virile man in a performance for their unit. To extend this analogy, the others involved in the assault become the audience and the victim is objectified as an unwilling prop (Franklin 2004). Consequently, perpetrators come to associate this masculine role with their membership in the armed group. They remain within the unit and form closer bonds with those within the group, as this further affirms their new, hyper-masculine identities. Finally, engaging in violence as a group makes perpetrators identify more with their unit; this effect is amplified when the violence is directed at an out-group (Littman and Paluck 2015; Cohen 2017) or when the rituals are more extreme (Winslow 1999).

Socialisation is an especially important function for groups who forcibly recruit a high proportion of combatants. These groups frequently face significant barriers to building unit cohesion, as abductees tend to be strangers who neither know nor trust each other. However, for the unit to function and to mitigate the risk of desertion and mutiny, individuals within the unit must form strong interpersonal bonds, establish accepted group norms and rely on each other (Goldstein 2001; Cohen 2013, 2017). Group acts of violence solve this dilemma, as they organise individuals and create a social structure where there exists none (Weinstein and Humphreys 2008). Gang rape, for its unusually strong ability to bind groups together, is either tolerated by leaders who recognise its practical use (Winslow 1999; Mitton 2015; Cohen 2017) or who have themselves been subjected to this socialisation (Wood and Toppelberg 2017). Thus, increased reports of sexual violence in warfare are associated with armed groups who forcibly recruit their troops (Cohen 2013). Cohen (2017) finds that this is especially likely in groups which forcibly abduct younger children; not only are these children removed from their social structures and families, they also seek to socially establish themselves in their armed group by adhering to its norms and regulations. In these situations, group sexual violence helps abducted child soldiers establish themselves socially within their unit. Forcibly recruited child soldiers cannot exit their armed groups without risking death or torture (Weinstein and Humphreys 2008; Mitton 2015); thus, by following the group and engaging in brutal sexual violence, they avoid ostracism from a peer group they cannot escape and establish themselves

within that group (Goldstein 2001; Franklin 2004; Wood and Toppelberg 2017). Others engage in this sexual violence out of the fear that if they do not, they will become victims themselves (Franklin 2004). Group sexual violence also poses benefits for forcibly recruited child soldiers: the prospect of group rape is often presented to them as the “spoils of war”, they form a closer bond with their unit, and they receive a masculine role which makes them feel like adult men in a scenario where they are insecure and powerless (Franklin 2004; Mitton 2015; Cohen 2017). Taken together, the vast majority of sexual violence literature proves that group rape is an unusually strong socialising mechanism for armed groups. However, missing from the discussion is an explanation of the role of drugs in group rape and how the two variables interact.

Drug use is anecdotally referenced as a feature of combat zones: specifically, in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where sexual violence and forced recruitment of child soldiers were also prevalent. Much of this anecdotal evidence initially attributed these acts of seemingly mindless sadism to drug use (Shepler 2002; Maclure and Denov 2007; Baaz and Stern 2008). However, the literature on causal links between drug usage and violence in criminological contexts is inconclusive on whether drugs make individuals more violent. Boles and Miotto (2003), in a review of this literature, find that while cocaine makes individuals more violent in laboratory settings, several variables confound its link to perpetrating violence in real life settings, weakening this assumption that drug usage turns individuals into sadistic, brutal killers. Further research shows that withdrawal is more likely to induce violence than drug usage itself (Miczek 1994). But while drugs may not directly cause individuals to become more violent, the social context in which individuals take them does. Drug usage can condition an individual into becoming more violent: taking drugs shortly before conflict, as done in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, builds a “temporal association” between drugs and violence (Mitton 2015). Those who take drugs before committing acts of violence come to believe that drugs increase their propensity for violence, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy (Mitton 2015). Additionally, drug usage during violent outbursts allows individuals to remove themselves from these situations and abdicate responsibility afterwards by claiming they were on drugs (Shepler 2002). Notably, in criminological literature, drug usage is closely associated with sexual violence, especially gang rape. These findings are backed up by a vast amount of criminological research (Jewkes et al. 2006). Thus, we understand that while

drugs may not explicitly cause sexual violence, they enable and facilitate it.

Similarly to sexual violence, drug usage is a crucial part of the socialisation process for forcibly recruited child soldiers. In Sierra Leone, the RUF drugged captives and new recruits to desensitise them to violence (Maclure and Denov 2007; Mitton, 2015). Once drugged, forcible recruits become more pliable and responsive to orders which contravene previously held norms against violence (Maclure and Denov 2007). Further, when given hallucinatory drugs, Keen (2005) finds through anecdotal interviews that in Sierra Leone, when child soldiers consumed drugs, civilians looked like “insects”. This dehumanisation facilitated large amounts of violence; because child soldiers did not perceive civilians to be fully human, they were better able to suspend norms surrounding the treatment of humans. Finally, in the aftermath of having been ordered to commit atrocities and brutal acts, further drug usage helps individuals cope with the guilt of these actions and provides relief from trauma and painful withdrawals (Keen 2005).

However, no work has been done to understand the link between drug usage and sexual violence in conflict, despite both being prevalent at the same time in several instances of conflict.

Theory

Building on the framework introduced by Cohen (2017), the following arguments regarding the connection between sexual violence and drug use in conflict zones are reached:

H1: Insurgent groups reliant on forcible recruitment of child soldiers where drug usage is widespread will commit higher rates of sexual violence.

H1a: Insurgent groups reliant on forcible recruitment of child soldiers where drug usage is widespread will commit higher rates of gang rape.

The thrust of these hypotheses holds that drug usage fuels sexual violence by combatant groups whose numbers are largely comprised of child soldiers. This prediction is made for two reasons.

Firstly, drug use facilitates sexual violence in non-conflict contexts. Rape and gang rape are

both associated with drug and alcohol abuse in criminological contexts (Jewkes et al. 2006). Boles and Miotto (2003) find that outside of a laboratory, the direct causal relationship between cocaine usage and propensity towards violence is influenced by the social context in which the perpetrators of violence are embedded. However, the trauma and violence experienced by forcibly abducted recruits, coupled with the mounting pressure to partake in violence from peers and commanders in conflict settings are more likely to influence an abducted recruit to be violent than not. The violent surroundings of conflict zones provide sufficient social context for this finding in non-conflict contexts to be extrapolated into conflict contexts. Thus, while drug usage may not explicitly cause sexual violence, its consumption enables the incidence of sexual violence and increases the likelihood that individuals engage in it. Even if this is not the case, Miczek (1994) finds that violence is more likely during withdrawal periods in non-conflict scenarios; consequently, fearful, abducted individuals suffering from withdrawal symptoms may be further predisposed towards committing atrocities.

Secondly, gang rape and sexual violence are both tools for socialising forcibly abducted recruits. Drugging abducted recruits desensitises them to violence and inhibits their understanding of the world around them, which increases the likelihood that they will follow orders commanders give them (Maclure and Denov 2007). Furthermore, by providing drugs to abducted recruits over time, even surreptitiously, commanders build dependency on themselves and force abducted recruits to remain with the unit to avoid painful withdrawals (Mitton 2015). Similarly, commanders employ gang rape as a tool to break down social norms, build unit cohesion, and provide terrified captives with an avenue through which to reassert their masculinity, as discussed above (Goldstein 2001; Cohen 2017). As both variables play a role in socialising forcibly abducted recruits, it is possible that they are used in conjunction; commanders can instrumentalise the desensitisation and increased likelihood of obeying orders induced by drug consumption to force recruits to participate in a gang rape and receive all the practical associated benefits.

Methods for Future Research

Having developed a robust theoretical model connecting drug use and sexual violence in conflict zones, the following section proposes how this theory ought to be tested.

As alluded to in the introduction, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo are ideal contexts to test the hypotheses developed and establish a more robust causal relationship. These conflicts heavily feature the variables of interest: combatants' rates of drug usage are high (Maclare and Denov 2007; Mitton 2015), conflict-related sexual violence is commonplace (Baaz and Stern 2008, 2009; Goff 2010; Maedl 2011; Cohen 2013, 2017), and a significant proportion of the violence is perpetrated by child soldiers (Shepler 2002; Kim 2006; Rakisits 2008).

If accurate, the theory suggests that results for both cases may be similar. However, a significant difference between incidents of drug usage and incidents of sexual violence in each country may indicate that the theory is inaccurate.

Further, the drugs used in each conflict differ. Consumption of cannabis and alcohol was widespread in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Baaz and Stern 2008), whereas in Sierra Leone, cocaine was consumed alongside cannabis and alcohol, often mixed with gunpowder to produce a substance known as "brown-brown" (Mitton 2015). This disparity between the substances used in each conflict ought to clarify the effects of cocaine when consumed in conjunction with cannabis and alcohol relative to the consumption of cannabis and alcohol on their own.

The approach to data collection in future research ought to mirror the approaches taken by Cohen (2017) and Baaz and Stern (2008), who collected data through fieldwork, surveys, and ethnographic interviews. Moreover, following from the adoption of the approach used by Cohen (2017) and Baaz and Stern (2008), the results of this research ought not to be extrapolated widely and generalised across other cases. Rather, these results will add to our understanding of the use of sexual violence and drug consumption to socialise forcibly abducted recruits in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

These interviews ought to be conducted with perpetrators of sexual violence, as perpetrators are more likely than victims to know whether they consumed drugs and what types of drugs they consumed prior to and following incidents of sexual violence. Additionally, it is easier to find perpetrators than victims of sexual assault; victims are likely to either be killed following the atrocities inflicted upon them or die from wounds sustained during the assault, whereas perpetrators are more likely to survive. Victims are also less likely than perpetrators to be reintegrated into society due to stigmas surrounding victims of sexual violence (Shepler 2002; Kim 2006).

During the interview process, incidents of sexual violence and gang rape should be coded as drug-fuelled or not drug-fuelled. Incidents of drug-fuelled sexual violence and gang rape should then be subjected to further process tracing to establish how drug consumption influenced the perpetration of sexual violence. The use of process tracing is crucial to obtaining useful data; while combatants may have been plied with drugs and forced to perpetrate acts of sexual violence on separate occasions as part of the socialisation process, these incidents may have occurred independently of one another. By analysing the trajectories of each incident as recounted through ethnographic interviews, a direct relationship between drug usage and sexual violence during processes of socialisation can be established and the relationship between the two variables assessed.

However, this model is not without its limitations – there exist several serious methodological challenges to collecting data concerning sexual violence. Low rates of reporting due to stigma around being a perpetrator and trauma or substance-induced memory loss bias the sample towards perpetrators who are willing and able to report having partaken in sexual violence (Goldstein 2001; Wood 2006; Maedl 2011). Furthermore, the destruction of infrastructure and societal collapse as a result of the conflict in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo further complicates data collection by increasing the difficulty of finding individuals who have perpetrated sexual assault, and those that are found are typically concentrated in cities rather than rural areas which biases the sample towards urban areas (Wood 2006).

