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Preface

Welcome to the Social and Political Review, Volume XXVI. Across a long history, the Review has sought to publish outstanding work that interrogates issues of socio-political relevance written by undergraduates and postgraduates in Trinity College, Dublin. I am sure that you will find that this year's collection is no different.

At a time when conflict continues to shape the landscape of global politics, a number of our authors address war across the globe, from the United States' involvement in the present day Middle East, to a history of France's involvement in the Six Day War. In a year when peace processes have often been strained, or failed, other authors consider the aftermath of conflict and lessons that might be learned from Northern Ireland and Sierra Leone. With the possibility of a British exit from the European Union in the coming months, lessons from Northern Ireland's past are examined at a time when the United Kingdom faces great uncertainty.

The resurgence of right wing populism in Europe and the United States, as well as responses from the grassroots Left has called into question the very foundations of parliamentary democracy. The Review contains two papers, both of which analyse the party political model, and the possible evolution of political systems beyond it. Finally, in the context of ever-present racial tensions across the West and the Global South, several authors interrogate the socio-political effects of race-based identity formation.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Editorial Board of this year's Review for their accurate, concise and timely advice on submissions. Fionn, our General Manager, and Conn, our deputy editor and designer, have my special thanks for their tireless work. The Departments of Political Science and Sociology have been, once again, generous in their support of the Review. Dr. Elaine Moriarty deserves special thanks for guiding the editorial process, and offering months of consistent support to the Review. The Board would also like to thank Grehan Printers, who produced the Review this year.

It is my sincere hope that you enjoy reading the stimulating, rigorous, and varied collection of thoughts contained within these pages. Those thoughts address, in a plethora of ways, some of the most pressing socio-political questions of our time.

This tradition of the Social and Political Review; publishing work by excellent students with relevance to the modern world, is one that I hope will long continue.

Liam Hunt

Editor-in-Chief

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The Evolution of Political Participation

Chloe Eddleston

"Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition, are forever forming associations. There are not only commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand different types--religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute.... Nothing, in my view, deserves more attention than the intellectual and moral associations in America."

Tocqueville, 1899

Upon the famous political thinker's visit to the United States in the 1830's, Toqueville was highly impressed by the participatory tendencies of Americans in comparison to Europeans. Today's social scientists repeatedly argue that political participation is "at the heart of democratic theory and the hart of the political formula of the united states" (Verba and Nie, 1972). Political participation encompasses the many activities that are used by citizens to influence political outcomes. It can be defined as the actions of citizens, by which they aim to influence or to support government and politics. Generally, there are two forms of political participation: Conventional and Unconventional. Conventional participation refers to the range of relatively routine behaviour that uses the channels of representative government. This form of participation includes voting, volunteering for a political campaign, serving in public office etc. On the other hand, unconventional political participation refers to the relatively uncommon behaviour that challenges or defies these government channels. This form of political participation includes signing petitions, supporting boycotts, and staging demonstrations and protests.

Political participation is essential to democracy, in the sense that unless the public is involved in the political process, democracy lacks in legitimacy as well as a sense of direction. The political participation described by Tocqueville, seems to have still been applicable in 20th century America. Many studies of the 1960's revealed that Americans where actively engaged in voluntary associations, had an interest in politics, where implicated in the political discussion, and America's turnout in political participation reached a modern day high in the 1960's. However, despite America's political heritage, an increasing number of scholars argue that political participation in the US has been declining since this point. For instance, a recent study from the American Political Sciences Association declared that "American Democracy was at risk" due to the decline of activities and capacities of citizenship (Macedo, 2005). Robert Putnam concludes his influential book Bowling Alone by noting that a "declining

electoral participation is merely the most visible symptom of a broader disengagement from community life" (Putnam, 2000). Indeed, there is no shortage of scholars who claim that American civil society is disintegrating, and that the previously model levels of political participation, are now in decline. Paradoxically, despite these claims, there is a considerable shortage of comprehensive longitudinal data on participation patterns in America. The majority of the available data looks at only one aspect of political participation over time. Furthermore, the parameters for measuring political participation vary greatly among scholars, and given that most studies rely on different definitions, analysing the evolution of political participation is a fairly complex matter. In my opinion, in order to evaluate how political participation has changed in America, it is necessary to test a predetermined set of measurements, by applying them to the present day

In order to test whether or not political participation in the US has declined, I wish to compare the findings of Verba and Nie's 1972 study, with the more recent measures of political participation. My central premise is that contrary to the literature claiming a decline in political participation, political participation is in fact diversifying and increasing. Over the last 40 years, the channels of political participation have been significantly modified; political participation is shifting towards new forms. Firstly, I will test my hypothesis that political participation in America has not declined, based on a comparison of Verba and Nies measurements, and measurements found in a more recent study by Russel J. Dalton (2011). After finding that my hypothesis is confirmed, I then discuss the implications of these results, by evaluating the new forms of political participation.

METHODOLOGY:

In Verba and Nie's book Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality (1972), they describe how much and what

kind of participation there is in the United States at that time. Their definition of political participation is simultaneously broad and narrow. It is narrow in the sense that they only consider activities that aim to influence the government in some way, thus excluding political discussion and media attention. However, they adopt a broad view of ways in which one can influence the government "both inside and outside the electoral sphere" (Verba and Nie, 1972). In order to analyse political participation among American citizens, Verba and Nie use a 1967 NORC cross sectional survey of 2549 respondents, as their main source of data. The questionnaire used was specifically designed to examine political participation, and the authors considered a large range of participatory behaviour. Although the authors acknowledge the lack of cross sectional surveys, it can be argued that there are few alternatives to survey data for analysing individual level correlates of participation. The sample used was a standard multistage area probability sample to the block or segment level. However, at the block level quota sampling was used to reduce costs. In the first part of their study, they introduce a table that presents twelve types of political participation, and the percentage of citizens engaging in each of the 12 acts. More recently, Russell J. Dalton examined political participation beyond elections, in his book Engaging Youth in Politics (2011). Dalton starts his research where previous scholars have reported that political participation begins to erode, in the 1970's. Due to the lack of comprehensive longitudinal data previously mentioned, Dalton combines a variety of sources to track activity patterns. By contrasting the findings from each of these studies, I aim to evaluate the change in political participation of America, since the 1960's.

TABLE 1 - PERCENTAGE ENGAGING IN TWELVE DIFFERENT ACTS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:

Type of political participation	Percentage
1. Report regularly voting in Presidential elections[a]	72
2. Report always voting in local elections	47
3. Active in at least one organization involved in community problems[b]	32
4. Have worked with others in trying to solve some community problems	30
5. Have attempted to persuade others to vote as they were	28
6. Have ever actively worked for a party or candidates during an election	26
7. Have ever contacted a local government official about some issue or problem	20
8. Have attended at least one political meeting or rally in last three years	19
9. Have ever contacted a state or national government official about some issue or problem	18
10. Have ever formed a group or organization to attempt to solve some local community problem	14
11. Have ever given money to a party or candidate during an election campaign	13
12. Presently a member of a political club or organization	8
Number of Cases: weighted 3,095 unweighted 2,549	

I have selected 3 forms of political participation as identified by Verba and Nie, and compared their findings with those of Dalton's study. I chose to look at involvement in community problem solving, contact with government officials, and participation in electoral campaigns. Furthermore, although Verba and Nie didn't include data on protests in their political participation survey, Verba did include it in his 1987 study, Voice and Equality. Given that the 3 other forms of political participation that I have selected are more conventional, it appeared to be only logical to also include a more unconventional form of political participation in my comparison. Furthermore, I have chosen not to examine turnout in presidential elections. This is partly due to the fact that as Michael McDonald and Samuel Popkin (2001) indicate, previous statistics did not correct turn out for non-eligible citizens, and consequently over estimated the decline in turnout. Further more, adjusted statistics show

that although overall voting rates have declined since the 1960's, the rate of decrease is less than estimates that included non-eligible citizens. The lack of clear consensus in the available data prevented me from considering voter turnout.

When evaluating involvement with community problem solving, I contrasted Verba and Nie's findings from the 1967 NORC cross sectional survey, with data from the 2004 GSS. The General Social Surveys are a biennial collection of 2,812 in person interviews, which are designed as part of a program of social indicator research. The GSS also uses a random area probability sampling selection, to ensure a representative sample. I added to this data with findings from the World Values Survey, which measures membership in four civic groups, that represent new forms of political engagement (environmental groups, women's groups, peace groups, and a civic association). The WVS uses face-to-face interviews, and allows quota sampling, in order to obtain a minimum sample of 1000 participants. Suggestions for the questionnaire are solicited by social scientists from all over the world, in order to understand changing social values and their impact on social and political life. I have used data regarding America's civic associations from the studies conducted in 1980, 1990, and 1999. Finally, I have also used data from the 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark survey, which asked nearly 30,000 people how they where connected to family, friends, neighbours and civic institutions.

In order to examine how citizens contact politicians, I again used the Verba and Nie findings, and as well as the results from their repeated survey in 1987. I also used the 2004 GSS study, and the 2006 CID survey. The Citizen Involvement in Democracy survey consists of in person interviews with samples of 1001 Americans who responded to an 80-minute questionnaire. The study used a classic cluster sample design with an equal probability of selective method and sampling. In regards to participation in electoral campaigns, I once again used Verba and Nie's data, as well as the ANES. The American National Election Study consist

of one or more interviews conducted with a sample of US eligible voters during one or more interview periods, designed to be representative at a national level. A random area probability sampling selection is used, as well as in person interviews, creating high response rates and representative samples. In order to measure campaign participation, the ANES asked about working for a party, giving money, displaying campaign material, and persuading others how to vote.

Finally, given that the 1976 study by Verba and Nie didn't include data on protesting, I have used the data collected by Verba, Schlozman and Brady in Voice and Equality (1995). They collected data from 15,053 telephone interviews, and 2,517 in person interviews, which enabled the authors to produced a series of articles on political participation, and civic voluntarism. I also used data from the World Values Survey previously mentioned. The WVS survey has data regarding participation in political protests, as well as signing a petition and other forms of contentious participation.

In order to understand the evolution of political participation, I compared each data set for each of the 4 kinds of political participation, and observed if there was an increase or a decline, as most of the literature observed. After relaying the results, I will then discuss these findings

RESULTS:

1 - Community Participation:

According to Tocqueville, the success of democracy in America is largely due to American's involvement with their communities (1899). Community participation can be loosely defined as group efforts to resolve a social or community problem. This can take on many different forms, from neighbourhood watch committees, to zoning boards, to parent-teacher associations. The mere existence of these groups is proof of a civil society, which is capable of assembling itself to deal

with collective problems. Furthermore, as stressed throughout the literature, these communities are an essential part of democracy as we know it. These associations contribute to the effectiveness and stability of democratic government because of internal effects on the individuals and external effects of wider polity (Putnam, 2000). In Bowling Alone (2000), Putnam points out the aggregate loss in membership of many existing civic organisations, and argues that it is problematic to democracy. He uses the example of bowling to illustrate his point, and to underline the importance of public participation in communities. Despite the increase in people bowling, the number of people who bowl in leagues has decreased. Lone bowlers do not participate in in the social interactions and civic discussions that could happen in a league environment.

However, upon closer inspection of the available data, it would appear that participation in local communities has not declined. In Verba and Nie's 1967 survey, when asked "Have you worked with others in trying to solve some community problems?", 30% of respondents answered yes. When the survey was recreated in 1987, for Verba's Voice of Equality research, this figure increased to 34%. Furthermore, the 2004 GSS survey found that when asking about community activity in only the last 5 years, 36% responded that they had worked on a community project, therefore revealing an increase in this form of political participation. In addition, the World Values survey also examined membership in America's civic associations, environmental groups, women's groups or peace groups. The survey found that membership in these groups increased form 6% in 1980, to 18% in 1990, to a further 33% in 1999.

TABLE 2 - TREND IN CIVIC MEMBERSHIP:



Source: World Values Survey

The 2000 Social capital study replicated this question, and found that community participation is has increased from 30% in 1967 to 38% in 2000. To conclude, these latest trends appear to reflect the Tocquevillian view of democracy, and negate Putnam's findings.

2 - Contacting government officials:

A second form of conventional political participation, is contacting government officials. This remains a fairly demanding form of political participation, seeing as the individual is required to identify the correct official that can address the issue, and to articulate their policy ideas, or the problem at hand. However, it does allow individuals to choose the method of communication, the issue discussed, and the content of their message. In fact, this individualised form of political participation is increasingly used, and is an attribute to any functioning democracy. Whether at a local or national level, if citizens use their initiative to contact their elected representatives, this only increases the representative's capacity to respond to citizen's demands in their policy choices. Surveys on political

contacting are often different in their formulation, however there are strong indications that the level of contact between officials and citizens is increasing. In Verba and Nie's 1967 study, they found that a fifth of the public had contacted a member of the local government or the national government. When the survey was repeated in 1987, they found that a third of the public had contacted officials at both levels. Furthermore, the 2004 General Social Survey found that 43% of Americans have contacted a local or national politician to express their opinion on policy matter and the CID survey found that 20% had contacted a politician or local government official in the last 12 months. To conclude, it would appear that this second form of political participation examined, has similarly increased since 1967.

3 - Campaign participation:

Campaign activism can be a highly rewarding form of political participation, as it equips participants with new skills in educating others how to vote. Similarly, political campaigns are also crucial for candidates themselves, seeing as they become more aware of the policy interests of their activists. However, many analysts argue that campaign activism has been following a downward trend. Putnam cites a marked decrease in electoral activities between 1973 and 1994, based on the Roper data series. In Putnam's demonstration, he calculates change in campaign participation as the ration change of participation at two points in time. For instance, if the number of participants drops from 6% to 4%, this would be reported as a 33% decrease, which seems exaggerated according to Dalton (2008). Further more, the Roper surveys use a mix of probability sampling and random walk selection of candidates, and so they are not entirely random samples. Finally, the methodology used by this commercial poll varies over time, and although Putnam does discuss these methodological issues, other data sources tell a different story. In Verba and Nie's study, they found that 26% of respondents had actively worked for a party or candidates during an election. Since 1967, it would appear that campaign activism spiked upwards in the 2004 elections, partly due to the polarization of the American electorate regarding the

Iraq war (Dalton, 2008). Further more, the ANES study shows that there is a relatively flat pattern of campaign participation, even excluding the 2004 spike. The 2008 presidential election also showed record levels of campaign involvement, so one could hypothesise that political participation is on the rise. In particular, one of the variables studied by the ANES is influencing people to vote. They asked survey respondents the following question "During the campaign, did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for one of the parties or candidates?" The graph below shows a clear rise in this variable.

TABLE 3 - TREND IN PERSUADING OTHERS HOW TO VOTE:



Source: ANES

To conclude, the data shows that despite ebbs and flows over the latest half-century, there is no clear sign that the American electorate has disengaged with electoral campaigns, and they still engage a considerable proportion of the American public.

4 - Political protests:

The issue of political protests brings us into the sphere of unconventional political participation. The style of political protests is significantly different to other forms of electoral politics. It is a demanding

form of participation, requiring political awareness, organisational skills, and high levels of interpersonal interaction. However, adopting a strategy of direct action can be fruitful for the activist, by increasing their political influence. Despite the fact that the Verba and Nie's study occurred in one of the most turbulent periods of American politics, they didn't include a question on protest. However, in Verba's 1987 study, they found that 6 % of participants had participated in a demonstration, protest or boycott in the past 2 years. The World Values survey shows a marked increase in protest participation since 1975, with 7% having protested in the past 5 years. Furthermore, in 1975, 50% said that they had signed a petition, and now this figure is about 75% (Dalton, 2008). It is also conceivable, that if the time span of the study were extended to the 1960's, the growth of protest participation would be dramatic. Dalton's graph affirms this diversification of contentious political methods.

TABLE 4 - TREND IN AMERICAN CAMPAIGN ACTIVITY:



Source: 1975 Political Action Study and World Values Survey, 1981-2006
Note: The questions on occupying buildings and unofficials strikes were not asked in 2006.

To conclude, political protests seems to have become part of the repertoire of political actions of American citizens, and the forms of protest had also proliferated, with the emergence of movements such as Occupy for instance.

In summary, the accusations of a society of loners, who have retreated from any form of political participation, appear to be contrary to the current trends. The evidence provided by the studies previously discussed does not support the claims surrounding the disengagement of the American electorate. Instead of the absolute decline in political participation that many scholars have been referring to, it would appear that Americans now have access to an increasing range of political participation. In comparison to the 1960's, it would appear that the current American public is engaged in many different forms of political action. This notion is clearly illustrated in Dalton's article; "Youth and Participation Beyond elections". He compares the patterns of participations observed in Verba and Nie's participation study, with the situation at hand. In the so called halcyon days of the 1960's, three-fifths of the public voted in presidential elections, a fifth were active in campaigns, a quarter had contacted public officials and finally a third were active in their community (Dalton, 2011). Today, presidential election turnout has slightly decreased, stimulating concerns about a disconnected public. However, the same amounts of people are active in political campaigns, political contacting has increased, and protesting has grown significantly.

TABLE 5 - ESTIMATE OF CHANGING CUMULATIVE PARTICIPATION OVER TIME:



Source: Dalton's estimates

Despite the fact that the data used is more of a suggestive estimate than hard data, the trend is clear; political participation is expanding over time.

DISCUSSION:

The four forms of political participation examined in this paper (community participation, contacting government officials, campaign participation and political protests) have increased or remained stable over time. This not only affirms my expectations, but also goes against a substantial amount of literature on the topic. One of the most widely acknowledged articles on this topic is Robert Putnam's Bowling Alone. Putnam stipulates that civic participation began its descent in mid 1960's, and spiralled downwards from there. However, data aside, even based on historical events, his thesis seems questionable. Carl Boggs's critique of Bowling Alone underlines the problem:

"Could it be that we have actually witnessed a steady downward spiral in public engagement since the Civil Rights movement burst upon the stage, since the great upheavals of the 1960's, since the rapid spread of new social movements and the related tendencies of the 1970's, and since the proliferation of diverse community groups, that even today remain very much a part of the social terrain?" (Boggs, 2001).

It would appear that Putnam's analysis fails to take in to account the spread of newer, and in many aspects, more interesting, forms of political participation that have been created over time.

Furthermore, Putnam relates the supposed decline in political participation in generational terms. He contends that World War II left America with a generation of civic-minded individuals, who had higher levels of civic obligations, a sense of community and a more active social life. In contrast, the current generations are supposedly more passive, less socially engaged and more alienated from the political process (Boggs,

2011). However, recent studies have shown that the current generation is simply more inclined to contentious and elite challenging forms of political participation. In Dalton's study, he uses the 2005 CDAS survey to illustrate this. By looking at participation in a legal or illegal protest, and the use of the Internet in political activities (visiting a political website, forwarding a political message or participation in Internet based political activities), a contrast between age groups emerges.

TABLE 6 - UNCONVENTIONAL ACTION BY AGE



Source: 2005 CDACS Survey.

These patterns suggest that the way that younger generations are implicated in politics is changing. The current generation no longer relies on the more conventional forms of political participation, and is looking towards unconventional political participation for solutions. Although it can be said that fewer young people vote, they are more likely to protest or to use the internet for political purposes, and this form of political participation is ignored in more traditional studies. Internet was not included in Verba and Nie's studies of the 1960's, simply due to the fact that it did not exist. Nonetheless, it is of such importance, that when studying the evolution of political participation, the Internet is a factor that simply cannot be ignored.

An increasing number of political groups and organisations now rely on the Internet to circulate their information. The 2005 CDACS survey found that in the previous year, 17% of American's had visited a political website, in order to gain information. Furthermore, the 2008 PEW Internet survey also found that significant minorities had taken part in some form of political action online. Although the numbers are still modest, increasing amounts of people are using the Internet for signing e-petitions, forwarding political emails, and more generally, making political contributions online. In conclusion, the Internet is providing new opportunities for traditional politics, by enabling citizens to connect with one another and to share information in order to influence the political process.

To summarize, contrary to Putnam's (and others'; Macedo et al 2005) thesis of a decrease in political engagement and participation, and the controversial measure of a fall in electoral turnout, the recent trends seem to depict a far more positive picture. Upon closer inspection of the evolution of four forms of political participation measured by Verba and Nie, there are no signs of a significant decrease in any of these measures. It would appear that instead of decreasing, the spectrum of political participation is broadening. Furthermore, reports of a politically indifferent generation appear to be missing the point; although young voters may participate less in conventional forms of politics, they are increasing their political participation through unconventional practices.

However, further analysis is required. Having only measured 4 of the 12 forms of political participation outlined by Verba and Nie, a broader study is necessary to consolidate these findings. Further more, closer inspection of these unconventional methods is also necessary, however this is a somewhat complex matter. Protests, boycotts, online activism and consumerism, are harder to measure than other forms of political participation, party due to their sometimes illicit nature. Finally, it is hard to give an indication of the effectiveness of these new forms of political participation. Do protests, online activism and other unconventional

activities actually get the message across? This remains unclear, and merits further examination. Evegeny Morozov's Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom (2011), led to concerns around the merits of Internet activism, with many refer to as "slacktivism", and so a study on the effectiveness of current modes of political participation could be of particular interest.

Furthermore, given Tocqueville's comparison previously cited, where he underlines the difference between the civil society of America in the 1800's, and the emerging democracies of Europe, it would also be of interest to reassess these differences in a modern day context. How does political participation differ between Europe and America? Is Europe undergoing the same changes? For instance, in 2009, when General Motors announced huge job cuts, 15,000 workers demonstrated outside the company's German headquarters, whereas in the US, whilst the firm was planning its biggest lay-offs to date, union members seemed relatively unresponsive in comparison. David Kennedy stipulates that American workers simply had different ways of addressing the same issue: "This generation," he said, has "found more effective ways to change the world. It's signed up for political campaigns, and it's not waiting for things to get so desperate that they feel forced to take to the streets." (Nytimes.com, 2014). Perhaps the American citizenry are simply more compelled to act on other issues, such as the latest the troubled race relations, which has recently seen mass protests take place as the result of the Ferguson shooting.

The implications of these findings are numerous. Firstly, an extended political repertoire allows more people to engage in politics, especially if the cost of doing so is lower than that of more classic forms of participation. For instance, individuals may refrain from voting, but may be more inclined to sign an online petition, given the lower cost of participation. Furthermore, non-electoral methods of political participation can expand the influence of the civic society. When citizenry

expands beyond elections, it gives voters the chance to decide on issue more frequently that every four years. Non-electoral participation allows citizens to shine light on issues of their choosing, and gives them more choice of the focus of the political process. In particular, direct action methods such as protests, allow citizens to control the framework of participation, by choosing the means of influence, and the timing. Finally, this changing concept of citizenry could also present new democratic opportunities, if institutions recognise these trends, and adapt accordingly. Progress is already being made. According to Dalton (2008), Environmental Impact reviews are become part of the policy making process, and local, state and national governments are expanding their open-government provisions.

Furthermore, given the concerns around electoral participation among the young, it is crucial to recognise these new forms of political participation. Young Americans are trying to contact their government in new ways, and these need to be recognised. Eisner's "Taking Back the Vote" (2004) study argues that partisan politics can be reshaped to fit the new generations citizenship norms. Although encouraging voting in this generation is crucial (Wattenberg, 2007), promoting new forms of political communication, that are coherent with these new tendencies, is key. For instance, platforms such as E-democracy are providing new opportunities for dialogue and discussion. In many ways, these changes represent an ideal opportunity for the American government to open up the democratic dialogue (Dalton, 2008). To conclude, rather than a period of democratic decline, when all the changes discussed in the paper are combined, America currently experiencing mass expansion in terms of political participation, rather than a period of democratic decline.

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The Political Cartel

Danny Trench Bowles

There is a growing school of thought that the political parties that we see today are coming to an end, characterised by the writing of Peter Mair and others. The suggestion is that parties are becoming less representative; instead, focusing their energies on governance. This essay will concentrate on this cartel party thesis laid out by Katz and Mair (1995). They suggest that the cartelisation of political parties is simply another way in which the political party has adapted to the political and social realities in order to survive; it by no means represents the end of the party. It is another in a line of party-types that have developed since the mid-nineteenth century in order to meet the needs of politics and society. This essay will begin by looking at the theory of the development of political parties; the suggestion that the model is "conceptually dubious", particularly focusing on Katz and Mair's convincing analysis of the cartel party that they suggest is developing in modern politics. The essay will then go on to discuss the criticisms that have been made regarding the cartel party thesis. Then, this essay will argue, taking the case study of party cartelisation within the European Union, that Katz and Mair's thesis is empirically supported.

However, first, "political parties as we know them today" must be defined. It is the mass party that is seen as the standard of party politics (Katz and Mair, 1995, p. 5). This is the party-type that is viewed as inextricably tied to civil society, with parties often linked to a social or religious identity. These parties have lots of members and are dependent on their party involvement, mainly through membership fees. Katz and Mair (1995, 6) argue that this conception of politics is anachronistic because it is tied to a social structure that no longer exists. The mass party was one stage in a continuing process of change for political parties (Katz and Mair, 1995, 6). It usurped the cadre parties of the Nineteenth century as more individuals wanted access to politics. Moreover, after the mass party, parties developed into catch-all parties, as conceptualised by Kirchheimer (1996, as cited by Krouwel, 2006, 255). They acted as brokers between civil society and the state (Katz and Mair, 1995, 13), developing from the mass party in the post-World War II era, as there was less class conflict. Politics became more professionalised and less ideologically constrained (Krouwel, 2006, 251). Political parties have been ever-changing, as they work out the best way to survive in their social atmosphere.

The flux of party-types suggests that the mass, or indeed the catch-all, party is not here to stay. Katz and Mair look for a new "ideal" type. They suggest the cartel model. According to the model, a cartel of centrist parties has been created, stifling political competition (Katz and Mair, 1995, 19-20). The business of politics has become very expensive, and parties can no longer depend on the membership fees of their voters like mass parties did, so parties cartelise to monopolise the resources of the state (Katz and Mair, 1995, 15). One of the greatest state resources is employment; politics is increasingly becoming a career, so there are large incentives to limit the effects of political defeat (Katz and Mair, 1995, 22-23). These are the contemporary social and political realities that the political party has to respond to. As a result, parties sever their links to civil society and become agents of the state (Krouwel, 2006, 258-59). The state provides a support structure for the parties (Katz and Mair, 1995, 16), increasingly regulating political parties in a way that would not be accepted

for any other private associations (Katz, 2002, 90). Parties are becoming independent of their members and activists, creating a "stratarchical" structure in which the national leaders and local leaders are both autonomous in their actions (Katz and Mair, 1995, 21). The decline in political competition and ideology means that coalition possibilities are widened, and a greater emphasis is placed on governance and its results, not policy, seeing as there is a growing policy consensus (Katz and Mair, 1995). Parties are no longer representative organisations; they are organisers of government, and part of the state apparatus (Mair and Thomassen, 2010, 25). Parties now draw their legitimacy from the state, not civil society.

