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Preface

Welcome to Volume XXXI of the Trinity College Social and Political Review. Since its founding, the SPR has given some of Trinity College Dublin's most critical thinkers an outlet to engage and invoke readers on issues of social and political importance.

The past year has been one rife with change and unusual circumstances. The world came to a stop still and our lives changed in the most drastic of ways. But too the political and social landscape we find ourselves in is very different from that just a year prior.

The United Kingdom has officially withdrawn from the European Union and the Northern Irish question remains unanswered. The 2020 US Elections offered scenes of hope and despair as a new leader of the Free World was welcomed, but days beforehand the Capitol was stormed by rebels. The murder of George Floyd sparked outrage and sadness across the globe and the Black Lives Matter movement took to the streets in force. Statues fell and voices rose to demand that the lives of black people be valued within our society. As Poland announced its LGBT-free zones, the European Parliament declared the EU to be an LGBT+ Freedom Zone. But the death of Sarah Everard gave another reason to take to the streets as we stood for the right for women to feel safe when they walk home. We still fight against the virus which has put our lives at such a standstill. With perpetual lockdowns rummaging forward, the roll out of vaccines offer some hope – yet it remains to be seen how strong the Irish Government will remain as we begin to seize some degree of our old lives back once again.

It might seem naïve, but I believe we are within a moment of major history and it too will have an effect on the future to come. We must take heed from the lessons we have learned in this past year. We must continue to fight for the protection of rights and of our democracy. We must stay informed and listen to those who know best – learn and follow and where needed stand up, speak up and march forward.

I was blown away by the fantastic submissions we received this year. It was incredibly difficult to make our final selections, but I am delighted to see the diversity amongst the topics published here including tensions on the Korean Peninsula, Marxism as a science, migration and asylum seekers, sexual subordination, identity politics in Yugoslavia, literacy levels in Ireland and a study of James Baldwin and the BLM movement.

The publication of XXXI would not be possible without the hard work of the team behind it. We owe a major thanks to our Editorial Board who have offered insightful and precise observations throughout the editing process; our Design Officer Aoife for her talented design skills; and our General Manager Ross and Financial Officer James for their tireless work, enthusiasm and dedication throughout the year. Furthermore, I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Dr. Jacqueline Hayden and Dr. Richard Layte for their guidance and assistance this year, as well as the unwavering support of the Departments of Political Science and Sociology. The Board would also like to thank Grehan's Printers for their support in producing the Review.

I really hope you enjoy reading this volume as much as I have. It has been an honour to serve as Editor-in-Chief for its 31st Volume. I cannot wait to see the new heights the Social and Political Review will reach in years to come.

Nathan O'Regan
Editor-in-Chief

Volume XXXI

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A Name in the Street: A Case for Reading James Baldwin in the 2020s

Bani Bedi

'*Men like me and my brothers filmed what we*
Planted for proof we existed
Too late, sped the video to see blossoms
Brought in seconds, colors you expect in poems
Where the world ends, everything cut down.
John Crawford. Eric Garner. Mike Brown.'
-Jericho Brown, on the Black Lives Matter movement (Brown, 2016, p. 9).

Introduction

Revolutionary ideas and social movements are seldom born out of thin air; their roots lie deep within decades of evolving thought and education. After the murder of Freddie Gray in 2015, protestors in Baltimore, Maryland, took to the streets, and one activist stood outside a police station with a sign:
'Ignorance allied with power is the most ferocious enemy of justice' (Glaude, 2020, p. 19). Writer and activist James Baldwin once prayed that within the wreckage of America, his work would manage to be found, and his words were now being displayed as a protest against police brutality three decades after his death (Glaude, 2020, Introduction).

This essay seeks to argue a case for reading and understanding Baldwin in 2020 by underlining the importance of his life and work to the Black Lives Matter movement. It presents four threads to pursue while exploring his thought, the first being his unapologetic honesty about the false illusion of America's progress, revealing inequalities which cannot be reversed without the radical restructuring of society. These themes have been picked up on by writer Ta-Nehisi Coates and others who struggle for liberation today. The initial half of this essay will focus on this first thread and show its relevance to today's movement. The second is his study of the racist criminal justice system in America and how it disadvantages Black people, which illustrates how

systematic racism keeps them suppressed – a theme which currently drives Black Lives Matter. Thirdly, Baldwin's life and work present a rare model of a Civil Rights leader who embraced 'intersectionality', rejecting traditional notions of masculinity and sexuality, much as the movement now aims to do. Lastly and crucially, his work gives us an opportunity to explore the importance of representation in context of current debates regarding history, in monuments and the education system. Baldwin argued that love – interpreted as truth and reflection – would lead America to reflect honestly upon its history and work towards consciousness. A deeper study of his writing is thus merited, to explore potential avenues for growth and reflection within the movement.

Background

The idea that Black lives matter is not an innovation, but a message that has resonated throughout the history of Black intellectual thought in America. In 2013, three Black women – Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors and Opal Tometi – created the hashtag #BlackLivesMatter on social media as a call to action, after the murderer of Black teenager Trayvon Martin was not brought to justice. This failure of the American justice system led them to send out a simple yet powerful message: Black lives possess inherent value (Lebron, 2017, p. xi). The movement re-emerged in full force after the police murdered Michael Brown in 2014, and the spark flamed into a fire in May 2020, in the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, when a policeman killed George Floyd by pressing a knee onto his neck and was caught on video doing so (Ransby, 2018, pp. 42-5). It is now regarded as the largest social movement in American history (Osse, 2020). As this powerful movement evolves and transforms, it warrants exploration of writings which would lend clarity to the ideas which encompass Black Lives Matter today and guide future directions.

James Baldwin is one such figure who advanced the intellectual tradition of black liberation. Baldwin had a deep awareness of history, earned from his grandmother who was born into slavery, his preacher father and his general childhood environment (Baldwin, 1963). Appalled by the hypocrisy of his neighbourhood churches, and the continued racial segregation in workplaces, he turned to writing and produced powerful essays and books about his experiences in the American South among other works (Kenan, 2009, p. 31). He began to see himself as a Black American and identified with what later became known as the Civil Rights Movement; as a writer, speaker, and

fundraiser, he supported Civil Rights' groups. By the time he took the country by storm with his explosive essay 'Letter from a Region of my Mind' – later published as The Fire Next Time – Baldwin had become a voice for Black America (Kenan, 2009, pp. 44-7). His death in 1987 at the age of sixty-three left the country with an amalgam of fiction and non-fiction to learn from, study and debate.

I: 'Progress' and Baldwin's Challenge to White Liberals

The first element of his thought that this essay highlights is Baldwin's refusal to buy into the myth of American racial and social 'progress'. Despite the legal gains of the Civil Rights Movement, racial economic disparity was widening and Black youth faced increasing unemployment (Scott, 2009, p. 147). The emergence of Black political rule, Baldwin argued, was dangerously concealing reality and creating illusions of racial progress, possibly comparable to how the election of a black man to the White House created such an illusion for many in the 2000s (I Am Not Your Negro). He stated that one need only read the news of the murders of young Black children to notice how hollow this supposed 'equality' was – the way Black Lives Matter dispels delusions of a post-racial America by repeating the names of Eric Garner, Michael Brown and others who were victims of racist police brutality (Scott, 2009, p. 146).

Within this context, Baldwin believed that the narrative of white liberalism was an 'affliction' (Aanerud, 1999, p. 61). He opposed the liberal assumption that Black people needed to be saved or integrated, repeated in paternalistic overtones. Various programs – all the way from the abolition of slavery to the 1960s – carried this attitude (Aanerud, 1999, p. 61). For Baldwin, this made white liberals unsuitable supporters of racial equality. In 'White Man's Guilt', he showed how these liberals, overwhelmed by their guilt, refuse to fully accept their history of slavery, cruelty and oppression of Black people. Only when white Americans stop defending themselves and take responsibility can they truly embrace change (Baldwin, 1965, p. 47).

Their counterproductive support is evident in the practice of publishing 'protest novels', which he disparaged. In 'Everybody's Protest Novel', he argued that though the writers of such books may be well-intentioned, they delude white liberals into believing that all is going well and society is progressing (Baldwin,

1985, p. 31). They become disconnected from real social relations (Baldwin, 1985, p. 32). The very idea of Black people as property, as subservient, comes not from a radical undemocratic faction as liberals would believe, but from the very architects of the American state (Baldwin, 1985, p. xix). Despite legal promises of racial equality, democratic societies remain vulnerable to the prejudices of their citizens (Balfour, 1999, p. 94). To face this history can be painful, but this is what Baldwin demands of us. Sensing the shifting winds, in 1963, Dissent magazine wrote that 'the honeymoon between white liberals and Negroes is over' (Polsgrove, 2001, p. 170). After the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Baldwin asserted that something had changed within him; he would no longer believe false promises (Baldwin, 1985, p. 453). There was no more bargaining ground – neither with white liberals nor white supremacists (Baldwin, 1985, p. 262).

Notably, Baldwin condemned the narrative of Black 'violence' which encompassed white American imagination whenever Black people fought for their rights – he argued this emerges only because white people are afraid of their own property and lives being damaged (Baldwin, 1964, pp. 74-5). Violence was acceptable for President Jimmy Carter or white men – like American military interventions in Iran in the name of freedom – but not for Black people (Baldwin, 1985, p. 684). This theme is reiterated in the documentary I Am Not Your Negro, which quotes Baldwin as stating that white people celebrate any kind of revolutionary violence unless it involves Black people fighting for their freedom (I Am Not Your Negro).

Baldwin's Vision

Baldwin was thus disillusioned with an America that chose to go back in time at critical moments of progress, and he wrote about a path forward. The answer to this regressive pattern lay in consciousness and repentance (Polsgrove, 2001, p. 157). This would involve radical changes in the entire structure of American society (Baldwin, 1964, p. 74). In The Fire Next Time, he argued that colour is a political reality, and problems created by race cannot be wished away through colour-blind thinking (Balfour, 1999, pp. 93-4). Each person must first take a hard look at themselves, confront their own prejudices and embrace their true histories (Baldwin, 1985, pp. 192-3). It was up to those who had gained a certain level of consciousness, both white and Black, to create broader conscious change, or to risk unleashing the anger of the oppressed: 'no more water, the fire

next time!' (Baldwin, 1964, p. 89). This theme may be related to today's context.

White support for Black Lives Matter was high in the summer of 2020. Yet throughout the Northern states, considered liberal, terms like 'property values' and 'neighbourhood schools' continue to be used widely by white populations arguing against living in mixed-race neighbourhoods (Blake, 2020). In Howard County, Maryland, a plan to integrate public schools across socio-economic statuses in 2019 met with extreme backlash from parents (Blake, 2020). 'White liberals' often exhibit reluctance to create personal sacrifice in the name of black lives, despite their shows of support.

A narrative painting the Black Lives Matter movement as unjustifiably violent has entered political discourse, as Baldwin predicted. Though ninety-three percent of all protests in the movement were peaceful, as shown by an Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project report, forty-three percent of respondents reported that they believe the movement intends to incite violence and is dangerous (Mansoor, 2020). Media representation and personal biases are partly responsible for this – a Washington Post report shows how Fox News disproportionately showed footage of protestors destroying property to viewers repeatedly (Mansoor, 2020). This exhibits Baldwin's claim about how progress is hindered by both performative support, and negative notions of violent Black protesters in popular imagination. Alicia Garza, one of the Black Lives Matter founders, believes that in 2020, the country has reached its 'boiling point' where black people will no longer compromise – its fire this time? (Wortham, 2020).

Baldwin's beliefs are being addressed today to an extent: Ta-Nehisi Coates, writing Between the World and Me as a letter to his teenage son the way The Fire Next Time was addressed to Baldwin's nephew, has 'fed a nation' that requires these same unapologetic truths (Dyson, 2020). Coates echoes the rage he feels upon reading, for instance, about the death of a friend at the hands of policemen (Coates, 2015, pp. 76-7). He quotes Baldwin and challenges the same notions the latter proposed: those who 'think they are white' need unlearning (Coates, 2015, pp. 137-8). In this age, as white people increasingly purchase books on antiracism and brave tear gas at Black Lives Matter protests, perhaps America is beginning to turn towards radical consciousness. Baldwin's ideas and their reiteration by writers like Coates would aid this process.

II: Baldwin, Black Lives Matter and the Criminal Justice System

The second thread of this essay highlights that at the epicentre of both Baldwin's observations of racism, and the movement today, lie police brutality and the prison system as expressions of a systematically racist structure. He penned what we now see as one of the first examples of carceral studies, revealing the systemic racial discrimination in the criminal justice system of America (Glaude, 2020, p. 178). Fourteen-year-old Emmett Till was murdered in 1955 for allegedly whistling at a white woman, and the state of Mississippi failed to bring his murderers to justice, setting off the Civil Rights Movement. In response, Baldwin wrote Blues for Mister Charlie when the movement for racial equality was at a critical junction (Scott, 2009, p. 163). The play features a conscious, adult male – Richard Henry – who chooses to taunt a white racist and questions the effectiveness of nonviolent protest. Richard is killed by the racist, and a white liberal, 'Mister Charlie,' attempts to compromise by saying the murderer was simply a victimized, poor white man (Baldwin, 1964, Act 1). He is found 'not guilty'. Despite the exhibited failure of the criminal justice system, 'Mister Charlie' ultimately breaks with the white murderer and joins a Black protest march, representing the potential of consciousness for each individual (Baldwin, 1964, Act 3).