Conclusion

Drug use has a significant impact on an individual's functioning, the socialisation of forcibly recruited child soldiers, and the violence perpetrated by insurgent groups. While previously, the relationship and interaction between the two has received no attention in the political violence literature, this research ought to demonstrate to what extent drugs affect sexual violence against civilians. This piece has developed a theoretical framework through which drug use and sexual violence in conflict settings can be plausibly connected. If this effect is strong, it ought to provide a key understanding to supplement our previous understanding of sexual violence in conflict, inform the reintegration of forcibly recruited child soldiers into society, and further demonstrate the need to cut off violent insurgent groups from drug imports.

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Why and how has the ‘Flanders poppy’ been a contested symbol in interwar and modern-day Ireland?

Kate Collins

Commemoration is an inherently and intrinsically conflictual act, being both a product and a reproducer of society’s unequal power relations; what we choose to commemorate and how we do so are under constant (re)negotiation (Graff-McRae 2010, pp.1-2). Since its introduction in 1921, the so-called ‘Flanders poppy’ has perhaps been the most contested commemorative symbol in the independent Irish state (Myers 2013, p.64). During the interwar period, the poppy was sold by the British Legion as an emblem of remembrance for those who died during the First World War, but for many in the newly-founded Irish Free State, it instead signalled one’s support for British oppression and imperialism in Ireland (Myers 2013, pp.64, 88-90; Fallon 2020). This division over the poppy’s meaning frequently spilled over into actual conflict each year on Armistice Day, also known as ‘Poppy Day’, with poppy-wearers being met with cries of ‘No poppies will be worn in this city!’ and violent efforts to remove the alleged symbol of British imperialism from their lapels (Fallon 2020; Leonard 1996; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1932).

The dispute over the poppy in the interwar years was ultimately bound up with the Free State’s attempts to negotiate its post-independence identity and define its relationship with Britain and the Empire — was Ireland a true willing and able participant in the British Empire or a victim and eternal opponent of British imperialism? The poppy conflict has served, and continues to serve today, as a proxy for this wider debate, with decisions concerning poppy-wearing being understood as an implicit statement of one’s relationship not only with Britain and the Empire, but also the independent Irish state (Canavan 2004, p.60). As long as the links between Ireland, Britain and the British Empire or Commonwealth are contested, the poppy controversy will therefore remain a live one in the Republic.

I. Armistice Day in the 1920s and 1930s Free State

The main theatre for conflict over the poppy in the interwar Irish Free State was naturally the celebration of Armistice Day on November 11th each year. A popular historiographical narrative posits that until recently, independent Ireland did not remember WWI, with its people suffering from a mass collective ‘national amnesia’, as put by F.X. Martin, over Irish participation in the conflict (Martin 1967, p.68; Bowman 2020). In reality, the interwar years in the Irish Free State did see a great deal of active, albeit unofficial, war commemoration, and it was precisely this fact which led to extensive public clashes over the poppy (Jeffery 2013, pp.117-118; Leonard 1996, p.100). At least 200,000 Irishmen are estimated to have joined the British armed forces during the war, excluding any Irish who joined units in Britain or elsewhere (Pennell 2013, p.39; Leonard 1997, p.60). Many of those who returned as ex-servicemen, and the families of those who did not, wished to commemorate Irish involvement in WWI in an open way – and they did, with the anniversary of the armistice each year becoming the major day for WWI commemoration (Jeffery 2013, p.118).

The first peacetime Armistice Day in the newly-founded Irish Free State in 1923 saw thousands of ex-servicemen attend remembrance masses and services across the country, with a large crowd made up of veterans and members of the public assembling at a temporary cenotaph in College Green in Dublin to observe the two minutes’ silence, a cornerstone of Armistice Day events (*Cork Examiner* 12 November 1923; *Freeman’s Journal* 12 November 1923; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1923; Leonard 1996, p.102). Photographs from later years show thousands of ex-servicemen and their families gathered at St. Stephen’s Green or, after 1926, the Phoenix Park, as well as well-attended ceremonies in other main population centres such as Cork (*Irish Independent* 12 November 1925; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1926; *Irish Times* 12 November 1928; *Cork Examiner* 12 November 1928; *Irish Times* 12 November 1932). Armistice Day commemorations were also popular amongst the Free State unionist community, which viewed the day as a chance to symbolically express their continued support for the Irish union with Britain and the Empire (Morris 2005, pp.154-156). November 11th each year was one of the few occasions in the new Free State when one would see Union Jacks flying and hear ‘God Save the King’ sung, usually following the two minutes’ silence (*Irish Independent* 12 November 1921; *Freeman’s Journal* 12 November 1923; *Irish Independent*

12 November 1923; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1924; *Irish Times* 12 November 1925; *Cork Examiner* 12 November 1927; *Irish Times* 12 November 1931). However, those who participated in Armistice Day events claimed that these symbols were used not because of their imperial associations, but rather because these had been the only flag and anthem that the Irish war dead had ever known (Morris 2005, pp.154-156).

The so-called 'Flanders poppy' soon joined the Union Jack and 'God Save the King' as a major element of Armistice Day rituals, to the extent that the date itself acquired the nickname 'Poppy Day' (*Cork Examiner* 12 November 1926; *Irish Independent* 14 November 1927; Myers 2013 p.64). The newly-formed British Legion launched the first Poppy Appeal in 1921 to allow individuals to remember the war dead while also donating money for struggling ex-servicemen (Myers 2013, pp.88-91). The main Irish veterans' organisation, the Legion of Irish Ex-Servicemen (which eventually amalgamated with the British Legion in 1925) quickly began to run their own Poppy Appeal, raising money in the run-up to and on Armistice Day itself through church collections and on-street sale of poppies and poppy wreaths (Myers 2013, pp.89-92). Within a few years, the poppy had arguably become the primary symbol for war remembrance in Ireland — as early as Armistice Day 1921, the (unionist) *Irish Times* remarked on the numbers in Dublin wearing the 'little scarlet flower', with similar comments featuring in various other newspapers in subsequent years (*Irish Times* 12 November 1921; for similar comments, see *Freeman's Journal* 12 November 1923; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1925; *Cork Examiner* 12 November 1926; *Cork Examiner* 12 November 1928). Exact figures for the number of poppies sold in the Free State are hard to come by. A reported 150,000 were sold in 1923, of which 35,000 were distributed in Cork alone (*Cork Examiner* 12 November 1923; *Irish Times* 12 November 1923); the British Legion claimed to have sold 77,000 poppies to Dubliners in 1928 (*Irish Independent* 12 November 1928). General take-up of the poppy was apparently quite high, with poppy-selling in the Free State soon developing into a significant operation involving thousands of street-sellers (mainly ex-servicemen and female relatives of dead soldiers), fleets of distribution vans, and several depots where stocks of poppies were sold (*Irish Times* 12 November 1923; *Irish Independent* 13 November 1925; *Cork Examiner* 12 November 1926; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1928; Myers 2013, p.91).

II. Historical Opposition to the Flanders Poppy

The Poppy Appeal in the Irish Free State did somewhat resemble that of mainland Britain; in 1924, the *Irish Times* proudly declared that in Dublin ‘the display of Flanders poppies was not equalled by any city in the British Isles’ (*Irish Times* 12 November 1924). Yet the rituals of distributing and wearing poppies in the Irish Free State differed from those in Britain in key ways: Irish poppy depots were closely guarded, with locked doors and passwords restricting access, and the vast majority of Irish poppy-sellers were women because the Legion thought them less likely to be attacked (Leonard 1996, p.104). These precautions were prompted not by official governmental opposition; both the Cumann na nGaedheal and Fianna Fáil interwar governments avoided acting against the poppy or other Armistice Day events and symbols in the hope that these seemingly pro-British imperial displays would die out over time (Morris 2005, p.160). Rather, it was republicans’ resistance to the poppy and what it allegedly stood for, as well as their wider hostility to the commemoration of Armistice Day itself, that made the flower such a contested symbol in this period. Many republicans in the Free State viewed their fellow countrymen who had fought in WWI as dupes at best and traitors at worst (Canavan 2004, p.58). They also believed that Armistice Day as a whole was much more about celebrating British imperialism and rule in Ireland than remembering the Irish killed in WWI (Leonard 1996, p.104). These views led republicans to reject the poppy, as well as the other rituals and symbols of Armistice Day, as imperialistic displays of support for the maintenance of the link between Ireland and the Empire (Morris 2005, p.156).

Republican opposition to Armistice Day and its symbols was specifically framed as being anti-imperialist in nature, with an ‘Anti-Imperial Association’ emerging in the late 1920s and holding rallies in the capital just before or on Armistice Day where speakers denounced those who took part in the commemorative events (*Irish Times* 12 November 1926; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1927; *Cork Examiner* 12 November 1932; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1934). Another meeting was organised by Fianna Fáil in the run-up to Armistice Day 1927 in order to express ‘the protest of the Nationalist people of Dublin against repetition of displays of British imperialist sentiment that are insulting to the Irish people’ (*Irish Times* 9 November 1927). ‘Poppy Day’ and its symbols thus became a key battleground in the ongoing republican struggle against the perceived continuance

of British imperialism in Ireland. The rejection of Armistice Day and its associated emblems was also the rejection of alleged attempts to portray Ireland as a willing participant in the Empire whose war dead had fallen in British uniforms fighting for a British cause. This dynamic was by no means unique to the Irish post-war experience, with the meaning and legacy of WWI also being the subject of opposing politically-contested narratives in countries such as Weimar Germany (Ziemann 2012, pp.226-227).

Throughout the interwar period, republicans in the Free State attempted to create a climate of anti-imperial intimidation by acting individually and collectively against British symbols and their display – and one of the main ways they did this was through poppy-snatching (Morris 2005, p.160). After almost every Armistice Day in the 1920s and 1930s, there were newspaper reports of individuals tearing poppies off the lapels of wearers (*Irish Times* 12 November 1926; *Irish Times* 12 November 1928; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1930; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1931; *Cork Examiner* 12 November 1932; *Irish Times* 12 November 1932; *Irish Press* 12 November 1932; *Irish Times* 13 November 1933; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1934; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1935; *Irish Times* 12 November 1937). Most of these incidents occurred on the streets of Dublin, where both commemoration and republican opposition were most concentrated, but further such altercations were reported in counties such as Donegal (*Irish Independent* 13 November 1932) and Waterford (*Cork Examiner* 13 November 1933). Motor cars festooned with poppies were also liable to having them ripped off upon stopping (*Irish Independent* 12 November 1925; *Irish Times* 12 November 1926). Some poppy-wearers tried to thwart attempts at removal by ensuring their emblems were fixed tightly (*Cork Examiner* 12 November 1932), or in one instance going so far as to hide a razor blade in their poppy to cut the fingers of anyone who touched it (*Irish Times* 12 November 1932). Those who physically resisted attempted removal of their poppy were frequently met with violence, resulting in street scuffles (*Cork Examiner* 12 November 1926; *Irish Times* 12 November 1926; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1927; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1930; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1932; *Irish Times* 13 November 1933). In 1932, one man who fought back against an attempt by youths to steal his poppy found himself being hoisted over the side of a bridge in an attempt to throw him into the Liffey (*Irish Independent* 12 November 1932). On another occasion in 1926, an elderly man wearing a poppy on D'Olier Street was beaten by members of a crowd, and a

nearby road repairer who tried to intervene was stabbed with a penknife (*Irish Times* 12 November 1926).