The argument for the cartel party model is convincing. However, some authors remain unconvinced. Kitschelt's (2000, 149) critique is three-fold; that party leaders are not divorced from their voters, that inter-party cooperation creates a prisoner's dilemma in which exiting the cartel is the dominant strategy and that new challengers on the political scene cannot be co-opted, rather the conventional parties have to adjust to the demand and appeal of the challengers. Generally, Kitschelt (2000, 150), comes from a more society-centred approach, rather than Katz and Mair's politics-centred thesis, suggesting that bureaucrats and politicians do not live in a vacuum. This may be over-stated by Kitschelt. Increasingly, politicians and bureaucrats decide what is appealing to the voters, as they predict voter opinion (Key, 1961). Moreover, by cartelising, the policy choice available to the public is much more limited. Indeed, by adjusting to the political challengers, the conventional parties are marginalising them, and ensuring their own safety. Also, the cartel seems to be based on iterated games whereby coalitions are formed after the election, so to leave the cartel is to risk increase the costs of electoral defeat. Furthermore, with the multi-level governance of contemporary politics it becomes harder to govern; the focus of political power is diffusing away from the state (Koole, 1996; 514). There is a need for consensus-building, which requires political professionals. Politicians and bureaucrats are forced to live in a vacuum and create a consensus that has no real input from the people. Kitschelt (2000, 157) argues that Katz and Mair are sug-

gesting that politicians violate their constituents' interests systematically. This does not seem to be the case, rather the politicians and bureaucrats need to compromise, and believe they can do so better than the public at large, as professional politicians. The essay will discuss more the effect of multi-level governance, with regards to the European Union, on parties later. In general, Kitschelt (2000) seems to misunderstand the arguments of the cartel model. He (2000, 160-63) suggests that the reason for popular dissatisfaction of parties is because of the main parties' failure to respond to citizens' needs, not cartelisation, but then goes on to discuss the lack of political alternatives in modern politics, seemingly providing an example of cartelisation. Again, Kitschelt (2000, 165) disagrees with Mair's idea of more political staff pointing to cartelisation by suggesting that parties are creating an entrenched party machine in order to react to voter dissatisfaction, again providing an example of party cartelisation.

Similar to Kitschelt, many of Koole's (1996) criticisms of Katz and Mair's thesis are easily refuted. Koole's (1996, 507-8) suggestions that the terminology is wrong and that different party types can co-exist add very little to the debate. Furthermore, Koole's (1996, 514) suggestion that the political focus of power is spreading has already been dealt with. Koole (1996, 509-10) writes that the lines between society and the state are becoming blurred and sees this as a way to refute the argument that parties are moving away from civil society to the state, while Katz and Mair (1996, 525-29) argue that this is one of the reasons why party cartelisation is occurring. Koole (1996, 515) even provides a support to Katz and Mair's argument, suggesting that cartelisation has been occurring for a number of years. Indeed, in the eyes of Katz and Mair (1996, 529), the trends of cartelisation have been occurring for a while, but they are becoming more widespread.

The arguments against the concept of the cartel party are not just unconvincing, they are empirically unsupported. According to the theory, cartels are most likely in Germany, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland due to their tradition of interparty cooperation (Katz and

Mair, 1995, 17). In Austria, Germany and Finland we can see "grand coalitions" governing that cross the left-right political divide. The coalition in Germany holds eighty percent of the seats of the Bundestag, meaning new laws are introduced without any meaningful debate, without any real alternatives (Packer, 2014). Even in France, this week, with the first round of their regional elections, we see the Socialist Party saying they would tactically withdraw candidates in order to have the candidates of the other traditional parties see off the threat posed by Front National (Willsher, 2015). Traditional parties are uniting to block the path to government for new challengers, and, despite what Koole (1996, 516-17) writes, it seems the cartels have been successful. Katz and Mair (1996, 531) point to the emergence of the Greens in Germany and D66 in the Netherlands, and their subsequent absorption into the cartel. The cartels are monopolising the resources of the state for themselves. Detterbeck (2005, 178-79) also backs up the cartel party argument, writing that the organisational dimension of the theory is ringing true in the four, positive and negative, cases he tested. He (2005, 185-86) also finds that there is clear evidence of party collusion. Similarly, in the positive cases, state resources are increasingly important for the national party organisations (Detterbeck, 2005, 183).

Van Biezen and Kopecky (2014) look more in depth at this issue of party-state linkage. Again, the trend seems to be towards cartelisation. Since 1995, when the Katz and Mair thesis was published, an additional eight countries have introduced public funding for parties (van Biezen and Kopecky, 2014, 172). Parties in a number of countries are now dependent on state funding (van Biezen and Kopecky, 2014, 172). Whereas, historically, political parties have been ignored by constitutions, they are now subject to laws that govern their internal and external rules (van Biezen and Kopecky, 2014, 173-75). The state is providing a support structure for parties of the cartel.

The support structure for parties may even go beyond the state, to the European Union. Van Biezen and Kopecky's analysis involves a cross national comparison of party-state linkages, but does not include the EU.

The role of the EU is neglected in this framework of the cartel party but it provides an important example because Koole (1996, 514-15), in his critiques of the cartel party model, brings up the idea of the focus of power shifting away from the state, and the EU is an example of this shift away from the state. However, it is in the EU that we see, perhaps, the greatest evidence for the cartelisation of parties. The EU is a consensus-building institution, and this essay has already discussed the need for political professionals, and the disconnection to voters and party members, in consensus-building. Indeed, the Europeanisation of parties seems to have resulted in cartelisation. The EU constrains policy options by giving up national sovereignty to a supranational body, limiting the policy space between parties (Ladrech, 2009, 8). Europeanisation has been one of the main factors leading to cartelisation as the traditional parties claim for themselves the resources of the EU, seen by the grand coalition within the European Parliament of the EPP, S&D and ALDE political groupings, spanning the left-right divide. European politics is more and more about EU and anti-EU, rather than left and right. In the European Parliament of 1999 to 2004 the centre-left S&Ds were more likely than not to vote with the centre-right EPP group (Hix and Høyland, 2011, 190-91). A Transparency International (2012) analysis of political parties in the EU suggests that the bigger parties are blocking the path of any new challengers. Moreover, the EU is well-known as an institution that provides employment for party officials and political professionals. The parties are using the resources of the "state", the EU in this instance, for its own purposes. Hix and Høyland (2011, 185), using Katz and Mair's terms, write that a pro-European "cartel" has been created.

So the empirical evidence in favour of the cartel party model, as presented by Katz and Mair, is strong. Moreover, this essay has already refuted the conceptual critiques of the model. Parties have always adapted to their surroundings, and the cartel model presents just another response to the political and social realities. Political parties are always vulnerable to a new "ideal" type. The future of political parties seems to be secure, but what type of political party we will see in the future is the issue. The cartel party seems to be winning this battle; they are becoming

typical rather than aberrational (Katz and Mair, 1996, 525). This has an important impact on contemporary politics. With the cartel model the role of the voter is extremely passive as the parties are reducing their representative function. The lack of political competition suggests that voters may only have the choice between the traditional, cartel parties and the neo-populist, non-cartel parties. Contemporary politics is the space of the cartel party.

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States, Information and Risk: Accurately Estimating The Costs of War

Clodagh Bergin

Time after time, policy-makers seem to mispredict the consequences of their actions and fail to recognize dangerous situations for what they are. Can the risks of war be correctly estimated, or do we really only learn from history that we do not learn from it?

> *"Man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun"*
>
> Clifford Geertz

Policy-makers constantly face the difficult scenario of estimating the risks of war for their state. With hindsight, many wish they had better predicted the outcome of their actions. This paper holds that it certainly is difficult to estimate the risk of war. Many factors can change the state of play, and these considerations can metamorphose in a second. However, prudent policy-makers should not continuously look to the past when making decisions. Important lessons can be learned, but every situation in our complex world is invariably different. All this taken into account,

this paper will evaluate the role that history has played in the hearts and minds of American policy-makers. In doing so, it will become evident that not only are all states faced with the rational risks of war, but furthermore, in interaction with the US, each state is also faced with the risk that the US will enter into a war of choice, a normative war, as it pushes its moral and cultural agenda worldwide.

This paper makes a number of assumptions: first, that the US is the global dominant power; second, that though institutions are in place to legitimize promises, decisions and laws, the fundamental nature of the international system is a state of anarchy; and third, that the primary concern of states is security, rather than simply pursuing challenges to a hegemon's power. Because the US knows and appreciates its own military capabilities, the question is posed: who checks the US? Who is there to stop US policy-makers from taking unnecessary risks as promote their version of the US agenda, as American administrations have continued to do over the course of modern history?

ESTIMATING RISKS

The risks of war are particularly difficult to calculate. Wars are costly, risky and always inefficient ex post; at least one side always regrets the occurrence of the war. What may seem beneficial at first, may prove to be costly in the long run e.g. failure of the US to bring reform in Vietnam (cost to their image), or becoming entangled in a second conflict with a nation that developed animosity towards the US during a conflict, as in Iraq (Stiglitz & Bilmes, 2012). Rational states are always better off with a negotiated settlement than a costly war, regardless of the outcome (Meirowitz & Sartori, 2008). Despite these facts, wars occur.

Fearon (1995) notes that war can be a rational, if not efficient, alternative for leaders acting in their states' interests. Policy-makers may be drawn into a conflict through rational miscalculation. States have an incentive to claim more capability and resolve than they are wiling to actually invest. Knowing this, states dismiss the signaling of other states as

bluffs, preferring to continue to make demands and are surprised when war actually occurs. It is also true, as this paper will argue, for the case of America, there exists no compromise position for some issues (e.g. moral, cultural). It would be costlier for America's reputation not to enter war; the cost of making concessions would be higher than any potential battle. States' underlying interests or national identities can give rise to disputes over policies, or the composition of another states' government (Frieden, Lake, & Schultz, 2010, p. 122). These types of conflict of interests are inevitable.

In this view, wars are judged to be the favored course of action by policy makers for reasons beyond the normal rationalist measures of material costs and benefits (Chadefaux, Aug. 2015). We can then conclude that policy-makers choose to suffer the consequences because they have estimated that the risk will be worthwhile, war is not a surprise and instead it is only new situations that may lead to unexpected outcomes. How do we then explain unwanted wars? In order to understand unwanted wars, we must turn to the problem of private information.

As Confucius once said "There is deceit and cunning and from these, wars arise", and this view postulates that wars are difficult to estimate due to suspicion of private information (Waltz, 1959, p. 16). Because man is "born in insecurity", states are "natural enemies", constantly on guard against the other because at any stage, any state may decide to attack (Waltz, 1959, p. 26). By this, states are naturally suspicious of each other. Each believes the other has private information, so each has their own incentives to misrepresent their own information, whether this is their military capability or their resolve. What the other knows is "private and potentially strategic information" (Chadefaux, Oct. 2015, p.2). Because leaders make decisions based on information available to them, any vague or looming threat to war can translate into a high probability of war occurring (Chadefaux, Aug. 2015). Viewed through this lens, information is the goal of conflict (Braumoeller, 2013). From this, it could be suggested that education would be the remedy to resolve the problem of private information and by consequence, dramatically reduce the risk of war (Waltz, 1959, p. 17).

This paper cannot agree with Waltz. Suspicions are more than the mere product of the systematic capability distribution of states. Take the case of Iran and the US. After being elected Supreme Leader in August 1989, Khamenei announced that no negotiations could ever take place between the two states as "American policy is based on lies, deception and duplicity" (Ganji, 2013, p. 12). No education could successfully ease tensions between states when deep-rooted suspicions like these exist. In the case of the US and Iran, Iran have learned from America's history.

LESSONS FROM HISTORY

The use of history by policy-makers is common (Vertzberger, 1986, p. 227). History provides a precedent from which policy-makers can work. There are many reasons, as outlined by Vertzberger (1986), why history is a significant tool for policy-makers. This paper sees the following three to be the most salient. There are causal inferences to be made from history, policy-makers who look to past events can uncover the causes of the present world order, and better estimate the risk of war. Secondly, history can be useful to understand and estimate the motives and intentions of other states. Knowledge of the actors' intentions in the past can guide policy-makers to understanding the states current intentions. Lastly, history can highlight continuity and change in patters of the behavior of both themselves and other states. It is evident that policy-makers in Iran (above) certainly hold the historic behavior of America as an important factor to consider when estimating the risks of war.

History can have an important effect on shaping state strategies for estimating the risks of war, however it should never be relied on as infallible. Policy-makers must learn from history and not attempt to mold it to fit any given problem. The US used the past experiences of success in Japan when evaluating the risks of entering into an asymmetric war of choice with Vietnam (Dower, 2003). However, Japan was a poor example for policy-makers to look to when calculating risks for obvious reasons. Policy-makers misused history, their thinking was narrow and confined rather than critical and analytical (May, 1979).

The US intervention in Japan was seen as a success because the US was pursuing a policy of nation building. The US had definite ideas about what needed to be done to democratize Japan; they crafted a new, progressive constitution and undertook major land reforms (Dower, 2003). South Vietnam exemplified governmental chaos and, the war the US waged was little more than fighting for normative values and pride in the Cold War (May, 1979). US policy-makers were pursing long-term goals of extending the nationalistic values of American's, highlighting the supremacy of these values vis-à-vis Soviet Russia. Furthermore, US intervention in Japan was welcomed. It was a unique situation, Japan had been at war for almost 15 years, they were tired, ruined and needed reform. The same conditions were not present in Vietnam.

In this paramount example of a weak state winning a war, it is evident that for various reasons, including the misuse of history, the US miscalculated the risks before entering into the Vietnam War. Johnson sent Bundy (National Security Advisor) and McNamara (Secretary of Defense) to South Vietnam shortly before launching an attack. Both favored the bombing of North Vietnam, yet could not estimate the odds of success, concluding that they could be anywhere "between 25% and 75%" (May, 1979, p. 112). This uncertainty at the top levels of the US administration about the potential success of the strategy pursued indicates a concern, not for traditional rationalist cost-benefit analysis, but the normative outcomes. Such an approach, ignoring the finer points of material costs and benefits, suggest that a more constructivist understanding of US action applies and, consequently, indicated that predicting the grounds upon which state actors make decisions in conflicts are made all the more opaque.

As Mack (1975) proposed, the actor with the most resolve is most often victorious in war. Policy-makers mistakenly compared the resolve of the Vietnamese to that found in Japan. Policy-makers should have sought some level of understanding of the history of Vietnam itself, had they done so, it would have quickly become apparent that the separate-

ness of the two Vietnams was largely a Western construct (May, 1979, p. 120). Therefore, the success of the Vietnamese strategy of guerilla warfare was inevitable. The US did not fight as effectively as it could have; its reaction to guerrilla attacks was to force neighborhoods to hamlets, eventually turning virtually the entire South Vietnamese population against the US (Arreguín- Toft, 2001). This massive miscalculation of the risks of war and, policy-makers failure to choose effective strategies, cost the US over $686 billon (Dagget, 2008), and its pride, something that is arguably much more pivotal to the US than many other states, given the evident American concern for the championing of values.

AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM - POLICY MAKERS AND THE RISK OF WAR

Speaking to the Chicago Economic Club in 1999, Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the US's closest ally, spoke of the "burdens and responsibilities" that have come with America's superpower status. The responsibility of America to reorder the world had become America's mantra during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (Waltz, 1959). Then, America entered the new century with the objectives to build security, stability and hope, having emerged as the dominant power post-Cold War (Hagel, 2001). Policy-makers and other international powers saw that US leadership was yearned for to guide the nations of the world. However rather than using the fall of communism as a means to unite developed nations to eradicate poverty, disease or other social ails, it in fact embarked upon a new search for enemies (Lieven, 2004).

Its dominant power post-WWII had become indispensible. In the months preceding the 9/11 attacks, Charles "Chuck" Hagel advocated for a foreign policy where adversaries "must fear us", that the US is prepared to "use force when the situation demands" (Hagel, 2001, p. 98). 9/11 was a devastating assault on American homeland. However rather than looking inwardly to reevaluate it own values, this paper posits that

the US used this moment as a golden ticket to legitimize the initiation of new conflict. This in turn introduced an added risk of war into the international system; the US was now selectively confronting old enemies, such as Saddam, in a strategy with no logical or systematically predictable choice of target.

Nationalism has been the usual prism through which American behavior has been viewed and unlike classical empires, the US national identity has been founded on an adherence to democracy and freedom. Quoting Kristol, policy-makers at the turn of the 21st century in the US advocated a revolutionary element and committed to a messianic vision of its nation in the world (Lieven, 2004). It is a case of classical realism; Machiavelli would commend the US as "lovers of glory" (Doyle, 1986, p. 1155). Seeking to rule, wanting more for their state than just rationalist material welfare, the US sought to have ultimate power in steering the moral compass of the world.

Policy-makers of the informal US Empire constructed fears of the risks of terrorism rather than building strong domestic security policies (Hinnebusch, 2006). This is akin to the constructed beliefs of previous authoritarian regimes as seen throughout history, however, most radical nationalistic groups in the world have opposed democracy; this is what sets America aside. This is what increased international risks of war. The sovereignty of America was to remain absolute after the Bush doctrine (Jervis, 2003), yet the sovereignty and, as this paper sees, the legitimacy, of other countries, their governments and their policies, has to be heavily qualified by America (Lieven, 2004). This new foreign policy agenda suggested that the US had in fact introduced a new uncertainty into international politics. It was now engaging in arbitrary (rather than necessary or defensive) conflicts in a role that seemed to accept the label of global policeman. Iraq was the first port of call.

The war in Iraq was not without international uproar and confusion, but the lack of international constraints on the US explains why America could so readily decide to go to war (Hinnebusch, 2006). States are constrained through fear for their own security to pursue their own

interests. By misleading the American public regarding weapons of mass destruction and forming the 'coalition of the willing' from these constrained states, the US sought to legitimize the war. Certainly, the attempt to eliminate Saddam's regime was a success for America. However this war now demonstrates to the world that predictability, self-restraint and multilateralism, key components of estimating the risk of war, no longer hold (Hinnebusch, 2006, p. 455). The hegemon, clearly, is by no means a natural provider of stability.

It has been argued that the war on Iraq was a resource war and that America's value spreading goals were just a front to legitimize their actions in Iraq (Klare, 2003). This paper argues directly against this thesis. As aforementioned, Blair himself saw the dangers of Hussein in 1999 and urged that when the time was right, the US would eradicate the "destructive policies [that] have brought calamity" on his own people. Furthermore as demonstrated throughout this paper, the US power projection has been the priority of US policy-makers both during and after the Cold War. America's unchecked power leaves the gap for greater risks of war to all states in the international system of today.

Most urgently, this paper sees the slippery slope Obama has set in motion with drone strikes. The low-risk, low-cost of drone technology favored by the current US administration will have frightening repercussions for states worldwide. America sets precedent and as outlined, states are likely to imitate this. However, at present there is the risk of widening conflict around the world because of the dangerous exemplar of US policy-makers (Spetalnick, 2014). The risks of war are greater than ever before because of the unchecked policy's that have been pursued by the US throughout its history right to the present moment. Never have the risks or the stakes been higher.

CONCLUSION

The risks of war are hard to estimate. The nature of international politics is hard to predict and often in trying to predict, policy-makers forget that states are not human beings; they do not always act rationally

and avoid war at all costs. Many wars are wanted; leaders weigh up their options and decide that in order to achieve the best outcome, they must wage war. Information and commitment problems exist, and ultimately, states live in fear of each other. We have learned many things from history, but as this paper has shown, too often, policy-makers take a fine-grained approach to the use of historical information. Things change rapidly; no situation is ever perfectly replicated. History can be a useful tool, but one used with caution. However there is a now a new, unprecedented risk of war, born out of American exceptionalism. The power of the hegemon goes unchecked in our political system. Two problems have thus manifested themselves. Firstly, it is almost impossible to estimate the risk of the US going to war with any particular state that it deems to challenge its values. Secondly, policy-makers are doomed to always take into account what consequences could arise for their state should they fail to follow the wishes of the US. We have learned from history only that the strong do what they can, while the weak suffer what they must.

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France and the Six-Day War (1967)

Emma O'Brien

"Men can have friends, statesmen cannot."
General Charles de Gaulle, December 9, 1967

INTRODUCTION

The 1967 war redefined Franco-Arab and Franco-Israeli relations under Charles de Gaulle's premiership. France's colonial legacy had left a stain on its relations with the Arab world, and even before the foundation of Israel French attitudes towards Jews, from the Dreyfus Affair to the collaboration of Vichy Paris, were fraught with controversy. After collaborating with the Germans during World War 2, pro-Israeli sentiment and

support for the newly-established state dominated the French collective conscience. The 1967 war represented a radical change in this attitude, at least in official policy circles. Under the administration of General de Gaulle, France attempted to distance itself from Israel and mend its relationship with the Arab states after the Algerian War. As France had been the traditional supporter and provider of arms to Israel in its nascent years, and particularly during the 1956 Suez conflict, de Gaulle's "militant neutrality" had a disproportionately negative impact on Israel (Pryce Jones, 2005). Moreover, the new Premier's desire to renew and improve relations with the Arab world was not reflected in public discourse during the conflict, which remained predominately sympathetic towards Israel. The paradoxical relationship created by this disparity between de Gaulle's official stance and public opinion will be explored in more detail in this essay. I will also examine the consequences of "the divorce" precipitated by the shift in official French policy in order to establish the catalytic nature of the conflict for France's relations with the Middle East (Louis and Shlaim, 2012, p 18). It is clear that Charles de Gaulle's leadership before, during and after the Six Days War played a pivotal role in bringing about a long-term realignment of French policy in relation to Israel.

BEFORE 1967

French support for Israel in the years following the foundation of the Jewish state was characterized by a "tacit alliance" (Crosbie, 1974). France assisted Israel both economically and politically, through the establishment of commercial links and by backing Israeli interests at the UN. The asymmetrical dynamic between the two was described by Gail Heidmann as a "patron-client relationship" (2010, p 241). Shimon Peres, the Israeli deputy Defence Minister, was a vocal advocate of this deepening bond in the 1950's. France also had a strong cultural influence on Israel with many French songs being translated into Hebrew and an established cultural centre in Jerusalem (Gerstenfeld interview, 2005). Underlying pro-Israel policy was an element of residual guilt from World War 2, when a large portion of the French public had collaborated with the Nazis under German occupation, but Franco-Israeli relations went

beyond sympathetic motivations. France was cognisant of the tactical importance of having a base of support in the Middle East as it began to lose its grip on its former colony, Algeria. At the end of the 1950's, as the Algerian crisis deteriorated into war, the two states shared a "strategic interest in combating radical Arab nationalism" (Bass, 2010).

Material support for the Israeli state began in earnest in the early- to mid-1950's, when France became Israel's major supplier of arms. In 1956, France fought alongside Israel in the Suez conflict, and their "shared humiliation" as a result of US and UN censure of the attack strengthened the relationship between the two states (Neff, 1999). At the time France was more committed to the war than Britain, seeing it as their "moral duty" to champion Israel's cause (Filiu, 2012, p 247). Furthermore, after the 1956 crisis France entered into nuclear cooperation agreements with Israel, providing technical assistance to help Israel acquire nuclear weapons (Neff, 1999). Essentially, France was the steadfast champion of Israeli interests throughout the 1950's.

OFFICIAL FRENCH POLICY UNDER DE GAULLE

It was at the height of this pro-Israeli policy regime that General de Gaulle became president of France, in 1959. At the beginning of his office, he acknowledged the justice of the establishment of a Jewish "national home", seeing it as "some compensation for suffering endured through long ages". He also expressed support for David Ben-Gurion as one of the "greatest leaders in the West" (Bass, 2010). However, de Gaulle was a political realist and, with Israel no longer as strategically important to France, his policies before and during the Six-Day War did not reflect his ostensibly pro-Zionist rhetoric (Heidmann, 2010, p 254).

De Gaulle's attitude towards Israel during his presidency represented a u-turn in French policy which was to have a lasting impact on Franco-Israeli relations. De Gaulle did not immediately revise France's economic and military connections with Israel but under his leadership the relationship was no longer characterised by the same degree of good-

will. His motivations were strategic rather than sentimental: he was not opposed to the idea of Israel – in fact, he actively supported the early Zionist pioneers. However, he was determined to re-establish relations with the Arab states, driven largely by tactical calculations based on improving access to Arab oil reserves. He endeavoured to demonstrate that the French colonial mind-set was no more, and that France respected the independence of the Arab states (Louis and Shlaim, 2012, p 18). Furthermore, amicable relations with the Arab states, of which there were twenty-one, gave France considerably more influence in the Middle East than its bond with the one Jewish state (Gerstenfeld interview, 2005). Driven by such strategic motivations, French policy became a balancing act. While playing "cat-and-mouse games over sales of arms and aircraft to Israel", de Gaulle called upon ambassadors in the Middle East to preach moderation and instructed the French ambassador to Egypt to focus on improving relations with Nasser which had been damaged by the Algerian War (Pryce Jones, 2005).

France's newfound affinity with the Arab states under de Gaulle did not manifest itself in a complete repudiation of support for Israel, and France remained Israel's "main source of military strength" until the early 1960's (Louis and Shlaim, 2012, p 18). However, French weapons were slower in reaching Israel both before and during the 1967 war, leading to shortages and a need to conserve ammunition (Oren, 2002, p 187). For example, in 1961, seventy-two fighter-jets arrived in Israel but subsequent deliveries scheduled for the following months failed to materialise (Crosbie, 1974, p 26). This weakened the armed forces of the Israeli military, placing them at a serious disadvantage, and caused them to look elsewhere – namely to the US – for military support. It is important to emphasise at this juncture that de Gaulle did not explicitly set out to cause difficulties for the Israelis; he was more concerned with avoiding obvious displays of preferential treatment. However, with the 1967 war he was forced to clarify the orientation of French policy.

De Gaulle's view of the Arab-Israeli hostilities was characterised by his consistent opposition to war of any kind in the Middle East. He was a pragmatist and as he "contemplated [the war] with utter pessimism" he

sought to avoid antagonism at all costs (Filiu, 2012, p 263). Furthermore, he viewed the volatile situation between the Arabs and the Israelis as a secondary dimension of the Cold War with the "the rivalry between the Americans and Russians [at] the heart of the matter" (Filiu, 2012, p 258). His belief was that the conflict should be resolved by "crisis management" on the part of the superpowers, and that the solution should be practical rather than legal or political (Shalom, 2008, pp 282-283). Seeing no possible positive outcome from war, he emphasised in meetings with both Israel and the Arab states that neither side should initiate hostilities by firing the first shot. On the eve of the Six Days War he stated publicly that France "would refuse to support any state that took up arms against another", no matter what side they were on (Von Dosenrode, 2002, p 60). He had no compunctions in informing the Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban that should Israel attack, the world, including France, would consider them the aggressor (Neff, 1999). He prophetically warned that attack by Israel would create an enduring Palestinian nationalism and his overriding fear was that conflict in Israel would jeopardize the links he had worked so hard to establish with the Arab states (Oren, 2002, p 100).