After the murder of George Floyd, one of the most prominent demands that thrummed throughout the movement was for police reform. This involves reducing police funding, allocating money to social services instead, and tackling the 'prison-industrial complex' head on: measures that are now the subject of extensive scholarship and debate (Coleman, 2020). Baldwin once condemned five policemen who pressed down on a Black woman's neck as 'moral monsters' (Baldwin, 1963). In works such as Blues for Mister Charlie we may trace the very system that has led to the murders of George Floyd and countless others, and through The Fire Next Time, we witness the commitment to radical restructuring he demands for all state institutions, including the prison system.

III: Baldwin, Queerness, and Intersectionality in 2020

The third theme of this paper holds that Baldwin's work serves as a precursor,

much ahead of its time, for the complex and whole nature of liberation, and the way oppressions intersect to create discrimination: what we today refer to as 'intersectionality'. As a Black man, a gay man, an American and an expatriate, Baldwin spent a large part of his life exploring his identity (Field, 2009, p. 8) He rejected Malcolm X's link between masculinity and violence (Scott, 2009, p. 153). For him, dichotomies – Black or white, masculine or feminine, held little appeal or utility (Joyce and McBride, 2009, p. 112). As the first prominent gay Black writer, Baldwin was the first to consciously profess and use his sexuality in his writing, challenging prevailing norms in African-American literature (Joyce and McBride, 2009, pp. 121-2). He contested the notion of the heterosexual, Black male who served as protector of his race. To deny this identity, Baldwin argued, is to justifiably threaten the American ideal of the good, white, Protestant family (Joyce and McBride, 2009, p. 125). He grouped various atrocities together while simultaneously condemning them: to kill a 'n*gger, kike, dyke or faggot' was an act of cowardice (Baldwin, 1985, p. xix). Reading Giovanni's Room reveals his thinking on the subject: it focuses less on sexuality and more on the problem of societies which perceive homosexuality as negative (Joyce and McBride, 2009, p. 126). Baldwin represented the intersection of a racial and sexual identity that the world rejected in different ways (Spurlin, 1999, p. 118).

Moreover, his behaviour called widely accepted ideas of masculinity into question, as homophobic descriptions of Baldwin by different sources show. Time magazine in 1963 described him as 'nervous, slight, fragile,' and 'effeminate in manner' (Spurlin, 1999, p. 105; Glaude, 2020, p. 98). FBI Director Hoover referred to him as a 'known pervert' in 1964 (Scott, 2009, p. 162). Other Civil Rights' leaders regarded him with suspicion at worst, and with cautious distance at best (Spurlin, 1999, pp. 116-7).

An intersectional politics argues not only that marginalized and different identities be included, but that their aspirations and welfare belong at the core of any social movement (Ransby, 2018, p. 70). Black Lives Matter, since its creation by three black women, has held onto this as a foundational principle. Its website proclaims a commitment to inclusivity and the united struggle of transgender, queer, undocumented, disabled and marginalized communities (Black Lives Matter, 2020). There is no liberation for black lives without liberation for queer, female and transgender individuals. The faces of the movement are no longer black male patriarchs like Martin Luther King, but women, queer folks and their

allies. In Baldwin, the movement can locate a figure to study and learn from: a Black, queer man who did not shirk from any of his identities in his personal life or his work.

IV: Baldwin and Studying the Past through the Present

Lastly, Baldwin's thought features in today's debates on history: he insisted that we are controlled sub-consciously by our personal and learned histories and we carry them within us (Baldwin, 1985, p. 47). Our identities are imbued within this despite any legal shows of progress. In The Price of the Ticket, he articulated this with stunning clarity: 'white power remains white, and what it appears to surrender with one hand it obsessively clutches in the other' (Baldwin, 1985, p. xvii). This is evident in his description of history textbooks: they taught children all over America that Black people have no history, and everyone seemed to agree. This was the only institutional learning available to most people (Baldwin, 1985, p. 406). According to him, the education system of America is designed to defeat Black children. It erases their history, isolates them and defines them through white gazes (Baldwin, 1985, p. 663). The institutions of the state are thus designed, and serve, to keep Black people suppressed even if they gain legal equality (Glaude, 2020, p. 40). Similarly, Baldwin found himself unable to recite the Pledge of Allegiance when he was a child. He wrote that he knew it had never protected him or his people, and its words, accordingly, seemed meaningless (Baldwin, 1985, p. 663).

History is a crucial contest for the future. Today's debate about tearing down Confederate monuments, which represent legacies of slavery and America's racist past, bears testimony to this (Glaude, 2020, p. 40). As a child, Baldwin believed, you learn from what you see around you. He himself was surrounded by veneration of George Washington, which he thus imbibed (I Am Not Your Negro). During the protests in 2020, protestors have toppled, crushed and vandalized the remnants of the country's racist past (Burch et al, 2020). Similar demands have rippled through the education system: schools across the country have begun to initiate conversations on race. The National School Boards Association reported that demands for a more diverse history curriculum have doubled this year; these involve demands for new material and new perspectives (Scheyder, 2020). Before real atonement, Baldwin wrote, comes a necessary moment of heartbreak and self-confrontation where one learns to let

go of histories which glorify cruelty (Baldwin, 1985, p. xviii). Reading his work gives the world this deeper opportunity to understand where these demands and actions come from, and whether there is a need for them.

Baldwin's Plea

Through studying these four themes, the Black Lives Matter movement could find a prospective path in Baldwin's anger, but also his love. In his life and work, Baldwin bore witness, defining himself through what he was not: he was neither a Black Panther, nor a Black Muslim – he didn't believe all white people were devils – nor a Christian, because he believed they did not act upon their own principles (I Am Not Your Negro). He said his work lay instead in witnessing the realities of race and relaying his message – to rid ourselves of hatred of the self and the other, and replace it with love (Lebron, 2017, p. 109). Baldwin defined love as a 'state of being': a tough, daring quest (Baldwin, 1964, p. 82). Love exposes the truth and strives to be better (Baldwin, 1964, pp. 81-2). He demands of us to not hate the man whose foot – or in George Floyd's case, knee – is on a Black person's neck but to find a way to commit people to consciousness (Baldwin, 1964, Notes). This may take different forms. For example, in 2020, social media is our soap box; most people learnt of Floyd's murder through videos on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. It is where we bear witness, mobilise and express solidarity (Ransby, 2018, pp. 100-1). Baldwin's call for change can be interpreted within this modern context, where we can seek to raise consciousness and reorder society through the internet, protest marches, and the political system.

Conclusion

Like Baldwin, Black Lives Matter has disturbed the peace. This essay concludes that America in 2020 would benefit from a closer understanding of Baldwin's ideas, many of which are echoed within the foundational principles and struggles of the movement. 'History is literally present in all we do', he wrote, and a deeper historical analysis of his writings and words reveals a thinker who paved a path for liberation today in multiple ways – as someone who rejected compromise with white liberals, spoke honestly about racial inequality, spearheaded carceral studies, questioned traditional ideas of masculinity, and analysed the importance of historical representation (Glaude, 2020, p. 189). He not only produced the blunt truth about race relations in America but offered a way out – deeper personal analysis at individual levels, using love to raise

consciousness and accept responsibility, and committing to change and sacrifice. According to Alicia Garza, one of the Black Lives Matter movement's founders, there are two ways forward for America now: the traditional legal route, which has failed Black people, and then the one which pushes Black lives to matter no matter the sacrifice (Wortham, 2020). Baldwin's work today thus makes a plea for us to confront difficult histories for the sake of progress, and to educate ourselves and others. When Black America gasps, 'I can't breathe,' he appeals to the country to find his work, commit to change and gain consciousness – or else, there will be fire.

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The role of information and migration policy in asylum seeker flow

Casper Kurpan

Abstract

This essay argues that host countries have the capacity to affect refugee flows by altering the information available to refugees about their asylum policies, asylum acceptance rates, and relationships with other states, and as such, are far from passive actors. This essay links states' actions and refugees' responses to information in destination selection, something that has been largely missing from the literature. The first part of the essay provides necessary evidence that civilians, when faced with the possibility of fleeing, inform themselves about asylum laws and situations in possible host countries. This is important as in the majority of cases refugees decide where to go based on information available to them. The second part illustrates potential changes to countries' asylum policies and their effects on refugee flow. Countries will update their refugee laws if there is an expectation of a refugee inflow. Restriction of asylum policies decreases refugee flow to a state. Political ideology of a state seems irrelevant in affecting displacement flow, previous acceptance rates and welcoming laws can increase refugee influx. Lastly, rival relationships between countries have a positive effect on acceptance rates and can be used strategically to support insurgency in a neighbouring country, hence prolonging conflict and create more asylum seekers.

How do refugees decide?

The majority of forced migration can be explained by civil war, political regime transformations, dissident conflicts, and genocide. Asylum seekers will prioritise mitigation of the possible harm to their personal integrity (Davenport et al, 2003). Refugees generally escape danger and often choose neighbouring countries to flee to, whilst their

decision is being influenced by better economic opportunities combined with a threat of violence linked to civil conflict. Refugees will avoid destinations that are experiencing civil conflict, genocide, or international wars (Moore, Shellman, 2007).

Push factors lead citizens to invest in learning about the migration environment and potential host countries' asylum policies. Surveys and experiments with Syrian refugee population find they are knowledgeable about policy; it is shown that a more welcoming policy and environment will attract refugees sooner (Holland, Peters, 2020). Policy changes are accompanied by internet searches showing refugees update their knowledge in this regard. This is important, as the only way for host countries to affect the refugee flow is through policies, but these are only effective if asylum seekers are aware of them (Holland, Peters, 2020). This establishes a mechanism through which refugees inform themselves, and hence helps inform their rationale.

Refugees can access the asylum policy index focusing on de jure legal provisions, which could be argued do not transfer into the actual policy enforcement. However, refugees often hear about asylum regulations from other refugees who are living in the countries they consider fleeing to. It is plausible that they are not very familiar with legal jargon and the asylum-seeking process, hence what they hear about from others is the actual implementation of the laws. Thus, liberal asylum policies are likely to have a positive effect on decisions made in regards to destination selection.

Asylum policy index, access to internet and information online in country of origin and transitional ethnic kin on migration to a specific country can be used as explanatory variables of migration flow. When these variables interact with each other, they bring significant effects on the decision of migration. This means that refugees include information about opportunities available to them dictated by the host country's law when considering where to flee (Blair et al, 2020). For example, the first

refugees from Mozambique's Civil War in the 1990s fled to neighbouring Malawi, as they possessed information in regards to the destination that they obtained previously due to labour activities and spending time there. After migrating they established information networks with those who remained at home. Given the access and quality of received information about conditions in Malawi, if positive the households chose to follow the first cohort, if comparatively negative to conditions in Mozambique they did not (Koser, 1996).

It is observed that the long-run effect of a change in refugee policies is stronger than the short-run effect on the refugee flow. This illustrates that the countries have capacity to influence the flow of refugees, but only if refugees are aware of changing policies. This requires time for the information to be passed on amongst the networks of asylum seekers (Brekke et al, 2016).

At this juncture, this essay has proven refugees inform themselves about asylum laws, through internet accessed news and through their contacts. They respond to available information and update their destination decisions based on that.

What can host states do to affect refugee flow?

Countries might try to restrict the refugee inflow, as the fear of uncontrolled migration is often combined with claims that refugees seek economic opportunities, which pressures governments to act (Silove, 2000). Asylum policies a state can implement to deter refugees are as follows. First, restrictive policies such as border surveillance, carrier sanctions, and visa policies that attempt to limit access to the border. Second, policies affecting processing asylum applications, which affect the likelihood of asylum being granted. Third, policies restricting movement or welfare benefits, whilst refugees' applications are being processed. Examples of such include the 47% benefit cut introduced by Denmark in 2015 towards asylum seekers (Hatton, 2020). When these policies are used to predict asylum applications, border control and

processing policies yield statistically significant effects in deterring asylum seekers. Welfare policies tend to produce insignificant effects, as these can be viewed by refugees as secondary to securing safety through claiming asylum. The policies that restricted border controls and processing policies introduced from 1997 to 2005 in 19 major countries of destination led to decrees of applications by close to 30 percent (Hatton, 2020). Moreover, findings suggest that tightening of restrictions in one country results in increased flows to neighbouring states. When Denmark and Sweden restricted their asylum policies around the 1990s, the flow increased in Sweden, but decreased in Denmark, due to a far larger increase of Asylum Policy Index for Denmark. This change made neighbouring Sweden seem comparatively more attractive, hence the refugees fled there instead (Brekke et al, 2016).

Asylum regulations vary according to time and location. Developing nations host 86% of the world's forcibly displaced persons, thus they tend to update their refugee laws more. When looking at de jure migration regulations, states respond with changes in their asylum policies, for example, if there is an intense civil conflict happening in a neighbouring state. A country will respond to the expected refugee flows, rather than changes of laws after the migration flow occurred. (Blair et al, 2020).

Wealthier countries are more likely to restrict their asylum laws, as they want to limit migration that could be triggered by their economic performance (Blair et al, 2020). Given only 9 of the developing countries in Blair's sample chose to restrict their asylum policies, it is unclear whether economic growth is causal or a mere correlation. However, there is evidence that when two countries share a border, the number of refugees increases as GNP per capita increases in the potential host country (Moore, Shellman, 2007). This phenomenon could be a driving force for restricting asylum policies in developing countries.