Poppy-snatchers often explicitly connected their actions to the twin causes of republicanism and anti-imperialism. In 1926, a crowd of between 200 and 300 men shouted 'Up the Republic' as they stole poppies from a procession of ex-servicemen passing through the junction of D'Olier and Westmoreland Street. In 1934, the evening before Armistice Day, attendees at an 'anti-imperialist' Republican Congress meeting in College Green snatched the poppies of passers-by (*Irish Times* 12 November 1926; *Irish Independent* 12 November 1934). Armistice Day 1932 in Dublin, the first to take place under a Fianna Fáil government, was one of the most riotous of the interwar period; thousands of youths wearing tricolour emblems and bearing the slogan 'Boycott British Goods' marched around the city centre in the evening, shouting 'No poppies will be worn in this city!' and attacking poppy-wearers (*Irish Independent* 12 November 1932). Earlier in the day, a man wearing the same tricolour favour tried to disrupt poppy-selling in College Green, telling people not to buy poppies but rather small tricolour flags. An English journalist wearing a large poppy was harassed by young men who demanded he removed his poppy and, upon realising he was English, attacked him (*Irish Independent* 12 November 1932; *Cork Examiner* 12 November 1932). Individuals engaged in poppy-snatching clearly saw themselves as striking a blow against Britain and its colonial legacy in Ireland.

Some republicans took their opposition to the poppy one step further by acting against sellers rather than those who bought from them. Despite the Legion's belief that having women vendors would help prevent violence, street-sellers were occasionally attacked and their wares destroyed, as in 1928 when a girl selling poppies in Waterford town was attacked by a woman who tore up the box containing the poppies and threw them around the street (*Cork Examiner* 12 November 1928). Five years later, there were two cases in Leitrim and Dublin where a female poppy-seller was assaulted by a man who tried to destroy the poppies she carried (*Irish Times* 13 November 1933; *Cork Examiner* 13 November 1933). A particularly dramatic example of such activity occurred shortly before Armistice Day in 1928, when at least two men forcibly entered a house in Carrigtwohill, Cork, where a woman active in local poppy-selling lived. Upon finding a pile of poppies on a table they

declared ‘We have come to stop this trash’ before tipping the emblems into the fire, raiding the cash box for money already raised from poppy-selling and, as they left, tearing a coat in the hall that had a poppy in its buttonhole (*Cork Examiner* 12 November 1928).

Premises that stored or promoted poppies were similarly targeted by republicans. The most spectacular attack against such a location was a 1926 attempt by four young women to burn out a Dawson Street poppy depot run by the British Legion, pouring petrol on a table inside before setting it ablaze and fleeing; one woman was immediately apprehended by a Garda patrolling outside and later sentenced to six months imprisonment, while the rest escaped (*Irish Times* 9 November 1926; *Irish Times* 10 November 1926). The stationing of Gardaí outside the depot speaks to the perceived threat of violence against such places, with special police watches being instituted over poppy depots in the run-up to and on Armistice Day well into the 1930s (*Cork Examiner* 12 November 1932; *Cork Examiner* 12 November 1934). This did not stop attacks on depots on Grafton and Pearse Street in 1932, as crowds threw stones at the buildings and smashed their windows (*Irish Independent* 12 November 1932; *Irish Press* 12 November 1932; *Irish Times* 12 November 1932). Such activity was not confined to Dublin or even to the Free State. In 1925, premises in Tullamore that advertised Flanders poppies in their window were vandalised with tar and red paint (*Irish Independent* 12 November 1925). Eight years later, hundreds of notices saying ‘Don’t Buy Poppies. Remember 1916. I.R.A. Derry’ were posted across Derry shopfronts (*Irish Press* 13 November 1933; *Irish Times* 13 November 1933).

Another tactic employed by republicans to undermine the poppy as a symbol of remembrance was the creation of alternative emblems, such as the tricolour favours mentioned above and the Easter Lily. These symbols were set up in direct opposition to the poppy – the ‘Easter Lily’, for instance, being created by Cumann na mBan in 1926 as an emblem of the republican martyrs, thus contesting the monopoly of the poppy, and indeed of Armistice Day as a whole, on remembrance of the glorious dead (Morris 2005, p.46; Beiner 2007, p.387). The celebration of perceived British imperialism was to be supplanted by the commemoration of those who had fought against it in the pursuit of the republic. The lily also had the added benefit, from a republican point of view, of indicating the wearer’s opposition to the partitionist Free State and commitment to a united Ireland completely

independent from Britain and the Empire (Morris 2005, p.46; Higgins 2016, pp.51-52). Advocates of these alternative republican symbols frequently protested Armistice Day ceremonies and rituals (*Cork Examiner* 12 November 1926, *Irish Independent* 12 November 1928, *Irish Times* 12 November 1930); in 1932, a group of young men wearing Republican emblems appeared at College Green during the two minutes' silence and told those wearing poppies to discard them in favour of Easter lilies (*Irish Times*, 12 November 1932). The creation of these alternative emblems essentially allowed inhabitants of the Free State to display their stance on Armistice Day, and by extension on Ireland's proper place vis-à-vis the United Kingdom and the British Empire, on their very lapels. This development was a highly significant one in terms of the conflict over British imperial symbols, as republicans moved beyond defining themselves in contrast to the poppy and the like to actually advancing an alternative historical narrative of their own, with its own roster of significant dates and fallen martyrs.

III. The Poppy in Modern Ireland - Change and Continuity

Today, almost a century on from the creation of the Poppy Appeal, the poppy remains a controversial symbol in the Republic of Ireland – even as the debate has shifted in a number of key ways. In the wake of the 1988 Poppy Day bombing in Enniskillen and the Good Friday agreement, the Irish state has adopted a narrative of greater tolerance of the island's so-called 'two traditions'. This shift has manifested itself in the recent tradition of leading national politicians taking part in Remembrance Day ceremonies, up to and including the wearing of the so-called 'shamrock poppy' (O'Carroll 2020; *Irish Independent* 11 November 2012; *Irish Independent* 7 November 2017; *BBC News* 8 November 2020). The very existence of the 'shamrock poppy' is itself a significant development in the long-running debate over the symbol. The Irish branch of the Royal British Legion chose the design of a red poppy inside a green shamrock to specifically commemorate Irish involvement in WW1. The badge is considered is an obvious attempt to shed some of the traditional poppy's heavy political baggage within the Irish context (*Irish Independent* 7 November 2017; McGreevy 2017; Royal British Legion, 2013). Irish politicians who have worn the shamrock poppy, such as Leo Varadkar and his successor Micheál Martin, justified their decision by arguing that unlike the regular poppy, which commemorates all British military dead, the shamrock poppy specifically remembers the Irish who died 'fighting for the United Kingdom', as Varadkar himself put it, in the First World

War (Loughnane 2018; Feighan 2018). The white poppy, created by British pacifists in the 1930s to symbolise remembrance of all war victims and a commitment to peace, is another non-traditional poppy emblem that seems to be entering Irish public discourse (Peace Pledge Union 2018); at least two TDs were pictured wearing the symbol in the Dáil last year (Houses of the Oireachtas 2020; Pringle 2020). Poppies, albeit not the usual red ones, have therefore become more visible and officially acceptable in Ireland in recent years, a contrast to official ambivalence towards the symbol in the interwar period.

Yet amidst this apparent shift, much about the poppy debate remains the same. Irish public figures who do wear a poppy, be it a shamrock, white, or traditional red one, are often sharply criticised. Although the main forum for opposition to poppy-wearing is now social media rather than the streets as in the 1920s and 1930s, the language of criticism mirrors that of the earlier period. In 2018, the Sinn Féin presidential candidate Liadh Ní Riada pledged to wear a poppy if elected and her party colleague Senator Paddy Mac Lochlainn highlighted his belief that the poppy commemorates 'all British war dead in every conflict' (Gallagher 2018; Coyne 2018). A large election poster of Ní Riada in Donegal was subsequently daubed with red paint and the slogan 'Wear your blood stained poppy' (Maguire 2018). In November 2020, Aontú leader Peadar Tóibín attacked Taoiseach Micheál Martin's decision to wear a shamrock poppy while attending a Remembrance Day service in Enniskillen, writing that by wearing the poppy 'you are honouring the Black and Tans, the killers on Bloody Sunday, the executioners of 1916' (Tóibín 2020). Others have made the connection to the poppy clashes of the interwar period even more explicit. A Twitter account named 'Anti Imperialist Action Ireland' has specifically called for the revival of 1930s-style poppy-snatching (Anti Imperialist Action Ireland 2020A), while also claiming to conduct 'poppy watch patrols' where they 'burn 'Brit Imperialist Poppy Wreaths' left around the country (Anti Imperialist Action Ireland 2020B, 2020C, 2021). A number of poppy wreaths laid at a war memorial in Rosses Point, Co. Sligo were similarly vandalised in November 2017 (Ryan 2017). Therefore, the poppy debate in modern Ireland is arguably marked as much by continuity from the interwar period as change.

Speaking in the Dáil in 1927, Minister for Justice Kevin O'Higgins, soon to be assassinated himself by members of the I.R.A. for his pro-Treaty actions during the Civil War, stated of the Irishmen killed during WWI:

No one denies the sacrifice, and no one denies the patriotic motives which induced the vast majority of those men to join the British Army to take part in the Great War, and yet it is not on their sacrifice that this State is based, and I have no desire to see it suggested that it is (Jeffery 2000, p.114).

O'Higgins' words strike at the heart of the dispute over the poppy in Ireland, which is fundamentally a competition over the commemoration of trauma – whose sacrifice do we get to commemorate in an independent Ireland (Beiner 2007, p.387)? Do we honour and remember actual Irish participation in Britain and the Empire, such as Irish involvement in WWI, or do we rather commemorate those who died for the nationalist and republican cause? In this way, the poppy wars are actually the debate over Irish nationalism and independence writ small; in grappling with what the poppy means and whether to wear it, we are also grappling with Ireland's historical and ongoing relationship with Britain and the Empire. The many methods Irish republicans have used to challenge the poppy over the years, from poppy-snatching to social media comments, speak to their continued perception of the poppy as a quasi-imperial symbol, even as individual Irish politicians have begun to embrace the supposedly detoxified 'shamrock poppy' or the more pacifistic white poppy.

The poppy has clearly become more acceptable in Ireland with the passage of time – how else could one explain a Fianna Fáil Taoiseach wearing a shamrock poppy as Micheál Martin has done this year and the year before (*BBC News* 8 November 2020; *Irish Times* 14 November 2021)? However, until any lingering conflict over Ireland's relationship with Britain comes to an end (an event which is unlikely to happen any time soon to say the least), the poppy will remain a highly contested symbol in Ireland.