Despite de Gaulle's best efforts to avoid war, tensions in Israel heightened as Egyptian forces continued to push their boundaries, breaching the Suez Canal by May 15th. Nasser demanded the withdrawal of UN peacekeeping forces which seemed to be a clear signal of intent to engage in hostilities and on May 30th Egypt cut off Israeli access to the Strait of Tiran. The following week Nasser signed military agreements with both Iraq and Jordan. Feeling increasingly vulnerable as it was surrounded by an ever-tightening net of enemies, Israel attacked Egypt on June 5th 1967. In response, de Gaulle accelerated his gradual disengagement from Israel, announcing a total arms embargo on the Middle East. His policy of neutrality had a far greater impact on the Israeli military than those of the Arab states; it was seen as a "brave display of friendship" in the Arab world while David Pryce Jones described it as a "betrayal" for Israel (Filiu, 2012, p 263; Pryce Jones, 2005). De Gaulle's decisive reaction to the outbreak of conflict was influenced by the personal blow to his pride caused by the Israelis' blatant disregard for his strong counsel

discouraging war.[1]

However, de Gaulle's attitude was nothing if not consistent: he was "committed to a rapprochement with the Arab world that required a disengagement from Israel" (Isaacson, 2014, p 2). Before the war he repeatedly demonstrated support for Arab independence alongside an Israeli state, and in its aftermath he called upon Israel to return the occupied territories and for the Arab states to recognise Israel (Louis and Schlaim, 2012, p 18). Fostering peace in the region became almost a personal mission: he was driven by aspirations of great-power status for France and he saw the Israeli conflict as an opportunity to realign France's position on the global stage, assuming the role of "the mediator between the East and West, communism and capitalism" (Oren, 2002, p 100). The potential significance of being on good terms with the Arab governments was not lost on him and he believed that this amity would one day prove to be an asset to the West (Pryce Jones, 2005). Thus, he viewed war as "the worst possible option" and he doggedly pursued his actively neutral policy despite the fact that it was at odds with the vast majority of public opinion (Filiu, 2012, p 255).

FRENCH PUBLIC OPINION

France's disengagement from Israel at this time of crisis caused consternation, leading to the birth of a hostile anti-France campaign in Israel which was echoed in America (Filiu, 2012, p 257). Closer to home, there was extreme dissatisfaction in the French domestic sphere regarding de Gaulle's active neutrality. The large majority of French people supported Israel during the six-day conflict despite de Gaulle's policies, influenced by memories of the Holocaust and the war in Algeria (Benraad, 2014). The French population had no great love for the Arab world and pro-Israeli sympathies continued to dominate public discourse: de Gaulle expressed concern at the trend of public opinion in discussions with President Wilson saying, "people are getting excited about the fate of Israel…

[1] On hearing of the outbreak of conflict, he is said to have exclaimed in wounded pride: "They didn't listen to me!" (Pryce Jones, 2005).

On top of that, there is at home a certain hostility towards the Arabs" (Filiu, 2012, p 259).

Pro-Israel demonstrations in France during the Six-Day War generated huge crowds, with reports of over 30,000 taking to the streets to show their support in response to the outbreak of the conflict. According to Jean-Pierre Filiu, "even-handed diplomacy became increasingly out of touch with French domestic debate" (2012, p 259). This is reflected in empirical evidence which illustrates the contradiction between popular and official approaches to the Arab-Israeli conflict at the time. According to a survey from June 6, 1967, the day after the outbreak of hostilities, 56% of French people declared themselves to be pro-Israel; less than two weeks later this figure had increased to 88%. In the aftermath of the Six Day War public support for Israel cooled somewhat, falling to 68% by October (Isaacson, 2014, p 3). Although these shifts show the fluctuating nature of French attitudes, a considerable majority of the French population remained pro-Israel demonstrating that de Gaulle's neutral policy approach was 'far from the monolith' that was often assumed (Isaacson, 2014, p 1).

The press played an instrumental role in promoting and capitalizing on this pro-Israel sentiment. Joan Wolf has examined the widespread symbolic use of Holocaust imagery throughout the media which played an almost cathartic role in the French public conscience (1999, 104-140).[2] This allowed them to identify to some extent with the Israelis in order to come to terms with the trauma of their own experience of World War 2. For example, Le Figaro tended to portray Israelis as 'vulnerable Holocaust survivors whose national rebirth was threatened with destruction' promulgating the view that Israel was a victim whose very existence was in jeopardy (Isaacson, 2014, p 5). The idea of the imminent threat of annihilation juxtaposed with references to the Holocaust had a powerful impact on French public opinion. Other newspapers such as Le Monde attempted to remain neutral but their coverage of frequent pro-Israel demonstrations often overshadowed any defence of de Gaulle's policies. As the

[2] The media also regularly compared Egypt's Nasser to Hitler accusing Arab states of plotting a second Holocaust, (Filiu, 2012, p 260).

conflict continued Le Figaro maintained its decidedly pro-Israel position, depicting the war as a fight for survival for Israelis while for Arabs it was merely a political matter (Isaacson, 2014, p 11). When the war came to an end they were triumphant, taking a "vicarious pride" in the Israeli victory (Isaacson, 2014, p 11). This prejudicial media coverage alienated French public opinion even further from de Gaulle's policy of neutrality.

French Jews were particularly concerned by the threat posed to Israel by the 1967 conflict and the "growing ambivalence in governing circles" towards Israel's plight (Mandel, 2014, p 81). De Gaulle's policies prompted an increase in Zionisation in France, with many Jews prioritising their Jewish political preferences over the French national agenda. Through the Six-Days War, Israel became an integral part of the French Jewish identity. Despite this, Jewish opinion diverged somewhat between those whose support for Israel was unconditional and those who distinguished support for the State of Israel from its imperialist policies (Mandel, 2014, p 86).

The paradox of France's attitude towards the conflict was complicated further by the coexistence of de Gaulle's support for Arab nations and anti-Arab racism. Again, this was driven by the media with imagery portraying Arabs as the instigators of the conflict. This anti-Arab sentiment manifest itself in violence in Nice on June 7 and racial harassment in other areas such as Paris and the Midi. Arab organizations in France were not as structured or cohesive as their Jewish counterparts which meant that the Arab perspective was rarely vocalised convincingly. As Maud Mandel said, Arab voices remained 'muted' (2014, p 86).

AFTERMATH OF THE CONFLICT: DE GAULLE'S TENACITY AND GEOPOLITICAL SHIFTS

In the face of often overwhelming pro-Israel public sentiment De Gaulle's resolve did not falter. He persevered in vocalising aversion to the conflict, refusing to support either side. In the months after the war, de Gaulle reiterated his contempt for the Israeli attack which he had explic-

itly counselled against. He declared that by assuming policy of neutrality France had "freed itself… from the very special and very close ties" with Israel. He also caused controversy with a speech describing the Jews as "an elite people, sure of itself, and dominating" (Bass, 2010). His rhetoric made it clear that the close relationship Israel had enjoyed with France was well and truly over.

De Gaulle's political approach gradually filtered down to the civilian population in the aftermath of the conflict and popular opinion slowly became more aligned with the official stance. The pro-Israel sentiment which dominated the French public during the six days of war waned somewhat in the wake of hostilities. With Israel no longer seen as the victim there was not the same sense of outrage and sympathy, and the wave of pro-Israeli feeling which had gained momentum during the conflict ultimately proved to be short-lived. While support for Israel remained strong among French Jews, many of whom left for Israel in the aftermath of the conflict, general commitment to Israel proved untenable in the long-run.

The "profound geopolitical shift" precipitated by the 1967 war affected other Western actors apart from France, particularly the US (Neff, 1999). Israeli relations with the US improved beyond recognition under John F. Kennedy, who became the first pro-Israel President in 1961. He was closely followed by Lyndon B Johnson who proved to be even more pro-Israel and the US quickly stepped in to replace France as Israel's major patron. During the 1967 war Israel received arms from the US, mitigating somewhat the potentially devastating effects of the French arms embargo. France's disengagement directly precipitated this strengthening of US-Israeli relations which would lead to the birth of American Zionism and go on to cost the US $100 billion a year in aid to Israel, with the US assuming its current role as "defence attorney for the Jewish state against the world community's condemnations of Israel's repeated violations of international law (Neff, 1999)". Essentially, de Gaulle's policies "[paved] the way for the strategic alliance" between the United States and the Jewish State" (Filiu, 2012, p 263).

CONCLUSION

The 1967 war was a landmark moment for French diplomacy under the auspices of a strong-willed premier (Filiu, 2012, p 247). France went from being Israel's closest ally to adopting a "conspicuously neutral" stance, bringing about an improvement in Franco-Arab relations and allowing France to move on from the bitter legacy of colonialism and the Suez crisis (Filiu, 2012, p 249). However, this came at the cost of close bonds with Israel which were irrevocably damaged by this perceived betrayal. French public opinion at the time of the conflict was at odds with de Gaulle's official policy but ultimately it was de Gaulle's resolve which had a defining impact on French attitudes towards Israel. On the other hand, the Six-Days War had a lasting effect on Israel's attitude to France and to European involvement in the Middle East: France's policy reversal was a psychological blow, sowing seeds of mistrust and scepticism which would delimit relations with Western powers (not including the US) (Von Dosenrode, 2002, p 60). In short, with the benefit of hindsight, the six days of war can be pinpointed as a decisive episode which crystallized the changing nature of France's relations in the Middle East.

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The Politics of Adversarial Reciprocity

Why the Israeli Likud Party and the Palestinian Islamist Movement Hamas derived mutual political benefits from one another?

Rachel Fitzsimons

This paper seeks to investigate and account for the reasons why the Palestinian Islamic movement Hamas and the Israeli Likud party have derived mutual political benefit from one another's policies in the past, in the wake of the Oslo Peace Accords 1993, even though the two groups stand on opposing sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The diametrically opposed ideological goals of both parties help construct a narrative of zero-sum political interests; both groups seek extreme outcomes to the conflict and will settle for little less than the meeting of the full complement of their demands, in particular on the question of territorial sovereignty. Yet while set at polar opposites of the political spectrum, Hamas would prefer that the right-wing Likud hardliners- who postulate notoriously tough anti-terrorist security policies- were voted into power by the Israeli electorate rather than Likud's left-wing moderate

rivals, the Labour Party. After the signing of the Oslo Accords, Likud and religious parties of the far Right proposed five no-confidence motions in the government on the premise that it had decided to freeze settlement activities in the territories (Shindler, 2008, 236). The intransigent Likud attitudes in opposition to a negotiated peace served to benefit Hamas who rigidly opposed Yassir Arafat's secular peace proposals, viewing them as a betrayal of Islamic ideology, as will be explored below. In a similar vein, while the Likud oppose Hamas as a terrorist organisation (National Counterterrorism Centre, 2016), they cannot deny that they have benefitted politically from Hamas's stratagems of 'spoiling.' They have capitalised on the widespread climate of fear permeating the Israeli citizen body by using the Islamic jihadist movement's suicide bombing campaigns as an electoral platform promising greater security measures, in successful efforts to oust the incumbent Labour Party and accede to political office.

For the purpose of this essay, examining the goals and strategies of both parties surrounding the time of the Oslo Accords onwards is justified on account of the fact that it was this peace agreement which led to significant shifts in the balance of power across the conflict-ridden political landscape. On 13 September 1993 the formal signing of the Declaration of Principles brought into being interim self-government arrangements, as well as stipulating that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) under Yassir Arafat recognised Israel's right to peace and security, and that the Labour Party under Yitzhak Rabin recognised the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people (Reich, 2005, 176). Both groups made moderate concessions in efforts towards achieving peace, and it was these conciliatory actions which constituted the catalyst that ignited the shared politics of opposition within Hamas and the Likud. Indeed, this essay seeks to illustrate that it is this intersection of shared ideological aims and methodological strategies employed by both the Islamic jihadist movement and the Israeli Likud which accounts for the primary reason as to why both parties have derived mutual political benefits from one another, albeit in an indirect manner. An examination of underlying theories pertaining to goals and strategies of terrorists and right-wing parties is paramount in order to place the subject matter in its broader contextual

light before examining it at a case-specific level. Following a literature review at case level, this essay shall employ qualitative methods in order to unearth the explanation behind the distribution of reciprocal benefits spanning both sides.

GENERAL THEORY: GOALS AND STRATEGIES OF TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS: "THE RATIONALITY OF IRRATIONALITY"

Terrorism can be defined in a number of ways, but a succinct analysis encapsulates it as 'the use of violence against civilians by non-state actors to attain political goals' (Kydd & Walter, 2006, 52). Of course, state terrorism is also often propagated in many instances but for the purpose of this paper, the focus will be solely restricted to non-state actors. In their article 'Strategies of Terrorism', Kydd and Walter provide a critical insight into the goals and strategies of terrorist organisations, positing that there exist 'five principal strategic logics of costly signalling at work in terrorist campaigns; attrition, intimidation, provocation, spoiling and outbidding' (Kydd & Walter, 2006, 51). The goals driving terrorist organisations are deemed to be primarily 'political objectives' (Kydd & Walter, 2006, 52), with five particular goals most prevalent and enduring, 'regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance' (Kydd & Walter, 2006, 52). They observe in particular an extremist tendency towards the politics of non- cooperation, noting that 'the purpose of extremist violence is to exacerbate doubts among those on the targeted side that the moderate opposition groups can be trusted to implement the peace deal and will not renege on it later' (Kydd & Walter, 2002, 264). Violence appears a key component in the strategies of extremist activity, with de Mesquita developing a complementary framework to that of Kydd and Walter, in which 'only moderate terrorist organisations accept the concessions granted by the government, leaving extremists in control of the violent opposition' (Berrebi & Klor, 2006, 902). Robert A. Pape focuses on the study of suicide terrorism, arguing that it 'follows a strategic logic, one specifically designed to coerce modern liberal democracies to make significant territorial concessions' (Pape, 2003, 343). He posits that such attacks are carried out as direct efforts to bring about

the realisation of specific political aims; 'to coerce a target government to change policy, to mobilise additional recruits and financial support, or both' (Pape, 2003, 344). More specifically, the goal of territorial sovereignty is viewed as a key motivation behind suicide terror, which seeks 'the withdrawal of the target state's military forces from what the terrorists see as a national homeland' (Pape, 2003, 344). The spreading of threats and creation of a climate of fear and hysteria among the citizen populace is a key strategy frequently employed by terrorist organisations to coerce governments into granting their demands. The tension between the irrationality of the individual suicide terrorist act itself and rationality of the overarching political cause for which it is carried out is captured by what Thomas Schelling (1966) labels "the rationality of irrationality," in which 'an act that is irrational for individual attackers is meant to demonstrate credibility to a democratic audience that still more and greater attacks are still to come' (Pape, 2003, 344). Such credible threats serve to instigate widespread fears among the populace who in turn seek greater security measures and generally, the implementation of less liberal policies in order to counteract such threats.

GENERAL THEORY: GOALS AND STRATEGIES PERTAINING TO THE MOTIVATIONS AND ACTIONS OF THE RIGHT

Right-wing parties tend towards conservative and fascist policies, generally aimed at upholding the existing social order and are, in that sense, a force for continuity (Heywood, 2013, 416). We can associate notions of hierarchy, authority, order, duties, tradition, and nationalism with right-wing parties. Bernt Hagtvet outlines key characteristics of right-wing politics, terming them 'nationalist' in origin; 'they insist on the excellence of their own nation; they emphasize its history as particularly glorious' (Hagtvet, 1994, 241). The politics of non-cooperation is an important strategy of right-wing parties in that it 'make the politics of compromise and bargaining of liberal democracy difficult' (Rydgren, 2007, 246). Orlandrew E. Danzell puts forward a complementary viewpoint in asserting that 'governing right-wing parties tend to implement a mix of policies that restrict the political process and alter the institutional land-

scape…' (Danzell, 2011, 86). In accounting for the emergence of the radical right, Rydgren notes that most explanations are based on grievance theory, 'in focusing on the objective conditions that have increased grievances and discontent among the people' (Rydgren, 2007, 247). In light of his theories it can be expected that the popularity of right-wing parties would increase in correlation with increased grievances experienced by the citizen population in question. The spread of public discourse delineating threats to security and civil liberties, inducing a climate of fear among the masses, would affect voting tendencies of a citizen electorate in shifting them towards the right. As noted by Malgorzata Kossowska et al., right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) 'is adopted to satisfy antecedent psychological motives stemming from fear, threat and uncertainty (Kossowska et al., 2011, 247).

However, it is of paramount importance to note that the ideological line along the spectrum of right-wing conservatism is often blurred, ranging from more moderate centre-right stances to that of right-wing authoritarianism, with the Likud generally fitting the former category. Policies of the right are frequently adapted to suit shifting contingencies of the time within a variety of situational contexts and in response to numerous exogenous factors that cannot always be controlled for. Thus it remains difficult to confer any set specific characteristics upon right-wing parties; this broad theoretical model is offered merely to shed some degree of light upon expected aims, tendencies and actions of right-wing groups. Nevertheless, it can be asserted that in light of the above theories, the goals and strategies of terrorist organisations and right-wing parties overlap somewhat; they converge on the nodal points of the politics of non-cooperation and extremist opposition, both groups maintaining a certain nationalist ideology which translates into zero-sum bargaining demands. Widespread fear of threats among the citizenry is used by both parties as a weapon of political expediency, so that they continually play upon and exploit weak security measures which the more moderate, liberal forces fail to rectify. Both extremes contest for power, and will follow parallel strategies aimed at acquiring such dominance.

CASE SPECIFIC LITERATURE: ADVERSARIAL ALIGNMENT OF HAMAS AND THE LIKUD

With this broad theoretical understanding of goals and strategies of terrorist organisations and right-wing parties in mind, we can now turn to examine a body of literature directly relating to theories of the Palestinian Islamic movement Hamas and the right-wing Likud party in Israeli politics. Hamas pursues both territorial change and regime change, in aiming to 'drive Israel out of the occupied territories and then to overthrow it' (Kydd/Walter, 2006, 53). Their main goal is 'the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state in accordance with the borders of British Mandate Palestine' (Berrebi/Klor, 2006, 900), meaning the occupied territories as well as Israel. The ceding of western Palestine to Israel was seen by Hamas as an irreligious act that cannot be tolerated under the fundamental dictates of Islam. In pursuit of this zero-sum goal of full territorial sovereignty, Hamas uses strategies of violence such as suicide bombing campaigns to disrupt moderate peace talks and engages in strategic methods of non-cooperation so that a settlement cannot be reached. Peace initiatives were deemed 'illusory', merely 'a reshuffle of Israeli forces and the establishment of limited autonomy…" (Irving Jensen, 2009, 21) Indeed, the Hamas charter envisaged 'a Palestinian state won through jihad (holy war) rather than negotiation (Shindler, 2008, 302). The strategies of Hamas's spoiling campaigns were influential in propelling the 'less co-operative and less trusting hardline Likud party' (Kydd/Walter, 2006, 74) into power. Spoilers, by definition, 'attack in an effort to persuade the enemy that the moderates on the terrorists' side are weak and untrustworthy, thus undermining attempts to reach a peace settlement' (Kydd/Walter, 2006, 51). Hamas dramatically increased its attacks prior to Israeli elections in 1996 and 2001, in which Labour was the incumbent party, in an attempt to sway the Israeli electorate towards casting their vote for the right-wing hardliners. Thus we can note the irony of this adversarial alignment; the policies and actions of Hamas, while carrying out attacks against the Israeli population, were actually putting the Likud party at an advantage and propelling them into power as the party that would stop at

nothing to exterminate the terrorist threat for the safety of its civilization.

Once in power, the Likud are less likely than their counterparts Labour to reach a peace settlement with the PLO, thus suiting the goals of Hamas in pushing for extremist outcomes. The goals and strategies of the Likud possess some similarities to those of the terrorist organisation. The extremist ambitions of the party are accounted for in Jason Hicks' assertion that 'since 1977 Likud-led governments…have facilitated the greatest increases in Israeli settlement growth in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem' (Hicks, 2009, 20/21). Elfi Pallis provides a parallel approach in observing that which lies at the core of the party's ideology, pointing to 'the inalienable right of the Jewish people to all of the land of Israel' (Pallis, 1992, 41). Likud's undermining of the peace process is also cited by Pallis when she refers to the observation that 'Shamir (Likud Prime Minister) has always maintained a "general disbelief in peace"' (Pallis, 1992, 47). Furthermore, Benjamin Netanyahu 'favoured a Greater Israel… delegitimised the PLO and supported the settlement drive…' (Shindler, 2008, 257). Ray Hanania provides arguably the most relevant piece in the selected literature on the way in which the Likud has benefitted Hamas and vice versa. He terms their struggle with one another 'a mutually beneficial dance of death' (Hanania, 2002). Hamas thrived off the Likud strategy of cultivating an alternative to Yassir Arafat that might win over the Palestinians while allowing Israel to extend its control. So too has the jihadist violence helped to elect Likud candidates to the office of Prime Minister. Hanania posits that 'it is this politics of opposition that drives Likud and Hamas to share similar goals…and undermining the peace process has always been the real target of Hamas and has played into the political ambitions of the Likud' (Hanania, 2002).

In analysing the body of literature discussed here, it is clear that we gain a wealth of insight into the descriptive methodology of two of the organisations party to the conflict, one inside the circles of political diplomacy and the other, an external non-parliamentary challenger to Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Most authors have observed the tendency of both parties to pursue extreme goals and strategies involving non-cooperation and blocking attempts towards a moderated peace.

Hanania even went so far as to assert that both groups benefit from each other. What the above articles lack however, is providing a satisfactory explanation as to exactly why this is the case. The literature gives an informative insight into actions and policies of both organisations, yet this paper seeks to probe deeper and account for the underlying casual mechanism that triggers the spread of mutual benefits to both sides. This paper seeks to delineate that both organisations follow the general theoretical model and overlap on certain nodal points of goals and strategies. If this overlap can be accounted for through employment of qualitative methods, we can then conclude that this is the principal cause of why Hamas and the Likud derive political benefits from one another.

EXPOSITION: CONVERGENCE IN IDEOLOGICAL AIMS AND OVERLAP IN METHODS EMPLOYED TO ACHIEVE THEM

Territorial Objectives:

From the evidence provided below, we can firstly assess that both Hamas and the Likud possess similar goals of wanting full territorial sovereignty for Palestinians and Israelis respectively, avoiding concessions at all costs. The Hamas Charter of 1988 states the organisation's objectives of 'discarding evil, crushing it and defeating it, so that truth may prevail, homelands revert to their owners, calls for prayer be heard from their mosques, announcing the reinstitution of the Muslim state.' (Hamas Charter, 1988, Article 9). For Hamas, the land of Palestine is sacred Muslim territory and no one, including Arab rulers, has the authority to concede any of it to the Israelis. In commenting upon the PLO's secularist ideology, the centrality and importance of Islam to Hamas is deeply emphasised; 'we cannot exchange the current and future of Islam in Palestine to adopt the secular ideology because the Islamic nature of the Palestinian issue is part and parcel of our din (ideology and way of life)' (Hamas Charter, 1993, 130/131). In a similar vein, the Likud manifesto unequivocally states: "The right of the Jewish people to Eretz Yisrael is eternal and indisputable, and linked to our right to security and peace… Any plan involving the hand-over of parts of western Eretz Yisrael to foreign rule, as proposed by the Labour Alignment, denies our right to this country"

(Neff, 1996, 87). The irony of the similarity of their goals is encapsulated in Steven J. Sosebee's Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 'Hamas's goal of a fundamentalist state established throughout the former mandate of Palestine is the reverse image of the Likud's dream of a greater Israel covering every inch of the former mandate' (Sosebee, 1995, 8). This convergence of goals fits neatly into the general theory outlined above in which one of the goals of terrorist organisations is territorial change, while one goal of right-wing parties is that of a nationalist state, naturally including that of territorial sovereignty. Thus there exists an overlap in that both parties involved want to maintain hold over or acquire territory in line with their political and religious objectives.

Opposition to Negotiated Peace:

Both organisations used strategies of non-cooperation to oppose both the peace process and moderate attempts made at territorial compromise. Hamas's clear political objectives 'aimed to disrupt the Middle East peace negotiations…' (Lewis, 1992). Article 13 of the Hamas Charter 1988 states that 'Peace initiatives, the so-called peaceful solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement' (Hamas Charter, 1988, Article 13). A member of the Palestinian Islamic movement, Yasir Hammad al-Hassan Ali, was quoted in the New York Times in 1993 in his opposition to co-operation with Israel, 'Since our enemies are trying to obliterate our nation, cooperation with them is clearly a terrible crime. Our most important objective must be to put an end to the plague of collaboration' (Anon., 1993). The organisation emphasised the importance of jihad (holy war) as the main means to achieve their extremist goals, in particular using suicide bombing campaigns throughout the 1990s as spoilers to the peace process. While the Likud does not engage in specific strategies of violence, they did deploy settlement programmes which helped to hinder moves towards peace. In 1996, Donald Neff observed that 'the right of settlement is a core belief of the revisionist Zionist Likud' (Neff, 1996, 87). He noted that 'settlements were a necessary strategy to avoid territorial compromise with the Palestinians' (Neff, 1996, 87). The

idea behind the programme was that at some stage, the number of Jewish settlers would be so high that no government would be strong enough to dislodge them in attempts to claim territory. According to Samuel L. Lewis of the New York Times, 'too many principal figures… in Israel's Likud party cling to diametrically opposed conceptions of the final outcome of any peace process' (Lewis, 1990). He further noted that Yitzhak Shamir 'cannot persuade Likud to swallow Secretary of State James Baker's mildly unpalatable proposal for talks with a Palestinian delegation' (Lewis, 1990). When excluded from power, Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the Likud at the time, stated that 'if the Likud were to return to power, he would feel no obligation to honour the current Labour Government's agreement with the Palestinian Liberation Organization' (Haberman, 1994).