The missing link between economic growth and policy restriction can be explained by the necessity of economic means to enforce legislation

that is meant to restrict asylum applications. Developing countries often struggle with a lack of resources necessary to ensure tighter border control, especially if we consider very large borders in Africa, or unfriendly geography consisting of mountains, jungles and rivers in Asia and South America. Hence, extra economic resources are necessary before the introduction of restrictive asylum policies. What seems to be the case is that if immigration is a salient issue, then countries will focus on stronger enforcement of the existing policies (Brekke et al, 2016). This in turn will result in refugees receiving information about increased difficulty of crossing the border and can change their destination based on that factor.

It could be argued that more conservative governments create a perception of a more hostile environment for refugees. Despite the majority of refugee flow taking place in the global South, Western European states still experience migration. Evidence suggests that countries with right-wing populist parties attract less asylum seekers, as refugees could be deterred by a hostile political environment. To test for that a proxy of a share of the seats secured by these parties in parliamentary elections is included in analysis (Neumayer, 2004). The problem with this argument arrives from the assumption that a potential asylum seeker is fully aware of the composition of the parliament in a host country. The reality is that a share of right-wing populist parties is likely to have no effect on perceived hostility, which can be observed by a very small statistically significant coefficient of -0.002. An asylum seeker will have a certain perception of a state before deciding to apply for asylum there, but it is unlikely they will closely follow results of the last general election. Moreover, votes for a particular party tend to cluster in areas of a country, which makes it possible for refugees to settle in other regions. Citizens can have a marginal effect on the flow of refugees through its voting decision and states deemed as hostile will attract less refugees. However, when looking at the USA we find that refugees are indifferent about whether a state within the US they choose to relocate to is governed by Democrats or Republicans (Mossaad et al, 2020). This shows

that the optics of the ideological leaning of a government do not strongly affect migration flows.

Countries also have the capacity to attract refugees, thus affecting the refugee flow. This has been observed as an increase in acceptance rate of asylum applications in the previous year will bring more asylum seekers. The logic of this is that the perception of whether a state will either be welcoming or hostile to an asylum seeker will affect individual decisions and migration flows as a whole (Neumayer, 2004). For example, when in 2013 Sweden granted all Syrian asylum seekers permanent instead of temporary residence, the number of applications more than doubled (Andersson, Jutvik, 2019). Moreover, the signing of UN non-refoulement treaties results in an increased number of asylum seekers the further the host country is from the country of origin (Moore, Shellman, 2007). This is consistent with the notion of refugees being attracted by liberal asylum laws and being willing to travel further to access those systems.

Why do countries want to attract asylum seekers?

Interstate rivalry and alliances dictate willingness of states to bear costs of hosting refugees in their territory. There was the wide acceptance of refugees from communist countries during the Cold War in the US and Western European Countries (Moorthy, Brathwaite, 2019). This is dictated by geo-political factors which transfer into perception of refugees as allies who distrust their country. The opportunity of a host state is then to utilise optics associated with hosting asylum seekers and framing it as undermining and harming rival regimes. Data from 1960 to 2006 suggests states accept significantly more refugees from rival countries than from allied or neutral states (Jackson, Atkinson, 2019). As the acceptance rate of refugees from a rival state increases it will likely result in a larger influx of refugees from that state.

This logic can be used as an extension of a country's foreign policy. When looking at East African refugee crises, whether host countries decide to set up a refugee camp by the border of a state fighting a civil war can be

dictated by their relationship with the country of origin. The deciding factor is the attitude of a host country towards the insurgent group. If they prefer them over the current government, they will set up a camp that will provide the insurgency with direct benefits; the camp provides rebels with potential soldiers they can recruit, as well as shelter and food that helps them continue fighting and increases their likelihood of a victory. Civilians are likely to flee their country if experiencing violence regardless of the presence of a camp, hence a neighbouring country is presented with a decision how they want to deal with the inflow of asylum seekers (Camerana, 2019). However, by supporting rebel groups, a host country is likely to extend a conflict, which can create more refugees. This shows how a host country can indirectly increase a refugee flow or decrease it through its way of dealing with asylum seekers on the ground. For example, the relationship between Burundi and Tanzania grew hostile in the 1990s, hence when a civil conflict began in Burundi, Tanzania placed Burundi refugees in densely inhabited camps next to the border. These camps served as means of recruitment and organisation for rebel groups. In the end, Forces for the Defence of Democracy took power in Burundi in the 2000s (Camerana, 2019).

Conclusion

This essay argued that host countries are far from passive actors in the displacement process. It made a link between host countries' actions and refugees responses to this information. Citizens, when confronted with threat of violence, inform themselves about asylum laws through internet accessed news and their contacts. They respond to available information and update their destination decisions based on that. This information comes from countries updating their asylum policies when they predict a potential inflow of refugees might occur, which if restrictive can redirect migrants into a different direction. Previous acceptance rates of refugees and welcoming asylum laws will attract more refugees. Political leaning of a state is irrelevant, as refugees will prioritise safety, over a potential xenophobia. Lastly, the host countries can affect displacement flow by allocating refugees in camps next to the border of a country fighting a

civil war, which can benefit insurgency and prolong conflict, hence generating more refugees.

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The role of identity politics in the disintegration of Yugoslavia: a socio-historical analysis

Félix Vanden Borre

Introduction

In 1978, one political observer commented that "Tito has become the symbol of Yugoslav unity. His death could have severe and immediate repercussions on the stability of the country" (Seroka, 1978, p. 271). While repercussions were not immediate, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) disintegrated in the decade that followed the death of its leader Josip Broz Tito. By looking at the history of Yugoslavia, it becomes apparent that severe underlying issues were not addressed, and that although quelled during the Tito era, these eventually led to the radical disintegration of the state and antagonization of the groups that inhabited it. Historian Sabrina Ramet suggested that Yugoslavia suffered from and was ultimately the victim of a perennial 'crisis of legitimacy': unable to build a system that promoted support and allegiance to the state from citizens, the Yugoslav Communist Party (LCY) could not tackle the state's innate illegitimacy and long-present problems (Ramet, 2002). This essay endeavours to take Ramet's proposition a step further, suggesting that the Yugoslav break-up was primarily the result of a development parallel to the crisis of legitimacy, a 'crisis of identity', as will be demonstrated with the aid of constructivist theory on identity formation. First, it will define constructivist theory and examine how Tito's Yugoslavia faced a multi-dimensional crisis of identity, being unable to create a pan-Yugoslav identity and successfully eliminate ethnic nationalism among its constituent republics, resulting in trends of self-victimisation. It will subsequently analyse the divergence of politico-economic interests between constituent republics in the 1960s economic crisis and its relevance in antagonising their relationships and leading to the revitalisation of repressed national sentiments and a politicisation of

national pasts post-Tito. Finally, the essay will demonstrate how these resulted in the rise of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia and how his coup at the federal level stalemated the political system, which proved to be the tipping point in severing the links between the constituent republics and the federal system. The state was weak and divided as per Ramet's legitimacy argument, and thus unable to reform itself, but what drove the system to disintegration were the centrifugal forces of nationalism, exacerbated by concerns of integrity and protection of national economic and political interests.

Constructivist theory: notions

Constructivist theory suggests that concepts such as nations and ethnicity are socially constructed phenomena and by essence both fluid and potentially reactionary in their development (Rocker, 1998). An ethnic group is no definitive entity: its identity is subject to change, in the sense that it may be altered or reinforced by external as well as internal pressures (Malešević, 2004). In this way, ethnic identity may be constructed as a result of reactionary behaviour and of internal forces: from below, by individuals and cultural institutions, and from above, as cultural differences and characteristics may be institutionalised by politicians and/or the establishment (Flere and Klanjšek, 2016). In the case of Yugoslavia, this theory entails a number of fundamental implications. First, identity may be purposefully constructed and maintained through states or "ethnic entrepreneurs" (Flere and Klanjšek, 2016, p. 842). Second, identity may be reactionary and thus based on opposition to other groups that pose a potential threat to one's own group's interests. These implications are central to understanding the fate of Yugoslavia, as state efforts to suppress national attachments and create a Yugoslav identity not only failed, but led to the exacerbation of localism and effectively, a crisis of identity. Attempts at imposing "brotherhood and unity" (Ramet, 2006, pp. 3-4), a central pillar of Yugoslav ideology, led to division and distrust.

Multi-dimensional crisis of identity

The first dimension of Communist Yugoslavia's crisis of identity is that it sought to build a Yugoslav identity but failed in doing so: "Yugoslavia is a country without Yugoslavs" (Lendvai and Parcell, 1991, p. 253). Only a small and mostly privileged group considered itself to be Yugoslav, with most individuals identifying as one of the many ethnicities that lived within the borders of the Yugoslav state (Oncioiu, 2016). The primary reason for this failure was that from its foundation, the Yugoslav state attempted to bring together people that had different expectations and interests both in their internal developments as well as in their relationships vis-à-vis other groups (Ramet, 2006). Indeed, many of these groups wished to maximise their relative power and influence in the Balkans. In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Serbs enjoyed a privileged status both socially and politically at the expense of non-Serbs. The ethnic resentments that emerged in that era were expressed through the creation of various national and xenophobic fascist organisations during World War II, such as the Croatian Ustaše and the Serbian Chetniks, and the genocides they carried out against other national groups (Hoare, 2010). Under Tito and Communism, an attempt was made at creating a political formula built on the principle of parity of all constituent republics and the achievements of the Partisans (Flere and Klanjšek, 2016). However, until the expulsion of Serbian centralist Aleksandar Ranković from the leadership of the LCY in 1966, Serbs were systematically overrepresented in the League of Communists and republic party apparatus in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia. This alienated non-Serbs and along with wartime memories, impeded the creation of a pan-Yugoslav identity. The sole exception were the Muslim Bosnians, who identified as Yugoslavs en masse until the recognition of the Muslim identity in 1966, to avoid having to identify as Serbs or Croats (Judt, 2005). This exception however proves the rule, as once given the opportunity, most Muslim Bosnians identified as ethnic Muslims rather than Yugoslavs.

Additionally, Tito's communists failed to effectively suppress nationalist attachments and loyalties – in fact, their efforts to do so exacerbated the

differences between the many ethnicities of Yugoslavia (Oncioiu, 2016). This is the second dimension of Yugoslavia's crisis of identity. All of the nations of Yugoslavia - except Montenegro - were, by the creation of the Yugoslav state, true national groups in nature (Flere and Klanjšek, 2016). To the Partisans, nationalism was the roots of the devastation which had struck Yugoslavia during World War II. It was thus necessary to eliminate such sentiments to create a harmonious Yugoslav society and stabilise the political scene. However, this took place through shaming and denial. For example, Croats and the Croatian Church were repeatedly shamed for the Ustaše genocide, while Serbs were made to feel guilty about their status in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Chetnik massacres (Hoare, 2010). Instead of addressing these issues and initiating constructive debates, the genocides and issues of nationalism in Yugoslavia were demonised (Ramet, 2006).

Efforts to undermine the integrity of national identities led to a sense of alienation among the constituent republics, in which national groups felt targeted by prejudice. Such sentiments of self-victimisation were common in Yugoslavia, as constituent republics and individuals increasingly felt that they were being wronged by the system in the favour of other ethnicities. Self-victimisation and manipulation by ethnic entrepreneurs of collective memory exaggerating wartime destruction and losses led to the developments of beliefs in which one's nation became the recipient of discrimination and second-class treatment throughout the history of the Yugoslav state (Flere and Klanjšek, 2016). This resulted in efforts by intellectual nationalists to affirm the identity of their ethnic community and demarcate themselves from other Yugoslav people, such as the "Croatian Spring" (Ramet, 2006). The Croatian Spring was a wave of Croatian national enthusiasm that was the consequence of the rejection by Croat intellectuals of the 1967 Novi Sad agreements, which declared Serbo-Croatian a single language, being perceived as a threat to the integrity of the Croatian variant of the common language (Oncioiu, 2016). Other ethnicities, like the Muslim Bosnians, similarly experienced renewed waves of nationalism in the 1970s after having been,

granted national recognition, as previously outlined. In both cases however, as well as in all other instances where nationalist sentiments were perceived to take primacy over the ideals of Yugoslav unity and parity under Tito, expressions of national pride and uniqueness were met with repression from the authorities.

Economic crisis: diverging interests and the beginning of decentralisation

While expressions of localism were repressed under Tito at the societal level, the economic crisis of the 1960s led to manifestations of nationalism and protection of national interests from above, i.e., from the political representatives of the constituent republics, which were expressed at the political level in the form of federalism and drew the lines by which the fracturing of the Yugoslav state would occur. The question of federalisation over centralisation was a debate that occupied the LCY from the 1960s to the fall of Yugoslavia (Lendvai and Parcell, 1991). These debates divided the political scene, as they were ultimately seen as a way of establishing one particular republic's national interests at the expense of others: attempts at centralisation were considered evidence of Serbian hegemony by non-Serbs, whereas attempts at decentralisation were experienced by Serbs as an attack on their national integrity.