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Freedom of Information's Limited Role in Canadian and British Transparency

James Burne

Introduction

Freedom of information (FOI) laws have been ineffective at achieving their objectives. While countries adopt FOI to enhance positive accountability and long-run returns through increased public engagement with institutions, politicisation prevents stakeholders from obtaining the legislation's benefits as politicians adopt defensive strategies to temper effective transparency and the costs of implementation. Hence, technical measurements are insufficient tools to determine FOI's cross-country effectiveness as the satisfaction of requests is inequivalent to substantive implications that dismantle cultures of secrecy, thereby requiring nuanced analysis of individual laws to determine FOI's effects. Resistance to the decentralisation of information in Canada has incentivised informalities within departments to limit potential releases and the discriminatory processing of politically sensitive requests to delay journalists' translation of disclosures into transparency whilst non-binding appeals prevent adequate public safeguards. Furthermore, the absence of high-quality record management and diverse user experiences within the UK reduces the significance of provisions and the benefits that the public derives whereas threats to cabinet unanimity undermine the rationale of adoption. It shall become evident that the tempered effectiveness of rights to access has prevented transformative outcomes as FOI remains ineffective.

Freedom of Information's Political Foundations

FOI represents political investments that provide long-run returns to governments and voters as transparency expands. FOI's right to access permits stakeholders to monitor and scrutinise politicians through information obtained upon request regarding their behaviour and rationale within policymaking, reducing public ignorance as administrative barriers and cultures of secrecy are removed (Shepherd, 2015). Thus, one can infer that the private information that incumbents

hold permits disclosures to be incorporated within subsequent electoral evaluations, thereby facilitating the selection of representatives characteristic of public interest. FOI's objectives are therefore mutually reinforcing and compound to enhance institutional legitimacy as voters become empowered and actively engaged with policy processes. Consequently, FOI undermines corruption incentives and self-interested policies as the capacity to conceal information is eroded, successively facilitating good governance to avoid political repercussions (Vadlamannati & Cooray, 2017). One can discern incumbents' exploitation of enhanced accountability and transparency to harbour support as the maintenance of robust reputations enhances re-election prospects relative to individuals that continually extract rents, permitting satisfaction of office-seeking interests. However, upon implementation, scrutiny and media reports facilitate scandals and increase public perceptions of corruption by 0.26 points on a six-point scale (Vadlamannati & Cooray, 2017), undermining legitimacy. Nevertheless, as enhanced accountability alters the cost-benefit analysis of corruption, realised practices decline to retain electoral returns, thereby increasing the degree of benevolent information available and subsequently decreasing corruption perceptions by 0.61 points following a one standard deviation in FOI's age (Vadlamannati & Cooray, 2017). Accordingly, one can perceive FOI as a political investment that requires upfront reputational costs to develop sustained benefits through institutional legitimacy as transparency and accountability expand, facilitating good governance. FOI is, therefore, politically advantageous to politicians and stakeholders as returns are not isolated to single periods, incentivising adoption.

However, failure to incorporate FOI's political obstacles into examinations of transparency implications hinder sincere evaluations of its effectiveness. Technical measurements facilitate empirical evaluations of success, including the capacity to provide information through reports, illustrating the removal of secrecy. Ergo, in contrast to Canada's average complete approval of approximately 39% of access to information requests during its three first years of FOI, the UK's satisfaction of approximately 64% (Hazell & Worthy, 2010) indicates its greater capacity to satisfy public desires and undermine information monopolies relative to Canada's constrained success. Nevertheless, one can perceive that the volume of approved requests is inequivalent to the legislation's capacity to satisfy its objectives. For example, in addition to political and public requests to analyse government behaviours, requests are frequently non-political and private as stakeholders obtain

information for self-interested purposes that bear no policy implications, including market research (Michener & Worthy, 2018). Hence, raw technical measures improve the perceived effectiveness of FOI, notwithstanding the minimal legitimacy returns voters receive from non-political requests. The absence of nuance within such rudimentary measures distorts perceptions of accountability and public engagement within policy processes, failing to capture sincere implications. Furthermore, politicisation has altered FOI's efficacy as restrictions regarding institutional secrecy create resistance to transparency as governments employ defensive tactics to hinder the liabilities derived from sensitive requests, altering effective disclosures (Michener & Worthy, 2018). Thus, one can surmise politicians' active tempering of FOI's associated adoption costs whilst endeavouring to maximise the reputational returns of perceived openness through the artificial reduction in damaging information disclosed. Accordingly, politicisation and enforcement concerns exacerbate discrepancies between FOI's potential and realised effectiveness, subsequently undermining accountability and transparency. Hence, the examination of FOI in isolation from political environments constrains analysis, incentivising nuanced focus to determine its transformative effects.

Freedom of Information in Canada

Canadian politicians' limited support for openness during FOI's inception has incentivised actions to mitigate its significance and retain policymaking secrecy in contrast to sincere transparency investments. Following resentment regarding the federal government's centrality of information, the 1982 Access to Information Act, ATIA, was implemented to enhance legislative and public checks notwithstanding its perceived decision-making disruptions that created hostility amongst ministers. The act was designed to dismantle secrecy and empower citizens through accessed information, subsequently supporting understandings of government decisions (Roberts, 2005). Thus, one can infer the ATIA's political adoption to maintain the legitimacy of democratic institutions and outputs as voters assess the incorporation of their interests within policy construction, thereby facilitating the employment of this knowledge within voting behaviour and enhancing effective accountability. The ATIA's significance is therefore derived from diminished alienation between government and stakeholders, thus promoting active political engagement and good governance incentives. However, while supportive of openness when in opposition, politicians actively resist FOI upon entering government to limit accountability to opposition and retain information

advantages. Ergo the visibility of formal policymaking incentivises informal consultations and decisions to limit insight into department operations, hindering effective inquiries into policies and associated motivations (Gingras, 2012). Correspondingly, one can infer that the politicisation of information hinders effective openness as governments oppose the cost of FOI's implementation, thereby creating heterogeneous support amongst politicians according to the threat transparency presents to political ends. Furthermore, the voluntary documentation of decisions and discussions incentivises officials to communicate through Blackberry messaging to prevent their recovery and subsequent release following deletion (Kazmierski, 2016), exacerbating informalities through technological innovations. One can perceive that the perpetuation of communications loopholes undermines stakeholders' evaluations of policies as the rationale of decisions and the inclusion of public interest remains ambiguous, preventing transformative transparency effects relative to pre-adoption periods. As a result, the evolution of practices has retained information's centrality, undermining the significance of the right to access.

Furthermore, discriminatory responses to sensitive requests exacerbate delays and subsequently prevent journalists' effective dissemination of information. The inclusion of applicants' occupation within requests permits governments to tailor processing per the threat disclosures present. Accordingly, within the amber lighting process, internal reviews evaluate sensitive information requested by opposition and journalists to determine potential repercussions and prepare ministerial responses before releases to mitigate backlash (Roberts, 2005). Hence, one can surmise that while the ATIA permits equal access to information, responses are conducted with prejudice as information is increasing politicised to prevent the aggravation of FOI's costs. Consequently, amber lighting's additional processing requirements substantially increased the probability of opposition and journalists' requests exceeding deadlines in six of eight analysed institutions respectively. Moreover, the proportion of their requests delayed relative to total requests expanded to 39.7% and 36.3% respectively in contrast to 17.4% for all other categories. Subsequently, as news cycles progress to alternative topics before delayed information can be employed within reports on salient issues (Roberts, 2005) discrepancies between disclosures and effective transparency are perceived as journalists' inability to employ information to assist voters' evaluations undermines the effectiveness of satisfying requests as they lack transformative implications. Thus, amber lighting processes permit

the retention of effective information monopolies, notwithstanding greater access, through perpetual ignorance, limiting the ATIA's returns. Moreover, minimal enforcement of the duty to assist mandating support of applicants through complete and timely request satisfaction irrespective of identity (Roziere & Walby, 2020) sustains discriminatory practices. Ergo, FOI's positive implications are eroded by political agendas, insulating governments from openness costs through limited public engagement. Therefore, the ATIA lacks substantive ramifications for transparency and accountability as officials undermine disclosures' adverse effects to protect political ends, dynamics technical measures exclude.

Moreover, the ATIA's insufficient appeal system fails to protect stakeholders as governments retain control of final verdicts. To protect requestors against unfair denials of valid FOI requests Information Commissioners investigate the decisions of officials and determine if withholding desired information was justified, providing neutral protection within the politicised system. However, the non-binding recommendations made by the Commissioners are incapable of mandating the release of withheld information as authorities maintain power to alter disclosures (Kazmierski, 2016), thereby failing to ensure satisfaction of requests irrespective of identified noncompliance. Therefore, one can infer that reliance upon governments resistant to transparency to comply with verdicts is counterintuitive to investigations' neutrality as the protection of legal rights is not guaranteed and becomes partisan a decision, undermining effective enforcement. Governments correspondingly maintain the capacity to artificially restrict disclosures to those supportive of reduced corruption perceptions, ergo enhancing returns whilst minimising reputational losses. Furthermore, the Commissioners' sustained budgetary dependence constrains investigations as the time required to respond to FOI complaints increased from four to five months from 1992-1993 to 1996-997 following reductions in federal funding to reduce budget deficits (Roberts, 2000). One can discern that exacerbated appeal times limit the effective employment of information to scrutinise and hold the government to account through media reports, subsequently insulating the costs governments endure from greater openness. In contrast, UK Commissioners hold substantial power, irrespective of delays, through decision notices mandating alterations to disclosures following failure to satisfy valid requests, whilst individuals retain the capacity to further appeal to the Information Tribunal (Hazell, Worthy, & Glover, 2010). Perceptions of Canadian Commissioners' absolute and relative deficiencies are apparent as the satisfaction of legitimate appeals is uncertain, undermining the significance of their

inclusion within the act. Politicisation threatens neutrality as officials determine who holds the right to access.

Freedom of Information in the UK

The absence of enforced record management compromises the capacity to guarantee access to information, thereby hampering public insight through institutional practices. The UK's 2000 Freedom of Information Act, FOIA, sought the removal of secrecy within British politics through enhanced transparency and public understanding of government decisions and associated processes, thus permitting accountability. Consequently, Section 46's Code of Practice on Records Management requires detailed record keeping to ensure effective access to and dissemination of information upon request to enhance transparency relative to pre-adoption periods (Shepherd, 2015). Therefore, one can surmise the significance of provisions to prevent mismanagement inhibitive of public engagement as the inability to assuredly provide requested information hampers the consequences of legally providing access. Ergo, the archiving of information for subsequent use facilitates robust foundations to enhance the FOIA's effectiveness through mutually reinforcing outcomes as institutional openness begets good governance and public evaluations. However, failure to rigorously enforce and maintain the Code's standards across institutions compromises the provision's significance. For instance, physical record safekeeping is inadequate as fires, flooding, and dampness within storage facilities damage files whilst digital backups are consistently missing or incorrectly stored within servers (Shepherd, Stevenson, & Flinn, 2011b), thereby compounding the risk of irreparable information losses. Therefore, the inability of the FOIA to ensure the satisfaction of valid requests derived from institutional incompetence and inefficiencies, undermining stakeholders' right to access and consequently accountability through constrained scrutiny. The absence of incentives to support transparency ,therefore, facilitates relaxed attitudes to record keeping, limiting effective evaluations when vital information is unlocatable. Whilst the FOIA places greater importance upon record keeping relative to the ATIA, limited enforcement undermines its foundational strength and consequently the provision's weight.