Security Fears as a Weapon of Political Expediency:

A final similarity in goals and strategies between the Likud and Hamas is that of their mirrored attempts at acquiring or maintaining their hold on power. Both organisations are in competition with more moderate alignments to win over the hearts and minds of populations, of the Israeli electorate in the Likud's case, and the Palestinian people in the case of Hamas. The Labour Party can be viewed as the main challengers to the grasp on political power of the Likud, while the PLO exists as Hamas's main competitor for dominance within the Palestinian community. For example, in identifying the political objectives of Hamas, Anthony Lewis noted one such aim was 'to enhance its own standing among Palestinians in the occupied territories' (Lewis, 1992). The creation of a climate of fear among the general population is a key tactic of both in order to gain support, both sides professing that moderate attempts at peace will undermine security and lead to unwanted outcomes. For example, the Original Party Platform of the Likud grossly exaggerated the terrorist threat of the PLO in deeming them 'an organisation of assassins' whose main aim was to 'liquidate the state of Israel, set up an Arab country instead and make the land of Israel part of the Arab world' (Likud Manifesto, 1977). The rhetoric used included phrases such as how the Likud would strive

to 'eliminate such murderous organisations' to stop them from carrying out their 'bloody deeds' (Likud Manifesto, 1977). This was clearly an attempt to manipulate public opinion into perceiving the PLO as a deadly threat that would only be eliminated if the Likud Party held the reins of power. A stream of propaganda and rhetoric used by Hamas to strike fear in the Palestinians mirrored this. Their charter of 1988 characterised the Israelis as 'invaders' against whom their lands needed to be defended with a call to take up arms (Hamas Charter, 1988, Article 33). Clear indications of anti-semitic incitement are found in the charter, 'the Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight Jews and kill them' (Hamas Charter, 1988, Article 7). The charter is clearly intended to stir up anger and hostility against the Zionist enemy whose 'scheming has no end' (Hamas Charter, 1988, Article 32) and who are pursuing dramatic policies of expansionism as well as being involved in a myriad of conflicts around the globe; 'there is no war going on anywhere without them having their finger in it' (Hamas Charter, 1988, Article 22). Similar to the Likud's 'salvation of the nation' approach to placing themselves to the forefront of combatting the deadly forces that threaten the Israeli population, Hamas 'regards itself the spearhead and the vanguard of the circle of struggle against World Zionism' (Hamas Charter, 1988, Article 32). These statements and actions fit the general theoretical pattern of strategies used to create a climate of fear. In evaluation, we can account for an overlap in the goals of Hamas and the Likud in their objectives of gaining power and using scare-mongering tactics to influence people to get behind their organisations and lend their support. Whether these tactics were successful or not is not the issue at large in this paper. Rather, it is the fact that Hamas and the Likud yet again converge on a similar nodal point in line with the general theory which proves the basis for why they assist one another, albeit in an indirect way.

In exploring this analysis to greater depth, it is important to take note of the distinct parameters of this essay, which has focused specifically on internal ideologies, that is, policy and action of both the Likud and Hamas. The overlap of the goals and strategies of both organisations has been the central hypothesis in accounting for why mutual benefits are spread between the adversaries. Perhaps further research on the topic

could engage in analysing external influences that might contribute to the provision of mutual benefits. Certainly the actions of the more moderate groups, the PLO and the Labour Party, are worth examining; perhaps their policies and actions pushed Hamas and the Likud to pursue such extremes in the first place. After all, the 'shared politics of opposition' approach could not be accounted for if there were no moderate attempts at a peace process to oppose! Furthermore, there exist a myriad of explanations for the election of the Likud Party to power in Israeli politics; they are not solely dependent on the terrorist activities of their adversaries to propel them into office. For example, Netanyahu garnered a large degree of support among the ultra-Orthodox Jewish camp who both shared his hard-line views on the peace process but also loathed 'the stridently secularist Meretz Party (a coalition of left-wing Zionist parties formed in 1992), which had been Labour's junior partner in the outgoing government, and also disliked the secularists within Labour, who also were seen as threatening the Jewishness of the state' (Reich, 2005, 190). Thus the intricacies of political infighting must not be overlooked in accounting for Likud's ascent to political power.

In sum, we can conclude that there exists an overlap between the goals and strategies of Hamas and the Likud party which accounts for why this opposing duality can derive political benefits from one another. It can be surmised that Hamas pursued goals of territorial change, and used strategies of 'spoiling' to block the peace process through suicide bombing campaigns conducted when the Labour party were the incumbent government. Furthermore, the Islamic movement used strategic rhetoric in attempting to create a climate of fear in order to garner greater support from Palestinians who may have previously held more moderate, concessional stances on the conflict in question. Some of the goals and strategies of the Likud party can be juxtaposed with those of Hamas. They too retained territorial objectives in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as aims of gaining political power through winning over the hearts and minds of the Israeli electorate. While there exists no transparent evidence that they pursued strategies of violence to bring about their aims, they certainly employed non-cooperative techniques such as introducing settlement programmes which helped them towards their territorial goals

as well as successfully blocking the peace process. They painted Yassir Arafat and the PLO as a serious threat to the state of Israel and portrayed themselves as the party that would rid the population of their grievances by eliminating such threats. Thus, similar to their adversaries Hamas, they sought to cultivate acutely threatening situations in the minds of the masses in order to gain electoral support. It can be asserted that the goals and strategies of the two organisations converge on the nodal points of territorial and ruling aims, non-cooperative strategies in the politics of opposition, and strategies of creating fear and tension among the masses in order to bring about a realisation of these aims. It is this overlap which accounts for the reason why both have derived mutual benefit from one another; their sharing of common ground allowed for the fertilization of the seed-bed of opposition to a peace process that granted too many concessions.

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Becoming a Racialized Subject: The Subjectifying Power of Stereotypes in Popular Visual Culture

Amadeus Harte

The power of visual representation in the hegemonic hands of those with the capacity to manufacture and deliver images to large audiences must not be underestimated in its capacity to subjectify. In other words, to construct an identification of the subject from without. Stuart Hall contends that race is a floating signifier, a discursive construct with no essential biological basis. What was once a signifier that was grounded in positivist epistemologies of scientific discourses which have since been discredited, has now instead floated into a fragmented collection of visual representations in popular culture. Hence, I aim to extend this post structuralist argument to the realm of visual cultures. I argue that postcolonial power relations immanent to representational images are the main medium which produces and reproduces discourses surrounding the process of racializing the subject through the deployment of racial stereotypes and tropes which function

to sustain power inequalities along racialized lines. Visuality is key here, because it leads us to think that colour creates race and acts as a precursor to racism. Yet rather it is the racism immanent to colonial discourse which creates race. I contend that it is the actor behind the lens who employs the power of such culturally hegemonic discourse to construct a representation of African American blackness which comes to produce the racialized subject. Race is thus a product of a visually discursive effect. Yet a seeming contradiction arises here: does theorising using analytical categories of racial difference not serve the latent purpose of reinscribing difference along racialized lines? I aim to show how a strategic use of theory does not reinforce binaries, rather highlights the very weakness of such, thus acting as a tool to dissolve them.

One of the main dividing lines that structure society is that of 'race'. Implicit in a common sense understanding of race is the contention that phenotypical differences in human beings signify a cultural or "ethnic" background grounded in biology which can positively correlate collectivised personality characteristics such as intelligence, submissiveness and sexuality to skin colour, bodily and facial characteristics. Yet W.E.B Du Bois claims that "The differences of colour, hair and bone are poorly correlated to biological difference" meaning that all attempts to scientifically prove this phenomenon have failed (Appia,1985). Consequently, Stuart Hall asserts that we must dislodge this common sense assumption and delve into the idea that race is a socio-historically contingent discursive construct, a collection of fragmented floating signifiers and semiotic sequences which are arbitrarily grounded according to common preconceptions embedded in stereotypes laden with cultural codes that deliver intelligibility of social difference. Hence, it is not through some shared static essence which acts as a cultural binding agent beneath the surface of skin colour that creates race, rather it is only through discourse that race gains its grounding as a concept (Hall, 1997). In this sense, skin colour can be seen as a badge of a shared socio-cultural history, produced by dominant discursive powers, rather than a shared genetic code (Hall, 1997). This discursive production of race becomes reified in our social psyche through language and the power immanent to the regime of truth produced by technologies of visual cultures. Such discourses mediate the

difference between the self and the other, which are part of systems of social classification responsible for the generation of meaning and association, both fundamental to our ways of seeing and understanding the world (Hall, 1997). Although the synthesis of meaning is a highly important part of our social fabric, differential definitions of race become problematic when they function amongst these classificatory systems as part of a hierarchy reliant on systems of power and domination of one social group over others, producing systemic oppression, social inequality and discrimination through mechanisms of structural violence. Hall invites us to consider how classification of humans into racial categories functions as an instrument of power which maintains the order of a given social system and serves the interests of those who hold a monopoly on the reigns of power and its resulting privileges (1992 lecture). In this case, the current Western social order is one of white supremacy where whites hold disproportionate positions of power economically, institutionally and culturally, thus allowing themselves to secrete the most cultural legitimacy. (resistance through rituals quote) Accordingly, the devaluation of certain cultural practices associated with skin colour assigns superiority to one group and inferiority to another according to the ideology of the dominant group which sews the seeds of racism and allows for colonial practices to shape our political spheres. From this it can be inferred in order to deconstruct the discursive construction of race, we must genealogically invert the lines of causality which dominant ideologies have enshrined in common sense discourse: rather than race and racial difference being the first principle of racism, it is arguable that power immanent to discourses founded on racist stereotypes in visual cultures function to create the concept of race.

It may seem fallacious to claim that race is simply the product of discourse or visual representations when what allows us to engage in such discourse initially is by reference to skin colour, which comes to infer the analytical category of difference from which I will proceed. For Fannon, physical blackness acts as "the dark and unarguable evidence of my own appearance" (1992). Skin colour is thus certainly the primary defining signifier that appears to fix race, as it relates nature (skin colour) and culture (behavioural traits) so that once a person is categorised in

racial terms, they can correspondingly be categorised in cultural terms. This metonymical relationship is one of the features that naturalises race in common sense discourse. We take this to be a realm existing a priori to all representations. It appears essentialised. Hall claims that "we read race through the body [which becomes] a text that classifies difference…the obviousness of the visibility of race reinforces it as a text" (Hall, 1997). But the idea of "race" is not simply one of difference in skin colour, rather it is a socially segregating difference which is produced by power relations. Thus, it is colonial power relations which divides people, not skin colour, and not "race". Hence, one must become racialized through colonial discourse and visualities, but only in relation to and through the eyes of the "socially white" subject. This holds true for whiteness as well as blackness, which is evident with reference to the nature of becoming in Irish whiteness. Although nationalist ideologies hold that the Irish have white skin, they only became considered as socially white in recent times (Ignatiev, 2009), meaning they were only granted the social privileges of whiteness partly because of the fact that race is a floating signifier that slides and shifts depending on context, and partly because this context in question is one pertaining to a subjectifying discourse of racialisation. Hence, to say that race is a social construct is to say that it is such because it is a floating signifier.

Since the Enlightenment, discursive power in the form of an epistemological monopoly of assumed legitimacy privileges the methods of visually oriented scientific empiricism which reigns at the top of a hierarchy of ways of knowing. There is productive power in the realm of images. Thus, consequential claims to objectivity, the empirical methods that are used to arrive there, and the assertion that once reached, this knowledge can be instrumentally used in a fashion to construct an identification of the racialized subject, a mode of power which imposes this identity and all its stereotyped connotations on a subject, is a sentiment that echoes the colonial period and one that has lead us into a subtler yet dangerously insidious era of neo-colonialism. (Merzoeff,1998, p.495) Yet regarding the rationality of instrumental knowledge, as Delezue says, all claims to rationality are rooted in the irrational (Delezue, 2002, p.262). In which case, rather than employing a standardised epistemological meth-

od with which to arrive at a static notion of truth, in the context of representational visuality with regards to race, we must instead ask in what way are conceptions of truth used by those in power? How do such notions of truth function to attach a racialized identity to the subject? What are the implications of one socio-political group conjuring up the visual constructions of truth and imposing them upon another? In this light, colonial discourse seeks to produce knowledge of the subject in which the colonisers knowledge is valued more. "The objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonised as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest to establish systems of administration and instruction." (Bhaba, 1983, P. 371) We can see how these epistemological mechanisms and practices of empiricism function if we consider the way in which the racialized subject is produced by western ideologically hegemonic discursive powers (Mitchell, 1992, p.501) of the language of (post)colonialism. In this sense, Foucault outlines three mechanisms of subjectification: "(1) the modes of inquiry (sciences) which produce the human subject as an object of knowledge, (2) "dividing practices" which divide the subject both within herself, and from other subjects according to a binary logic of norm and deviance, and (3) practices of self-governance by which the subject (re)produces and transforms herself as subject." (Rowe, 2014). Thus, the mechanism of subjectification is one which attaches a subject's identity to herself.

Under the rhetoric of "social science", (which uses the term "science" to grant itself more epistemological legitimacy regardless of the often incompatibility of applying scientific methodology to the nebulous and fluid nature of social phenomena) phenotypical difference was historically interpreted by anthropologists to prove the existence of race, whereby specimens were objectified and evaluated according to a normative standard of unmarked whiteness, resulting in black people being marked as the deviant and thus devalued other according to the terms of the white colonial power. By quantifiably measuring the skulls of different ethnic or cultural groups, racial scientists erroneously inferred that humans could be divided into what was essentially different species groups who were varied in terms of intellectual and emotional capacity, a notion which was used as the justificatory basis for the captivation of humans

through slavery and exclusionary institutionalised judicial practices prior to the civil rights movements of the 1960's. In this way, race was socially constructed initially through a hegemonic discourse of modernity borne scientific normativity. Yet when we speak of a construction, what exactly are we referring to? Does the term "construction" pertain to a singular definition, or are there a multiplicity of ways in which a construction can be enacted? According to Foucault, "There are a multiplicity of constitutive points in the web [of power]…there is no single "discourse", only many historically specific discourses." (Foucault, 1982 p. 89). To say that race is a floating signifier is to assert that its construction is a product of power under different culturally hegemonic guises, that it is contingent on the nuances of power relations according to socio-political and historical contexts and their epistemological hierarchies. The science of eugenics has since been widely discredited, yet "race" persists as a visual signifier which is used to produce racist stereotypes and has floated from one realm of cultural legitimacy to another; previously the signifier was produced by the discursive power of science, today it is produced by the visually discursive form of tropes in popular culture.

Images, whether moving or static, and owing to the culturally dominant epistemology of empiricism, are central to how meaning concerning stereotypes of race are constructed and thus become one of our reference points for social reality. This is due to an "…apparent acceptance of the image itself an as accurate representation… [which is] linked with positivism, that flawed epistemology that sees "reality" as discrete bits of empirical data divorced from historical processes or social relationships." (Petchesky, 1987, P. 268-269) Through the mediums of visual cultures such as photography and cinema and their capacity to subjectify, we do not come to define our own meanings of what it entails to be part of a certain race, rather as Fannon puts it "I discovered my blackness… and so it is not I who make meaning for myself, but it is the meaning that was already there, pre existing, waiting for me" (1992). To claim that the racialized subject is a product of ubiquitous rhizomatic power relations (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) immanent to Western discourse implies that the subject is not at liberty to construct the connotations of their own identities and subjectivities, rather they are bound by an a priori so-

cial mould shaped by racist stereotypes and thus the racialized subject is "decentered" (Davis, 2000). In the context of a visually orientated culture (Petchesky, 1987, 264), decentering subjectification works through the power of representational images. "Representation is the normative function of a language which is said to either reveal or distort what is assumed to be true about the category of women." (Butler, 1990 p. 4). Butler's assertion about how normativity functions through visual representation is transferable in this context to be applicable to race. When we look at images, implicit is the assumption that images are simply narrating what is objectively "already there". "Objectiveness was a matter not just of visual arrangement around a curious spectator, but of representation." (Mitchell 1992) Thus, it is the way in which these images of blackness are organised in contrast to images of whiteness that evokes some larger meaning which we must deconstruct – this system is the exhibitionary order (Mitchell, 1992) which is what displays the variations of race and gives them order and grounding. Barthes' narrative of the image is that it appears as a "a mechanical analogue of reality" (1982), implicitly devoid of cultural codes which give it meaning. Yet we cannot ignore the ideological contingencies on which image production are embedded. We must consistently ask who is producing images, from what standpoint, why, and whose interests do images serve when they are embedded in (post) colonial systems of white cultural hegemony. Regarding representations of racialisation, Timothy Mitchell claims that "Constructions of the colonial order" are synonymous with modern forms of representation, power and knowledge. (Mitchell 1992)

> "…The distortion inherent in all photographic images: the tendency to slice up reality into tiny bits wrenched out of real space and time. The origins of photography can be traced to late nineteenth century Europe's cult of science, itself a by-product of industrial capitalism. Its rise is inextricably linked with positivism, that flawed epistemology that sees "reality" as discrete bits of empirical data divorced from historical processes or social relationships."
>
> (Petchesky, 1987, p. 268-269)

No image exists in a cultural vacuum, hence meaning is produced

according to a set of pre-established semiotic codes which we come to internalise as we navigate our way through our visually saturated social spheres. This is especially true of "public photographs" (Berger, 1980), in which surface impressions are interpreted as the entirety of the message according to the norms of late capitalism (Petchesky, 1987, p. 264). Both race and gender representations in visual cultures serve a self fulfilling prophecy; in the same way in which power relations produce the subject (Foucault, 1982), representational power produces the identities of the subjects they subsequently come to represent. Yet these visual signifiers and what they signify must not be interpreted according to a structuralist notion of fixity. Rather, "Meaning…is generated by the movement from Signifier to Signifier: what we generally call the Signified—the meaning or conceptual content of an utterance—is now rather to be seen as a meaning-effect." In which case, personal or communal identity and outside identification of such is itself the produced effect of a certain temporal unification of past and future with the present; and second, that this temporal unification is itself a function of the discursive capacity to subjectify (Jameson, 1999, p.72). Hence, my contention is that representational images produce, construct, establish and reproduce the racialized subject through a web of pre-mediated meaning created vis-à-vis stereotyped tropes in visual cultures. Yet this emphasis on the subjectifying capacities of the visual is somewhat paradoxical if we consider "The peculiar capacity for detachment, for objectifying the thing visualised by creating distance between the knower and the known." (Petchesky, 1987, p. 276)

It is here where the gaze becomes relevant, that which refers to the spectator relationship between those who are viewed and those engaged in the act of viewing which shapes an imbalanced social dynamic in the context of visual cultures. (Sturken and Cartwright 2001, p. 72). The production of power relations is fundamental to this concept and through this framework of generative power, the gaze normalises its content in our social consciousness (p.93), positioning itself as a bearer of objectivity. "Men create the world from their own point of view, which then becomes the truth to be described. Power to create the world from one's own point of view is power in its male form. The male epistemological stance, which corresponds to the world it creates, is objectivity." (Mackinnon 1983).

Mackinnon's feminist observances regarding the epistemological capacity which orientates itself towards the terms of the male can here be applied to the terms of the productive capacity of the white coloniser. This is because of the situated nature of knowledge: knowledge is produced by communities, not individuals, and such knowledge arises from the identity categories which have shaped our views of the world (Harraway, 1988). "A subjects ability to speak is ontologically bounded by the conditions of that subjects discursive existence, that which constitutes the subject, a process which is always determined by the subjects location within the specific topography of a particular social formation." (Heller, 1996, P. 91) Through the politics of positioning, the actor behind the camera shutter, the active "bearer of the look" (Mulvey, 1975) holds a disproportionate share of power than the passive "looked at" subjects due to the actor's capacity to construct an identification of the subject and thus relating to them and encouraging other viewers to do so according to the actor's terms. This is reminiscent of the situationalities where black slaves were punished for meeting the eyes of their white masters, having to lower their gaze so as not to consider themselves equals. (hooks, 1992). This history of whites getting to decide when blacks can be visible or can themselves be viewers is still relevant in a post-colonial context where they own the majority of the means of visual production. In which case, and in line with questioning the foundational assumptions on which empiricist epistemology lies, looking to situated knowledges (Harraway, 1988) reminds us that it is imperative to remember that "the social location of the knower effects what and how she knows" (Anderson 2011), insofar as we must consistently ask what is the socially constructed location of the person behind the lens (eg. man, white etc.), and what implications this has for communal power relations between social groups structured according to the relational difference of the colour line. Consider the idea of blackness from a relational standpoint through which the definition of being black gains its meaning in the words of Frantz Fannon, "for not only must a black man be black, he must be black in relation to the white man" (1992). It is this idea of definition in relation to the other which allows for racialization as a process to become embedded in how we define racial difference in discursive terms. Here we can see that power is not only enshrined in the process of categorising race, but in the gaze, through whose situated vision decides

how race is portrayed and represented.

Culturally, photography often functions to define a relationship between what is normatively "natural" or universal (and dominant), and what encompasses the particular "other" (which becomes subordinate in status) (Strucken and Cartwright, 2001, p.95). From the behind the lens standpoint of a colonial western gaze in which white folk are those who do the viewing, blackness has been routinely constructed as the marked, exotic and oriental other in a binary contrast to the unmarked, white, standard racial category (p.102) which renders itself beyond the constraints of racial identity. Drawing on Edward Said's Orientalism (1979), the Orient can be envisioned as not just a spatiality of otherness in terms of geographic location, but as an embodiment of otherness. This imposition of the status of "other" comes to characterise representations of the racialized subject and structures their lived experiences, always on the terms of the white gaze. This otherness is such because the remaining two features of Orientalism; absence and essentialism, (Mitchell, 1992) stand in opposition to representations of the white, non racialized subject. Absence in this context refers to a lack of agency in terms of structuring one's own visual narrative, a lack of standing behind the lens. Thus, representational portrayal of the racialized subject …."is not merely an ideological distortion convenient to an emergent political order but a densely imbricated arrangement of imagery and expertise that organises and produces the Orient as a (hierarchically submissive) political reality". (Mitchell, 1992, P. 289) The construction of blackness-as-other is typified in this colonially saturated photograph (fig 1.) of two Aoime women of Papau New Guinea who are not given names, rather identified as representatives of black otherness amidst a code of white dominance.



Figure 1

As hooks claims, whiteness proclaims itself as the invisible gaze (hooks, 1992). But definitions of views that are considered objective or universal such as that of the photographer who wishes to see without themselves being seen; those who are considered beyond the particularities of racial identification bound by subjectification, must be scrutinised perhaps most of all. Inherent in power's ability to function is the condition that it mask a significant part of itself (Foucault, 1978, p.88) in order to obscure the fact that its gaze is nonetheless a particular and socially contingent vision, rather than the objective "whole picture". If it is consistently whites who hold the scophophelic (Mulvey, 1975) power to be the viewers of black people, we must ask if their representative constructions of what has come to be the "other" are legitimate, or if they are portrayals of a homogenised monolith that strips blacks of the power to represent themselves and their own narratives of lived ontologies. In this sense, "The effect of objectness was a matter not just of visual arrangement …but of representation" (Mitchell, 1992, p. 505) Arguments for "practical consideration" must be rejected as these too are not without ideological consequence (Ziezk, 1989). Legitimacy of representation on the terms of the white western gaze can be answered through analysing a cohort of images from popular culture in which blackness is most heavily represented. It is seemingly apparent that whites portray blacks in the manner in which the west wishes to see them in order to retain the current imbalance of power and privileges associated with whiteness (regardless of whether they are conscious of it). Through the white western gaze, blackness as a signifier is constructed as a passive bearer of meaning, not an active maker of meaning. Echoing Laura Mulvey's dictum of gender disparities in cinema, in western visual cultures the dominant semiotic structures portray black as image, and white as bearer of the look. The implications of this are relatable to how this image of blackness shot by the western gaze functions to produce itself as a bearer of truth and in doing so, objectifies the black subject.

Intersectionality highlights how the subject can never be analysed according to a singular variable of difference (Thompson, 2004). Hence, in order to critique representations of blackness in the western media, we

must do so alongside an analysis of gender and class (although the scope of this essay cannot account for the latter). The black woman's body has historically been a site of racial politics and continues to act as such in a contemporary context. Perhaps the most profound example of the colonial racialisation and orientalist exotification of the black woman's body is that of Saartjie Baartman who was captured in a Boer commando raid in 1810 and sold into slavery to act as an exhibit in Human Zoos in London, Paris and Ireland. Her naked appearance was displayed and scrutinised as an example of the bestial black female whose apparently primitive status could be highlighted through reference to her "abnormally" pronounced sexual organs (in comparison to a white "standard".) "People came to see her because they saw her not as a person but as a pure example of this one part of the natural world" (Crais and Scully, 2009). Baartman's otherness and consequential objectifying devaluation was emphasised through comparison to the ideals of the white, middle class, male scientist whose ideals of rationality set the terms of rendering cultural difference in "objective" form. (Sadiah, 2004). (Mitchell, 1992, p. 506).



Figure 2

The traditional representation of the black women's naked body as a signifier of exotic sexuality is still very much alive. White photographer Jean-Paul Goude, who capitalises on "blacksploitation, was quoted in a 1979 issue of Paper magazine as saying "I had Jungle Fever…Blacks are the premise of my work." This is a clear example how black women are fetishized as sexually wild, animalistic and uninhibited for the consumption of white male pleasure and fascination. The image of Baartman is hauntingly similar to Goude's internationally acclaimed work:

Figure 3

Figure 4

In the same way in which Orientalism presented the world outside the west as an exhibition, visualities of race present the racialized female body as an exhibition. Mirzoeff (1998, p. 498) claims that this exhibitionisation of woman is a product of "the colonial gaze". Implicit in the colonially saturated gaze is the capacity to objectify as well as to subjectify. "The more the exhibit drew in and encircled the visitor, the more the gaze was set apart from it, as the mind (in our Cartesian imagery) is said to be set apart from the material world it observes" (Mitchell, 1992). The observing eye is always detached from the status of the subject – in this case, the exotica of the black female sexuality is precisely what designates it as other and thus it objectifies. The observing eye is always set

apart from the lived ontologies of what it observes; in the gallery, in a photograph, on screen or in a cage.