Demands for greater decentralisation emerged from the debate on economic reforms after the economic crisis that had struck the country by the 1960s. An obvious economic division existed between the wealthy north of Yugoslavia such as Slovenia and Croatia, and the poorer south. These wealthier republics believed that they were being exploited and cumbered by the federal system and were furious that certain important economic decisions were made on clearly political rather than economic grounds (Judt, 2005). In the face of the economic crisis, they thus demanded greater autonomy to protect their national political and economic interests, which increasingly diverged from those of the SFRY (Ramet, 2006). The earliest and most palpable of such conflicts was the Slovenian road affair of 1969, where the funds of a loan from the World

Bank that had been made to improve its road networks between Slovenia and Austria were reallocated to meliorate the road infrastructures of other constituent republics. This angered the Slovenian communist branch which warned the LCY of potential damage to the relations between Slovenia and other republics – while having few effects, this was significantly the first time that a republic had protested against a federal decision (Ramet, 2006). Nevertheless, by empowering the national political systems from the 1963 constitution onwards (Ramet, 2002), decentralisation laid the foundations by which the fissuring of the Yugoslav state would occur, and made certain nations feel prejudiced against despite making the federal system more equitable. These steps felt most like a threat to Serbs, historically the champions of centralism: the dismissal of Ranković for example, was interpreted as evidence that the LCY had become anti-Serb (Ramet, 1996).

Politics and identity: rise of nationalism post-Tito and the fall of Yugoslavia

The 1960s economic crisis exacerbated demands for greater autonomy by the constituent republics, leading to the development of decentralisation at the federal level – coinciding with the crisis of the late 1970s. However, nationalist tensions were manifested in novel overt ways after the death of Tito. Indeed, the effects of the 1973 oil crisis came late to Yugoslavia, but as in other countries, proved to be not only an economic but political crisis (Hobsbawm, 1995). As per Ramet's argument of a crisis of legitimacy, the weakness and polarisation of the political system had left politicians unable to efficiently respond to Yugoslavia's economic and political problems. This stimulated demands for even greater liberty from the constituent republics. As previously mentioned, nationalist behaviour coming from below was met with repression under Tito. Upon his death, however, there was no all-Yugoslav figure and political arbiter which could regulate the relations between the constituent republics and their citizens. Instead, he left behind a decentralised political legacy in which all six constituent republics and the two Serbian autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and

Kosovo, enjoyed an equal say in federal matters as guaranteed by the 1974 constitution (Ramet, 2002). Just a year after his death, the Albanians of Kosovo took to the streets to protest against the discrimination they experienced by the Yugoslav and above all Serbian political system (Ramet, 2002). Albanians represented about 15% of the Yugoslav population by that time, as opposed to 3.6% in 1931 (Judt, 2005). Despite being the most rapidly growing ethnic group of Yugoslavia, they lived in conditions thoroughly inferior to the Yugoslav average. Their demands for a republic independent from Serbia felt like a threat to Serbs and as per constructivist theory reactionism, fuelled Serbian nationalism and Albanophobia, leading to mass demonstrations by Serbs in Belgrade and Pristina (Ramet, 2006). Indeed, Kosovo occupied a central place in Serbian history, as the 1389 battle of Kosovo stood in the conscience collective as the manifestation of Serbian unity and protection of its national integrity. Such politicisation of the past was omnipresent throughout the ethnicities of Yugoslavia, presenting an idealised conception of pre-Yugoslav national freedom and greatness and would be harnessed by ethnic entrepreneurs to fuel growing nationalist sentiments (Flere and Klanjšek, 2016).

The growth of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s and the political demands of the Serbian republic on the federal system led to the rise of Slobodan Milošević and the strengthening of national sentiments amongst other peoples of Yugoslavia as a reaction, eventually resulting in a political stalemate to which the constituent republics could only reply by seceding. Serbian nationalism was accentuated by both decentralisation, which was experienced as anti-Serb and to which political and economic faults were attributed, and the re-emergence of Kosovar Albanian nationalism. Already in 1984, the Serbian party organisation called for reforms which would strengthen the federal government and undermine the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo. In 1985, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts drafted a Memorandum which portrayed Serbs as the great victims of Tito and Communism and argued that Serbs were being utilised and exploited in the SFRY. It also

contained an ideological program which would establish Serbian hegemony over non-Serbs (Ramet, 2002). By 1987, Slobodan Milošević had risen to power and channelled Serbian nationalism first against Albanians and Tito's legacy, and ultimately against the other people of the SFRY (Ramet, 1996). The strengthening of Serbian nationalism and the Memorandum demands caused outrage in other constituent republics anxious to preserve their national integrity, leading to the election of other nationalist leaders such as the Croat Franjo Tudjman (Judt, 2005), which once again highlights the reactionary aspect of nationalism in Yugoslavia. More than simple demagogic talk however, Milošević was able to bring the autonomous provinces under the control of Belgrade but retaining their federal votes through a constitutional coup. By placing allies at the head of Montenegro, he secured half of the federal votes for Serbia, thus stalemating the political system by 1989 (Ramet, 2006). Up to this point, the Slovenes, among others, had used the threat of secession as a last resort, and were willing to work out compromises (Ramet, 2002). With the federal stalemate, the only solution was to secede, which brought Croatia and eventually Bosnia and Macedonia to secede too. Milošević was not the main actor in Yugoslavia's disintegration, but rather, represented the political catalyst for nationalism to erupt and topple the federal system of the SFRY.

Conclusion

The Yugoslav political system was polarised, adversely affected by Ramet's crisis of legitimacy, but the driving forces in the disintegration of Yugoslavia were nationalism and reactions to infringements on national integrity, as part of the state's crisis of identity. Tito wished to create a pan-Yugoslav identity, but his failure in doing so and effectively quelling expressions of nationalism resulted in their exacerbation, as nationalism would eventually resurface in the wake of the political and economic problems that the SFRY faced – first at the political level in the form of decentralisation, and after Tito's death, renewing itself at the societal level, first in Kosovo, then Serbia and the rest of Yugoslavia. The disintegration of Yugoslavia is best understood in the context of constructivist theory

and a crisis of identity, as the issue of nationality and the protection of national interests lay at the heart of essential political conflict and debate of the federation. Nationalism was reactionary throughout its development and essentially constructed. Whether to centralise or decentralise the state and the emergence of self-victimisation antagonised constituent republics and their relations towards each other, whilst the demands for greater autonomy from the Albanian Kosovars led to a reinvigoration of Serbian nationalism which eventually resulted in the rise to power of Milošević and a political stalemate at the federal level. Sabrina Ramet proposed to allegorise the story of Yugoslavia with that of the Tower of Babel in that both are a story of failed cooperation. This myth however presupposes initial unity, which was absent in Yugoslavia from the very creation of the state. It is in this light perhaps more fitting to interpret the disintegration of Yugoslavia through George Steiner's conception of the Babel problem: "New languages are not designed to improve communication, or to express things better, but to allow secrecy and maintain cultural isolation" (Web Archive: Powers of Literature). The people of Yugoslavia wished to affirm and demarcate their national identities and interests against those of other national groups of Yugoslavia and the federation itself, a process which entailed the violent disintegration of the state and of the relations between ethnic groups.

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"고래 싸움에 새우등 터진다" When whales fight, the shrimp's back is broken

Elvire Olmos

Introduction

The Korean saying '고래 싸움에 새우등 터진다' encapsulates the belief that the fate of the Korean Peninsula is shaped or determined by the interplay between larger powers. The proverb carries with it an underlying negative connotation of weakness, vulnerability, and powerlessness attached to the 'shrimp'. The peninsula is clearly associated with a 'shrimp' caught up in a whirlpool of fighting giants. It is at the mercy of its powerful neighbours, 'the whales', namely China, the United States, and Russia. Despite extensive use in media and literature, numerous observers have questioned this 'shrimp' categorisation on the grounds of major economic, political, and military change in status of the Korean Peninsula over the whole region and beyond.

Thus, to what extent can we say that the Korean Peninsula has been shaped and influenced by outside forces and larger powers? This paper will demonstrate that even though the fate and nature of the Korean Peninsula were primarily shaped by outside forces throughout its history, North Korea and South Korea have now been able to take their fate into their own hands. Today, Korea plays a major strategic role, having expanded beyond its regional influence to become a prominent member in world affairs. In recent years, it can be argued that the Peninsula transformed into a 'dolphin swimming between the whales'. Historical 'Shrimp' Status of the Korean Peninsula

The geographic position of Korea, located in the middle of powerful actors, is the foundation for the geopolitics of the region; the Peninsula is the central land point to control the region. Consequently, from the

Tributary System to the Cold War, the Korean Peninsula has been seen both as "a 'menace' and an 'opportunity' by all regional great powers in Northeast Asia (Mansourov, 2000), leading to its emergence as a 'small and profitable shrimp among powerful whales'.

From the Tributary System to the Japanese Colonisation

For many centuries, Korea was a member of China's tributary system. This system was centered around the superiority of the Chinese emperor and the deference of his subjects; the emperor overrode the land and princes governing in their own fiefdoms. The Korean king therefore acknowledged the titular superiority of the Chinese emperor and had to pay a tribute in return for military protection, political legitimacy, and limited internal interference. Subject to strong imperial competition, this relatively isolated and weak Peninsula was successively conquered by more powerful powers in the region, which determined its fate and history. With the decline of the Chinese Empire, the hermit kingdom became the object of competing interests between the Japanese, Russian and the Western alternative ascendancy in East Asia (Kim, 2017). Finally, after the Sino-Japanese (1895) and the Russo-Japanese (1905) war defeats, the Japanese Empire became the predominant power in the region until 1945. Japan controlled the Korean Peninsula before the 20th century and formally annexed it in 1910. With the continuous fight for the control of the region, notably owing to Korea's central and strategic location, the domination over the Korean Peninsula became the symbol of the ascendancy of larger powers. Accordingly, the fate of the Korean Peninsula and its people became totally dependent on the evolution of the struggle for power led by its powerful neighbours.

The Korean War and Division of the Peninsula

After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the northeast Asian power struggle changed in nature with the emergence of the Cold War context; the Korean Peninsula power dynamic changed from a regional-centred struggle to a global-proxy competition between the Communist and the

Western blocs. Without prior consultation with the Korean population, the Peninsula was divided along the 38th parallel by American soldiers. Later, two separate states were created in 1948, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) occupied by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) occupied by the US. A
fter the establishment of a pro-US South Korean government by the US and a Communist North Korean government by the USSR, the
tension between the blocs heightened, and the Peninsula became the ground of confrontation between the two superpowers. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army crossed the parallel and sparked the beginning of the Korean War. This proxy war was the scene of the confrontation
between North Korea, backed by China, and the USSR and South
Korea, supported by the UN . The Korean Peninsula therefore emerged as grounds for global-proxy competition between the two blocs. Even after the military confrontation stopped in July 1953, the Korean Peninsula remained the embodiment of the ideological cleavages of the Cold War, with constant military tension and occasional détente periods, notably due to negotiations between the two Koreas (Kim, 2017). The fading of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union did not ease the
tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but rather froze the divide. Once again, Korea's history became the result of power struggle and desire for
domination. This time, what was a regional struggle became global. Due to its 'sandwiched' position – this time with China-Soviet Union on one side and Japan-US on the other side - Korea became one of the first grounds for proxy war between the superpowers.

The pivotal geo-strategic position of the Korean Peninsula between major powers has given Korea a crucial role in the international system. At its expense, this 'land of desire' became the ground for states to establish their dominance over the region. This regional dominance opportunity progressively emerged to become a global one, notably due to its ideal
location between the two blocs. Consequently, the Peninsula's fate has been shaped by the external forces and powers that have sought power

and domination over the region, making the Peninsula and its people collateral damage. The fights among the whales have contributed to what the Peninsula has become today; more than just a broken back, the nation has entirely severed in two.

Moving From a 'Shrimp' Into a 'Dolphin' Symbolism

The emergence of China on the global scene and the threat it represents to the American power has contributed to the escalation of tensions on the Korea Peninsula in this 'new Cold War context' (Armstrong, 2019). Even if the traditional alliances persist, the relationships inside and outside of the blocs seem to have changed. Rather than being collateral damages, North Korea and South Korea have progressively succeeded in taking their fate into their own hands. Still influenced by the whales, the Peninsula has nevertheless emerged to become a 'dolphin' swimming between the whales.

South Korea: Hedging Strategy

South Korea has become a wealthy democracy and a strong economic force in Asia, with its economy ranking fourth in the continent. Unable to rise without the economic giant of the region, China has become South Korea's largest trading partner. Consequently, in the recent Sino-US competition, Seoul has played a dual balance game between the US, its traditional security ally, and China, its strategic economic partner (McGill, 2012; Lee, 2014). As Kim highlights, South Korea employs a hedging strategy. When the middle power is caught between representing the interests of the US and China, the government waits until the very last moment to make a choice that will seem inevitable to outsiders. This awaiting strategy enables South Korea to create ambiguity and decrease the apparent saliency of the choice. Thus, South Korea is able to reduce any negative effect of a decision caught in between the US and China's hegemonic competition to maintain favourable relationships between both strategic partners. For instance, South Korea delayed its membership for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which was

perceived by the US as a Chinese effort to undermine the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, until the latest application date. This late membership allowed South Korea to avoid offending the USA, considering that other US allies also decided to join in (Kim, 2017). This dual game has allowed South Korea to maintain a relatively neutral stance by not taking a clear side. Contrary to the pre-Cold War and Cold War era, South Korea, now often considered a middle power, has succeeded in creating its own strategic path and securing its own fate. Rather than completely depending on the US as was the case after WWII, this hedging strategy expresses a certain liberation and free will to act independently. This willingness has been reinforced in recent years due to Trump's unilateral foreign policies which completely overlooked Korea on subjects such as security measures regarding North Korea (Norris, 2017). Thus, this middle power is still subject to waves created by the whales, however, it is able to move along with them and create its own path by balancing between the two predominant whale powers. We can now begin to see South Korea losing its weak power position as 'the shrimp' in exchange for its newfound role as the 'agile dolphin'.