Heterogeneous user experiences have compromised aggregate access to information in conjunction

with minimal returns. The FOIA has enhanced transparency perceptions amongst 60% of requesters surveyed using links provided in FOI responses and department websites relative to 20% that experienced no alterations (Worthy, 2010). Thus, one can surmise the erosion of secrecy as institutional openness and monitoring expand. However, the legislation's returns are hindered by assorted experiences. In contrast to knowledgeable requesters that comprehend the specificity required to successfully file requests, inexperienced users rely upon support from requestees through the duty to assist. However, resembling the ATIA, the principle's enforcement is variable and derivative of authorities' motivations to communicate and clarify requests, thereby facilitating incorrect disclosures and denials because of requests' generality and inaccuracies (Shepherd, Stevenson, & Flinn, 2011a). Ergo, perceptions remain that irrespective of equal opportunity to file requests, access to information is inherently unequal as authorities disadvantage individuals without a robust knowledge of application processes to limit disclosures, discouraging reiterated use following dissatisfaction. As repeated users were more likely to file requests and therefore be surveyed, one can infer that transparency increases predominantly reflect the experiences of requesters capable of successfully invoking the legislation, ergo inflating the FOIA's perceived effectiveness relative to its heterogeneous accessibility. However, the FOIA has failed to enlighten successful individuals as 40% did not understand policy processes nor motivations relative to 30% and 22%, which did respectively, consequently limiting increased accountability perceptions to 20% of respondents while 30% incurred no change (Worthy, 2010). Correspondingly weaknesses exist within technical measurements as the UK's high approval rate has failed to yield substantive returns whilst unknowledgeable individuals are continually alienated, restricting cumulative benefits. Accordingly, power imbalances are consistent relative to pre-adoption periods.

The FOIA threatens perceptions of government unity in absence of cabinet paper exemptions. Individual ministers are solely accountable to parliament for their department's actions, preventing deferral of culpability to civil servants and incentivising good governance. Whilst the FOIA permits requests regarding civil servants' involvement within policymaking, their coverage within approximately 1% of media articles prevents the dilution of focus upon ministers, thereby retaining parliament's checks whilst permitting FOI to complement parliamentary questions and monitor department outputs (Hazell & Glover, 2011), perpetuating incentives for due diligence. Therefore,

one can infer that the FOIA has neither substantially enhanced nor detracted from ministers' accountability to voters and opposition, perpetuating minimal effects. However, the act limits ministers' capacity to effectively debate policies during cabinet discussions as potential releases of cabinet papers deemed in the public interest by the Information Commissioner and Tribunal in the absence of explicit exemptions, contrary to the ATIA, retain the capacity to undermine perceptions of government unity. Hence, whilst collective cabinet responsibility commits all cabinet members to claim authority for enacted policies irrespective of personal beliefs, revelations of government incoherence challenge confidence, consequently motivating executive vetoes to prevent disclosures on matters including the 2003 papers discussing deployments to Iraq perceived to threaten political stability (Hazell & Glover, 2011). Moreover, while the necessity of transparency regarding the motivations of collective decisions to facilitate public engagement can be perceived, the inability to effectively debate and incorporate alternative perspectives as ministers focus upon stability repercussions of potential disclosures hinders effective policymaking. Ergo, the absence of amendments to exempt cabinet discussions from release shall restrain discussions through the threat of retracted legitimacy bestowed to feuding governments, thus solely motivating disclosures of the cabinet's final outputs in contrast to its intermediary process to prevent sustained reputational losses and the exacerbation of FOI's costs.

Conclusion

In conclusion, one can observe that FOI laws have been ineffective in achieving their objectives. Notwithstanding their adoption to implement mutually beneficial outcomes for politicians and stakeholders through enhanced accountability and public engagement with institutions, the politicisation of the right to access information has eroded public returns in favour of reduced government costs, consequently limiting the sufficiency of technical measurements to determine FOI's implications. Irrespective of its objectives to reduce information centrality, the ATIA has facilitated informalities and discriminatory request processing to undermine the significance of transparency constraints whilst retaining power within authorities to determine the success of valid appeals. Furthermore, breached provisions within the FOIA through insufficient record keeping and the alienation of inexperienced users compromise requesters' returns whilst the potential disclosure of cabinet papers constrains government discussions. FOI's failures are accordingly

perceived through the inability to produce transformative effects as realised returns are constrained by political environments, mitigating the significance of differences in mechanical measurements between Canada and the UK. The absence of alternative practices, including enforcing duty to assist and granting exceptions to cabinet papers, shall accordingly perpetuate the insignificance of the right to access.

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Domestic actors, 9/11, and diamonds: the US and the Kimberley Process

Kylie Quinn

Introduction

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is a unique multi-level consultative private-public partnership designed to regulate a natural resource (Kantz 2017). It covers 99.8% of rough diamond production, requiring participating states to maintain customs controls to track the trade of rough diamonds (US Department of State 2021). This paper seeks to answer why major diamond importing states created the KPCS for conflict diamonds, which are defined as “rough diamonds used to finance wars against governments” (*ibid*). This paper considers a case study of influences leading to the United States supporting the creation of this global institution. This state is an appropriate choice for detailed consideration because the characteristic foreign policy of the US at the time of the KPCS would typically be neoconservative (McGlinchey 2009), whereas this process demonstrates strong multilateralism, further adding to the puzzle of why diamond importing states created the KPCS. Existing research to date largely considers non-state actors and state actors generally, and studies of the US in the KPCS are broad; this research contributes a focused neoliberal explanation to the question at hand. Neoliberal international relations theory includes the state-society approach and institutionalism; these posit that a states’ foreign relations are the product of the national government’s translation of domestic actors’ interests and that states’ foreign relations are shaped by their desire for national security information coordination and thus create international institutions.

State of the art

Much of the research to date on the creation process of the KPCS emphasizes the dominant role of NGOs in agenda-setting the issue and influencing the diamond jewellery industry (Grant and

Taylor 2004; Haufler 2009; Santiago 2014; Rina-Luoise 2011; Beiri 2010). Specifically, literature on US involvement in the negotiation process is considered tangentially to the negotiation process as a whole (Wright 2011). Additionally, some research focuses on the effectiveness of the implementation of the KPCS in the US (Petrova 2006). Finally, Thomas (2012) considers four main International Relations theoretical frameworks as applied to US support for the KPCS. In light of this prior literature, this paper seeks to highlight the US's main reasons for supporting the KPCS. To these ends, this article hypothesizes that the US supported the creation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme mainly due to (1) domestic pressure and (2) the idea that an international institution was the best solution to address conflict diamonds as a security issue.

Methodology

This work conducts a qualitative case study of the United States, drawing on relevant events leading to the KPCS's enactment in 2003 and after the most recent Plenary meeting in 2021. These time periods were chosen because the pre-KP period captures the origin and progression of conflict diamonds through the US domestic and international agenda. The post-Plenary statements demonstrate ongoing negotiation positions of US interests in the KPCS, which reflect interests consistent with the creation of the initial KPCS.

Results and discussion

Response to domestic pressure

This article found support for the first part of its hypothesis, that the US supported the KPCS due to domestic pressure, by considering the effect of US-based domestic actors on state actors leading up to enactment of the KPCS.

Evidence of NGOs' successful grassroots campaigning in the late 1990s and early 2000s suggests that the US supported the creation of the KPCS due to domestic pressure. Initially, human rights organisations brought consumer attention to human rights violations, civil war, and general atrocities in Africa while pointing to diamonds as propagating this conflict. A notable example of this is Global Witnesses' publication of "A Rough Trade" (Thomas 2012). This report publicly surfaced the issue of Angolan rebel group UNITA's avoidance of UN sanctions against rough diamonds which were

funding the civil war (Ibid). There was a notable shift on Valentine's Day 2001, when over seventy domestic groups, sponsored by a coalition of Amnesty International USA, World Vision, Physicians for Human Rights, Oxfam USA and World Relief, launched their campaign, called "The Campaign to Eliminate Conflict Diamonds" (Tamm 2004). The goal was to increase consumer concern over conflict diamonds and gain domestic support and increased pressure for conflict diamond foreign policy (Rappaport 2001). In particular, Amnesty International led an online campaign designed to increase support for the Clean Diamonds Trade Act through directing consumers to their website, which provided sample scripts and contact information for grassroots Congressional lobbying (Ibid). The launch of the Valentine's Day Campaign to Eliminate Conflict Diamonds, a year after the Kimberley Process meeting, "brought new force to the cause" (Tamm 2004, 693). This successful consumer awareness campaign formed just one part of the domestic support which translated into the US supporting the creation of the KPCS.

The campaign was particularly effective partly due to the nature of diamonds as having a socially constructed value. Common understanding of diamonds vary, but the traditional conception capitalized upon by the US jewellery industry is that of romance and love (Falls 2014). By launching on Valentine's Day, the human rights organizations co-opted the most symbolic day for the diamond jewellery industry in a budding attempt to shift common conception of diamonds to conflict. One example of this weaponized social construction is given by Grant and Taylor (2004), highlighting an NGO campaign video which imitated a diamond industry advertisement; the video changed midway from a romantic engagement to an amputation, representing the violent measures taken by armed diamond extracting groups in African diamond-producing regions. As such, this social construction was weaponized by these human rights groups against the diamond jewellery industry. The domestic industry interest groups were under pressure to cooperate as a result of intense media scrutiny of its practices; the US was the biggest consumer market for diamond jewellery (Gooch 2008).

In response to NGO pressure, the US diamond jewellery industry joined the campaign, amplifying the impact of domestic groups on the US in relation to the KPCS. Four months after Valentine's Day 2001, human rights groups and diamond jewellery industry groups struck a compromise regarding

desired foreign policy measures to address conflict diamonds (Tamm 2004). At this point, both human rights groups and industry interest groups were campaigning to the public and lobbying Congress to find a solution. Five months after that, the Clean Diamond Trade Act (CDTA), which incorporated the Kimberley Process minimum legislative requirements, was passed in the House. The Senate made the bill stronger, and the final bill was passed and signed in April 2003. However, it was not implemented by President Bush for another three months. This timeline suggests the effect of domestic non-state actors towards the creation of the KPCS; further evidence will now be considered..