Figure 5

Representations of the black female in today's popular culture is subject to a carefully regulated visibility. As was noted earlier, the process of subjectification is one which attaches the subject's identity to herself, a mode through which she comes to know herself, and "…it is only through the way in which we represent and imagine ourselves that we come to know how we are constituted and who we are" (Hall, 1993). Stereotypes provide the racialized subject with an identity borne of colonial discourse which become internalised and thus performed by the subject (Bhabha, 1983). Yet despite largely male ownership of the visual means of production which produce images of the black female, the body can be envisioned as a form of cultural capital: we have worked on ourselves as the

canvases of representation, and popular cultural depictions of the black female body are no exception. Figures such as Kim Kardashian (fig. 4) and Niki Minaj (fig. 6) can be interpreted as using their bodies as a means to capitalise. What was once a product of objectifying subjectification can be interpreted as a process of reclamation. One of the most viewed music videos of 2015 was Niki Minaj's Anaconda: a humid erotica set in an exotic jungle landscape in which close up, slow motion shots of Minaj's bare buttocks appear to be the main event of the video, accompanied by lyrics which continually instruct us to "Look at [her] butt!" According to the viewer stats, we are indeed looking, and our looking is what designates her video among the top of the charts from which she yields her sexuality as a form of capitalising power. Yet on the other hand, we must not forget who is behind the lens and who wrote and directed the video: in this case it was Colin Tilley, a white man. In which case, is the subject of the video really in the hands of Minaj? Power relations in a visual context have been subdued since the time of a colonial relationship as was the case for Baartman and other victims of slavery, which was once overtly violent and repressive, to become a subtle yet ubiquitous web of subjectifying relations which are still on the terms of the white male gaze. Catharine Mackinnon's succinct "Man fucks woman; subject verb object" (1983) in this context must be extended further to the realm of visual cultures; white man shoots black woman, subject verb object. In relation to seeing and being seen; "the drive that represents the pleasure in "seeing", which has the look as its object of desire, is related both to the myth of origins, the primal scene, and the problematic of fetishism." (Bhabha, 1983, P. 375) A key component of the Orientalist fetishisation which produces racialized subjects and stereotypes is fantasy (source), which is particularly applicable in a context where the backsides of Kardashian and Minaj have been surgically produced by white men in white lab coats. "The role of the popular in popular culture is to fix the authenticity of popular forms, rooting them in expressions of popular communities from which they draw their strength, allowing us to see them as expressive of a particular subordinate social life that resists its being constantly made over" (Hall, 1993). "The construction of colonial discourse is then a complex articulation of the tropes of fetishism – metaphor and metonymy – and the forms of…identification available to the Imaginary." (Bhaba, 1983, P. 376)



Figure 6

John Berger's dictum "men act, women appear" (1972) rings true of racial signifiers even in the domain in which a black woman should be defined by her action rather than her appearance such as in sport. Tennis players Venus and Serena Williams' bodies have been codified as a site of racial segregation from the hegemonic white normative standard of tennis by being referred to as 'predator one and predator two' (Childs, 2001). "The significance of these descriptions of the sisters rests in the fact that they establish a symbolic line, which supports beliefs regarding racial difference….Black bodies were seen as the site and source of black pathology, as boundaries against which one could determine acceptable sexuality, femininity and morality" (Giddings, 1984, Gilman, 1985) . The power of the black woman's body is marked as other and demonised through ascribing it a sense of deviance from the feminised norm it. Even when the body is pumped full of physical power, as a black woman grappling with the white western gaze, it is apparent that one cannot win.

Of course it is not only blackness as transcribed on to a woman's body that has impacted the meaning of black as a cultural signifier. Black men too have been profoundly impacted by the Western gaze. "If we con-

sider that black bodies have historically been designated as the site and source of pathology, by extension, one's behaviour and habits are seen as symptomatic of these racial distinctions" (Kawash, 1997). In Fannon's The Fact of Blackness, a telling encounter with a young white girl reveals the tarnishing imposition of the discourse of colonialization on the racialized subject: "Look, a Negro…Mama, see the Negro! I'm Frightened. Frightened. Frightened." (Fannon 1992) Fannon thus speaks of the racialisation of his body as "A hemmorage that splattered my whole body with black blood." (Fannon 1992). Consider this depiction of former footballer O.J. Simpson. Time magazine heightened the contrast of the image to darken his skin. The ideological assumptions underlying this criminalising edit is that the blacker the skin, the more predisposed one is to social deviance and immorality. (Struken and Cartwright, 2001) "The objective of colonial discourse is to construe the colonised as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest to establish systems of administration and instruction." (Bhabha, 1983, p. 371)

Figure 7

Part of the subjectifying power of colonial discourse relies on the essentialist notion of the fixity of the other, and it is the stereotype as a visual trope which acts as the primary discursive strategy which implements fixity. Yet it is not the case that this fixity which denotes race is one which exemplifies an established ontology, rather it is the regime of truth immanent to our technologies of discursive power (scientific empiricism, positivism and their implications for the image) which produce this false notion of fixity. Race, as we have seen, is a floating signifier, a collection of discursive fragments which have been produced according to the power relations inherent to the colonial order. Subjectification is the method by which race as a construct is attached to a subject who thus becomes racialized as an effect of power, imbued with the connotations of stereotypes that are invoked with reference to the visual signifier of skin colour. The stereotype requires, for its successful signification, a continual and repetitive chain. (Bhabha, 1983)

"The stereotype is not a simplification because it is a false representation of a given reality. It is a simplification because it is an arrested, fixated form of representation that, in denying the play of difference (that the negation through the Other permits), constitutes a problem for the representation of the subject in significations of psychic and social relations… The stereotype can also be seen as that particular "fixated" form of the colonial subject which facilitates colonial relations, and sets up a discursive form of racial and cultural opposition in terms of which colonial power is exercised." (

Bhabha, 1983, p. 374-376)

Cultural theorist Ed Gurrero's comment on the depiction of the black male image in cinema contends with Hall's theory of race as a floating signifier and further highlights its relevance to visual cultures,
"The social and political meanings of race of course are not fixed but matters of ongoing construction and contestation, weather in volatile debate or subtle transactions…for the racial ideology and stereotypes that are but part of a dominant cinemas' work are not fixed or static, instead they are a set of dynamic, lived relations and social transactions, the filmic conventions and codes of racial subordination are continually being reworked,

shifting under pressure of new material, aesthetic and social conditions… portrayals of the macho men and their strength was almost always at the service of or under the control of white institutional power and authority" (Gurrero, 2012).

Film may have made a visual departure from the overt, stark racism of blackface, whereby white characters would use make up to exaggerate their facial features as a caricature of blackness (whilst also denying black agents a stage on which to perform), but the slings and arrows of racial tropes surrounding the black male in a white dominated visual industry still remain. Throughout the 20th century, the black male as had various roles in western cinema, albeit few of which award him a social visa to enact roles that depart from racialized stereotypes. Again, this is working from the assumption that these roles are representative of a black man's "natural" behavioural dispositions. An ongoing dependency to drive narrative in genres such as horror and sci-fi relies on processes of "othering" black male sexuality as an animalistic predatory poison that permeates throughout 20th century cinema in such titles as King Kong (1933) and The Fly (1986) (Gurrero, 2012 p. 57). Institutional control of the film industry by whites echoes a residual hangover of slavery through the depiction of black/white relations. The concept of "blacksploitation" encapsulates this idea through films such as Shaft (1971) and Superfly (1972), which quenched the thirst of black inner city male dwellers to catch a glimpse of empowering depictions of themselves on the big screen, yet motivations for funding this niche by producers was fuelled by the recession in the industry at the time and once profits had been delivered, producers abandoned the idea of furthering this genre (Gurrero 2012 p. 80). We can see once again that it is the white middle class male who gains from the cultural pursuit of racializing the other. The power immanent to visual representation not only works to subjectify, but it also colours collective assumptions of black male capability which are partly driven by cinematic stereotypes. "Portrayed as incompetents of a violent nature, unembraceable black males are featured in media images that seem to threaten the body politic, including the visible and often invisible bureaucratic and corporate arenas of cultural manipulation which I call white public space." (Page, 2008). It is also notable that television series

such as The Wire (also directed by a white man) which explores the inner workings of black gangster life suggests that black male destructiveness is a diasporic (if not a genetic) male behavioural trait that originates from Africa's darkness (Page, 2008 p.102).

Figure 8 (left)
Figure 9 (right)

The images here show the similarity between the glorified depiction of the violent black cinematic male and the 2014 Ferguson riots. "The ways we have been positioned and subjected in the dominant regimes of representation are a critical exercise of cultural power and normalisation…" (Hall 1992) Both internalisation and alienation result from the split that occurs from seeing the stereotyped image as oneself and yet also as an ideal – looking at oneself through the implied gaze of others. (Sturken and Cartwright, 2001). Power thus works to divide the subject within herself as well as from others.

But what about the diversity of the existential phenomenology of "blackness" which resides outside these stereotypes? How can we ignore these? "We must give our attention to the diversity of black experience rather than the homogeneity – yet in representational terms, there is a clear line of homogeneity and patterns in representation." (Hall, 1999). "This quite logically, then, prompts the question: How can poststruc-

turalists who seek to identify and rectify tangible social inequalities that have been enacted by one identity group to the disenfranchisement of a fabricated relational opposite, engage in a discourse of diversity without reinscribing the dichotomous ethos of essentialism?" (Prashad, 2012). Hence, can it be the case that through using analytical categories of difference in order to invoke the oppressions faced according to the limits of racialized subjectification, we are ignoring the extent of diversity that exists, thus reinscribing such differences through the very theoretical discourses that aim to dissolve such limits of difference? "For example, in invoking the language of the binaries we risk reifying, and perhaps unwittingly legitimating, public assumptions of the existence of its fixed reference points, and of its opposing but mutually-reinforcing ideological positions." (Prashad, 2012) Through the very processes of researching them, ideas of 'woman', 'man', 'black', 'white', 'homosexual', and 'heterosexual' become further understood as being stable, unproblematic and determined a priori (Butler, 1990). Although it may be arguable that theorising on such difference is necessary in order to highlight the precarious and unstable foundations on which the category of race lies, Butler (1990 p. 4) reminds us that such strategies always have meanings that exceed the purposes for which they are employed. Yet the notion of strategic essentialism, which "promotes reclaiming the essential identity of a group as a temporary strategic gesture in the interest of agency for struggle, no matter how dispersed the identities of the members" (Calas & Smircich, 1999, p. 662), is not what we are employing when we engage in theoretical discourse on the construction of racial identities. Although a binary between black and white is implied in analysis, this binary does not have to be one which asserts an essential ontological basis for either identity category. What unites the subaltern in this case is not something essential, but is the terms of representation that imposes limits of identification which racializing stereotypes produce. Thus, it is the colonial discourse of representation which does the demarcation rather than my theoretical methodology. In which case, a reflexively critical relation to the norms of analytical categories of difference is a capacity which presupposes a distance from them (Butler, 2004, p.3). An articulation of difference contained within the fantasy of colonial discourse reveals very boundaries of colonial discourse and it enables a transgression of these limits from the

space of otherness. (Bhabha, 1983, P. 371) Unfortunately the articulation of difference is necessary in order to expose its constraints. "It is through the notion of splitting that it becomes easier to see the bind of knowledge and fantasy, power and pleasure, that informs the particular regime of visibility deployed in colonial discourse" (Bhabha 1983). The objective of theory in this case must be addressed when we consider the necessity of positing a unity between ontology, epistemology and methodology (Prashad, 2012). If the objective is to dissolve the foundational basis of the category of racial difference (essentialism), then perhaps employing an analytical methodology that highlights a racialized category of unified otherness which departs from the fragmented ontology and epistemology of post-structuralism is not detrimental after all. Engaging with race as an analytical category of difference affords critical researchers a lens through which to conceptualize, problematize, and apprehend (Prashad, 2012) the mechanisms of power through which racialisations are produced, in this case it is the power immanent to representation in visual cultures.

In sum, repetition of racialized representations delivers us with cognitive reinforcement of our associative signifiers of race, which consequently structures our social understanding of what it means to be part of a given race. Contrary to this common sense understanding of race, a post structuralist critique highlights how the direction of causality which we are culturally lead to believe becomes inverted; rather than race creating racism, racial stereotypes in visual cultures produces race. The subject "black man" or "Black woman" is a discursive function and effect of a given version of visual representation.

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Jungle Fever cover, 1982. Jean Paul Goude

Time magazine cover and Newsweek cover, both 1994 in Sturken and Cartwright 2001, p. 23

Shaft 1972 film poster found at: https://www.google.ie/search?q=shaft+1972+film+poster&rlz=1C1DSGW_enIE573IE573&espv=2&biw=1242&bih=585&tbm=isch&imgil=XWZIfSrftu2IKM%253A%253B2RIi2Sezl39KBM%253Bhttps%25253A%25252F%25252Ftv-movie-reviews.knoji.com%25252Ften-best-hollywood-movie-private-eyes%25252F&source=iu&pf=m&fir=XWZIfSrftu2IKM%253A%252C2RIi2Sezl39KBM%252C_&usg=__4AOQL4ddJLOCaecUpRB0rgY2YGA%3D&ved=0CDEQyjc&ei=tk-YVKzrM6a67ga9yIDgDg#facrc=_&imgdii=_&imgrc=XWZIfSrftu2IKM%253A%3B2RIi2Sezl39KBM%3Bhttps%253A%252F%252Fknoji.com%252Fimages%252Fuser%252Fshaftonesheetstylef.jpg%3Bhttps%253A%252F%252Ftv-movie-reviews.knoji.com%252Ften-best-hollywood-movie-private-eyes%252F%3B400%3B600

Ferguson images found at http://scgnews.com/ferguson-riots-and-bundy-ranch-showdown-signs-of-an-approaching-breaking-point

Niki Minaj Image found at: https://thenypost.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/minaj_anaconda.jpg

To Be A 'Manly' Man:

Cleaver, Moynihan, and the Role of Black Masculinity in American Racial Discourse

James Tyler

Toward the latter half of the twentieth century, the concept of masculinity played a fundamental role in the racial discourse of American society. Often championed by mutually opposed cultural dialogues, masculinity assumed a centre-stage position at the intersections between race, gender, and sexuality. This essay thus seeks to explore what it meant to be a black man in a racialized America. Two works, Eldridge Cleaver's Soul on Ice (1968) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan's The Negro Family: The Case for National Action ('Moynihan Report', 1967) serve as ideal frameworks for analyses of parallel and divergent interpretations of masculinity. It is only through a direct comparison of these two texts that the ambiguous and phantasmical nature of

masculinity becomes apparent (Taylor, 2010, p. 91): masculinity in this discourse cannot be viewed in a vacuum, but instead as a battleground over which constant skirmishes were waged between competing ideas of history, pathology, matriarchy and sexuality.

That Moynihan and Cleaver heralded from two different worlds makes their consensus over certain racial issues all the more surprising. Though one must be careful not to falsely dichotomise their characters, there existed substantial personality dissimilarities. A convicted black rapist, Cleaver has been described as "violent" and "macho" (Wallace, 1978, p. 67); traits which he maintained as one of the philosophical foundations of the Black Power movement (Matlin, 2006, p. 91). Conversely, as Assistant Secretary of Labour in the Kennedy administration, Moynihan was in a position to enjoy all of the advantages American society afforded to middle-class white men - though he claimed a unique perspective on social issues given that he was raised alone by his mother (Geary, 2015, p. 14).

Unsurprisingly the two works therefore assume distinct natures: where Soul on Ice is more of a disjointed collection of essays, the Moynihan Report is a purpose-built governmental document, designed to outline "challenges" the "nation now faces" and ways in which they could be resolved (Moynihan, 1967, p. 2). Perhaps due to these intrinsic differences between both the nature of the two works and the personalities of their authors, masculinity is interpreted through different mediums. Cleaver employed powerful, evocative diction to great effect - he "hope[d] that in the convulsions of your guts, America, you can vomit out the poisons of hate which have led you to a dead end in this valley of the shadow of death" (Cleaver, 1968, p. 121). Such violent and cataclysmic rhetoric is fairly indicative of Cleaver's writings, and hints at his emotive and impassioned interpretation of black masculinity. Moynihan, however, focused heavily on "statistics in this paper to refer to Negroes", and attempted a more professional and academic assessment of the fate of the "Negro family" (Moynihan, 1967, p. 4). In origin, characteristics, and nature, Soul on Ice and the Moynihan Report occupy opposite ends of the spectrum of

racial discourse.

Yet, at times Moynihan and Cleaver indicated similar societal priorities and shared consensuses on the existence of several key challenges to black masculinity. Given that, according to Andrew Shin (1998), "African American literature from approximately 1940 to the mid-1970s was primarily a masculinist enterprise" (Shin and Judson, 1998, p. 247), Soul on Ice predictably focuses on the importance of being a 'man'. Cleaver wrote that in prison his "pride as a man dissolved"; that if he had obeyed prison officials he would "be less of a man"; and that "if you had laid down your life…at least we could say you were a man…a great man" (Cleaver, 1968, pp. 34, 36, 183). Cleaver was not alone in his preoccupation with ascertaining the status of a 'man': Moynihan described the testimonial of a black military veteran, who stated that the army was "the only time I ever felt like a man" (Moynihan, 1967, p. 43) Where Moynihan argued that "keeping the Negro 'in his place' can be translated as keeping the Negro male in his place", it is evident that his singular attention to masculinity was at the expense of women - "the female was not a threat to anyone" (Moynihan, 1967, p. 16) Moynihan and Cleaver's writings here embody a culture-wide fascination over the role of a 'man', to the extent that 'man' had become synonymous with respect and dignity (Breines, 2007, p. 56).

This emphasis on the role of men was given cultural significance by the concurrent popular notion that black women brought up their children to be metaphorically 'castrated' (Hernton, 1969, p. 133), an emasculating phenomenon that both Moynihan and Cleaver attributed to historic slavery. Cleaver wrote that he "became a snivelling craven, a funky punk, a vile, grovelling bootlicker…petrified by a cosmic fear of the Slavemaster" (Cleaver, 1968, p. 240), a clear allusion to the psychological damage incurred by black men during their subordination to slave owners. So too, Moynihan agreed that "the slaves were therefore reduced to the status of chattels" in a further denigration of black masculinity (Moynihan, 1967, p. 15). The impact of historic slavery on the racial discourse cannot be overstated: armed with clear examples of subjugation,

such as where black men were addressed as 'boy' until they were elderly (Staples: 1971, p. 4), both white liberals and Black Power leaders agreed that the prevalence of slavery had inflicted deep wounds on the psyche of African-American men.

These slavery-induced psychological injuries to masculinity assumed several different forms. Cleaver focused extensively on the self-perception of black men as animals. He argued that white men "elaborated a complex, all-pervasive myth" of "the black man as a subhuman beast" and that such a man was "seen as a mindless Supermasculine Menial" (Cleaver, 1968, p. 101). Similarly, Robert Staples, an influential black social commentator, has noted an argument "that slavery made black men docile" (Staples, 1971, p. 4). A strong influence on Moynihan's own racial thought, the white liberal Thomas Pettigrew postulated that slavery made black men into under-achievers (Pettigrew, 1964, p. 14); this argument accrued unlikely support from reputable African-American authors such as William Grier and Price Cobbs, who argued that black men were psychologically emasculated by the persistence of slavery (Grier and Cobbs, 1968, p. 60). Moynihan himself honed in on the harms to masculinity stemming from "a fatherless matrifocal pattern" amongst black families, the conception of which he firmly grounded in the setting of historic slavery (Moynihan, 1967, p. 16). The notion that black masculinity had been irrefutably damaged by slavery did not garner support from all components of the cultural discourse at the time - Michelle Wallace challenged the idea that the "black man was emasculated by slavery" on the grounds that this suggested black men to be "creatures without will" (Wallace, 1978, p. 22). Regardless, there remained an unlikely consensus between the majority of white and black racial narratives on the role of slavery in damaging black masculinity.

Just as most black activists and white liberals were unified in their denunciation of the mentally impairing effect of slavery, so too were they linked in their concern over the harms perpetrated against black men by contemporaneous psychological pathologies. Cleaver employed violent imageries of castration to emphasise the abrogation of black masculinity:

he was a "Black Eunuch, divested of [his] Balls" (Cleaver, 1968, p. 241), who stared across a "naked abyss of negated masculinity…minus [his] balls", and knew that he would find a "merciless indictment of impotence" and a challenge to "redeem [his] conquered manhood" reflected in the eyes of black women (Cleaver, 1968, p. 237). Cleaver's equation of 'balls' to masculinity is typical of his own highly sexualised definition of what it meant to be a man.

Away from Soul on Ice, the existence of psychologically damaging pathologies gained a degree of acceptance within the miasma of contemporaneous black racial discourse. Bolstered by pseudo-psychological arguments, black doctors such as Frances Welsing warned of increasing "black male passivity, effeminisation, bisexuality and homosexuality", a result of the "totality of the white supremacy social and political apparatus" (Welsing, 1981, p. 91). Others pointed to feelings of "rage festering inside black men", or fears of vulnerability and "nobodiness" (Staples, 1979, p. 26). Stokely Carmichael himself asserted that "black people" came to be depicted as "lazy, apathetic, dumb, shiftless, good-timers" (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967, p. 36).

Though Moynihan did not indulge in the same evocative, brutalist diction as Cleaver, he similarly attempted to portray the severity of existing psychological pathologies for black men. Tellingly, he brought into focus the consequences of dispossessed masculinity on black families. According to Moynihan, the fundamental source of weakness in the "Negro community" was the "deterioration of the Negro family", a fact which he underwrote with statistics showing that "nearly a quarter of urban Negro marriages are dissolved", and that "almost one-fourth of Negro families are headed by females" (Moynihan, 1967, p. 6). Moynihan's extensive attention to the pathological damage to Negro families, as a consequence of black emasculation, is further indicative of his own definition of a responsible, breadwinning masculinity. So too, Pettigrew viewed the absence of father figures as a key factor in hereditary emasculation: black male children became "more immature, submissive, dependent and effeminate that other boys" (Pettigrew, 1964, p. 18). A considerable portion of support for the existence of such psychological pathologies stemmed from the Minnesota Multiphasic Inventory Test (MMPI). The MMPI ar-

gued that "Negroes…are more prone to act on their ideas and impulses… and exhibit a more feminine pattern of interests" (Calden and Hokanson, 1960, p. 33). Femininity, according to the male-dominated cultural narrative of the 1960s and 1970s, was to the mutual exclusion of masculinity.

Again, however, dissenting voices could be detected from within this broad racial discourse. The MMPI suffered from a range of refutations - critics believed it to simply re-enforce the notion of black impotence with little evidence, acting as a "means of social control exercised by white America" (Staples, 1979, p. 2). Similarly those black feminists such as Michelle Wallace spurned the 'myth' of black male castration, and instead asserted that the existence of black pathology was a fallacy, engineered by white liberals to further subordinate black men and adopted by black power leaders to suit their own patriarchal agendas (Wallace, 1978, p. 23).

By far the most significant point of unison, then, between Moynihan and Cleaver, and also between the ill-defined camps of white liberalism and Black Power, was over damage to 'Negro' masculinity perpetrated by the pervasiveness of black matriarchies. In Soul on Ice, Cleaver dramatized this gendered issue with the assertion that "there is a war going on between the black man and the black woman"; he recognised both the predominance of matriarchies, as women were "propped up economically above you and me", and also the consequent deleterious effect this had on masculinity - matriarchies "strengthened her hand against us" (Cleaver, 1968, p. 187; italics mine). This resentment of the economic superiority of black women found support in the form of Moynihan, who took issue with "dependence on the mother's income" as this "undermined the position of the father" and thus his breadwinning masculinity (Moynihan, 1967, p. 25). The notion that black women were socio-economically privileged over black men took flight amongst racial commentators: many believed that the majority of Negro families were dominated by women (Blood and Wolfe, 1960, p. 35), due to a reduction in the number of black male breadwinners (Edwards, 1963, p. 459). Subjected to these complex matrices of gender and economic power, many consequently defined

masculinity as superiority over women.

In this respect, the disempowerment of black men in comparison to black women was believed to be a direct corollary of dispossessed masculinity. Cleaver put forward the idea that black women viewed black men as "only half a man, an incomplete man" due to his lack of "sovereignty over her" (Cleaver, 1968, p. 287). This gendered portrayal is also evident in the Moynihan Report - Moynihan argued that because men were supposed to provide for women (Mead, 1949, p. 146), their inability to fulfil their 'natural' societal role due to matriarchies had imposed a "crushing burden on the Negro male" (Moynihan, 1967, p. 29). Women were further blamed for their rejection of financially inadequate men (Pettigrew, 1964, p. 16); such condemnations disassociated men from their breadwinning, dominant masculinities (Frazier, 1962, p. 182). Within this patriarchal coalition against the emasculating effect of female dominance, there emerged strong approval for the 'reimposition' of patriarchal control. Although Cleaver did not advocate middle-class breadwinning to the extent Moynihan did (Geary, 2015, p. 157), due perhaps to disparate definitions of masculinity, both parties firmly supported the idea and practice of male superiority. Daniel Matlin has convincingly underscored white liberal and Black Power similarities on this issue: according to Matlin, it "could have been…Moynihan, rather than Amiri Baraka, who wrote 'we are saying that we gotta get a betta structure'" (Matlin, 2006, p. 106).

The numerous feminist ripostes to this broad anti-matriarchal coalition provide an excellent framework through which the unity of black and white commentators can be keenly perceived. A common complaint of the 'Black Liberation Movement' was that, in language and in practice (Joseph, 2009, p. 709), it was steeped in male chauvinism (Simanga, 2015, p. 74). Wallace has argued that, although those black spokesmen such as Cleaver would have "wanted to cut Daniel Moynihan's heart out and feed it to the dogs" for his repositioning of social responsibility onto the black population, they also thought perhaps "he did have a point after all" in his condemnation of matriarchy (Wallace, 1978, p. 11). Wallace essentially postulated that the Moynihan Report catered to unconscious desires of

many black men in its 'scapegoating' of black women; matriarchy, not black male agency, was responsible for this negation of masculinity (Wallace, 1978, p. 110). For Moynihan and for African American male activists alike, the restoration of patriarchy was a vital prerequisite for racial equality (Geary, 2015, p. 140), and thus for black masculinity to operate effectively.

It would be fallacious, however, to assume complete unity between Moynihan and Cleaver regarding gendered issues. Moynihan did not believe himself to be inherently sexist (Matlin, 2006, p. 106). He wrote that "there is presumably no special reason why a society in which males are dominant in family relationships is to be preferred to a matriarchal arrangement", but instead rejected matriarchy due to its harmful effect on traditional patriarchal masculinity (Moynihan, 1967, p. 29). Conversely, some influential African American nationalists fundamentally disavowed the concept of gender equality: Cleaver believed that "all men must have a self-image, or they start seeing themselves as women" (Cleaver, 1968, p. 119). This difference stemmed not only from a difference in character and personality, but also from fundamentally divergent conceptions of what constituted masculinity.

By far the greatest dissimilarity between Soul on Ice and the Moynihan Report, then, rests with two different definitions of what it was 'to be a man'. So too, it can reasonably be argued that Moynihan and Cleaver's perceptions of masculinity are symbolic of their own experiences. Moynihan's own definition of masculinity was decidedly moderate, middle class, and militaristic. He argued that military service was an "utterly masculine world" where you "get to know what it means to feel like a man". Moynihan also envisaged a "world run by strong men of unquestioning authority" (Moynihan, 1967, p. 42). His admiration for the hierarchical power structures of the military thus betrayed his characterisation of a desexualised masculinity that was based upon discipline and authority. This definition was shared by those such as Pettigrew (1964, p. 176), and also by those who associated masculinity with middle-class money-mak-

ing (Grier and Cobbs, 1968). Moynihan's equation of masculinity with hierarchical discipline did not find widespread support. Cleaver rejected the patriotic associations of militaristic masculinity - he argued that racists were often pro-war (Cleaver, 1968, p. 138). Other critics attacked a "conception of masculinity that valorised financially supporting a wife and child" (Geary, 2015, p. 149).