North Korea: China and Nuclear Program

On the communist side, North Korea's relationship with its allies has also changed. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of China's economic, political and military capacity, China has now become the main leader of the Communist faction. While China is a crucial ally for North Korea, the Mont Peaktu bloodline has never stopped implementing its Juche ideology, which is political, strategic, and economic self-reliance. In fact, after WWII and the division of the Korean Peninsula between the Soviet Union and the USA, Russia and China largely decided on the fate of North Korea by putting Kim Il Sung in the back seat. However, after the Korean War and Kim Il Sung power takeover, the latter established the Juche model with his famous speech delivered on the 28th of December 1955, where he sought independence from all other countries. Still reliant on the Soviet Union and (mainly) China, the Kim bloodline has been able to take the destiny of North

Korea into their own hands, increase their self-reliance, and reduce their dependence on their traditional allies. Nowadays, North Korea's nuclear program might be one of the most striking examples of this independent decision-making. Pyongyang's nuclear program has been publicly opposed by its long-time ally, China, as directly threatening its strategic interests (Kim, 2017). Even under this pressure, North Korea carried on with its nuclear program because it provided the latter highly beneficial unilateral diplomatic leverage. Thus, North Korea has succeeded in distancing itself from Chinese strategic interests to follow its own, even if it means occasionally breaking alliance pacts. Similarly to South Korea, the position of the Peninsula has changed from 'game taker' to 'game maker'.

While traditional alliances remain, North and South Korea are no longer merely the collateral damages of the fight between the powerful whales. They are now the dolphins in control of their futures. Although the game has changed, the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula remains the same. Consequently, when the Sino-US competition gets fiercer, greater importance will be given to the Peninsula's strategic decision. From the shrimp having its back broken, the whales are now trying to seduce the shrimp to gain power in this rivalry whale game. Accordingly, as a substitute for the shrimp imagery, it would be relevant to equate the Peninsula with a dolphin. And whilst the dolphin cannot match the predator whales, the dolphin is quick-witted and agile. It is able to adapt to the conflict and move along the waves created by the whales' fight, swimming between them (Tudor, 2014 ; Kim, 2017).

Conclusion

'When whales fight, a shrimp's back is broken' is an insightful proverb shedding light on how the fate of the Korean Peninsula was historically influenced and even shaped by outside forces and larger powers. The strategic location of the Peninsula has been the subject of power rivalry and its relative weakness has, throughout history, spurred on many nations -the "whales"- to compete for regional and world

ascendancy. This is how the peninsula, 'the shrimp', has often been collateral damage to those situations of rivalry. Yet, the evolutions and ever-changing shifts in the balance of power in East Asia are often overlooked. The dolphin symbolism has emerged as an alternative way of considering the control of both North and South Korea in taking their fate into their own hands. Consequently, it may be argued that the 'shrimp' concept seems outdated and flawed to describe the making of the fate of the Peninsula. Nevertheless, the Sino-American rivalries remain significantly influential in the decision-making and position-taking of both Koreas.

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Will low levels of literacy remain a gerontological issue in Ireland?

Áine Bernadette Mannion

How low levels of literacy have impacted older adults and the continued role of policy and lifelong education interventions.

Introduction

Ireland has a below average literacy rate for adults, with a low ranking of 17th out of 24 OECD countries, and low levels of literacy for older adults can have devastating impacts (CSO 2013). Yet, in the most recent international literacy assessments of 15-year-olds, Ireland ranked 4th in the OECD (Schleicher 2019). Literacy in an Irish context has been related to a cohort effect where over time adult literacy rates are expected to improve (Denny et al. 1999). Nevertheless, this essay will explore how low literacy levels is a gerontological concern with continuing relevance. The impact of low literacy levels on older adults aged 65 years and older will first be explored. The possibility of a cohort effect will also be analysed using the evidence from different cohort-specific international literacy assessments and skills surveys. However, older adults with literacy difficulties are not a homogeneous group, and the most disadvantaged are showing persistent low levels of literacy (Lalor et al. 2009). Therefore, I will look to lifelong education interventions and policy being informed by research that includes older adults, which will remain gerontological concerns regardless of demographic changes. Literacy can be seen as one of the tools needed to fully participate in society and to achieve one's goals, and is essential in the use of technology, communication skills or numeracy (NALA 2020). However, due to the limited scope of this essay, the evidence put forward here will specifically refer to proficiency in reading and writing.

Is literacy a gerontological concern? How low levels of literacy impact older adults

Low literacy levels have been found in numerous studies to have vast-ranging effects, or costs, on older individuals and their families (Grotlüschen et al. 2016). When Interviewing older adults with literacy difficulties, the National Adult Literacy Agency [NALA] found that respondents were less likely to participate in community activities out of fear their family and friends would think less of them upon finding out they had literacy difficulties (Lalor et al. 2009). The Irish Longitudinal Study on Ageing [TILDA] has found among their respondents that those aged 75+ were significantly less confident at filling in medical forms compared to younger 65+ cohorts (Turner et al. 2018; HaPAI 2018). This is reflective of other research that health and social care services can be challenging to navigate for older adults with literacy difficulties, resulting in adverse physical and mental health outcomes, for example, chronic diseases like diabetes, higher mortality rates, and an increased likelihood of dementia (Kaup et al. 2014; Kim et al. 2014; Lamar et al. 2019; Pandit et al. 2009; Rentería et al. 2019; Sudore et al. 2006). From health to social impacts, research on older adults has unanimously shown that low literacy levels can deeply impact in many areas of an older adult's life.

Ultimately, negative effects of low levels of literacy are not just confined to those aged 65+, however, both the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies [PIAAC] and TILDA have found that age and more significant literacy difficulties are positively correlated (Barrett & Riddell 2019; Turner et al. 2018; HaPAI 2018). As per Chart 1.1, the average Irish PIAAC scores decrease with age. Older adults in Ireland with literacy difficulties have described how historical abuse during their education negatively impacted on their current literacy proficiency and involvement in lifelong education. They also described becoming very reliant and a burden on family to cope with basic daily literacy tasks, which could become problematic as a family structure changes, for example, a spouse passing away (Lalor et al. 2009). There-

fore, ramifications for having low levels of literacy is not solely an issue for the 65+, however there is a distinct experience for older adults.

Chart 1.1 Mean PIAAC Score (unadjusted) for literacy proficiency by age group



Source taken from CSO (2013) PIAAC 2012: Survey Results for Ireland from the OECD's Programme for International Assessment for Competencies. Central Statistics Office, Stationery Office, Cork.

A Cohort Effect?

Though the ramifications of low literacy are deeply felt, as outlined in the essay so far, some argue that low levels of older adult literacy are just a cohort effect that will correct itself. Population projections show that the number of older adults in Ireland will expand significantly from its last census level of 629,800 in 2016 to nearly 1.6 million by 2051 (CSO 2017b). One could argue that this will make the issue of low levels of older adult literacy more of a concern as society grows older. However, it is alternatively projected that as time goes by, older adults with low literacy levels will be replaced with those with higher levels of literacy, who grew up following the introduction of proactive literacy and

education policy interventions (Denny et al. 1999). When comparing the first International Adult Literacy Survey [IALS] in the 1990s with the most recent Irish PIAAC sores, as per Chart 1.2, over time the number of adults at Level 1 or below is decreasing, which are the levels corresponding to low performance. As these demographic changes are realised, issues concerning older demographics may become of greater importance, with the context of literacy concerns demonstrating a strong argument for the inverse of this.

Chart 1.2 IALS 1994 vs PIAAC 2012, Percentage of adults (16-65) across levels of literacy proficiency, Ireland



Source taken from CSO (2013) PIAAC 2012: Survey Results for Ireland from the OECD's Programme for International Assessment for Competencies. Central Statistics Office, Stationery Office, Cork.

Denny et al. (1999) contend that the introduction of free post-primary school education provides a possible explanation for the cohort effect where literacy levels will improve in time. Ireland's low competitiveness in international adult literacy rankings as well as this being a phenomenon observed in older people, can be explained by the existence of a cohort of adults who were too old to avail of free post-primary educa-

tion from 1967. This cohort received less schooling than future cohorts and are behind in both literacy and educational attainment. Chart 1.3 shows Irish PIAAC findings that demonstrate that educational attainment directly correlates with a person's literacy level. Denny et al. (1999) state that the effect of formal schooling was particularly strong in an Irish context. In 1966, 7% of those aged 14 or older remained in full time education (CSO 1966). Today approximately 90% of 15- to 19-year-olds have completed lower or upper secondary school (CSO 2017a). Those aged 12 in the year the then-controversial policy was introduced, turned 65 years old in 2020. Therefore, with the introduction of secondary school education to explain this cohort effect, we should expect to see improvement over time.

Chart 1.3 Percentage of Adults at levels of literacy proficiency by highest level of education achieved, Ireland



Source taken from CSO (2013) PIAAC 2012: Survey Results for Ireland from the OECD's Programme for International Assessment for Competencies. Central Statistics Office, Stationery Office, Cork.

Looking at contemporary assessments of childhood literacy, there is clear evidence of above-average literacy levels compared to older adults, providing evidence of a cohort effect and improvement over time. PISA [Programme for International Student Assessment] tests the literacy and other skills of 15-year-olds. Looking to Charts 1.4 and 1.5 it is possible to see the trend in Irish literacy rates with younger cohorts ranking well above average, unlike Ireland's PIAAC results which show adults below average. PISA classifies 88% of Irish 15-year-olds as having at least level 2 proficiency in reading, which they consider as the baseline needed to participate effectively and productively in society and future learning (ERC 2017). Again, policy change has been credited with improving literacy levels, for example, the implementation of the National Strategy to Improve Literacy and Numeracy among Children and Young People 2011–2020 (Kennedy 2013). These assessment scores provide evidence of a cohort effect, and as these younger cohorts age, it is logical to expect the levels of literacy of older adults will also increase.

Chart 1.4 PISA Average Reading Scores 2018 (15 Years Olds), OECD – Top 20



Source adapted from Schleicher A. (2019) PISA 2018: Insights and Interpretations. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris.

Chart 1.5 PIAAC 2012 Adult Literacy (adjusted) mean scores



Source taken from CSO (2013) PIAAC 2012: Survey Results for Ireland from the OECD's Programme for International Assessment for Competencies. Central Statistics Office, Stationery Office, Cork.

The impact of socio-economic background on literacy

Literacy assessment scores might provide evidence for an argument of a cohort effect but it also promotes a narrative that all cohorts are homogenous groups, despite there being evidence of a different experience for the most disadvantaged. Research by NALA has highlighted the profound and specific experiences of older adults who are members of lower socioeconomic classes, the Irish travelling

community, and those who are homeless (Lalor et al. 2009). Western nations still demonstrate profound gaps between the literacy achievement of children in lower socioeconomic backgrounds and their wealthier counterparts (Kennedy 2013). Significant differences for the most economically disadvantaged can be seen for adults in Chart 1.6, but also in the PISA results where 22% of students in DEIS [Delivering Equality of Opportunity in Schools] schools had only very basic reading skills in comparison to 9% of children in non-DEIS schools (Gilleece et al. 2020). Therefore, even as demographics change and absolute literacy levels rise, the most disadvantaged are still facing significant literacy difficulties.

Chart 1.6 Percentage of adults at levels of literacy proficiency by principal economic status, Ireland



Source taken from CSO (2013) PIAAC 2012: Survey Results for Ireland from the OECD's Programme for International Assessment for Competencies. Central Statistics Office, Stationery Office, Cork.

The Role of Interventions: Adult and Life-Long Education

The provision of lifelong education could be an intervention that will remain a vital part of literacy policy for the most disadvantaged in ageing societies, as analysis of literacy outcomes have concluded that education is persistently the most important predictor of literacy proficiency (Desjardins 2003). Adult education interventions can positively impact the literacy proficiency of older adults, however, those who engaged with education to a greater extent in the past are more likely to engage with education throughout their life course (Findsen and Formosa 2011). Bruello et al. (2015) interestingly found that there was a relationship between education and lifetime earnings with how accessible books were in the homes of 10-year-olds. Those with greater access and ability to afford books as children had much higher returns from education. Therefore, adult education and policy that invests in early educational attainment, with a full life course perspective will remain a gerontological concern and necessary literacy policy intervention for the most disadvantaged older adults with low levels of literacy.

Examining how and why lifelong education interventions are provided, and their role within labour markets, will also remain a concern for older adults. Barrett and Riddell (2019) argue that adult education policy is growing in importance because of societies' ageing demographics, but also because of the changes in the labour market, including changes to the nature of work and retirement ages. However, this also leads to criticisms of adult literacy education as it shifts into a mechanism for meeting the upskilling needs of the labour market which can preclude older people from seeing relevance in such programmes for themselves (O'Brien 2018). A one size fits all approach to success can often focus on perceived deficits rather than supporting positive capabilities and opening up the possibility of personal development and learning for the older adult (Lalor et al. 2009; Findsen & Formosa 2011). The commodification of adult literacy education, therefore, will also remain a concern for older adults with literacy difficulties.