The effect of domestic interest groups on foreign policy relating to conflict diamonds is evidenced by Thomas' voting reference model of Congressmen supporting the Clean Diamond Trade Act in the 107th and 108th sessions (2012). In these two sessions, Congressmen mentioned supporting the Clean Diamond Trade Act for human rights reasons 98 times, nearly three times more than mentions of the world economy or national security (ibid). The end of the 107th session evoked criticism of the weakness of the Act in stemming the flow of conflict diamonds; the 108th session provided a stronger version of the bill. Notably, between these sessions, the ratio of mentions of human rights and the world economy grew in proportion to mentions of national security (ibid), suggesting that both human rights and diamond jewellery industry interest groups also exerted influence in the intermediary period.

Additionally, the effect of domestic pressure is further demonstrated by the Bush administration's initial hostility to the scheme. Smillie (2005) provides the US's reservations about affecting the law, which include the issues of workload, cost, and trade law implications. None of these factors changed in the intermediary period between when the delay began and when the CDTA was enacted by Executive Order 13312 (2013).

Institutional solution to security issue

The second finding of this article is that the US supported the creation of the KPCS because of the idea that an international institution was the best solution to address conflict diamonds as a security

issue. Grant and Taylor (2004) suggest that al-Qaeda, who launched a terrorist attack against the US on the 11th of September, 2001, were using diamonds to fund themselves. The chief prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone has stressed the link between al-Qaeda and Sierra Leone's diamonds (*ibid*). Le Billon (2006) suggests that conflict diamonds became a security issue for the US due to its attention towards reports and studies of terrorist finance after 9/11. As previously stated, the US was the biggest retail market for diamond jewellery. So, during a crucial time period in the creation of the KPCS, the US had a unique security motivation and responsibility for stemming the conflict diamond financing flow.

Moreover, the timing of implementing the CDTA correlates with a new report on conflict diamonds as a source of funding for 9/11. The US ultimately effected the CDTA into law three months after the deadline, despite the Congressional effort made to have the bill passed and signed before the deadline. The Bush administration said its hesitance was due to WTO compliance and concerns over loopholes (Grant and Taylor 2004). Notably, the Executive Order that implemented the CDTA was issued a week after Global Witness published another report which focused on al-Qaeda's use of conflict diamonds to fund 9/11.

Additionally, comments made by US policy-makers reflect institutionalist behaviours in world politics. An example of this is in the discourse surrounding the definition of conflict diamonds within the KP organization. The definition of a conflict diamond in the KP is "rough diamonds used to finance wars against legitimate governments" (US Department of State 2021). This definition encompasses conflict diamonds that were shown to fund the terrorist attack on 9/11 against the United States. However, it is an arguably narrow definition because it does not cover polished diamonds, or diamonds fastened to jewellery. The nearly-unanimous number of signatory parties from both diamond producing and diamond importing states suggests that compromise was made in this definition. In the wake of this agreement, the US has demonstrated a consistent desire for a more broad definition in order to regulate more diamond trade. This suggests that when negotiating the initial KPCS included, the US was interested in effective institutional regulation of diamonds. For example, the November 2021 post-Plenary statement reflects a desire for the organization to expand the definition. In particular, the post-Plenary statement "expressed concern [that] the Kimberley

Process of a conflict diamond does not sufficiently address consumer concerns related to human rights and other important standards" (US Department of State 2021). This statement demonstrates a desire to cooperate in global policy-making through institutions, contradictory to its otherwise neoconservative policy. In light of its explicit concern for the consumer, this statement further supports the claim that US participation in the KPCS is due to domestic pressure. Furthermore, comments made in the 107th and 108th sessions reflect a desire to supplement the KPCS definition in the CDTA, and also wanting to be a leader in the institution (Thomas 2012).

Furthermore, the organizational design of the KPCS further supports the institutionalist explanation towards the international political response to conflict diamonds. As noted previously, the KPCS has a unique, tripartite structure which receives significant academic attention for its model of global institutional governance. LeBillon (2006) highlights the significant role of NGOs in surfacing and educating policy-makers on this security issue. The necessary role of NGOs in socializing the public, industry groups, and state actors could suggest one main reason why the US thought international institutions were the best solution for governing conflict diamonds.

Finally, the previous case study by Thomas (2012) of the US's support for the KPCS provides alternate perspectives on why the KPCS was created by considering the applicability of realism, classical liberalism, neoliberalism, and constructivism to the KPCS creation process. She concludes that no theoretical framework can fully explain the reasons for joining the KPCS, a perspective with which this paper also agrees. However, this paper maintains, and has shown, that the neoliberal approach to explaining the US's behavior in regards to the KPCS accounts for the most significant factors in the process. The role of NGOs' widespread sociopolitical effect is evident from historical accounts of the creation process, which describe wide public engagement with these causes; this effect is also reflected in NGOs' policymaking role on equal footing with states in the KPCS, which is unique in terms of international institution structures. Furthermore, the creation of an international institution is a solution which the US was predisposed to politically oppose at the time, yet broke with this expectation to create the KPCS. Alternate theories lack an account for these extraordinary factors, thus they cannot adequately explain the question at hand.

Conclusion

Considering the role of domestic and state actors in the creation of the KPCS demonstrates the main reason why the US joined the organization. It did so because domestic human rights NGOs successfully influenced the public and the domestic diamond jewellery industry to have an interest in finding a solution to the trade of conflict diamonds. From this broad base of support, these interests were translated into foreign policy by domestic institutions. Furthermore, these interests were reflected through the creation of the KPCS, which was the institutional response to the security issue posed by conflict diamonds.

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To what extent does China give loans to other countries for geopolitical purposes? The case of the Hambantota Port

Ursula McDonnell

Introduction

“Predatory economics”, “coercive economic manoeuvring”, and a reconstruction of “the current geopolitical landscape” are some of the rhetoric used to describe China’s lending policies (Tillerson 2017; Basu 2021; Fallon 2015). Formerly, China was a beneficiary of international economic assistance (Hatton 2021). Conversely, in the space of 18 years, China has loaned money to over 13,000 infrastructure projects valued at \$843bn, spanning 165 countries (Malik et al. 2021). Such an accelerated overturn of donee to donor status as China challenges Western hegemony has been surveyed with major suspicion.

Indeed, China’s most recent global infrastructure investment scheme known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been met with vehement condemnation by policymakers and political scholars since its conception in 2013. These criticisms have manifested themselves as accusations that China has been exercising so-called ‘debt-trap diplomacy’; enticing developing states with deceptively agreeable loans to undertake ambitious infrastructure ventures so that, when they can no longer sustain the debt, the government will expropriate the asset. In doing so they supposedly proliferate their geopolitical influence internationally (Blanchard and Martina 2019; Brautigam 2019a).

Originating as a ‘meme’ in 2017, ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ has become the mantra and bête noire of political commentary on China and the BRI, with the phrase diffusing all the way to the US

government, with then-US Vice President Mike Pence uttering the idiom to describe China's loan behaviour in 2018 (Brautigam 2019a; Jones and Hameiri 2020). This analysis is motivated by exploring the truth that lies in the meme. Is 'debt-trap diplomacy' something that we should be genuinely worried about, or is it political hysteria emerging from western hegemonic insecurity?

As such this paper aims to analyse the extent to which China gives loans under the BRI for its own geopolitical interests by studying the case of the failed Sri Lankan Hambantota Port. This paper will begin with a background of how states give loans to other countries and how they can be used for geopolitical aims. It will then look at the rationale behind China's bilateral loan policies. Finally, it will evaluate the extent to which China utilises loans for geopolitical purposes in relation to the case of the Hambantota Port.

How states use loans as geopolitical tools:

The international norm for giving out foreign loans is in the form of financial support through international development financial institutions (DFIs). Most foreign loans are conducted through multilateral development banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank, and bilateral development banks (BDBs) such as the Inter-American Development Bank. While MDBs and BDBs are private sector branches of DFIs, most of these institutions are state-owned. These organisations aim to promote development in recipient countries by means of supplying long- and medium-term funds for productive investment (Britannica 2017; Ligeti 1985).

Nevertheless, the mechanisms practised and the motives behind national governments in their interaction with DFIs are widely debated. Supporters of state intervention in DFIs argue that such a high degree of presence is essential for the promotion of economic development and growth, while critics insist that states are egoistic in their engagement with DFIs, utilising them as a canvas for the expansion of their own political intentions (Yeyati et al. 2004). Musacchio et al. (2017) highlight the possibility of the successful implementation of the norms and interest of donating countries in these loan agreements. They conclude that an exploitation of a development bank is dependent on whether the institution is adequately structured and safeguarded. In the absence of safeguards, development banks may be used for rent-seeking governmental policies (Ingram, 2021; *ibid.*). From this, we can

theorise that this could translate into such institutions constituting a tool for the coordination of geopolitical interests (Ingram 2021; Musacchio et al. 2017).

Separately, countries may wish to acquire aid via direct bilateral loans. Outwardly, bilateral direct loans are formulated to promote economic growth. With fewer checks and balances than DFIs, in truth, many are designed with the intention of creating geopolitical tools (Ross 2021). This can be seen in Belarus-Russian relations and Putin's most recent commitment to their ally: a release of \$500 million from a previously negotiated loan of \$US1.5 billion under the condition that Belarus strengthens its economic, political, and military ties with Russia (Newnham 2020; Quinn & Arkhipov 2021). Such blatant Russian political strategising displays how bilateral loans of this nature can easily and outrightly be used for political objectives.

Chinese Loaning:

China's bilateral loans procedure is an exception to international norms. Instead of participating in DFIs or granting direct loans, most of the money it invests is in the form of state banking loans. National governmental branches are not specified in many of these loan agreements and thus they are kept from official governmental debt reports (Hatton 2021). Such confidentiality has been viewed with suspicion, causing western policymakers and commentators to speculate about what exactly is China concealing, a suspicion that has emanated into the 'debt-trap diplomacy' meme. The money from Chinese state banking loans is linked to the BRI and so we must discuss the functioning of the BRI to understand why it gives loans.

To explain, the BRI is a development plan initiated by the Chinese government in 2013 intending to foster cooperation and connectivity across the six major international economic corridors (OECD 2018). It is a reiteration of existing Chinese commitment to international investment engagement (Hurley et al. 2018). It is understandable that the West is sceptical of the BRI. Rather than understanding it to be a more complicated economically driven initiative, it is easier to view it as a fragment of an extensive narrative about dwindling western hegemony (Jone & Hameiri 2020). While there is a clear desire for greater Chinese leverage on the world political stage by way of the BRI and its influence on the global economy, Jones & Hameiri (2020) explain its primary aim, that

is, externalising domestic economic issues. China's manufacturing industry suffers from production overcapacity, leaving futile surplus production (Liu et al. 2017).

A solution to unload unwanted supply is to send it outwards. Thus, China launched the BRI with the intention of increasing demand for Chinese-funded infrastructure projects to rectify these structural issues. In fact, the externalisation of domestic problems has been embedded in past Chinese economic strategies. The BRI is in essence a more extensive version of such existing initiatives that aim to fulfil economic motivations.