Though Moynihan briefly alluded to a more typically 'macho' definition of masculinity, where he argued that "the very essence of the male animal…is to strut" (Moynihan, 1967, p. 16), he largely employed a disciplined vocabulary to describe his conception of what it mean to be a 'man'. Cleaver however occupied the other end of this definitional spectrum. In Soul on Ice, masculinity is depicted through a concatenation of violent rhetoric and aggressively virile imagery: Cleaver argued that "the boxing ring is the ultimate focus of masculinity", an image that suggests that a 'man' was to be strong and combative. He further described black men as "Supermasculine Menials" who possessed "strength, brute power, muscle, even the beauty of the brute body". To Cleaver, "virility, strength, and power" were synonymous with masculinity (Cleaver, 1968, pp. 108, 193, 210). This emphasis on aggressive masculinity drew criticism from those who resented Cleaver's "phallocentric self-assertion" (Gaines, 1996, p. 103), his equation of masculinity with physical strength (Taylor, 2010, p. 90), and also his lionisation of "the macho man" (Hooks, 1981, p. 106).

On the other hand, it is evident that this 'macho' masculinity pervaded throughout the cultural establishment (Shin and Judson, 1995, p. 402): not only did black men utilise their 'ownership' of sexual virility as a "dagger to be symbolically thrust into the white man" (Grier and Cobbs, 1968, p. 64), but they also invoked aggressively sexualised imagery - Amiri Baraka, in his 1964 poem Black Dada Nihilisimus, urged black men to "rape the white girls. Rape their fathers. Cut their mother's throats" (Matlin, 2006, p. 91). The extent to which black men actualised this notion of physical virility is evident in the writing of Frances Welsing, who seriously argued that white men could only dominate in "two major sports (tennis and golf)", both of which consisted of "hitting small white balls" (Welsing,

1991, p. 85). Wallace has pithily summed up this pervasive conception of black masculinity: that it simply entailed "a big Afro, a rifle, and a penis in good working order" (Wallace, 1978, p. 69).

Not only was a 'man' thus supposed to be strong, physical, and aggressive, but he was also supposed to be heterosexual. Through an examination of African American homophobia, the realities of a 'macho' conception of masculinity, position at the intersection between sexuality and race, become more apparent. Due to his patently less sexualised definition of masculinity, Moynihan rarely exhibited blatant homophobia (though his conception of an ideal Negro family was clearly discriminatory toward homosexual black males). In a 1966 report to the Carnegie foundation, he argued that homosexuality would potentially preclude the possibility of economic uplift for black families (Geary, 2015, p. 150). At the same time, given that sexuality was not obviously central to Moynihan's definition of what it meant to be a 'man', the Moynihan Report's implied homophobia was to a certain extent left unchallenged.

The same cannot be said for Cleaver. In Soul on Ice, he asserted that "the homosexual" has been "castrated" in his "burning skull"; he attacked the fictitious Rufus Scott "who let a white bisexual homosexual fuck him in the ass"; he concluded that "homosexuality is a sickness, just as are baby-rape" (Cleaver, 1968, pp. 128, 132, 136). For Cleaver, homosexuality was a dangerous challenge to his conception of a 'macho' masculinity (Ongiri, 1997, p. 282): not only did it oppose the notion of an unimpeachable black male heterosexuality, but it also conjured up the counter-revolutionary image of a black man "being fucked by a white man" (Wallace, 1978, p. 283). Situated in the homosocial environment of prison (Reid-Pharr, 1996, p. 375), Cleaver's vehement rejection of homosexuality is indicative of the importance he attached to this proudly heterosexual, virile, physical, and 'macho' masculinity.

Despite clear trends within the civil rights cultural discourse on the nature of black masculinity, it is important not to falsely group different racial groups with specific stances on what it meant to be a 'man'. Rev-

olutionary African American leaders were not all convinced by the pervasive sexualised virility espoused by Cleaver - Askia Muhammed Toure stated that a "complete man" could "write a beautiful poem, or carve an ancestral figure" (Matlin, 2006, p. 103). Moreover, social commentators were by no means consistent in their elucidation of masculinity: Amiri Baraka, long associated with the aggressive physicality of Cleaver's definition of masculinity, shifted his views away from the hot rage of Black Dada Nihilisimus and toward a more mature conception of Black Power (Matlin, 2006, p. 115). Similarly, although many white liberals would have shared Moynihan's conception of a breadwinning and militaristic masculinity, it would fallacious to perfectly equate this viewpoint to 'White Liberalism'.

It is finally the case, however, that disparate conceptions of what it was to be a 'man' defined the different mechanisms through which racial equality could be achieved. Steeped in the conviction of militaristic, patriarchal, and middle-class masculinities, Moynihan sought to untangle black pathologies through a concerted governmental effort toward economic uplift. He wrote that "a national effort towards the problems of Negro Americans must be directed towards…family structure", and that "programs of the Federal government" shall be "designed to have the effect" of "enhancing stability" among black families (Moynihan, 1967, pp. 47; 48). Evidently, Moynihan and Pettigrew believed that racial issues could be resolved through a top-down restatement of their perception of a breadwinning masculinity.

Based on an alternate definition of masculinity, Cleaver and his fellow activists refuted this white-sponsored ameliorationary mechanism. Instead, they advocated a more aggressive, revolutionary resumption of their "manhood"; Cleaver cited Ossie Davis' eulogy of Malcolm X, in which Davis raged that "we shall have it [our manhood] or the earth will be levelled by our attempts to gain it" (Cleaver, 1968, p. 84). In the final pages of Soul on Ice, Cleaver tells his "Queen" that "we will build a New City on these ruins" (Cleaver, 1968, p. 242). The emphatic final position of this cataclysmic rhetoric indicates Cleaver's belief in a black-led push

for racial equality, and foreshadows Carmichael's push for "new structures" and "new institutions" to achieve African American rights. Given that Cleaver's ultimate target throughout Soul on Ice was the white man (Reid-Pharr, 1996, p. 376), it is unlikely that he would have shared Moynihan's enthusiasm for a cooperative effort (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967, p. 42).

In conclusion, then, analyses of black masculinity in 1960s and 1970s shed light on a number of important American cultural characteristics. The unity between Cleaver, Moynihan, and both black and white social commentators against black women served as an unsettling indication of the strength and depth of misogynist ideologies. Yet, the existence of fundamentally different definitions of masculinity not only informed support for two different mechanisms toward achieving racial equality, but also demonstrated the abstract nature of masculinity in civil rights discourse. Situated at the point of intersection between often antagonistic forces of sexuality, gender, class, and race, what it meant to be 'man' in America depended on whom you asked, and why you asked it.

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Why does America not have a European-style Welfare State?

Danny Trench Bowles

The comparison of the goods and services offered by the American state and those offered by European states has been a common one in politics; it is seen as a major differentiating factor between American governance and that of the states of Europe. What has caused this difference? Why, to use the popular political lexicon, does the USA have such a "small government" compared to the "big government" of the European states? To provide a simple explanation of the differences in the welfare states of Europe to the American welfare state; European governments have much more progressive taxation, more generous social programs and the European policies designed to protect the poor are more intrusive than the equiv-

alents in America. While it is a rather simplistic review of a welfare state, government spending averages in EU are 48% of GDP, compared to 36% in USA. Is there something inherent within the mentality of Americans or within the social, economic or political structures of the country that has meant it has created a totally different approach to the question of social welfare? Is America exceptional in this regard?

This essay begins with the hypothesis that America is exceptional, and this is down to the underlying political ideologies that define the politics and the institutions of the USA and the racial heterogeneity of the country. Within this hypothesis we can find two sub-hypotheses; that the general American public has different underlying political ideologies to the general European public; and that social welfare and, more generally, American politics, is not race-neutral; there exists a latent racism within American politics that has had the effect of undermining possible worker solidarity and has reduced the altruism of the people at large. These two sub-hypotheses will be tested through the course of this essay.

Through my own research I found that these sub-hypotheses, and thus the hypothesis held true. To test these hypotheses the essay concentrated on, particularly, Alberto Alesina, Edward Glaeser and Bruce Sacerdote's 2001 Brookings Paper on Economic Activity, 'Why Doesn't the United States have a European-style Welfare State?'. To challenge this work I will be referring to Jonas Pontusson's 2006 review of Alesina, Glaeser and Sacredote's work. Martin Gilens' 1996 work on the effect of racial heterogeneity will prove invaluable, as will Brooks and Manza (2007). In addition, the essay will also use the work of Jennifer L. Hochschild (1981) and Stanley Feldman and John Zaller (1992). Though these works do not engage in any statistical comparison between America and European states these works' surveys studying American public opinion is a vital aspect of this essay's analysis of the research question. Hochschild's (1981) work proved important for my testing of the idea of an underlying conservative political ideology in American political culture as she engages with the issue of the historical lack of socialism is US politics

as compared to its success as a mainstream political ideology in European countries. Furthermore, Europe, in the context of this essay's research question, is simply a tool of comparison; this is really a study of America and its opposition to a large welfare state. As such, Europe, and its distinct states and welfare states will invariably be treated as one whole.

This essay will also analyse the question of America's welfare state through the prism of a myriad of other works. As a starting point we can look upon some of the classic works of American political behaviour in order to form a framework in order to understand our question. For example, we know that according to Lippmann (1925) and Delli, Carpini and Keeter (1996) citizens are not knowledgeable about most issues, and that they tend to hold stereotypical views and prejudices. If our hypothesis is to hold true then it will serve to back this statement up. Through this research the question of the rational voter is also raised; do voters vote according to their interests; if they do then this would suggest workers all would support a larger welfare state. More generally, this work could affect our ideas of economic inequalities in American society, and with a before tax GINI coefficient (used as a measure of inequality) much higher than that in any country in Europe, 38.5 compared to the average for European countries of 29.6, this is central to understanding contemporary American economics and politics.

In order to make the analysis easier I have grouped explanations for the differentiation between the American and European welfare states into political, behavioural and economic explanations. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote's (2001) work deals specifically with these three groupings. When we refer to political explanations these are institutional explanations, for example, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) deal with the question of electoral structure, and other scholars have studied the effects of federalism and the particularly conservative nature of American constitutionalism. Behavioural explanations consist of ideological and psychological tendencies and are best tested through surveys and interviews, like Hochschild (1981) and Feldman and Zaller (1992) use. Economic explanations could imply that the openness of a national economy or the

level of income inequality could provide the reason for the differentiation between the styles of welfare state. This particular explanation has been a leader in the field; it suggests that individuals engage in a series of cost-benefit analyses according to their economic interests and decide whether they want a welfare state, i.e. it would assume the rationality of the voter.

METHODOLOGY

Hypothesis 1

Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) do not explicitly test public opinion towards welfare or towards poverty. To test this hypothesis I will look elsewhere in the research. However, their work does not totally ignore this question, but rather, they focus on political institutions as a manifestation of public opinion. They make use of work by Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno who tested the proportionality of certain electoral regimes by finding the share of electoral votes that guarantees a party a parliamentary seat in an electoral district of average size. The variable they found was then labelled the UMS (upper marginal share). In a two-party system with a first-past-the-post electoral competition, like the US has, the UMS has a value of 0.5, compared to the values between 1.5 and 3.5 for the proportional representation systems of Europe. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001; 31-4) then used these UMS variables to test against income redistribution. However, this finding would not be enough to prove any hypothesis, as the writers admit to themselves; it is a narrow interpretation of political explanations (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001; 34) as these institutions may be endogenous to other variables, most importantly, public attitude to the poor and poverty. Furthermore, we can look upon France, a European country with a large amount of income redistribution but also with a UMS value of 0.5.

To, then, look beyond simply political institutions and racialized attitudes towards the poor, the essay will use the studies of Hochschild (1981), Feldman and Zaller (1992) and Brooks and Manza (2007). Hoch-

schild engaged in in-depth interviews consisting of open-ended questions to gauge individuals' impressions of income redistribution and, more generally, the values that permeate through their social and economic ideas. She spoke with twenty-eight randomly chosen individuals from New Haven, Connecticut. Of these, sixteen could be considered in the low-income bracket. Intensive interviews serve to avoid the researcher having to infer meaning from short survey answers; the participants can explain what they mean so helps in our analysis of a particular political culture in American public opinion. Similarly, Feldman and Zaller (1992) used a 1987 National Election Studies' survey with open-ended questions to discover, from 450 Americans, the ideals that the American public draw from in order to explain their opinions on the welfare state. The much larger sample as compared to Hochschild's is important because it is much more representative and Feldman and Zaller (1992) are able to create a standard measure. One group of the participants were asked the open-ended questions following a more straightforward question on a particular social governmental policy while the other group were asked to stop and think about each answer they gave in order to support their positive or negative reaction to a particular policy in order to differ between two methods in which we justify our beliefs.

Finally, to test this hypothesis the essay will make use of the research of Brooks and Manza (2007) who studied the effects of public opinion on the welfare state with a cross-national approach using policy and economic data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and survey data from the International Social Survey Program. In testing only policy preferences Brooks and Manza (2007; 42-3) had to be wary of particular confounding factors such as age composition and political institutions; they do this particularly in reference to Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote's (2001) findings that the lag in American welfare state policy is down to political institutions and racial heterogeneity, i.e. there is no public opinion/policy linkage; but, at the same time, they do not control for factors of public opinion. Additionally, to discover, solely, public opinion/policy linkage, Brooks and Manza (2007; 43) have to control for the rate of immigration, women's labour force participation and, borrowing from Huber and Stephens (2001), the "veto points" with-

in a political structure, meaning the extent to which actors can veto policy through different means. In particular, Brooks and Manza (2007) test their theory of embedded ideals against economic models of explanation for differentiation in welfare states. The important variables here are measures of respondents' impressions of the national economy, evaluations of their own economic circumstances, and a number of social differences and institutional variables, and different reference measures 'relating to social provision, governmental responsibility, and social inequality' (Brooks and Manza, 2007; 109). The authors analysed policy preference from each of four countries; USA, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, using models that measured the impacts of economic evaluations on the policy preferences, as well as several social factors; they then compared the initial values with a second set, assuming no change in the variables measuring economic evaluations (Brooks and Manza, 2007; 114-5). The assumption was that if economic evaluations contributed to policy preferences, the two sets of values would be substantially different; the second set of values, those assuming no change in the economic covariates, should flatten considerably, thus indicating that patterns of change in welfare state preferences amongst the public vanish without the independent variable of economic change (Brooks and Manza, 2007; 114-5).

Hypothesis 2

To test the effects of racial heterogeneity in the welfare state Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) test racial origin against government spending. Then the authors added the variable of public opinion, specifically the opinion of African-Americans towards welfare and that of the Caucasians that had had close contact with African-Americans; based on information from the General Social Survey. With one particularly salient test, the authors studied a whole number of independent variables based on information from the same study; they tested for education level, ethnicity, marital status and social level (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote's, 2001; 48). They then accounted for those living in particularly racially fractionalised states in the US, those that believe African-Americans are lazy and those had had close contact with African-Americans.

To provide a source to test Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote's (2001) study this essay will refer to the work of Martin Gilens (1996), who used data gathered from a randomised survey-based experiment using a national telephone survey. The survey brought back 2,223 completed interviews and 1,198 of these completed mailback questionnaires; Gilens (1996; 595) then excluded the responses of the black participants. Gilens allowed for economic self-interest by basing it on family income, individualism based on responses to the question "The government in Washington tries to do too many things that should be left up to individuals and private businesses" and attitude towards African-Americans was measured by asking for a 0-10 rating from the respondents on certain words and how well they describe black people (Gilens, 1996; 595). The views of respondents on welfare were measured by '(1) a single variable asking whether federal spending for welfare should be increased, decreased, or kept the same and (2) an index of four agree/disagree questions measuring respondents' attitudes toward welfare' (Gilens, 1996; 596). Gilens (1996; 598) was also wary of social pressures because respondents might feel obliged to say the same things about Caucasians as they do about African-Americans; to overcome this problem half of the respondents were asked about Caucasians and the other half were asked the exact same questions in relation to African-Americans.

RESULTS

Before reviewing the findings in the various sources with regards to the two hypotheses being tested I would like to first oppose the economic explanations of the difference in welfare state provision. The economic explanations would be based on economic variance, i.e. more pre-tax inequality, and the openness of the economy but, as Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001; 1-2) show, this cannot explain differences because US income levels are more skewed and volatile than European levels. Also, there are issues of income mobility; in those countries where income mobility is high individuals are more likely to think that poverty is something that can be escaped, so is more down to the person who is poor than anything innate, or unfair within the system itself. Alesina,

Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001; 26-7) test the levels of income mobility and see that, in fact, differences between the US economy and European economies are negligible.

Brooks and Manza (2007) also show the economic explanations to be weak when comparing economic and social effects on social welfare preferences. They argue that if preferences were based upon economic self-interest there would be much variance year-to-year in support of welfare state policies; there is 'little evidence of a cyclical pattern of change'. Year-to-year variation is well under 10 percent of their standard deviations (Brooks and Manza, 2007; 111). Rather, it is something else that causes this inertia.

Hypothesis 1

The issue of income mobility is rather more an aspect of the behavioural explanations than economic explanations. Despite the proof that Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) show of there being only very small differences, if any, in income mobility between the US economy and European economies, there is a belief among the general public of the USA that income mobility is high and that anyone can make it out of poverty, so there is not as much need for a large welfare state. Referring to the World Values Survey, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001; 26) write that 71 percent of Americans, compared to only 40 percent of Europeans, consider that the poor are able to escape poverty. Ideas of income mobility are used to ignore issues of income inequality and vilify the poor. This is central to our first hypothesis, that the American public has different, more conservative, political ideologies when compared to the general European public upon which they develop their ideas of welfare and the role of the state in dealing with economic inequality.

In their test of the correlation between proportionality of the electoral system and government spending Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001; 33-4) find that there does exist a correlation, whereby the higher a state's UMS, the higher its government spending will be. However,

an issue crops up when they test non-OECD countries and the correlation is lost. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001; 60-1) still come to the conclusion that the amount of proportionality matters, however the data does not strongly back this up. Also, they do not adequately address the question of why France and Great Britain, to give just two examples, have socialist parties while having a majoritarian electoral system that, supposedly, undermines the ability of a socialist party to emerge. However, as has already been mentioned with regards to Brooks and Manza (2007), these political institutions could have endogenous variables. Pontusson (2006; 321) rightly points out that most conventional accounts of the coming of the PR electoral system base it on an extension of suffrage caused by the mobilisation of the working classes. In the brief section of their paper that they reserve for public opinion of the poor, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001; 51-4), referring to World Values Survey, present data that shows opinions of the poor to differ sharply between Americans and Europeans, with much more Americans believing the poor can work their way out of poverty than Germans. However, for an important aspect of their work, the authors do not engage with this question any more, only offering theories as to why there is a difference in attitudes.

So we must look further for a deeper understanding of the public opinion of the poor and of poverty itself. Hochschild (1981), through her in-depth interviews, found that it is the ambivalence of the American voter that affects altruism and social solidarity; though workers should be seeking self-interest by supporting a stronger welfare state, they actually fear equality so, due to their ideological predispositions, oppose a large welfare state. In other words, the people are not rational because of their adherence to the engrained political culture of America. Despite the growing economic inequalities since World War II it seems that opposition to policies of income redistribution has remained rather solid among all employment categories (Hochschild, 1981; 18-9). In this context ambivalence refers to the respondents 'simultaneously [holding] contradictory opinions about one subject'. For example, Maria Pulaski resents her employers because of their wealth, but believes that they deserve what they earn (Hochschild, 1981; 28). The vast majority of the interviewees

believe in the fairness of free enterprise and the necessity of hard work. Hochschild (1981; 82) argues that rather than looking at the class and income of an individual we should study their distributive norms, i.e. what they see as "fair"; and in American society distributive norms are generally based around ideals of equality, individualism and work ethic.

Feldman and Zaller (1992; 269), with their larger sample size, back up Hochschild's (1981) findings; they find that popular support for a bigger welfare state has to battle with the ideological hegemony in American political culture of nineteenth-century liberalism. Laissez-faire capitalism and the ideas of individualism that come with it are almost universally supported (Feldman and Zaller, 1992; 272). Even for those in favour of welfare state ideas, especially job and living standards guarantees, more than forty percent 'made either a negative reference to the role of government or a positive reference to individualism'; those in support of welfare state policies were deeply conflicted as they tried to explain their support by using the political lexicon that they knew, but one that is swayed towards a more conservative, economically liberal, political ideology (Feldman and Zaller, 1982; 282). The individuals most in favour of welfare state policies showed minimal support for the ideals that would be behind a European-style welfare state, i.e. greater equality of outcomes and guarantees of the necessities for a decent life for everyone; although, plainly the effect of a larger welfare state would be to make society more equal, those in support of one could not mobilise egalitarian arguments (Feldman and Zaller, 1992; 297).

So, tested with the work of Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001), Hochschild (1981), Feldman and Zaller (1992), this hypothesis was proven. There is an underlying political culture in America that opposes the idea and ideals of a large welfare state; it is one based in the historical and geographical foundations of America. In proving this hypothesis, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote's (2001) hypothesis that the electoral institution of PR is integral to the differentiation in welfare state has been challenged.

Hypothesis 2

However, European welfare states are built into a capitalist and religious system that is based on ideas of hard work and individualism. There is something else embedded into American politics and society that has a role in differentiating between the altruism and political power of the poor. This issue, I hypothesised, was race; more specifically, the racial heterogeneity of American society. The reason why this could be an issue is that as a minority the African-American make up a very large minority in the USA, and they are disproportionately represented in the lowest social and economic classes; while this is the case also in European countries with regards to their minorities:

> *'in no European country is there a minority that is as poor, rela tive to the rest of the population, as blacks in the United States. The poverty rate among non-Hispanic whites in the United States is 7.7 percent, compared with 23.6 percent among blacks'*
> (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001; 44)'

Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001; 46) find that there is a strong correlation between racial spending and racial fractionalisation, i.e. the higher the racial fractionalisation, the lower the government spending in the country; and this test took into account not just OECD countries unlike their testing of the effects of proportionality in the electoral process. Perhaps most significantly, when testing a whole host of variables, including racial fractionalisation of home state, income, education, and others the authors found that being black was the most important variable in support for welfare state policies (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001; 48). The authors also showed the effect racial fractionalisation had upon each state in the US, finding a correlation between this variable and state government spending on welfare benefits (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001; 49-50). They found that a one percent increase in the share of African-Americans in the state's population resulted in an effect on the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) of a $6.92 monthly decrease in payments. In short, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) find that there is a strong correlation between racial attitudes and attitudes

towards welfare; it undermines altruism and the ability with which there can be cross-race collaboration in order to fight for the economic interests of a class.

Pontusson (2006; 315) challenged what he saw as Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote's (2001) exaggeration of the racial-ethnic homogeneity of European states, and the extent to which this homogeneity would have caused an increase in working class solidarity. He argues that the authors embedded the myth of America as an immigration nation and presents data to show that there are a number of countries within the OECD that has more immigration at the moment; but these are racial tensions that have been present for over two-hundred years; the USA has had a long history of immigration of one particular race and of the racial tensions that have stemmed from it. Also, the proportional amount of African-Americans far outweighs any minority in Europe; and so does their proportional amount amongst the poor in the nation.

More compelling evidence for the strong effect of racial attitudes comes from Gilens' (1996; 593) findings; findings that lead him to the conclusion that the general impression of black people as lazy is the most salient factor on Americans' welfare policy preferences. According to Gilens' (1996; 597) findings, white people who had the impression that black people were lazy had 'predicted scores on welfare spending that were 0.67 units lower than whites who fully rejected this view'. With regards to welfare attitudes, the impression of black people being lazy reflected a unit change of 0.55. As Feldman and Zaller (1992) wrote, it is important to differentiate between all utterances referring to individualism, which Gilens does not do; and, also, it is not simply individualism that is at issue when we speak about political culture and ideology. So, there is still enough proof to prove the first hypothesis. At the same time, Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) and Gilens (1996) do enough to prove the second hypothesis correct also; the effect of racial heterogeneity has been to reduce altruism and, we can infer, reduce solidarity among the working class and among society in general so as to compound the ideas of rugged

individualism that serve as the basis of the political culture.

DISCUSSION

This essay began with the hypothesis that America's exceptionalism when it came to the issue of the welfare state was down to the underlying political ideologies that define the politics and the institutions of the USA and the racial heterogeneity of the country. This was a behavioural explanation for the difference between the US welfare state and the European-style welfare state. Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) found that racial fractionalisation has an integral effect on altruism and that the lack of proportionality has served to undermine the ability of the working class to mobilise. However, this idea was rightly challenged by Brooks and Manza (2007) and Pontusson (2006) in that the political institutions are manifestations of a particular political culture. We then tested these ideas of political culture and Feldman and Zaller (1992) and Hochschild (1981) found ambivalence in those individuals that supported welfare state policies; the political culture of America is swayed to more conservative ideology as even those in support of a stronger welfare state had trouble articulating their ideas without contradicting themselves. When the issue of race was tested Gilens (1996) found the centrality of race to opposition to welfare state policies. However his failure to test significantly for a particular political culture means that he did not do enough to disprove the idea of a conservative political culture holding sway in American politics.

What does this mean more generally for the state of American politics and the study of political science? These findings relate back to some of the works that were referred to in the introduction; our findings seem to have backed up the claims of Lippmann (1925) and Delli, Carpini and Keeter (1996) in that, citizens tend to hold stereotypical views and prejudices. Similarly, in adhering to the political culture, citizens take political shortcuts when trying to explain their policy positions. The findings also have implications for the conclusions of Page and Shapiro (1994) and their idea of the collective public holding collective political properties. There does seem to be a collective political mood, culture; but it is

one that sways against the interest of progressives, those in the lowest tiers of society and, especially, African-Americans, and one that hinders their opportunity for fair representation in politics and in the media.