Limitations of literacy policy, assessments and research

Lastly, when discussing if literacy will remain a gerontological concern, it is important to highlight the lack of older adult specific assessments and consequently policy being based on outdated or non-older adult specific data. Literacy rates and statistics are known to be a difficult indicator to analyse, for example, the reliability of some countries' literacy rates and testing practices have been questioned (Zhao 2020). The only major assessment of adult literacy, PIAAC, is nearly a decade old. Though a new wave is expected within the next two years, PIAAC testing does not involve those aged over 65. Much of the analysis of the older adult literacy trends and the majority of the adult and older adult education and literacy policy is based on PIAAC results (NALA 2020; Lalor et al. 2009; Barrett & Riddell 2016). It is also important to note that no two test items are the same in PIAAC and PISA, which raises questions for the legitimacy and speculative nature of cohort comparisons of literacy rates (CSO 2013). Therefore, the quantity and quality of data and evidence-based policy relating to the distinct experience of older adults with literacy difficulties will remain a gerontological concern.

Conclusion

Ultimately, low levels of literacy will remain a gerontological issue in Ireland. It is a gerontological concern because of the deep and devastating social and health impacts literacy difficulties can have on older adults. Certainly, there has been great and continued improvement of Irish literacy levels, with evidence of a cohort effect as younger cohorts who availed of proactive literacy and education policy innovations age. However, despite improvements there are still significant gaps in literacy levels that correlate with socio-economic status. As older adults and those with literacy difficulties are not a homogenous group, evidenced-based literacy policy and considered life-long education interventions will continue to be a gerontological issue in Ireland

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Marxism as Science

Ross Mallervy

Introduction

This paper will act as an explanation for why Marx and Engels described themselves as scientific socialists. Scientific socialism, also known as Marxism, is the method forwarded by Marx and Engels for both scientifically examining existing societal structures, while also forwarding socialism as both necessitated by , and resulting from, existing social structures. The importance of Marx and Engels' work derives from its systemic analysis of existing structures, while also positing an inevitable, new economic system from the internal logic of the capitalist economy.

Firstly, this paper will explain historical materialism and the Marxist view of economics. Consideration will then turn to the main influences on Marxist thought, namely Hegel, Feuerbach and the utopian socialists, showcasing how these ideologies were crucial to the development of the dialectical and scientific aspects of Marxism. This paper will then examine how Marx and Engels distinguished their 'scientific' brand of socialism from their contemporaries, namely the reformist socialists and anarchists, before outlining an argument for why modern Marxist functionalism is still scientific.

Historical Materialism

When Marx and Engels discuss 'materialism', they do so in two senses. Firstly, Marx (1875, Part one) is a materialist in the sense that he sees man's material needs as the basis for all social interaction. Marx notes that man has physical needs which may only be satisfied by the products of nature, thereby shaping society. Marxists are also

philosophically materialist in that they disavow any non-observable phenomena such as religion (Engels 1892, introduction). These are synonymous for Marx and Engels; Man is both subjected to and relies on sensuous data (Engels 1892, Introduction). To understand why Marx and Engels saw their conception of materialism as 'historical', it is apt to examine an earlier form of materialism which Marx and Engels dub 'mechanical materialism'.

Engels (1892, chapter 2) notes that 18th century metaphysics was materialist in an abstract sense – things either existed or did not exist. Material reality was fixed, or possibly cyclical, but while the notion of change existed to traditional materialists, history could not be said to have any concept of progress (Engels 1946, Part 2). Engels (1946, chapter 2) contends that such a rigid metaphysical stance permeated the scientific thinking of the period, seeing matter as fixed and the universe as essentially static. Engels thus credits the discovery of cells and particularly Darwinian selection as vindicating the Marxist position that material reality is in a constant state of flux, if not progressive.

Man, like nature, responds to his material setting – while individual humans may be sentient, societies are too complex to move intelligently, and are thus akin to natural, observable phenomena (Engels 1892, chapter 3). Marx and Engels saw these material changes in society resulting from class struggle throughout history, as opposed to traditional materialism that divorced ideas from their material 'driving forces' (Engels 1946, Part 4).

The modes of production provide us with an understanding of how material classes spur history. Marx (1859, preface) gives us the clearest espousal of how economies are structured. Marx divides all hitherto existing economic systems (modes of production) into two factors; the forces of production (FOP) and the relations of production (ROP). The forces of production equate to all the material resources within an economy, whereas the relations of production are the 'definite' economic

relations between those who own the FOP and those who do not. Marx and Engels perceived the ROP as an economic, rather than exclusively cultural phenomena, and thus grounded class in a material reality, rather than a sociological perspective.

The capitalist mode of production

Engels (1892, introduction) believed that capitalist economics has two main classes – the Bourgeoisie who own 'nature' (the FOP) and the Proletariat who own nothing except their labour, and must sell themselves to survive. Marx and Engels (1848, chapter.1) argue that historically, changes in modes of production are usually 'pregnant' within the pre-existing society. The origins of the Bourgeoisie lay in the mercantile burghers of the feudal era as they expanded from private manufacturing of private business to social manufacturing of private business (1892, Chap.3). Marx and Engels perceived capitalism as a liberating force, radically simplifying the complex class structure of feudalism, and understood European society in 19th century to be composed of three major classes – Aristocracy, Bourgeoisie and Proletariat, the latter two having emerged from the economic base (1946, chapter 4). Marxists see capitalism as intensifying the collapse of other classes such as the aristocracy and middle class (Petit bourgeois) until these classes are subsumed into the other two major classes (Marx and Engels 1848, chapter 1).

Influences on Marxism

It is evident that Marx and Engels used class relations to analyse the past and present in a materialist sense. To understand how Marxists use this analysis to predict the future, one must first look at Hegel, Feuerbach and the utopian socialists.

Hegelian dialectic

Engels (1946, Chap.4) defines the Marxist position as distinct from Hegel and Feuerbach. From Hegel, Marxists borrow the idea of dialectics and reason as a process instead of a fixed metaphysical truth. For Hegel,

unlike previous eighteenth-century metaphysicians, human history was constantly progressing towards an end point. This occurred via the dialectic – ideas would confront opposing ideas which would create better ideas. Hegel believed the endpoint of this process was the 'absolute idea' – in which human reason would reach absolute perfection. For Hegel, our ideas and understanding of reason was relative to the period we lived in. Hegel did not believe we had reached the absolute idea, however he believed that Prussian society in the 1830s was approaching it and therefore conservatively protected it (Engels 1946, chapter 1). Engels (1946, Chapter 1) notes the paradox in Hegel's thinking – conservative Hegelians upheld the 'proposition' that Prussia must be protected, while the Hegelian dialectic stressed constant change and destruction of outdated ideas. For Marx and Engels, it was therefore necessary to turn Hegel 'right side up' by seeing ideas as a product of material conditions rather than abstract ideas causing changes (Engels 1946, chapter 4).

Feuerbach

Feuerbach, by viewing religious belief materialistically as a product of internal human reason, also rejected Hegel's idealism by focusing on the materialist basis of ideas. Engels (1946, chapter 3) notes that Hegel studied societal changes, as opposed to Feuerbach's analysis of an abstracted individual. Marxists reject Feuerbach's thinking just as they reject Hegel albeit for different reasons; Hegel had an idealist conception of humanity while Feuerbach had a materialist conception of an abstracted man. Historical materialism was thus a tool to predict dialectical movements via materialist, societal analysis , which was most evident in class struggle throughout historical epochs (Engels 1946, chapter 3).

Utopian socialists

Engels (1892, Part 1) discusses the weaknesses of previous 'utopian' socialists. Engels traces the origins of early socialists such as Fourier and Owens in bourgeois, Enlightenment ideas of reason. These intellectuals took the idea of political equality and extended it to economic equality – their analysis is not based upon liberating classes but emancipating humanity. To Engels, these thinkers are 'idealist' in the same sense as Hegel – their philosophy is not derived from materialist analysis but

from philosophising a perfect society. Engels lambasts these thinkers for ignoring that ideas derive from materialist conditions therefore reason is relative, not fixed. These thinkers rejected revolution, seeing the merits of socialism as self-evident. Engels fundamentally rejects this idea, seeing a change in the mode of production as a necessarily violent act. This focus on dialectics leads naturally to the moniker of 'scientific' socialism.

Marxism as science

Dialectical analysis allows Marxists to do two things. Firstly, it facilitates the explanation of historical materialism in the context of economic class struggle, which moves dialectically. Secondly, this dialectical class movement allows Marxists to predict ensuing struggles. For Marx and Engels, historical materialism and class struggle are not just historical phenomena – they are current and constant phenomena that can be studied with the 'precision of natural science' (Marx 1859, preface).

Engels (1892, chapter 2) credits Darwin as the scientist who proved that matter operates dialectically as opposed to being metaphysically fixed. Marx and Engels believe that human society, like all phenomena, must move dialectically and that historical materialism is the mechanic by which society operates. History is therefore not random but governed by dialectical movements in the form of class struggle as the 'inner, hidden laws' of human history (Engels 1946, part 4). As noted above, Marx saw capitalism as simplifying class structure (Marx 1848, chapter 1). Engels (1892, chapter 3) gives the clearest expression of the scientific inevitability of the socialist revolution. Class simplification occurs as private industry outpaces and destroys the need for mercantile business, simplifying the classes within society while intensifying the division between bourgeoisie and Proletariat. Engels sees feudalism as individual producers producing for subsistence, whereas capitalist production has led to a revolution in economic production. Moreover, capitalism turns feudal producers into labourers within socialised factories. Marx and Engels therefore saw the nucleus of future socialist society as existing in the present society which will encourage class consciousness and eventually socialist revolution.

Marx (1875, Part 1) explains how socialism will inevitably occupy two distinct stages – 'lower' and 'upper' communism. Later Marxists such as

Lenin dub these stages 'socialism' and 'communism' respectively. The lower stage will make all labour equal and have some form of state-administered currency, although the workers' state will gradually wither away as it becomes occupied with purely administrative tasks. The higher stage will be classless and stateless and governed by the maxim 'from each according to his ability to each to this need'. Engels (1892, chapter 3) saw this process as the inevitable outcome of the seizing of socialised production by the workers. The newly founded socialist state will immediately begin to wither away and end class struggle, as the relations of production will be equalised, and all people will be provided with their material needs. Communism thus achieves the 'end of history' by abolishing the material conditions necessary for class struggle.

Reformism and Anarchism

'Scientific socialism' may also be distinguished from so-called 'reformist' socialism on the issue of revolution. Marx and Engels (1848, chapter 1) believe that all of history is class struggle, and the resolution of class struggle is via revolution and the ushering of a new mode of production. In contrast, other socialist movements borrowed from Marx but believed that socialism may be achieved by reforms within the political and legal system. An example of such a movement is the S.P.D's proposed 'Gotha' programme, which was meticulously scrutinised by Marx (Marx 1875, Chapter 1).

Marx (1875, Part 4) argues that reforming the bourgeois state is impossible as the state is a super structural entity emanating from the economic base and helping to uphold it. Reformists are therefore incorrect to conceive the state as a neutral umpire; for Marx and Engels, the capitalist state is a bourgeois tool for class domination. Engels (1946, chapter 4) notes that common and civil law systems, despite their radically different origins, have coalesced in the modern bourgeois state to a near synonymous view on property rights. Engels argues this is because the legal system merely codifies and legitimises the status quo via ideology (Engels 1946, chapter 4). We may be granted 'legal equality' but

as noted by the utopian socialists we have no material equality (Engels, 1946, chap 3). The 'superstructure' of countries may thus reflect a plethora of different cultural and societal values, but it only has one purpose- to empower the ruling class (Marx 1875 part 4).

This does not mean that scientific socialism rejects the use of states entirely, rather the opposite is true. Marx (1875, part 4) argues it is necessary for the workers to create their own state which they will use to crush the bourgeoisie. Marx believes the various bourgeois revolutions of the 1800s merely refined the bourgeois state, however the goal of the socialist revolution is to build a new state (Lenin 1917, Chapter 2.3). The proletariat state should be designed as a democratic institution which will quickly allow the coercive apparatus to wither away and achieve communism (Lenin 1917, chapter 3.3).

Scientific socialists thus distinguish their ideology from anarchists, who want to bypass the state and achieve communism immediately, on three grounds. Firstly, scientific socialists disagree with the anarchist rejection of all 'authority' as idealism similar to Utopian socialists, instead arguing that a revolution is inevitably authoritarian against opposing classes (Engels, 1872). Secondly, scientific socialists reject the anarchist belief that oppression derives from states per se, instead arguing that the state merely enforces pre-existing class antagonisms from the relations of production (Lenin 1917, Chapter 1.1). Finally, scientific socialists reject the anarchist absolutism against state participation, arguing socialists should use states (including the bourgeois state) if it benefits class struggle (Lenin 1917 , chapter 3.1).

Marxism as functionalist

Elster (1982, pg.455) critiques the functionalist nature of much of Marxist theory. Elster argues Marxists generally look at the existence of social phenomena as explaining its consequences, seeing this as a logical fallacy. Elster (1982) argues that functionalist explanations cannot explain individual behaviour, but that game theory can. Engels (1892, chapter 4)

notes that scientific socialism is not interested in rationalised, individual actors but the broad movements of social history. Cohen (1982, Pg.485) argues that all of Marxism is built on functionalist arguments of the superstructural legal and political system. Returning to an example used above, Marxist functionalism may be highlighted in Engel's argument that common and civil law have reached similar conceptions of property rights because capitalist economics (Engels 1946, chapter 4). For a critic of Marxism, such functionalism is unfalsifiable and teleologically necessitates its own conclusion. Capitalism is both the result and the source of all societal changes.