Those who acknowledge China's economic motivations and still criticise the BRI may accuse it of utilising 'economic statecraft' to achieve geopolitical interests (Chellaney 2017; Jones & Hameiri, 2017.). However, there is limited empirical evidence of the actuality of this behaviour. Critics of the BRI overestimate its efficacy, giving it a far more grandiose reputation than is warranted. In reality, the BRI is operated via a loose, item-by-item system of administration rather than having a specific strategy. This system of administration is reflected in China's willingness to loan to countries with discreditable governance such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Myanmar. China does not prioritise the good governance of borrower countries like the west does. This makes China a great alternative creditor for developing countries because they view good governance as secondary to economic development (Vlaskamp 2019). Attracted potential borrowers initiate these specific development projects, materialising in a "bottom-up, piecemeal manner" (Jones & Hameiri 2017). Essentially, there is no coercion on China's part for a country to take on these loans. Even if China did have a specific strategy, it could not force countries to undertake these projects and as such, there is limited space for the BRI to be utilised as a geopolitical tool.

Indeed, this model of administration is not necessarily productive in the sense that the BRI has funded many ill-executed foreign projects. As a rudimentary initiative, the BRI lacks experience in the global marketplace, resulting in some illogical high-risk investments. These miscarriages have fabricated hysteria in the West as opponents of the BRI use the case of the Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka as the poster child for their debt-trap accusations against Chinese loaning behaviour. Additionally, they postulate that China is attempting to create a 'Chinese naval outpost' to anchor its

geopolitical position there (Jones & Hameiri). However, evidence for these allegations is relatively narrow (Brautigam 2019b). Indeed, based on the economic and structural dynamics discussed above, we will look at the case of the Hambantota Port and analyse to what extent China is using it for geopolitical objectives.

The case of the Hambantota Port:

In 2017, saddled with debt, Sri Lanka ceded operational control of the commercially inviable Hambantota Port to a Chinese-commanded joint venture on a 99-year lease in exchange of a \$US1.1 billion investment from China Merchant Port Holdings (CMPort). Characterised as ‘debt-trap diplomacy’, opponents of the BRI declared the deal was an intentional asset seizure initiated by China for a loan that they knew would create debt distress.

The debt trap accusations about the Hambantota Port mirrors another geopolitical hypothesis known as the ‘String of Pearls, which argues that China aims to establish a nexus of commercial and military facilities along maritime routes on the Indian Ocean, spanning from China to Port Sudan to achieve maritime hegemony (Brautigam 2019a). Indeed, China has placed a considerable emphasis on joint venture port development projects since the 1970s. Many of these investments have been highly successful. However, profits gained by these projects are not entirely dependent on Chinese intervention. Rather, revenue relies on strategic planning from the recipient country to attract ships and recover loan costs.

Indeed, in the case of Sri Lanka, the government had concocted the idea of developing a port in Hambantota decades before and then approached the Chinese to fulfil the project. In 2017, China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) and the Sri Lankan government successfully lobbied for an agreement with China Eximbank to finance the project (Brautigam 2019b). However, the Hambantota Port transpired to be unprofitable, with use of the facility decreasing annually (Sri Lankan Department of Census and Statistics 2017). Jones & Hameiri (2020) flag local economists’ commentary on the port who cite governmental incompetence and commercial neglect for the unmarketability of the port. While critics point to a geo-strategised debt trap, the initiative’s failings appear to be primarily due to Sri Lankan governance issues and an element of poor risk assessment .

Sri Lanka was in an unstable position, recovering from civil war and the effects of a tsunami, when the Hambantota Port project was propelled. Nevertheless, the development was initiated via excessive borrowing from both Chinese and Western-dominated financial markets (Jones & Hameiri 2020). The port was subject to mismanagement by the Sri Lankan Port Authority (SPLA). Evidently, the Sri Lankan government failed to implement any fixed strategy on how to commercialise the port, resulting in the SPLA losing over \$US300 million (Brautigam 2019a). In addition, China Eximbank overlooked Sri Lankan vulnerability as a recuperating state. These factors contributed to Sri Lankan economic instability and by 2014, Sri Lanka was experiencing a debt crisis. By the end of 2016, the IMF estimated Sri Lanka's external debt to be US\$46.6 billion.

In 2015, the Rajapaksa administration was defeated in elections and to pay their debts, its successors privatised a majority stake of the port to collect foreign exchange in the joint venture deal for 70% shares with CMPort. Despite this data being public, misinformation among academics led to speculation that it was an asset-seizure deal and that it gave China naval control of the port. Evidently, this was not the case; China did not get Sri Lanka to "cough up a port" (Abi-Habib 2018). The deal was a manifestation of inefficient Sri Lankan governance and commercial strategy, and an absence of adequate risk assessment by both China and Sri Lanka. There is no evidence that China intended on adding Hambantota to its fictional 'string of pearls'. In essence, claims that China partakes in 'debt-trap diplomacy' to gain geopolitical leverage cannot be backed by the case of the Hambantota Port.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, this evidence supports our hypothesis that the extent to which China uses lending for geopolitical purposes is limited. In reality, the BRI is much more elementary in its operations. China commits to bilateral investment projects primarily for its own egoistic desire to solve problems in its own economy, rather than to strategise global domination. Indeed, such wariness of Chinese loaning behaviour may be a projection of western consciousness of their increasing vulnerability on the world stage. This paper recommends that if China adopted more transparency in its lending negotiations, the west would have less capacity to create this scapegoat. However, with China being a notoriously secretive political actor, that reality is unlikely to be realised. Thus, only until China

stops fostering so much ambiguity around the BRI will these debt trap accusations continue to appear.

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Create Your Enemy and Create Your Self: A Comparative Study of the Use of Propaganda by Islamic State and in the Rwandan Genocide.

Ellen McHugh

Introduction

The study of propaganda and its ability to motivate ordinary citizens to commit atrocities has long been prevalent in academic and popular discourse, particularly in the years following the Second World War and the Holocaust. Interest in the study of propaganda was renewed in the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide in the 1990s and again with the rise to prominence of the so-called Islamic State (also known as ISIS, IS, and Daesh) in the 2010s. The concerted, strategic use of media in these two cases in particular illustrate the perceived capacity of propaganda to mobilise citizens and enable them to partake in extreme violence. However, both cases differ substantially in their aims and structures, a difference which is reflected in the contrasting types of propaganda employed. This essay will offer a comparative analysis of the use of propaganda in both cases, illustrating the manner in which the differing aims, mobilising factors, justifications, and targets of those employing propaganda shaped the type of propaganda utilised.

While there were a number of common factors in the emergence of the groups responsible for directing the violence in both the Rwandan genocide and IS (such as the transfer of power to a previously subjugated group, which then created a repressive status quo), there are key differences between them that form the basis of this analysis. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, the overall aim was the preservation of the status quo through destructive violence. Participation in the genocide was motivated by fear of an ultimate threat to a community's existence, justified by material benefit, and powered by mass activation. In contrast, the aim of IS was the radical transformation

of the status quo through both destructive and constructive violence. Participation was motivated by power, justified by both a purported material necessity and apocalypticism, and powered by targeted activation. This essay will examine each of these contrasts in turn and illustrate the manner in which they influenced the propaganda employed in both cases.

Overall Aims: Preservation vs. Radical Transformation of the Status Quo

The overall aim of the violence conducted during the Rwandan Genocide was to eliminate a specific community in order to preserve the status quo. Violence was directed at a specific out-group - the Tutsi - and was, at least overtly, instrumentalised almost solely in relation to their elimination.

In other words, the overall aim of the genocide was *destructive*: as it was intent on maintaining the status quo of Hutu dominance, the organisation of the violence did not need to concern itself with institution-building or forging ties with local communities, as is the case with revolutionary or insurgent movements. This had a number of key effects on the propaganda utilised in the lead-up to and throughout the genocide. First, as noted by Hefti & Ausserladscheider (2020) among others, almost all propaganda was negative propaganda directed at a specific (if not always clearly defined) out-group: propaganda was *anti-Tutsi propaganda*. The key concern of the propaganda was to portray the Tutsi as a threat to the status quo and to psychologically prepare the population to enact violence against them (Kellow & Steeves, 2006). This was achieved on multiple levels, as illustrated by Baisley (2014): RTLM and Radio Rwanda portrayed the Tutsi as “living off the work of Hutu cultivators” (Baisley, 2014, p. 46), as a distinct racial group attempting to infiltrate the ranks of the Hutu and take over “their” country, and as synonymous with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and other groups threatening “infiltration” (Baisley, 2014, p. 49). The out-group of the Tutsi were further marginalised and dehumanised by repeated references to the Tutsi population as “cockroaches” (Hefti & Ausserladscheider, 2020; Eltringham, 2006). In this regard, it may be said that much of the propaganda in the lead-up to the genocide concentrated primarily on creating an enemy towards which violence would be directed, and readying civilians to enact this violence (Hefti & Ausserladscheider, 2020, p. 15).

While the promotion of destructive violence was also a key feature of propaganda produced by IS,

the propaganda in this case served a dual purpose. Not only did IS's propaganda seek to create an out-group and incite violence against this group, it also sought to create a distinct in-group identity and derive legitimacy for the caliphate. This dual purpose arose as a result of the overall aim of IS: that of constructing, consolidating, and expanding an absolutist Islamic state (Byman, 2016). Rather than seeking to protect an advantageous status quo, as was the case in the Rwandan genocide, IS sought to radically overthrow the status quo and create a new social, political, and economic order. Consequently, there was an additional burden on the group not only to characterise the enemy as threatening enough to warrant overthrowing (Walt, 2015), but also to construct a distinct in-group identity that would be used to form the new order. Additionally, it should be noted that the target of the destructive component of IS's violence was far broader than in the case of the Rwandan genocide. As noted by Byman (2016, p. 152), “(...) any country that does not bow down to the Islamic State is, by definition, illegitimate.” Extending on this, any person or group of people that does not comply with IS's conceptualisation of an absolutist Islamist identity or accept the legitimacy of its authority is, definitionally, the enemy of IS (Andersen & Samberg, 2018).

As a result of this duality of sub-goals relating to IS's overall aim, its propaganda performed a dual purpose throughout IS's activity in the 2010s. This is illustrated by Andersen & Samberg's (2018, p. 1508) analysis of IS's propaganda magazine, *Dabiq*:

“The magazine can generally be divided into two types of content. The first type covers reportages about state building, aid work, military successes, religious practice, and history. The second type involves images and texts about the destruction of historical artefacts, child soldiers, brutal murders, and executions.”