This, unfortunately, due to the latent nature of the racism in American policymaking, is an issue that has been largely ignored. For example, the survey and interview studies of Hochschild (1981) and Feldman and Zaller (1992) do not mention race, and would have been more complete if they had. Though not referred to in this study, Gilens (2003) found, in studying news coverage of stories related to the poor and poverty, that being poor has become racialized, thus reinforcing the idea that a further redistribution of wealth would only help African-Americans, and reinforcing the impression that they are lazy and "undeserving". According to a CBS/New York Times survey, respondents who, falsely, believed that the majority of welfare recipients were black held more negative views about welfare recipients; while those who thought the majority of recipients were white were more likely to blame the system for their poverty (Gilens, 2003; 124). Gilens (1996; 602) suggests that the media has created 'a subterranean discourse on race' that avoids making explicit claims that can be challenged but link African-Americans to welfare, laziness, etc.; and this discourse serves to influence voters by raising indignation.

Looking at the effect of race upon welfare state policy may also be of help in studies of contemporary European welfare state. Pontusson (2006) argues that Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2001) exaggerate the modern racial-ethnic homogeneity of Europe. As I have already argued this does not pose a significant challenge to the efficacy of their work as the nature of America's racial heterogeneity is completely different to Europe's. However, with the rise of immigration in recent decades into European states we have seen a rise in populist parties and anti-immigration rhetoric, with particular reference to ideas of the immigrants being "undeserving" of the welfare state benefits; thus we have seen a fall in altruism that could be seen as down to racial heterogeneity.

One caveat that does remain for these findings is that, though the

American state does not engage in much income redistribution, private redistribution, charity is greater in American than in any European state. Though it does not equalise the difference between the welfare state styles it does provide an issue if we are to argue that there is a lack of altruism in America; perhaps the political, rather than behavioural explanations will ring truer when we take this private charity into account. It is a test that each study fails to look at comprehensively. However, we may hypothesise that this penchant for private charity actually backs up our behavioural explanations in that individuals choose who their money goes to. This means that they, privately, decide who deserves their money, who is the "deserving" and who is the "undeserving" poor. In this sense individuals who seek to redistribute their own income can use individualistic principles of hard work, liberty by awarding their money to those who work hardest, those who are poor through no fault of their own. It also means that racism can play a role as individuals redistributing their income can avoid giving their money to the African-American poor.

There is still much left to study on this issue, however. I have referred to, in this essay, a number of sources that do not engage in a comparison of Europe and American, for example, Hochschild (1981) and Feldman and Zaller (1992). Though it would be a costly and timely venture, in depth surveys and interviews on a cross-national perspective would greatly enhance the study of this subject. When Hochschild (1981) is trying to answer the question of why there is no socialism in USA she finds that the answer is ideological ambivalence. Does this mean we can reliably infer that Europeans are much more ideologically coherent? Unfortunately, we cannot. However, cross-national in depth studies with open-ended questions are necessary because, as Hochschild (1981) has shown, they provide the participant the ability to explain their ideas that no other methodology offers. Additionally, Zaller and Feldman (1992; 285) find that those supporting welfare state policies complain about taxes, the budget deficit, the limits of government and the problems of bureaucracy. Plainly these would also be complaints of those supporting the welfare state in Europe.

The findings of this essay seem to prove that American exceptionalism is based on behavioural explanation. Specifically, behaviours produced by the existence of a conservative, economically liberal, political culture and prevalent racial attitudes. However, there is still much study to be done on this subject due to the latent nature of these explanations.

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Gender, Conflict and Peace-Building in Sierra Leone

Daniel McCarron

> "Peace is about men and women and how they relate to each other'
>
> South African Women[1]

1. Cheryl De La Rey, and Susan McKay, 'Peacebuilding as a Gendered Process.' (2006) 62 (1) Journal of Social Issues 141-153. at 148.

(I) INTRODUCTION

This article seeks to utilize feminist theory and praxis in order to analyse the Sierra Leone conflict and subsequent peace building operations. The adoption of a gender perspective is a necessary tool in understanding the complex causal factors of war, the ways in which different actors perceive peace and/or security, and how post-conflict societies can move towards reconciliation and reconstruction. It will be argued that understanding peace-building as a gendered process is essential for the consolidation of sustainable peace and the prevention of future conflict in Sierra Leone. As such the article will first examine the widespread gender based violence that characterised the Sierra Leone conflict with particular attention being paid to the systematic use of rape as a weapon war during the conflict. In doing so it will discuss the concept of gender and how it relates to conflict. By recognizing that gender based violence forms a central component of what Kaldor (2013) has termed 'New Wars', gender equality will be presented as a central component of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction.

Secondly, the article will present the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security as explicit recognition by the United Nations (UN) of the importance of gendering peace and security. In doing so it will distinguish feminist meanings of peace and peace-building from the structural definition advanced by the UN. It will be argued that Feminist understandings of peace utilize a "bottom-up foundational logic" that tailors the peace process so that it is both context specific and culturally knowledgeable. This gender based approach will be used to critique the formal peace-building operations of international organizations like the UN who externally impose exclusionary definitions of security which fail to take into account differences between cultures and across genders.

Thirdly, the divergent approaches to peace-building and the results which each approach have produced will be examined in the context of Sierra Leone by discussing the formal UN peacekeeping mis-

sion (UNAMSIL) and informal women's organisations MARWOPNET and FAWE. In discussing the official peacekeeping mission of UNAMSIL it will be argued that such formal peace-building projects have traditionally excluded and marginalized women. Furthermore, it will be shown that UNAMSIL lacked a gender perspective despite the explicitly gendered mandate of Resolution 1325. This will be evidenced by reference to the structural discrimination faced by women within UNAMSIL and in its tendency to prioritize quantitative results over qualitative changes in gender equality. As a result, it will be argued that UNAMSIL's failure to view women as legitimate actors within the formal peace building process severely undermined the mission's contribution to meaningful and sustainable peace in Sierra Leone. In contrast, by adopting a gender perspective that is both context specific and indebted to indigenous knowledge, MARWOPNET and FAWE are contributing to an altogether more inclusive and holistic peace. Consequently, any further attempts by the international community to consolidate sustainable peace in Sierra Leone must first adopt and then implement a gendered understanding of peace.

(II) THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT AND GENDER BASED VIOLENCE

Sierra Leone gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1961. The following years of failed elections and coup d'états put an end to the experiment of democracy in Sierra Leone and resulted in the All People's Congress (APC) taking power in 1968 under the leadership of Siaka Stevens. (Collier, 1970, cited in Zack- Williams, 2012, p.15). The following period of uninterrupted autocratic rule from 1968 – 1992 was characterised by corruption, nepotism, fiscal mismanagement and has been referred to as 'the era of the plague of locusts.' (Zack-Williams, 2012, p.46). A sense of alienation and frustration with the APC government led to the creation of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in 1984 with the stated aim of saving the country from its corrupt government. Conflict broke out in 1991 initially as a result of a spill over from an uprising in Liberia led by Charles Taylor. Backed by Taylor's Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) the RUF launched an invasion from Liberia into the South-Eastern corner of Sierra Leone. The RUF invasion quickly 'degenerated into

a campaign of violence whose principal aim was to gain access to the country's diamond and other mineral wealth.'(Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.10). In November 1996 a ceasefire was called and the government along with the RUF signed the Abidjan Peace accord. Violence later broke out in 1997 and the ceasefire was abandoned leading to a UN embargo being imposed later that year. (S/RES/1132 Of the 8th October 1999). As the result of intense international pressure a ceasefire agreement was signed on May 18th 1999 followed by the Lomé Peace Accords in 1999. On the 22nd of October 1999 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1270 which created the Sierra Leone peacekeeping operation UNAMSIL. However, violence continued and it was not until a military intervention by the United Kingdom in May 2000 that the conflict formally came to an end in January 2002. In the period between March 1991 and February 2002 the conflict claimed the lives of between 70,000 and 75,000 people. (Zack-Williams, 2012, p.13). The conflict has since become infamous for the rebels use of 'blood diamonds' for financial security, the inscription and abduction of a large number of children on both sides, and the widespread use of rape and sexual violence against the civilian population. (Smet, 2008, p. 150).

The extent and severity of the sexual violence perpetrated against the civilian population during the Sierra Leone conflict prompted Human Rights Watch (2003) to produce a harrowing report entitled, ' "We'll Kill You If You Cry" Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict.' The report details the systematic use of rape and sexual violence through extensive eyewitness and victim testimony. It details reports of rape, gang rape, sexual assault, sexual slavery, genital mutilation, abduction, and the forced pregnancy of thousands of women and girls of all ages. The main perpetrators of the sexual violence according to the report were the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), and the West Side Boys, but it also documents sexual violence on the part of government forces and Untied Nations peacekeepers. (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.4). The Report comments that, 'These crimes of sexual violence were generally characterised by extraordinary brutality and frequently preceded or followed by other egregious human rights violations against the victim, her family and her community.' (Human

Rights Watch, 2003, p.3). The report stresses the lack of accountability for sexual violence in Sierra Leone and criticises the Lomé Peace Agreement for including a blanket amnesty under Sierra Leonean law for offenses committed by all sides. (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.4). The UN placed a reservation upon this amnesty for crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Despite the UN subsequently recognizing gender based violence as constituting war crimes the amnesty has been used to hamper attempts at successful prosecution. (S/RES/1820 of the 19th of June 2008.)

The report goes on to highlight that despite the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) these efforts are being undermined by structural discrimination which women are subjected to in Sierra Leone by practice, custom and law. The customary law in Sierra Leone, which governs most of the population, discriminates against women in the areas of family law, property acquisition, and inheritance. Furthermore, customary law offers inadequate protection for rape victims as the perpetrator is generally required to pay a fine to the victim's family and the victim may be forced to marry the perpetrator.(Human Rights Watch, 2003, p.5). The report argues that these factors have contributed to a climate of impunity where the perpetrators of sexual violence escape justice and may have contributed to the scale and severity of the sexual violence witnessed during the conflict. (Human Rights Watch, 2003 p. 73). Indeed, this view was echoed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which commented that the subordinate place of women in Sierra Leonean society led to some armed groups to 'simply not consider it an aberration to rape girls or use them as sexual slaves' (Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004, cited in Smet, 2008 p. 152).

The Human Rights Watch report concludes by calling on the international community and the Sierra Leone government to address this structural discrimination against women and to make meaningful attempts to prosecute perpetrators of sexual violence. In order to properly address the extreme imbalance in gender relations that exists in Sierra Leonean society and to understand the causal implications of the conflict,

a gendered approach to conflict is essential.

(III) GENDER AND CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT.

The link between gender and conflict has been for the most part been ignored by international interventions. This is despite the fact that the prevalence of gender discrimination against women within a society has been shown to increase the likelihood of, or be a determining factor in, a state experiencing internal conflict. (Carpioli, 2000). Indeed, Mazurana et al (2005) argues that 'the politics of gender are not recognised and the gendered causes and consequences of armed conflict and post conflict periods are overlooked…' Regrettably, gender perspectives continue to be marginalized within formal peace-building operations and peacekeeping projects.

When referring to 'Gender' what is meant is the, 'set of cultural institutions and practices that constitute the norms and standards of masculinity and femininity.' (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2013, p. 167). Unlike biological sex, gender is an acquired identity that is learned, shaped over time, and varies across and within cultures. (Smet, 2008, at 149). Gender defines the relationship between men and women in society. Gender also plays a crosscutting role within other societal factors, being shaped by and helping to shape experiences of ethnicity, race, class, poverty, and age. (Mazurana et al, 2005, p.13). Understanding the role played by gender during war and the way in which violence becomes gendered is essential in order to conceptualize what peace and security will mean for both men and women across cultures and between genders.

War plays an important role in the construction of gender as men and women tend to experience conflict differently, particularly in the ways that men and women are susceptible to and experience violence as a result of their sex or gender. (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2013, p. 167 – 169). Kaldor (2013) refers to contemporary political violence as 'New Wars' which are characterised by the participation of non-state actors, the inclusion of identity based causes, non-traditional means of finance, and a disproportionate level of violence being directed towards the civilian

population. She argues that, 'new wars are largely fought by men in the name of a political identity that usually has a significant gender dimension…'. (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2013, p.167). Thus, in the context of 'New Wars' McKay (2004, p.154) has argued that, 'women and girls suffer disproportionately due to the gender specific effects of contemporary conflicts.' The ways in which contemporary conflicts such as the one in Sierra Leone disproportionality affect women and girls has significant implications for any attempt at post-conflict peace-building.

Gender based violence forms a pervasive and central component of contemporary political violence as rape becomes a 'systematic strategy of political control', a weapon of war. (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2013, p. 173). The targeting of 'women, girls, men, and boys based on their gender roles . . . is systematic and thorough.' (Mazurana et al, 2005, p.2). It is gender itself, which is attacked during violence by the 'castration of men and boys and the cutting of the breasts and vaginal regions of women and girls.' (Mazurana et al, 2005, p. 33). Indeed the Human Rights Watch (2003, p.4) report on Sierra Lone emphasises the strategic and political nature of the violence, which sought to 'dominate women and their communities by deliberately undermining cultural values and community relationships, destroying the ties that hold society together'. These forms of extreme violence such as systematic rape and the use of child soldiers in contemporary conflicts, Mazurana et al (2005, p.33) argues, are 'not unfortunate by-products of the conflicts; they are both the tools and the goals.'

Furthermore, the ways in which 'New Wars' are financed disproportionately affects women and contributes to the creation of new oppressive power structures within conflict. 'New War' economics are decentralised and open to the world economy, often being based on the smuggling of valuable commodities such oil, diamonds, drugs, and humans. (Chinkin and Kaldor, 2013, p. 175). The evolution of a 'shadow economy' based on the exploitation of these resources through inputs and outputs created by the globalization of world trade has significant implications for the power structures of inequality and exploitation that become established during conflict. In an environment where legitimacy becomes synonymous with violence and control, conflicts over commod-

ities and resources such as the diamond mines in Sierra Leone are overtly gendered. Sexual violence in 'New Wars' is strategic and is used by rebels and government forces as a means of dispersing resources rich areas. The displacement of populations occupying resources rich areas is 'carried out with attention to gender'. (Mazurana et al, 2005, pp. 33). Non-state actors such as rebel groups use such extreme forms of violence to consolidate political and economic power and as a means of creating the conditions in which new forms of wealth and legitimacy can be realized. (Mazurana et al, 2005, p. 34). In addition to this, women are further affected as conflict shifts the burden of public services such as education and childcare into the private sector of the home by destroying essential services and infrastructure.

The strategic and gendered nature of violence in contemporary conflicts has significant consequences. In addressing the nature of such extreme forms of violence where 'bodies have become commodities within war economies' Manzurana et al (2005, p.34) has argued that it has 'deeper, more causal, and explicitly transnational implications.' Failure on the part of international organizations to seriously examine the causal implications of gender politics, in generating unrest and in causing conflict in Sierra Leone, will prevent attempts at peace-building from preventing future conflict and may actually perpetuate or worsen the structural imbalances they are attempting to fix.

(IV) UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security is recognition, at least on a declaratory level, of the link between gender, conflict and peace. (S/RES/1325 of 31 October 2000.) The resolution recognizes the 'important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace- building' and calls for an urgent need to 'mainstream a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations.' (S/RES/1325 of 31 October 2000.) Gender mainstreaming has been defined by the United Nations in the ECISIC agreed conclusions 1997/2 as; 'the process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs in all

areas and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension of design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality is not perpetuated. The Ultimate goal is to achieve gender equality.'

This resolution is the first time that the United Nations has explicitly addressed the role of women in the maintenance of international peace and security. Anwarul K. Chowdhury (2010, p.10) who was the president of the Security Council at the time has stated that the resolution is an official recognition on the part of the members of the Security Council that 'peace is inextricably linked with the equality between women and men. . .' The resolution builds on the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action. The individual success of the resolution was largely the result of advocacy from civil society groups calling upon the Security Council to recognise the important role played by women in the maintenance of international peace and security. More broadly the resolution reflects a move within the United Nations since the end of the Cold War to recognizing what has been termed 'Human Security'. The recognition by the Resolution of the importance of adopting a gendered perspective to conflict and peace is important in improving the 'UN's capacity to engender security and promote an equitable, sustainable peace.' (Olonisakin, 2011, p. 4). It provides the international community with a concrete framework that can be used to incorporate a gender perspective into existing peace- building policies and programmes. (Olonisakin, 2011, p. 20). However, the Security Council has been and to an extent remains, 'an over-whelming male and masculinized preserve.'(Olonisakin, 2011, p. 19). Masculine definitions of security and post- conflict reconstruction have traditionally emphasised the importance of institutions or organizations. (McKay, 2004, p. 157). As such, the fact that women's participation is advanced by the Resolution through a structural definition of peace-building is unsurprising. Failure to consider alternative definitions of peace-building and what this might look like may limit the resolution's ability to effect change in situations where externally im-

posed peace is perceived as illegitimate.

(V) GENDER AND PEACE-BUILDING.

Susan McKay has eloquently stated that '[t]o build peace requires visioning what constitutes peace and security across cultures, nationalities, ethnicities, and between genders.' (McKay, 2004, p.15) This is in recognition of the fact that there is no one singular or universal definition of peace-building and the ends which it should pursue. Peace-building as a process is frequently defined broadly and actors will ascribe to peace-building a wide range of activities, relational behaviours, and structural changes. (McKay and De La Ray, 2001, p.228).

Formal peace-building is often defined structurally, by international organisations, in terms of post-conflict reconstruction of societal institutions and infrastructure. In his 1992 'Agenda for Peace' former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peace-building as 're-building the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war…'. (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, p.8). Such 'top down' approaches to post-conflict reconstruction often formulate Westernized solutions to conflict based on a Neo-liberal orthodoxy which fails to recognize the importance of local context and knowledge. The form and content of UNAMSIL's mandate in Sierra Leone reflects this perception of peace-building which is conceptualized without any reference to Sierra Leone's specific cultural and gendered context. The UN conceptualizes security as a 'phenomenon experienced at the group level' rarely inquiring as to how local populations define their own security and as a result 'externally imposed notions become the standard point of reference.' (Olonisakin, 2011, p. 6-7). This way of understanding assumes that definitions of peace and security are universal and subsequently fails to take into account local perceptions of security which may themselves differ subjectively depending on an actor's culture, context, and gender. This may lead international interventions to misunderstand the causal factors of the conflict and to miscalculate the stability or sustainability of externally imposed peace.

The feminist approach to peace-building offers an alternative and more inclusive vision of global security through the lens of gender. (Hudson, 2009, p. 289). A gendered approach to peace-building recognizes that men and women experience violence in conflict differently because of gender and as such will prioritize different needs and values within the peace- building process. In addition to this, rather than perceiving women in post-conflict solely as victims, a gendered approach affirms their agency by recognizing the integral role women play in the peace building processes. It also underlines that these efforts have largely gone unrecognized by actors or have been deemed to be outside of the scope of formal peace-building projects. This is because the formal peace process has been dominated by male elites with Moosa, Rahmani and Webster pointing out that Women make up just 2.5% of signatories to formal peace agreements globally. (Moosa, 2013, p.455). Because of this exclusion and marginalization, women's definitions of peace and security are not being represented and do not appear in peace agreements. Zuckerman and Greenberg (2004, p.73) argue that peace-building operations and post-conflict reconstruction programmes 'often flounder because they fail to address unequal gender relations and power dynamics.'

The important difference is that while masculine definitions of peace tend to emphasize the security of the state or system, 'Women's peacebuilidng interests are likely to be shaped by local and regional concerns.' (De La Ray and Mc Kay, 2006, p.3). The security of the individual or community is prioritized over that of the state or the international system. (De La Ray and Mc Kay, 2006, p.3). Instead of externally imposing peace upon a society a gendered approach to peace building is both culture specific and contextually based, utilizing processes which are meaningful to actors within the context of their own culture and community. (De La Ray and Mc Kay, 2006, p.141). By engaging with local groups and grassroots organisations a gendered approach to peace building utilizes a 'bottom-up foundational logic', which delivers legitimacy and substance to the process. (Hudson, 2009, p. 291). Indigenous knowledge is used to fashion practical solutions that are successful and make sense to local actors. In the context of Sierra Leone large differences existed between UNAMSIL and grassroots organisations on what peace was, how it was to be

maintained, and by which process it was to be brought about.

(VI) THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATION IN SIERRA LEONE.

On the 22nd of October 1999 the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1270 which established the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The resolution defined the situation in Sierra Leone as constituting a threat to international peace and security and called upon parties to the conflict to facilitate the restoration of peace, stability, and, national reconciliation. The peacekeeping mission was given a broad mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take necessary action to ensure the security of UN personnel, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, and to assist with the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process. At its peak UNAMSIL became the UN's largest ever peacekeeping mission with 17,500 military personnel. (Macauley, cited in Zack-Williams, 2012, p.34). The disarmament and demobilization goals of the mission were largely successful with some 75,000 former combatants, including 20,000 child soldiers, being disarmed and demobilized. (Macauley, cited in Zack-Williams, 2012, p.41). It also provided security and logistical support for 2002 elections in Sierra Leone. On the 31st of December 2005 UNAMSIL was drawn down and was replaced by the Untied Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). However, the marginalization of women and a failure to seriously examine the gendered nature of the conflict on the part of UNAMSIL limited the missions ability to consolidate peace in Sierra Leone.

Karen Barnes has argued that UNAMSIL did not perceive women as legitimate actors in the formal peace building process and failed to take Resolution 1325's mandate of gender mainstreaming on board as anything more than an 'add women and stir' strategy. (Barnes, cited in Olonisakin et al, 2011, p.121). Despite the gendered and extreme nature of violence which had occurred during the conflict the peacekeeping mandate makes no reference to gender objectives apart from staff training. Although UNAMSIL was mandated before the creation of Res-

olution 1325 it was required after 2000 to gender mainstream its projects. Indeed Barnes highlights that few of the Secretary General reports on the mission before or after Resolution 1325 attempt to mainstream a gender perspective. (Barnes, cited in Olonisakin et al, 2011, p.122). The creation of Resolution 1325 along with lobbying from civil society groups resulted in the appointment of a gender advisor to the human rights section of the peacekeeping mission in 2003. (Barnes, cited in Olonisakin et al, 2011, p.121). However, from the beginning gender was structurally marginalized within UNAMSIL. The office of the gender advisor for the largest peacekeeping mission on record consisted of a single person, was woefully understaffed, and by being allocated within the human rights section received no independent budget and was limited in its authority. (Barnes, cited in Olonisakin et al, 2011, p.121). In 2004, UNASMIL received a renewed mandate under Resolution 1542 to guide it in the process of withdrawal but again no meaningful attempt was made to gender mainstream the operation's practices. (S/RES/1542 of the 30th of April 2004) The office of gender advisor was later appointed to the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in 2005 only to be dismantled as part of UNAMSIL's withdrawal one year later. (Barnes, cited in Olonisakin et al, 2011, p.123). Any attempt to gender mainstream practices within UNAMSIL were reactionary rather than proactive. UNAMSIL's implementation of Resolution 1325's mandate demonstrated a stark difference between the inclusion of a gender perspective in theory and in practice.

That being said, UNAMSIL did make some positive contributions to addressing issues of gender in Sierra Leone as it developed a local weekly radio programme relating to gender based violence, actively supported the TRC in setting up a Women's Task Force, and produced a report on gender based violence in conjunction with an NGO – Physicians for Human Rights. (Barnes, cited in Olonisakin et al, 2011, p.123). Furthermore, the Gender Advisor played an essential connecting role between the peacekeeping mission and civil society groups even if this was conducted primarily on an ad hoc basis. However, Barnes (2011, p.125). points out that in interpreting Resolution 1325's mandate of women's participation, UNAMSIL often 'confused quantitative increase with

qualitative impact…' Women's participation was largely low level and voluntary. The mission advocated for women's participation but failed to back this up with the resources and funding necessary for women's empowerment. Furthermore the mission tended to view women purely as victims of the conflict rather than as actors central to the peace building process. This is reflected in the strategy report developed to guide the handover from UNAMSIL to UNIOSIL which was aimed at promoting long term durable peace in Sierra Leone. (Barnes, cited in Olonisakin et al, 2011, p.125). No mention is made in the report of women's role in this process, or of a connection between gender equality and peace. As such Karen Barnes (2011, p. 130) has argued that UNAMSIL failed to 'capitalise on women's deep involvement on peace building in informal, local spheres to strengthen their attempts to build peace and contribute to the attitudinal shift required to end the violence'.

(VII) LOCAL WOMEN'S ORGANISATIONS AND PEACE-BUILDING IN SIERRA LEONE.

War had both a disempowering and empowering affect on women in Sierra Leone as many took on a central role within civil society in ending conflict and establishing peace. 'The case of women's organisations in Sierra Leone illustrates how women in conflict-affected regions actively build peace at the community level outside of "formal" peace-building or conflict resolution structures.' (Barnes, cited in Olonisakin et al, 2011, p.127). Women throughout Sierra Leone mobilized collectively with local actors to address security threats facing their communities. They engaged with local and regional actors, even before the formal conflict intervention, to restore peace and security to their localities. The women's organisations of MARWOPNET and FAWE provide viable local and gendered alternatives to the United Nation's approach to peace-building in Sierra Leone.

MARWOPNET:

The Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET) is a regional women's organization founded in 2000 and composed of fe-

male leaders, politicians, and activists which advocates for a gendered approach to peace-building in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. (MARWOPNET, 2015). The organisation is headquartered in Freetown and works towards durable peace in the region. In recognition of its contribution to peace-building in the region it was awarded the United Nations Human Rights prize in 2003. The stated mission of MARWOPNET (2015) is 'to advocate for and promote at all decision-making levels the involvement of women and youth in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict in the Mano-River sub region, throughout Africa and the world…' It is committed to ensuring 'gender responsive policies and building women's/girl's capacity for socio-economic and political empowerment.' (MARWOPNET, 2015). It specifically addresses the need for a better understanding of the mechanisms of peace, security and development at all levels including civil society. It actively promotes UNSCR 1325 and provides training on the use of the resolution within peace-building policy. (MARWOPNET, 2015).

The Sierra Leone chapter of the organisation promotes the need for a local and gendered perspective to peace-building. The chapter has organised trauma healing and counselling workshops to help with the emotional and psychological recovery of the thousands of victims of gender based violence. (MARWOPNET, 2015). Organized workshops on conflict management and mediation for women in Sierra Leone. (MARWOPNET, 2015). Empowered local women's organisations and initiatives by running workshops on capacity building and economic empowerment. (MARWOPNET, 2015). Aided in the organization of a mass rally for peace in Liberia during the peace talks in 2003 in recognition of an important regional aspect to peace- building. (MARWOPNET, 2015). Worked with Sierra Leonean refugees displaced by the conflict in neighbouring Liberia and Guinea and set up a specific camp for commercial sex workers and HIV/AIDS orphans. (MARWOPNET, 2015). Conducted workshops for the wives of soldiers on their role in sustaining peace in Sierra Leone. (Macauley, cited in Zack-Williams, 2012, p.152). Held consultations for women around the country on the TRC report and addressed the possibility of community security systems such as early warning systems in the various districts from a gender perspective. (Macauley,

cited in Zack-Williams, 2012, p.41). And fielded an all-female observer team in strategic areas of the country to monitor the 2007 Sierra Leone elections process. (Macauley, cited in Zack-Williams, 2012, p.41).