This argument is quite strong, however it presupposes a rigid obstinacy not found in Marx and Engels' writings. While Engels claims that the goal of scientific socialism and historical materialism is to find the 'inner, hidden laws' that spur social history, neither Marx nor Engels claim that their method is unfalsifiable or not subject to scientific rejection. Engels instead believes that Marxism, and particularly dialectical materialism, must always be updated with new scientific advances (Engels 1946, chapter 4). An example of falsification and modification of early Marxism was that Marx's theory of history was constantly expanded upon – Marx initially believed in an 'Asiatic' mode of production but rejected this upon new evidence and instead subsumed 'Asiatic' societies into an enlarged and modified understanding of 'feudal' societies (Marx 1859, introduction). Cohen (1982, Pg. 489) posits that some form of functionalism is necessary for scientific socialism, but such functionalism does not detract from its scientific validity, as Marx did not believe he necessarily had to uncover every causal mechanism in order to predict the course of history or class struggle. It is contended that some form of functionalism will undoubtedly arise throughout all the social sciences, simply because evidence must be understood in light of the function it plays in a particular model or theory.

The viability of Marxist functionalism for explaining our increasingly complex society in the 21st century remains to be seen, and it is

contended that its validity as a scientific method may only be proven or falsified if its functionalist approach ceases to produce any compelling understanding of modern society, or if the world economy were to move past both socialism and capitalism. Similarly, drawing upon the dialectical understanding of history as expounded by Marx and Engels, scientific socialism would also be falsified if global economies 'regress' into a feudal structure, as this would be anathema to the Marxist understanding of a progressive history.

Conclusion

This paper has explained why Marx and Engels distinguished their conception of socialism as 'scientific' by firstly explaining historical materialism and its progressive view of history. Marxism relies on an economic, materialist analysis of society, which is distinguishable from previous philosophers and socialists. Marxism attempts to be analogous to nineteenth-century science in its emphasis on dialectical progress, most notably in the concept of class struggle.

This paper has shown how Marx and Engels came to believe that socialism is the inevitable result of their conception of history and necessary to abolish class struggle entirely. It has distinguished this scientific outlook from other forms of socialism and considered how the super structural nature of the state in Marxist theory gives them a radically different viewpoint of the state as a tool for class domination than other socialists. Marxism is undoubtedly a functionalist philosophy, but it has been contended that functionalism does not prove or disprove its place amongst the social sciences, as all social sciences necessitate some form of functionalist perspective.

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State, social order and sexual subordination: A Comparative & Intersectional Account of Irish and Canadian Cases under Foucauldian Theory

Lara Summers

Introduction

This essay investigates the use of sexuality and sexual violence as an instrument of state biopower, while also highlighting the role of intersectional identities in increasing the vulnerability of the states' victims. Ireland's history of mother and baby homes illuminates the state's use of sexualised power to control citizens and their bodies. This institutionalised violence is comparable to the incarceration of indigenous people in Canadian residential schools at a similar time, when indigenous people were subjugated on ethnic grounds.

First, this essay explains Michel Foucault's theory of biopower and his theory for the history of sexuality which provides a theoretical framework for the type of power discussed in this essay. Secondly, it discusses Ireland's mother and baby homes, and how the Irish state subordinated Irish women by regulating their sexual endeavors. It then examines race as an aggravating factor in the experience of the female victim. Further, it considers whether Ireland continues to dehumanize people within its borders today, with regard to the institutionalisation of asylum seekers in the states' direct provision centres.

Thirdly, the essay discusses Canada's residential schools, comparing them to the Irish case. In this case, attention is paid to ethnic discrimination as a tool of biopower, with gender acting as an aggravating factor in the indigenous experience. The recent history of Canada's missing and murdered indigenous people is then examined, assessing whether Canada continues to dehumanise indigenous communities today. Finally, the essay assesses state apologies for what happened in their pasts.

In response to the ongoing sexual violence towards women and children in minority groups in both states, the essay concludes that state apologies are simply not enough for a nation to heal. Moreover, the state must reassess its use of biopower, if it seeks to create, as vocalized by the Irish Taoiseach, a 'more just society, grounded in respect, diversity, tolerance and equality (O'Halloran, 2021).

Foucault: 'Biopower'

According to Foucault, states are inclined to dominate citizens through the use of bio-power. The term bio-power denotes a technology of power, which the state uses to control bodies or regulate its population (Garner, 2010, p. 59). Power is an event or relationship that happens when people have conflicting motives, and is an exercise in which we all participate (McWhorter, 2004, pp. 42-43). In events of power, people try to act on each other's bodily actions, and this can take place on an individual level or societal level (McWhorter, 2004). According to Foucault, power struggles are not always limiting or repressive, but are also positive and creative, as they lead to the construction of new ideas (McWhorter, 2004, pp. 42-43). Through conflicts of power, new identities and situations are produced, with social structures and the self-experiencing shifts as well (McWhorter, 2004, pp. 42-43).

The state uses biopower to regulate its population through 'Disciplinary power' (the regulation of human bodies), and by creating categories such as gender, sexuality and nationality to describe its citizens (Garner, 2010, p. 59). Foucault's theory of power takes two forms. The first is centered on the body as a machine, and pays attention to its discipline, and to optimizing its capabilities (Foucault, 1976, p. 139). The second is focused on the 'species body', or on the regulation of the population (Foucault, 1976, p.139). Foucault located important historical shifts in configurations of this power in state institutions such as schools and hospitals, and these configurations play a key role in shaping identity and experience (McWhorter, 2004, p. 43) These configurations of power bear striking similarities to the power instrumental to both Irish and Canadian

institutions discussed in this essay (McWhorter, 2004, p. 43).
Foucault's theory captures the use of biopower to suppress bodies that deviate from state desired norms, and its use in controlling state populations. While the examples addressed here demonstrate biopower as a 'creative' phenomenon capable of molding individual identities, the Irish and Canadian cases illustrate that this power can also be limiting and repressive.

Foucault: Sex and Social Order

Although these states differ in their circumstances, as do the relevant marginalised groups, the sexualised control of bodies by the state is crucial to both cases. Foucault considered sexuality to be instrumental to a regime of biopower that develops within institutions and aims to harness the developmental potential of human bodies (McWhorter, 2004, p. 40). This regime of power came into existence in the late 19th century when people began to understand themselves as fundamentally sexual in nature, viewing sex as fundamental to pleasure, self-understanding, and health (McWhorter, 2004, p. 40). Sexual identity became a product of what Foucault called 'normalizing power' (McWhorter, 2004, p. 40). As such, the control of sexuality became a tactic for maintaining social order through the regulation of norms and standardised practices (McWhorter, 2004, pp. 45-46). As a result, concepts of sex and sexuality now exist as a set of power relations that give society its structure and shape individual identities (McWhorter, 2004, p .45).

The control of sexual relations is now instrumental to the civilising process and the maintenance of power (Inglis, 2005, p. 3). The Irish victims of institutionalised violence and incarceration were single mothers, while their counterparts in Canada were victims of ethnic discrimination. Nevertheless, the prevalence of sex and sexuality in relation to social order in both cases exhibits the profound role of sexualised power in states pursuits of social order, and this provokes need for comparisons between both states and their use of sexualised power.
Intersectionality and Social Order

Intersectionality investigates how intersecting power relations influence relationships and experiences in society (Hill-Collins et al, 2016, p. 22). Intersectionality views categories such as race, class and gender as interrelated, capable of shaping each other, and explaining complex experiences (Hill-Collins et al, 2020, p. 22). The intersectionality of identities makes individuals extremely vulnerable to institutionalised violence. In Ireland, the state sought to regulate its population and national identity by constraining women's' sexual endeavors, and punishing those who deviated from gender norms. However, special attention is paid to the experiences of mixed-race women in mother and baby homes, who received deeper oppression due to the colour of their skin (Department of Children, Disability, Integration and Youth, 2021, p. 74). While Canada's residential schools affected all genders, being indigenous and female, or indigenous and 'two-spirited' exacerbated the experience of an already very vulnerable group. This issue is even more prevalent today in stories of Canada's missing and murdered women, whose stories unfold later in the essay.

Ireland's Mother and Baby Homes

Ireland's mother and baby homes demonstrate the role of sex and sexuality in power relations and the formation of individual identities. In response to Victorian prudery, Irish attempts to progress from so-called 'savages' to civilisation launched a desire for sexual purity (Inglis, 2005, pp. 5-14). Attempts to maintain sexualised social order were led by views of Irish women as faithful, dependent and subordinate homemakers. Women were held responsible for the enactment of sexual activity, and deviation from the idyllic 'respectable Irish woman' was a shame to society (Inglis, 2005, pp. 5-14). The harsh maintenance of sexual endeavors was also a reaction to Ireland's high birth rates and population growth, which the state sought to control at the time (Inglis, 2005, pp. 1-15). The focus of this sexualised power and states' control over women's bodies as disciplinary power and an instrument of population control is directly applicable under Foucauldian theory. Moreover, this phenomenon bred the harrowing culture of institutional abuse that Irish

women suffered for years to come.

There were 56,000 unmarried mothers and about 57,000 children in the mother and baby homes and county homes investigated during the 1960s and early 70s (Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth, 2021, p. 2). These homes offered a place of refuge for young mothers who were shunned by their families and communities for becoming pregnant before marriage (Department of Children, disability, Integration and Youth, 2021, p. 1). As hostages to Ireland's sexually repressed and patriarchal culture, some of these women became pregnant through exploitation or rape, while others had digressed societal norms that had grown out of Victorian prudery (Department of Children, Disability, Integration and Youth, 2021, p. 2). According to state-inflicted sexual attitudes, women's' lives were 'blighted' by pregnancy outside of marriage (Department of Children, Disability, Integration and Youth, 2021, p. 2). While the homes tempted safety and security, they were really a state weapon in its harsh practice of biopower.

The physical and emotional conditions of the homes offered a painful reality to young mothers (Department of Children, Disability, Integration and Youth, 2021, p. 4). Women were abused mentally, physically and emotionally, and were shown little kindness, even when they needed it most (Department of Children, Disability, Integration and Youth, 2021, p. 5). Childbirth was an exceptionally traumatic experience, and women were degraded and shunned from their bedsides (Department of Children, Disability, Integration and Youth, 2021, p. 5). In the eyes of the church and state, these women were sinners, or so-called 'fallen women', and the only solution was to sweep them of their s elf-esteem and their identities (Redmond, 2018, p. 26).

After birth, babies were often taken from their mothers, and in many cases, were never seen or held by them again (Redmond, 2018, p. 109). Some 'illegitimate' children were sent to Ireland's industrial schools – an additional scandal in which the state sentenced orphans and

disadvantaged children to a childhood of sexual, physical and emotional abuse (Redmond, 2018, p. 43). Ireland's greatest shame it seems, is the some 9,000 children who died in the institutions as a result of neglect, and oftentimes even murder (Department of Children, Disability, Integration and Youth, 2021, p. 63). Sentenced to lifelong pain by their own state and society, Ireland's mothers and babies rest in Irish history, as victims of the state in its abuse of biopower.

Racial Diversity in Ireland's Mother and Baby Homes

The story of Rosemary Adeser, a mixed-race child born in a mother and baby home illustrates the intersectional subordination experienced by young women who not only transgressed sexual norms, but also deviated from Ireland's all white racial identity (Holland, 2015). Not only was Adeser born in a mother and baby home, but she later gave birth in a home in her teenage years. According to Adeser, her file from the homes 'was peppered with references to my colour', and she wrote that 'The racism was relentless and brutalising (Holland, 2015).

During her time in the homes, Adeser believes she received different treatment to her white counterparts under state policy (Holland, 2015). Alongside other black women who shared a similar experience, Adeser believes there was a policy regarding mixed race and black babies being put up for adoption, which the state avoided in fear that 'nobody would want them' (Holland, 2015). In the homes, Adeser was abused both sexually and verbally, and was also tortured by her foster parents when she was four, who told her she was 'filthy and nasty' (Holland, 2015). During her time in foster care, her foster parents would strip her naked, and beat her (Holland, 2015).

In recent years Adeser was part of a campaign group called 'Mixed race and Irish' that sought justice for women like Adeser, who suffered 'an extra layer of abuse' because of their racial identity (Holland, 2015). The group rallied for the recent commission to investigate the issue of race in a module alongside disability, religion and Traveller identity (Holland,

2015). Finally, in the report released this year, racial discrimination is factored into the government's close analysis of Ireland's past. Records of inspectors' reports support Adesers' beliefs regarding racist policy, and provide proof of inspectors making explicitly racist commentary in the homes. To quote: 'Nice looking girl, but her father is Jamaican', and 'The fact that T is half coloured could affect her chances of adoption.' These remarks show the clear rejection of mixed-race babies, who were c onsidered undesirable due to the colour of their skin (Department of Children, Disability, Integration and Youth, 2021, p. 74).

Adeser's story, in combination with primary research by the recent commission, prove that racial discrimination was certainly a compounding factor in the severity of women's' experiences (Department of Children, Disability, Integration and Youth, 2021, p. 74). Moreover, the intersectionality of identities remains applicable to Foucault's' theory of biopower, with states desires to control racial norms aggravating the victims' experience.