The goal of state-building, and the considerable force required to achieve this goal, necessitated the derivation of the legitimacy of and the construction of allegiance to the Islamic State, which is reflected in the propaganda produced by IS, particularly on social media (Gates & Podder, 2015). From the perspective of dramaturgical political sociology (Welsh, 1985), IS's propaganda can be seen as a technology by which the group sought to convert its power into authority and manage the

political consciousness of its populace and potential recruits. It was a key means of *performing* the state, a performance designed to attract recruits and citizens who believed in its legitimacy. As argued by Anfinson (2019, p. 6), images used by IS in its propaganda acted “as “proof” of a) a permanent population, b) a defined territory, c) government, and d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.” Additionally, there are clear instances where the constructive and destructive aspects of IS’s goals overlapped in its propaganda. For example, propagandistic material related to the use of counter-normative violence (most notably, the use of beheading) sought to create a distinct IS “brand” of violence, simultaneously psychologically preparing recruits to enact destructive violence themselves and contributing to in-group identity differentiating IS from competing *jihadist* groups (Zech & Kelly, 2015).

Emotional Motivation of Fighters and Recruits: Fear vs. Power

In order to incite civilians to participate in the genocide, the extreme Hutu within the government sought to create, reinforce, and capitalise upon a culture of fear among the Hutu population: namely, fear that their lives and livelihoods were in immediate danger from the “threat” posed by the Tutsi. This is related to the general aim of the genocide as a means of protecting the state and maintaining the status quo. For the genocide to occur, Hutu civilians had to be convinced that there was a pressing *need* to protect the state and themselves from an existential threat and had to be motivated by the fear that this threat caused. In the years leading up to the genocide, therefore, “...the media worked to instil a pronounced ethnic fear and hatred that previously had not been part of the everyday culture.” (Kellow & Steeves, 2006, p. 124) There were a number of components to this ethnic fear and hatred promoted by the Rwandan media, as noted previously. What is important to note in this context of motivating participation in the genocide, however, is the emphasis placed on the immediacy of the threat supposedly posed by the Tutsi. As Kellow & Steeves (2016, p. 120) note, “Throughout the genocide, the *inkuruishushe* (hot news) announcements emphasized a “risk and danger”, “kill or be killed” frame...[and] described alleged, and unsubstantiated, Tutsi atrocities against the Hutus.” In essence, radio was used to instil a sense of mass panic among civilians, which then made them more impressionable to calls for violence. This was not a new phenomenon, as illustrated by Cantril’s (1940) study of the mass panic induced by Orson Welles’ 1938 Halloween radio broadcast. The reach and the authority of radio in Rwanda made it a uniquely powerful motivating force - so much so

that it was deemed to have incited the genocide (Hefti & Ausserladscheider, 2020). The atmosphere of fear constructed and promoted by the Rwandan media created “a state of mind where killings [were] accepted as ordinary and necessary actions.” (Hefti & Ausserladscheider, 2020) Additionally, as the ultimate aim of the propaganda was to provoke the genocide, the fear and mass panic had to be directed at the Tutsi in *general*. It was not enough to say that certain Tutsi were to be feared: all Tutsi needed to be considered a threat to the Hutu. Therefore, propaganda promoted the idea that “[a]ll Tutsi...shared an ‘ineradicable vice’, a ‘thirst for blood and power.’” (Eltringham, 2006, p. 437) This furthered the sense of mass panic and deepened the fear felt by Hutu civilians, thus making them more easily susceptible to calls for participation in violence.

The message of fear promoted by the Rwandan media before and during the genocide may be contrasted with that of power and might promoted by IS’s various propaganda machines, most notably its English and Arabic-language magazines *Dabiq*, *Rumiyyah* and *al-Naba’*. As in the case of the Rwandan genocide, the motivating messages used in IS’s propaganda were derived from the overall goals of the group. In order to attract new recruits and citizens to the Islamic State, the recruits needed to believe that the creation and expansion of the caliphate were, at the very least, possible (indeed, in many cases, IS’s propaganda portrayed its eventual victory not only as possible but as *inevitable* (Gambhir, 2014; Walt, 2015)). As a result, much propaganda was directed at presenting IS as a *powerful* as well as a *legitimate* force. This is seen in its use of visual imagery throughout its magazines: as noted by Winkler et al. (2019, p. 9), “The group’s exaggerated emphasis on dynamic shots of its own militants photographed against dynamic backgrounds highlighted that the contemporary Arab context was changing and that ISIS militants were the ones responsible for making the changes.” Additionally, IS’s publications in both English and Arabic repeatedly emphasised the commitment and vigour of its recruits to the caliphate, along with the power of its militants (Winkler et al, 2019). It should be noted, however, that IS also created a sense of hatred towards those who did not conform with IS’s ideology, as seen in its recruitment and radicalisation strategies (Bagut & Neumann, 2020) and in articles published in *Dabiq*, such as “Why We Hate Them and Why We Fight Them.” (Azman, 2016). Much as in the case of the promotion of legitimacy, it may be argued that IS’s goal of the creation of an absolutist Islamist state placed an additional burden on the group to motivate recruits along multiple lines, which meant that its propaganda

focused on the creation of multiple emotional or psychological states rather than one predominant state.

Justification: Material and Spiritual/Religious

In addition to motivating participation in the genocide through fear of a threat to the status quo, it was important for the Rwandan government to justify its preservation (a preservation which would involve extreme violence) by illustrating the material benefits it provided to the Hutu. However, the Civil War in the early 1990s had “taken its toll on an economy which had already been in a state of crisis when it started.” (Prunier, 1996, p. 159). Additionally, the collapse in coffee prices and the Structural Adjustment Programme introduced under Rwanda’s agreement with the World Bank placed further strain on the economy (Prunier, 1996) This limited the options available to propagandists in terms of convincing civilians of the material benefits of the status quo. Therefore, much of the propaganda in this regard was framed in relation to the supposed desire of the Tutsi to dominate the Hutu (Baisely, 2014, p. 52). No matter the economic hardships of the status quo, its material benefits were proclaimed to lie in the absence of Tutsi domination. The material justification for maintaining Hutu power in Rwanda was based largely, therefore, on the creation of a counterfactual of what a Rwanda controlled by the Tutsi would mean for Hutu civilians. This relates closely to the motivation through fear discussed earlier - it is a justification based largely on a perceived existential threat, and a desire to avoid the consequences of a change to the status quo. However, it should be noted that propaganda also made use of religion to justify attacks against the Tutsi and that “the policy of Tutsi extermination seemed to be tolerated and even endorsed by religion.” (Hefit & Ausserladschider, 2020, p. 16) This added an additional layer of legitimacy to the violence and enabled participants to justify their actions further.

Religious justification for extreme violence was more prevalent in the propaganda produced by Islamic State than in that of the Rwandan genocide. As noted by Mahood & Rane (2017), IS drew heavily on extreme interpretations of Islamic narratives in order to enable recruits to justify their actions. These narratives - such as those of the crusaders and the hypocrites - conferred on IS “a degree of legitimacy reinforced by the historical experiences of Islam...exacerbate[d] historical and political grievances and... harness[ed] feelings of personal victimisation and discrimination

experienced by Western Muslims.” (Mahood & Rane, 2017, p. 31). This religious justification is further evidenced by IS’s use of apocalyptic language in its propaganda (Byman, 2016), along with its frequent use of scripture to justify violence. Boutz et al. (2018) illustrate that IS’s use of *hadith* quotations differed across its English and Arabic-language publications, with those produced in English drawing more heavily on apocalyptic prophecies than those produced in Arabic. This indicates that IS tailored its religious justification to match the experiences of those targeted by its propaganda: it may have been easier for those living in English-speaking countries to engage with apocalyptic prophecies than crusader narratives, for example, as they may not have had first or second-hand knowledge of the experience of occupation or colonialism. This illustrates the manner in which religious narratives were strategically instrumentalised by IS in order to justify violence to different groups of potential and actual recruits. Additionally, however, IS propaganda made reference to material justifications for participating in the violence it promoted. Propaganda used during radicalisation focused heavily on the oppression experienced by Muslims in the West (Bagut & Neumann, 2020) and the oppression of the Sunni in Iraq. Participation in the violence promoted by IS was justified, therefore, by recourse to material need and the overthrowing of unjust systems under the status quo. In many instances, material and religious justifications overlapped: the religious narrative of the crusaders, for example, appealed to the logic of fulfilling God’s will and to the logic of defeating an unjust enemy. The varying justifications, therefore, complemented and reinforced each other, and enabled recruits to rationalise their actions on multiple levels.

Recruitment: Mass Activation and Targeted Radicalisation

The operation of the genocide in Rwanda necessitated the mass activation of civilians to partake in, or at least accept, the killings. Additionally, the use of radio as one of the primary dispensers of propaganda meant that the propaganda produced would indiscriminately reach a broad segment of the population. Both of these factors meant that the propaganda employed before and during the genocide needed to be widely accessible and engaging for a general Hutu audience. This was achieved in a number of ways. Stations such as RTLM sought to engage general audiences of young people through broadcasting popular music between its “ethnic commentaries and news.” (Kellow & Steeves, 1998, p. 118) General audiences were further attracted to RTLM by its mixture of lighthearted stories, political gossip, and *inkuruushushe*, or “hot news” (Kellow & Steeves, 1998). As

time went on, the media intensified the urgency and extremity of its messages, before open calls for genocide began. By this time, the general Hutu public was primed to be receptive to the messages from the media and willing to accept the calls for violence against the Tutsi.

While there were certainly elements of attracting popular support in the case of Islamic State, reflected in its similar use of the “wolf-in-sheep’s-clothing” method (Bagut & Neumann, 2020), there was also a great deal of emphasis placed on targeted radicalisation - particularly of foreign fighters, as seen in the discussion of *hadith* quotations above (Boutz et al., 2018; Gates & Podder, 2015). Additionally, the growth of social media and communication technologies allowed for far greater personalisation of targeted content and direct communication with potential recruits. Bagut & Neumann (2020) illustrate the manner in which the process of radicalisation often combined the proliferation of propaganda gradually increasing in extremity (as was the case with the propaganda produced in the lead-up to the Rwandan genocide) with personal talks with preachers and other Islamists and social groups in which potential recruits could meet with each other. The aim of attracting foreign fighters, therefore, necessitated additional investment of time, resources, and effort into the recruitment process, investment which was heavily directed towards IS’s propaganda, both in terms of its content and its proliferation online.

Conclusion

The common trend evident throughout the contrasts that have been drawn in this essay is the additional burden placed on IS and its propaganda as a result of its aims of state-building and its use of foreign fighters. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, it was necessary and sufficient for propaganda to create an enemy at which the violence would be directed and mobilise civilians to enact it. In contrast, the creation of the enemy was a necessary but not sufficient component of IS’s propaganda. There was an additional onus on IS’s propaganda to create an image of IS itself as a legitimate and powerful actor, the “one true way” of creating the utopian society it promoted. This necessitated additional justification, emotional motivation, and techniques of activation, which were illustrated in this essay. While there were a number of common tropes employed in the propaganda used in both cases, the clearest contrast may be seen between the emotional states that the propaganda attempted to create in potential recruits and participants. Again, however, it

is evident that this contrast arose from the difference between the overall aims of the Rwandan genocide compared with that of Islamic State and the means by which civilians would be mobilised to engage with each of these aims.

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