Ireland's Direct Provision Centres: Ireland's New Shame

As Ireland attempts to heal the past of the mother and baby homes, the continued dehumanization in Irish Direct Provision Centres today must not go unmentioned. In particular is the Irish state's failure to protect female asylum seekers against sexual violence. Henceforth, it is considered whether this behaviour implies continuous abuse of state biopower, and a sexualised social order.

Since 2000, the Irish government has funded private contractors to house for-profit accommodation schemes for asylum seekers waiting for claims of international protection, a process with extreme delays (Amnesty International, 2019, p. 3). Asylum seekers who have fled from war zones or extreme poverty are offered little protection and are pushed into worrying living conditions (Amnesty International, 2019, p. 4) Small hostel rooms host entire families who receive a minute monthly income

and minimal basic necessities (Amnesty International, 2019, p. 3). These conditions are a villainous representation of a state who, having failed its native women and children in the past, continues to dehumanize vulnerable people within its borders.

In 2019, it came to media attention that women in direct provision centres have been forced into sex work, and that cases of sexual abuse in direct provision were not uncommon. "He knew I had kids and told me you'll make money and be supporting your children. When I told him I wasn't interested he asked, 'why are you refusing this opportunity, don't you know how to have sex?' wrote one woman, explaining the pressure inflicted on her by male asylum seekers in the home, who encouraged her to get involved with sex work to sustain her family (Pollak, 2019). This not only highlights the dominance of sex in power relations, but also the prominent role of sexual norms, and how they can be manipulated, coerced, or controlled in society through Foucault's' process of 'normalization'. It seems that in the case explained above, women were not only expected to participate in sex work but were shamed or manipulated if they opted against it. Moreover, the victims of sexual exploitation are once again a minority group (non-nationals) who have the additional vulnerability of also being female.

In 2015, Amnesty International made recommendations to the Irish government to develop an alternative to direct provision, that 'respects, protects, and fulfills the rights of asylum seekers to adequate housing, and an adequate standard of living for themselves and their families', putting a particular emphasis on the state's implementation of new laws surrounding sex work and sexual violence (Amnesty International, 2019, p. 5). Amnesty recommended that the Irish government repeal section 27 of Part 4 of the Criminal Law Act 2017, which criminalizes the purchase of consensual adult sex (Amnesty, 2019, p. 8). Similarly, in 2019 the US State Department accused the Irish of failing to provide effective support services for asylum seekers, such as vulnerability assessments (Pollak, 2019). By failing to provide vulnerability assessments, the state

was accused of 'under-identifying victims', who may, in the past, have been victims of sex trafficking (Pollak, 2019).

On February 26th 2021, the Irish government finally released 'A White Paper to End Direct Provision and to Establish a New International Protection Support Service', in which it outlined plans to change the treatment of asylum seekers in Ireland by 2024. The new plan encompasses a non-for-profit initiative for housing migrants, with a commitment to providing accommodation, health, education, income support and other service needs to migrants, that will be both professional and grounded in a human rights approach (Government of Ireland, 2021).

As suggested by the US State Department, the State has pledged to carry out vulnerability assessments, the outcomes of which will determine the accommodations and support options available for the applicant (Government of Ireland, 2021, p. 60). Specialist refuge accommodation will be made available for those who have escaped from abusive or violent relationships (Government of Ireland, 2021, p. 32). Additionally, the plan promises to be responsive to differing identities and cultural needs, with provision of cultural competence training for all those providing services (Government of Ireland, 2021, p. 32).

While advancing change is commendable, the institutionalised neglect and diminishment of vulnerable persons over the past 21 years is evidence that the State has not yet learned from its past. The circumstances of direct provision centres are on-going, and their recentness is worrying. The stories of female asylum seekers being forced into sex work and exploitation is once again exemplary of the role that sex and sexuality plays in the practise of power and power relations, and the states failure to protect them from harm exposes it as an implicit actor of institutional and societal wrong. It's also noteworthy that the victims of this harm are once again predominantly women and children, who carry the additional burden of being discriminated against due to their home

nationality, or the colour of their skin. In the years to come, this abuse must not be forgotten, and the states' new promises must not be broken again.

Canada's Residential Schools

The history of Canadian residential schools bears striking similarities to the Irish mother and baby homes, particularly in how it exposes the states' attempts to civilise society and regulate bodies through institutionalised subordination. Constructed under misguided policy and institutional harm, residential schools for indigenous children were constructed with the goal of stripping children of their aboriginal identity, or the 'essence of their being', which was considered a deviation from the national identity pursued by their colonisers. (Niezen, 2017, pp. 1-39). At this point, strict attention is paid to the State's use of biopower to regulate its population on ethnic grounds, and in addition, the role that sex played in ethnic subjugation.

The conditions of the residential schools bore a striking resemblance to Irelands' mother and baby homes and industrial schools. According to Niezen, the residential schools had 'all the markings of a cause that provokes a kind of persistent, nagging, sympathetic sense of wrong', brought about by institutional authority and political harm – a description also applicable to the Irish mother and baby homes (Niezen, 2017, pp. 1-39). Residential schools were off reserve and separated indigenous children from their families (MacDonald et al, 2011, p. 430). Much like the mother and baby homes, the schools were church-run, and offered harsh living standards (Macdonald et al, 2011, p. 430). Children received little medical or dietary care, were victims of violent sexual and physical abuse, and the possibility of disease or even death loomed (Macdonald et al, 2011, pp. 429). Children were forbidden to speak their native languages or practise their traditional beliefs or customs (MacDonald et al, 2011, pp. 429). Once again this is exemplary of the type of 'normalizing power' established by Foucault, which the state uses to strengthen norms, and punish those who deviate from the status quo

(McWhorter, 2004, p. 40).

In Foucault's' analysis of biopower, he refers to regimes of biopower as instrumental 'managers of life and survival, of bodies and race', meaning they pursue the primary goal of protecting the entire population and its race (Foucault, 1978, p. 137). However, he also describes such regimes as 'holocaust' on the relevant populations who are suppressed and regulated in the pursuit of social order (Foucault, 1970, p. 137). Interestingly, Macdonald et al asked whether the Canadian residential schools were a case of genocide for indigenous people, making it remarkably applicable to Foucault's' use of the term 'Holocaust' in describing regimes of biopower (Macdonald et al, 2012, p. 428).

Much of the abuse carried out in residential schools was sexual abuse by members of the religious clergy, which once again highlights the prominence of sex and sexuality as an instrument of repressive power (Niezan, 2017, pp. 1-39). Indigenous children in residential schools were placed into the care of 'sadists and pederasts', who abused them sexually, as well as physically and emotionally, in attempts by their predators to strip them of their indigenous identity (Niezan, 2017, pp. 1-39). Much like Ireland's mother and baby homes, and industrial schools, the residential schools were hidden from wider society until they closed in the 90s (Niezan, 2017, pp. 1-39). By the time the schools closed in 1996, approximately 140 Indian residential schools, housing 150,000 children, had been in operation (Niezen, 2017, pp. 1-39).

Canada's Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Two-Spirited People as Victims of Sexual Violence

Today, indigenous women and 'two spirited people' are overrepresented as victims of human trafficking and sexual exploitation in Canada. Over the last 30 years, more than 1000 indigenous women were murdered in Canada, and more than 100 are still missing (Seramo, 2015, p. 204). However, until 2015, the issue of missing and murdered women received

little to no attention from the state (Hansen et al, 2019, p. 2).

Studies report that in Canada, indigenous women are nearly three times more likely to be killed by a stranger than non-indigenous women (Hansen et al, 2019, p. 3) Indigenous women in Canada are extremely vulnerable to violence in a male-dominated, all-white society, and are branded with racial stereotypes that cast them as 'promiscuous' or prostitutes, although studies show that only half of Canada's missing women are even involved in the sex trade (Hansen et al, 2019, p. 3). This widespread violence towards women and girls has been described as a 'Femicide' by some authors, while some researchers argue that 'two-spirited' indigenous people and indigenous men are equally vulnerable (Seramo, 2015, p. 206 and Hansen et al, 2019, pp. 1-14).

On the latter point, it's interesting that little attention has been paid to those of 'two spirit' people who have gone missing and whose stories remain untold (Seramo, 2015, p. 205). The term 'two-spirit' was adopted by Indigenous people and queer allies to capture an array of Indigenous gender, sex, and sexuality identifications (Hunt, 2016, in Seramo, 2015, p. 205). Existing data shows that two-spirit indigenous people are overrepresented in cases of racism and violence in Canada, and while it's unknown how many appear on Canada's list of missing and murdered indigenous people, this issue demands further attention (Seramo, 2015, p. 205). Of course, indigenous men are also victims to societal and systematic discrimination, and this is not disregarded. However, due to the focus of this essay on intersectional identities and the practice of bio-power, deeper attention is paid to the cases of indigenous women and girls and 'two-spirited' people.

The efforts of indigenous women in recent years have brought this issue to the forefront of Canadian attention to issues surrounding institutional racism and sexism (Hansen et al, 2019, p. 4). Without their continuous efforts, the Canadian government's 'National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls' which was launched in 2015

under Prime Minister Trudeau, might never have been launched (Hansen et al, 2019, p. 4). Unfortunately, the Harper government in power between 2006 and 2015 continuously denied the stories of Canada's missing and murdered people as a sociological phenomenon, and did little in the way of resolving it (Seramo, 2015, p. 205).

Prime Minister Harper himself claimed 'We think the issue has been studied to death', exposing the little care or motivation the government had for mitigating an urgent national issue (Seramo, 2015, p. 208). In line with its historically tense relationship with indigenous people, research also finds that the Canadian Police Force has failed to protect indigenous people from harm in recent years. According to CFNMP 2004, "Young Aboriginal men and women have been beaten, disappeared and died while in police contact or shortly after police contact" which suggests that violence towards indigenous people is not only enabled by the state, but is perhaps even a result of decades of systemic racism (Hansen et al, 2019, p. 4).

Apologies, Hypocrisy and National Healing

Public apologies have become instrumental in the rehabilitation of states that are seen to have committed gross human rights violations (Niezen, 2017, p. 32). At this stage, both Irish and Canadian governments have publicly apologized for their states' subordination of marginalized groups, which, as argued in this essay, developed as instruments of biopower. Ireland's Taoiseach Michael Martin apologised for the 'profound generational wrong' that was committed on Irish land, and claimed, 'for the women and children who were treated so cruelly we must do what we can, to show our deep remorse, understanding and support.' (O'Halloran, 2021). The Irish government has promised to respond to all recommendations made by the commission, and these suggestions include memorialisation, educational and research commitments, and information and tracing legislation will be introduced and prioritized, with the Taoiseach claiming that 'access to one's own identity is a basic right'. (O'Halloran, 2021). Under the pillar of restorative recognition, the

state has also promised an enhanced medical card to victims of the mother and baby homes, as well as promises of access to counselling and patient liaison services (O'Halloran, 2021).

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau also apologized for his state's tragic past and the suffering it caused (Trudeau, 2017). This apology followed the attempts of Prime Minister Harper, who in 2008 apologized for the state's use of residential schools, but failed to recognise students from provincial residential schools in Newfoundland and Labrador (Trudeau, 2017). Akin to the Irish government, the Canadian government has committed itself to providing compensation, commemoration and healing for victims of the residential schools (Niezen, 2017, p. 32).

While state apologies are valuable, they are seemingly not sufficient for our nations to heal. Truly, one wonders if a nation can ever heal from such a tragic and brutal past. Additionally, while both states' recent efforts to protect vulnerable populations are acknowledged, both states' failures to protect vulnerable bodies from sexualised violence and exploitation on the grounds of gender, ethnicity, or race today show their carelessness and implicit acceptance of sexual subjugation in power and power relations. Our conclusion, therefore, is not that the Irish and Canadian governments have learned from the harmful effects of sexualised, sexist and racist biopower, but that the use of biopower remains equally harmful in their behaviour today.

Conclusion

This essay has examined the role of sexuality as an instrument of power in the cases of Irish and Canadian histories until now. Foucault's' theory of biopower explains the states' regulation of bodies, and use of categorization in attempts to regulate and maintain social order and desired national identity.

In accordance with this theory, this essay has examined the use of sexuality as an instrument of power for the Irish state, through its

cruel regulation and maltreatment of women, their bodies, and their children. Looking closely at the circumstances of mixed-race Irish women, it was established that race undeniably increased the vulnerability of single mothers in mother and baby homes.

The essay examined the effects of institutional oppression today, looking closely at Ireland's treatment of asylum seekers in Direct Provision Centres. In response to research regarding sex work and sexual exploitation in Direct Provision centres, the Irish government's failure to protect the victims of its system led the conclusion that the Irish government remains an agent of sexualised power relations through inaction. The Canadian government's funding of residential schools for indigenous people was explored, with emphasis on the role of sexual violence in the dehumanisation of indigenous people. Later, the recent experiences of missing indigenous women and 'two-spirit' people were discussed, with the state's failure to act on this phenomenon contributing to a continuing cycle of societal and systemic discriminatory and sexualised violence.

Both states have apologised for the cruel, tragic and shameful events of their pasts. However, having explored the continued abuse of biopower in recent times, this essay concludes that both governments must reassess how they can positively exercise this power in the years to come. Conclusively, it is after making this shift that either state will succeed in creating an equal society that is grounded in respect, diversity, and equality for all.

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