FAWE:

The Forum for African Women Educationalist (FAWE) promotes the education of girls and women in Africa as a means of post-conflict reconstruction and societal transformation. FAWE's (2010) stated mission is '[t]o promote gender equity and equality in education in Africa by fostering positive policies, practices and attitudes towards girls' education.' FAWE uses the education of girls as an entry point to support work in other areas such as addressing the 'culture of violence among youth, issues of reconciliation and reintegration and gender based violence'. (Barnes, cited in Olonisakin et al, 2011, p.129).

The FAWE Sierra Leone Chapter was established in the middle of the conflict on the 23rd of March 1995. (2004, p.3) The chapter was established in response to the failure of the Sierra Leone Department of Education to deal with the thousands of children displaced by the conflict and deprived of an education as a result of gender based violence. In pursuance of this FAWE established the Emergency Camp Schools Programme in Sierra Leone for displaced children in 1995 with the help of UNICEF, Plan International, the World Food Programme, and UNHCR. (2004, p.4) FAWE also engaged with local groups by enlisting the Sierra Leone Association of Retired Teachers and the Old Wharf Community to supply firewood and vegetables. 2,608 out of the 4,371 displaced children attending the programme were girls. (FAWE, 2004, p.10) Given the gender based violence experienced by many of the children attending the programme, the curriculum included guidance counselling and trauma healing sessions. These sessions utilized talking therapy, games, and songs in local languages. The school programme monitored the psychological state of the children by issuing report cards based on emotional wellbeing. (FAWE) 2004, p.6). Furthermore, FAWE worked with the World Food Programme to provide free meals to children at school. (FAWE, 2004, p.6). The programme succeeded in providing over 60% of the displaced

children in Sierra Leone access to education. (FAWE, 2004, p. 10).

Due to the success of this programme and in recognition of the need to rehabilitate the thousands of traumatized women and girls subjected to gender based violence during the war, FAWE established the FAWE Girls Primary School to act as the 'vanguard of the organization's mandate in the country.' (FAWE, 2004, p.11). The school established a curriculum based on the needs and experiences of the students by providing psychological counselling sessions twice a week. The trauma counselling reflected the needs of survivors and took the form of concerts, singing, radio shows, and drama. In 1998 the Ministry for Education in Sierra Leone decided to close down all displaced schools but gave FAWE permission to continue running the school now known as the FAWE school for girls. (2004, p.12)

Following further violence and continued sexual violence in 1997/1998, FAWE established the Rape Victims Programme. (2004, p.13). The programme aided in providing medical and counselling services to abducted girls and boy and conducted public sensitization via radio and television broadcasts to break the stigma associated with rape survivors. (FAWE, 2004, p.13).

(VIII) COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF APPROACHES TO PEACE-BUILDING IN SIERRA LEONE.

In providing an alternative to externally imposed models of post-conflict reconstruction, local organizations such as MARWOPNET and FAWE, are redefining what is to count as peace-building and who are thought of as a peace-builders in Sierra Leone. (Cole and Norander, 2011, p.42). By focusing on gender issues that are traditionally thought of as beyond the scope of formal peace building MARWOPENT and FAWE contribute to an altogether more in-depth and complex understanding of peace-building in Sierra Leone.

The empowerment of local women that both organizations are engaging in represents a gendered approach to peace-building which

is an altogether more complex approach than 'add women and stir.' Whereas UNAMSIL viewed the gender mandate of Resolution 1325 in terms of quantitative women's participation, FAWE and MARWOPNET have contributed to meaningful qualitative advances in women's empowerment. MARWOPNET's organization of workshops for women on capacity building and economic empowerment is providing women with the resources they need to contribute towards sustainable peace in Sierra Leone. This is further reflected in the fielding of female observers to monitor the 2007 elections in Sierra Leone.

Furthermore, both MARWOPNET and FAWE have recognised and a dressed the need for psychological counselling for the thousands of girls and women traumatized by gender based violence during the conflict. FAWE have further contributed to the psychological healing of Sierra Leone's young female population through the provision of much needed gender aware education. FAWE have also advocated for the Department of Education in Sierra Leone to include peace education as part of the general curriculum. (FAWE, 2004, p. 19) In addition to this, MARWOPNET have addressed the marginalization of women in the DDR process by engaging with the wives of soldiers and former female combatants.

Both organisations are contributing to a more inclusive peace where the knowledge and expertise of local populations are valued. The resulting peace process is one where the needs and experiences of survivors are utilized to fashion projects which work in practice and make sense to those involved in them. MARWOPNET creates local ownership of the peace building process by establishing local early warning systems and running consultations on the TRC report. Local ownership and engagement is also reflected in the support received from local actors by FAWE's Emergency Camp Schools Programme. This reflects a feminist commitment to empowerment that acknowledges the agency and values of people in post-conflict contexts. (Cole and Norander, 2011, p.44). This has in turn redefined which actors, interests and values are being placed at the center of the peace-building process in Sierra Leone. In both cases, FAWE and MARWOPNET are using the post-conflict transition as an

opportunity to engage in gender-based peace-building which is transformative. (Cole and Norander, 2011, p.43).

(IX) CONCLUSION.

This article has utilized feminist theory and praxis to adopt a gendered approach to conflict and peace in Sierra Leone. This, it was stressed, is necessary in order to properly understand the role played by gender politics in causing the violent nature of the conflict and the importance of gendering the peace-building process. As such the article first examined the widespread gender based violence that characterised the Sierra Leone conflict and paid particular attention to the strategic and systemic use of rape as a weapon of war as documented by the Human Rights Watch report. The article then argued that contemporary conflicts or 'New Wars' disproportionately affect women due to the gendered nature of the violence, the way in which such conflicts are financed and through the destruction of public goods and services. In doing so attention was drawn to the need for international organizations to examine the causal implications of gender politics and to gender their approaches to peace-building in Sierra Leone.

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security was then presented as official recognition of this link between gender, conflict and peace. The role of civil society in bringing about the resolution and how it marks a transition by the UN to a deeper focus on human security was also emphasised. However, the structural definition of peace-building advanced by the Resolution and the failure to consider alternatives was highlighted as a possible limitation upon the mandates legitimacy. The article then distinguished feminist understandings of peace and peace-building as a viable alternative to the structural definition advanced by the UN. In contrast to the exclusionary or 'top-down' approach of international organizations the feminist approach was presented as utilizing a 'bottom up foundational logic' which is both context specific and culturally based. In order to discuss these divergent approaches to peace-building in Sierra Leone, the UN peacekeeping mission (UNAMSIL) and the local Women's organisa-

tions MARWOPNET and FAWE were examined.

In examining the UNAMSIL's peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone it was argued that women were not perceived as legitimate actors in the formal peace process and that UNAMSIL's attempt at gender mainstreaming its practice represented nothing more than an 'add women and stir' strategy. In contrast, it was shown that MARWOPNET and FAWE are providing local alternatives which are redefining the previously 'top-down' approach to peace building in Sierra Leone. By engaging with local women's groups and providing the resources necessary to empower women, it was shown that both organizations are going well beyond the 'add women and stir' strategy of UNAMSIL. Finally, it was argued that this gendered approach to peace-building is creating a more inclusive peace by giving local actors ownership of the process. In both cases, MARWOPNET and FAWE are bringing an end to conflict in Sierra Leone by adopting a gendered approach to war and peace.

The post-conflict period in Sierra Leone is a formative moment in advancing a gendered perception of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction. However, raising awareness about women's rights and promoting female empowerment need not be pursued as an end in itself, but instead should be seen as essential to the building of an inclusive, sustainable, and equitable peace in Sierra Leone. In doing so, one should recall the words of Anwarul K Chowdhury, 'We should never forget that when women are marginalized, there is little chance for the world to get sustainable peace in the real sense.'(2010, p.15).[2]

[2] Chowdhury (n 37). at 15.

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The Good Friday Agreement and Transitional Justice: Has Northern Ireland Achieved Peace?

Glen Byrne and Seán O'Sullivan

The Troubles consumed Northern Ireland in a violent conflict that has defined the history of the region. Many lives were claimed, civilian and combatant, on both sides of the divide, and a wedge was driven between already ideologically and religiously opposed communities. Violent responses only exacerbated cleavages, until the variance between the two sides seemed irreconcilable.

The Good Friday Agreement was signed in 1998, at a point when parties felt the need to settle differences through political means, rather than violence. Among its provisions, the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement implemented important and necessary mechanisms of tran-

sitional justice. In other words, these provisions were intimately related to assisting Northern Ireland in transitioning from a period of injustice and discord, to a period of relative peace and understanding.

This article will analyse this feature of the Northern Ireland conflict using the following structure: first, the history of the Troubles will be outlined; second, the concept of 'peace', the aim of the Northern Ireland process, will be analysed in relation to the Good Friday Agreement; third, the mechanisms of transitional justice as found in the Agreement will be evaluated. This article will conclude by further evaluating whether the transitional justice mechanisms found in the Good Friday Agreement have been sufficient in achieving our understanding of 'peace', with reference to recent instances of disagreement or unrest in the region. Through the prism of transitional justice, it is submitted, a greater understanding of the motives and successes of the process can truly be understood.

Background to the Northern Ireland Conflict

The Troubles began on 5th October 1968 when a civil rights march led by the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association resulted in confrontations with the Northern Irish police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Violent events over the following years heightened tensions in the region, and both unionist and nationalist paramilitary organisations employed guerrilla tactics on the streets and towns of 'the North'.

Religious affiliation at first proved the dividing factor in a conflict that arguably dates back to the plantations of the 17th century and the influence that Protestant Britain had on a Catholic island prior to its inauguration to the British Crown from signing the Act of Union in 1801. In the midst of growing resistance to British rule, and by virtue of signing the Government of Ireland Act 1920, the island was partitioned between two separate parliaments, one in Belfast, and one in Dublin. A united Ireland was relinquished in order to establish instead two separate nations, ceding the six counties of today's Northern Ireland to Great Britain while

granting the remaining 26 a de facto independence under the auspicious guise of Home Rule. The ultimate goal of the unionist and overwhelmingly Protestant majority in Northern Ireland was to remain part of the United Kingdom. The goal of the nationalist and republican, almost exclusively Catholic, minority was to become part of the Republic of Ireland (BBC 2015).

Widespread civil, political and socio-economic rights violations led to an intercommunal schism between Protestants and Catholics (Democratic Progress Institute 2013, p. 11). Discrimination in favour of Protestants over Catholics for the allocation of jobs, housing and the election of local officials remains pertinent to how The Troubles devolved into a conflict spanning 30 years that is estimated to have claimed over 3,600 casualties.

Attempts to resolve the governance of Northern Ireland resulted in the signing of both the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 and later the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985. Both documents failed to garner sufficient support, the former with respect to the disinterest both parties to the conflict showed in overcoming their agenda through political means, while the latter for reasons such as its apparent alienation of the unionist community and its provisions about the Republic of Ireland's involvement in the status of Northern Ireland's affairs.

The aftermath and subsequent failure in reaching a compromise for the achievement of peace and in addressing issues of injustice, unrest and exclusion resulted in the signing of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement of 1998. The signing of the two inter-related documents concerning the tripartite relationship of Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain was set to ensure lasting peace on such contentious issues as civil and cultural rights, the decommissioning of weapons and justice, to name but a few.

Among its provisions, the Good Friday Agreement, compartmentalised into three main strands, first stipulates the status of Northern

Ireland's territorial boarders, its institutional credentials found amongst a power-sharing cross-community arrangement. Second, North/South relations were established to facilitate a peaceful dialogue in all matters concerning the territorial governance of Northern Ireland. A third and final feature enabled the respective governments of Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland to assist in the policies concerning the welfare of the two nations.

The Good Friday Agreement and Achieving 'Peace'

The 'peace process', the beginning of which is generally attributed to the IRA ceasefire of 1994, is concerned with how the disputing parties can negotiate a peaceful political end to the conflict. The peace process reached its apex with the signing of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement in 1998. Segmented into eleven sections, the crux of which is divided into three main strands, and wholly endorsed by both British and Irish governments as well as by the main political parties involved in the conflict, the Good Friday Agreement attempted to address a number of issues ranging from devolution and decommissioning to criminal justice and policing reforms (The Good Friday Agreement – An Overview 2013, 33).

On 22 May 1998, voters in the six counties of Fermanagh, Down, Armagh, (London) Derry, Tyrone, and Antrim as well as the twenty-six counties of the Republic of Ireland approved the Good Friday Agreement by referenda. The tripartite relationship of Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain centred on a power-sharing arrangement. A declaration of support for the Good Friday Agreement enabled participants by democratic and peaceful means to establish new institutions (Strand 1) with a North/South Ministerial Council (Strand 2) and a British-Irish Council, which included a British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (Strand 3).

Among its provisions, the twenty-nine page document called for a devolved government – the transfer of power from London to Belfast – with a Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive Committee in which

unionist and nationalist parties would share power (Archick, 2015, 1). The 108-seat assembly uses a system of 'parallel consent' in decision-making, giving representatives of each community a veto over contentious issues and thus ensuring that neither opposing party can dominate proceedings. 'Key decisions' must receive cross-community support by Assembly members. The Executive Committee would be composed of a first minister, a deputy first minister, and up to ten ministers with departmental responsibilities in such areas as health, education, and social services (Archick 2015, p. 1).

Non-devolved matters, such as law and order, were to remain with the British Secretary of State, who would also remain as the representative for Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. In revising Articles 2 and 3 of its constitution, the Republic of Ireland agreed to remove its claim over the whole of the island of Ireland. The 'Irish dimension' was initiated through a North-South Ministerial Council that allowed leaders in the southern and northern parts of the island of Ireland to consult and cooperate on cross-border issues such as transport, agriculture and education (Archick, 2015, 1). The delegations would be answerable to Ireland's lower house of parliament (the Dáil) and the Northern Ireland Assembly respectively. The unionist parties contributed through a British-Irish Council, composed of representatives of the two governments, the devolved administrations of Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, the Channel Islands, and the Isle of Man to discuss matters of regional interest (Archick 2015, p. 1).

Among these provisions, the Good Friday Agreement provides for a number of mechanisms, intimately related to transitional justice, by which it aims to achieve peace. Furthermore, a holistic understanding of the Good Friday agreement suggests it is itself a tool of transitional justice directed at "reconciliation and rapprochement within the framework of democratic and agreed arrangements" (Good Friday Agreement 1998, Declaration of Support). The question posited is whether the means of implementing transitional justice have lent themselves to the achievement of peace.

By their signing of the Good Friday Agreement, all parties to the conflict ipso facto projected an image of harmony of interests. The term 'peace' is a much argued and debated intersubjective concept related to overcoming the many obstacles set in place pre-1998. The most pertinent issue in evaluating the Good Friday Agreement's contribution to the 'peace' process is that there is no agreed definition of the concept. This issue will attempted to be resolved.

AN UNDERSTANDING OF 'PEACE'

Johan Galtung's positive and negative peace theory aims to empower and give resonance to 'peace' as an achievable and lasting concept. 'Negative' peace, Galtung argues, ''Is the absence of violence, absence of war", while 'positive' peace ''is the integration of human society" (Galtung, 1964, 2, as cited in Grewal, 2003). Both are to be interpreted as two separate dimensions, one being possible without the need for the other, yet it is the case that both may be used to achieve integration, deploying coercive methods if needs be in their aim to achieve a greater good (Grewal, 2003). Positive peace is perceived as being more optimistic in contrast to the pessimism to which negative peace has become more attuned. In deepening our understanding, Galtung metaphorically references health as an illustration of distinguishing the positive from the negative. Health, Galtung argues, is the absence of disease, similar to the preventative elements of positive peace. This is in contrast to the curative mechanisms of negative peace (Grewal, 2003). Positive peace is concerned with the 'before' element and the openness for human understanding through communication. Negative peace is concerned with the 'after' element and perhaps in line with the needs of the powerful for power in any given situation.

Positively or negatively aligned, Galtung's peace research methods purport to create certain conditions for promoting both types of peace in a given situation (Grewal, 2003). Violence, however, is an underlying factor in understanding and defining peace from a theoretical and conceptual perspective. According to Galtung (1969) the terms 'peace' and

'violence' can be linked to one another such that 'peace' can be regarded as the 'absence of violence'. Galtung (1969) defines violence as being ''present when human beings are being influenced so that their somatic and mental realisations are below their potential realisation" (Galtung 1969, as cited in Grewal, 2003, 168). Violence, therefore, exists because of certain structures within society, and violent acts are a mere by-product in facilitating and perpetuating the continuing existence of such violence (Grewal, 2003). 'Peace' is not merely an absence of direct violence (negative peace) but also absence of structural violence (positive peace) that stems from the structure of society, rather than actor-generated personal and direct violence (Grewal 2003). Thus the cause and effect of personal and direct violence through social structures enables us, not only to understand the intricate details for tackling 'violence' but also the instruments that may be used in overcoming obstacles for preventative peace.

Notions of social cosmology, culture and ecology featured high on Galtung's agenda to expand and attempt to define contemporary peace theory (Grewal, 2003). Such notions serve the interests of the powerful to maintain a status quo in any given society by virtue of Galtung's newly contrived concept of cultural violence (Galtung, 1981 in Grewal, 2003). Violence thus was redefined by Galtung as ''avoidable insults to basic human needs and, more generally, to life" (Galtung, 1990, in Grewal 2003). By 'cultural violence' we mean those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence – exemplified by religion and ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) – that can be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence to levels considered acceptable with at least one actor: the government (Galtung 1990, p 291-293). Differing approaches to war and violence along culturalist lines are primarily concerned, however ambiguous in their findings, with the justification, legitimization and conceptualization of such acts rendered acceptable to those who hold power in accordance with the principles of the sovereign (O'Sullivan, 2013).

In the case of Northern Ireland, given the nature of the conflict and the analysis given above, it is argued that during the Troubles, cultural

and structural violence was used as a conduit of suppression of a minority grouping (Catholics) in favour of the majority (Protestants). Cultural, economic, military and political are the four dimensions Galtung uses in his concept of power, a similar mechanism Northern Ireland's unionist majority used as a tactic for maintaining a monopoly pre-April 1998 for fear of suppression of their identity.

The 'peace process' that began with the IRA ceasefire in 1994 illustrates policy-makers' pursuit of peace as and end goal. Varying methods were used to conclude the conflict and begin a process of achieving peace, the most notable mechanism being the Good Friday Agreement. Through the prism of 'transitional justice', the following section will analyse the various provisions of the Agreement that either directly, or indirectly, contributed to the resolving of conflict and violence in Northern Ireland.

Transitional Justice in the Good Friday Agreement

Modern transitional justice finds its origins in the aftermath of World War II (Lundy & McGovern, 2008). Since then, it has undergone many changes (Teitel, 2003), and has been applied in a variety of ways in a diverse range of post-conflict situations. Thus, reaching a comprehensive definition of transitional justice across time and space is difficult.
It is submitted that no specific definition can, or should, be given to 'transitional justice' as a protean concept. To do so would invariably limit the scope of transitional justice in practice, and prescribing a certain 'ideal type' would not reflect its diverse and varied manifestations in post-conflict situations.

Although there is difficulty in defining 'transitional justice', there are several commonalities shared by its practices in many post-conflicts situations. Transitional justice is intimately related to restoration of rule of law, judicial retribution designed to counter impunity, institutional reform, social and political reconciliation, and creating a 'shared narrative' (Lundy & McGovern, 2008, p.267).

As a means of conflict resolution, transitional justice can be a powerful tool in achieving peace. For the purposes of analysing the aftermath of the Troubles, the concept of transitional justice is divided between 'retributive justice' and 'restorative justice', the former being more perpetrator-focused and often employing traditional justice methods, the latter being more victim-focused and employing reconciliatory methods (Bloomfield, Barnes & Huyse, 2003, 97). This distinction was found best-suited to analysing transitional justice as it manifests in the Good Friday Agreement. However, it is not robust distinction, and there are areas of peace process and the Good Friday Agreement that relate to both retribution and restoration.

RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Retributive justice as a vehicle for transitional justice is underpinned by the idea that wrongdoers should be punished for the wrongs committed (Bloomfield, Barnes and Huyse, 2003, 97). Therefore, central to this idea is how a society deals with perpetrators of violence following a period of conflict. Retributive justice often draws on formal paradigms of justice and is influenced by Western liberal traditions (Lambourne, 2009, 30). In contrast to restorative justice, retributive justice tends to operate within the framework of legal norms and institutions (Quinn, 2005).

An underlying issue of retributive justice is the external influence of civilised societies, which can inhibit the contextualisation of transitional justice (Lambourne, 2009). There often arises a bitter debate between what is needed to achieve a perceived form of 'justice' and what is needed to achieve peace, thus two complimentary notions can become antagonistic. This is best illustrated in cases of amnesty, which some view as necessary to achieve peace, and others view as unjust impunity.

There are nonetheless a number of benefits provided by retributive justice mechanisms. Victims tend to seek punishment for those who have allegedly done wrong, with punitive state measures often being the most legitimate means of retribution. Criminal courts individualise the guilt of crimes committed during a conflict, counteracting the potential

for communities to impute general responsibility onto the other side and entrench divisions. Retributive justice also concretises the importance of law enforcement in societies where such institutions have lost respect by the general population (Bloomfield, Barnes & Huyse, 2003, 98).

In this section, retributive justice mechanisms in the Good Friday Agreement will be analysed. First, the reform of retributive justice institutions under the document will be outlined. Second, the controversial issue of prisoner release under the Good Friday Agreement will be analysed. Finally, state accountability, a difficult aspect of retribution during the peace process, will be addressed.

Development of Retributive Justice Mechanisms

The complexity of retribution in the context of Northern Ireland is that there was no explicit regime or despotic rule that was 'overthrown', and the justice system operated for many decades under the guise of democratic functionality (Mulholland, 2003). Northern Ireland is a devolved government within the United Kingdom, and at the time of the Troubles it had established institutions common to democratic states.

Unionists were nonetheless accused of holding control over Parliament and implementing sectarian and discriminatory policy against nationalist Catholics (Fitzduff, 2002, 4). When violence erupted in 1968, the UK government response was internment – first under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (1922) (Northern Ireland) in 1971 and then through the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 after 'direct rule' from Westminster was reinstated. Further legislation was introduced in the seventies in response to growing violence. The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 established the Diplock courts, non-juridical courts that tried terrorist offences. This was then reversed in the UK 'criminalisation' strategy of 1976 – 1981 which aimed to delegitimise political prisoners and paramilitary groups by removing legal distinctions between these actors and 'ordinary' criminals (Gormally, McEvoy & Wall, 1993).

Derogations by the UK government from rule of law norms increased tensions between the two communities and led to further violence. Ideologies that motivated actions were fuelled by perceived injustices and abuse of the criminal legal system.

At the time of the Good Friday Agreement negotiations, many Catholics still perceived the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) as discriminatory in its treatment (Democratic Progress Institute, 2011). The Good Friday Agreement commissioned a number of functional and symbolic institutional reforms to combat perceived injustices and to "ensure policing arrangements, including composition, recruitment, training, culture, ethos and symbols, are such that ... Northern Ireland has a police service that can enjoy widespread support from ... the community as a whole" (The Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, 1998, section 9).

The RUC was renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). Other symbolic changes included a new rights-based oath, and the uniform, logo and flag of the police force were made more politically neutral (Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland, 1999). A Police ombudsman to deal with complaints against officers was established under the Northern Ireland Act 2000. Positive discrimination recruitment measures were implemented in order to integrate the Catholic community into the police force, however these were removed in 2011 when it was believed they were no longer necessary (Archick, 2015, 10).

Under the Good Friday Agreement's provisions on judicial reform, the Criminal Justice Inspection Northern Ireland (CJI) was established. An ad hoc body was also set up in 2001 tasked with advising on reform of the judiciary, which produced the Report on the Draft Justice (NI) Bill and the Criminal Justice Review. The Criminal Justice review produced in 2000 gave recommendations not only on matters of criminal justice, but further recommended the implementation of rehabilitative and restorative justice mechanisms, "rather than pure retributive justice" (Criminal Justice System Review, 2000, 418). This illustrates the intentions of policy-makers to harmonise retributive and restorative justice, rather than allowing the mechanisms under each concept to become mu-

tually exclusive.

Prisoner Release

During the Troubles, divided groups developed divided perceptions of 'wrongs', and thus divided perceptions of 'wrong-doers'. The challenge for the Good Friday Agreement therefore was meeting the demands of the divided groups while being seen at the same time as functionally just.

The solution reached by the parties to the Agreement was the release of prisoners on the concessions of a ceasefire by the paramilitary groups. The Good Friday Agreement provides that state parties will "put in place mechanisms to provide for an accelerated programme for the release of prisoners". This is qualified by the provision that "prisoners affiliated to organisations which have not established or are not maintaining a complete and unequivocal ceasefire will not benefit from the arrangements" (Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement, section 10).

The release of prisoners was one of the most controversial aspects of the Good Friday Agreement, UK MP William Hague stating that "[i] t doesn't make any of us feel comfortable or happy to talk about releasing prisoners. But we also have to recognize that unless there is some agreement on such things there can be no agreement at all in Northern Ireland" (BBC Radio, 1998, reproduced in McEvoy, 1998).

The most acute harm of prisoner release is felt by the victims of violence and the families of victims of violence at the hands of those imprisoned. For those who sought retribution for the crimes of the conflict, the early release of prisoners can exacerbate suffering and risk the re-victimisation (Maguire, 1991). Some victims argued for veto over the release of certain prisoners (McBride, 1995), some expressed their resentment of the releases of "convicted terrorists" (BBC, 2000, July 28). However, other victims saw the need for prisoner release as a necessary means of furthering the peace process. The sub-text of this narrative is the persistent conflict between consolidating peace and retroactive justice that

could compromise that peace, a narrative that plagues many post-conflict regions (Former President of Uruguay, Julio M. Sanguinetti).

State Accountability

Over 360 people were killed by law enforcement authorise in Northern Ireland, half of whom were unarmed, innocent civilians (Amnesty International, 1994). Only four security force members were imprisoned for killings during the Troubles, two of whom were served four years of a life sentence (Currie & MacLean, 1995). The UK government was also found liable in front of the European Court of Human Rights on several occasions for rights violations relating to persons involved in the Troubles.[1]

Accountability for alleged crimes committed by state forces during the Troubles has been a persistent issue of retributive justice (Hegarty, 2003). In 1972, The Widgery Tribunal was tasked with compiling a report on the violent events of Bloody Sunday on 30 January of that year. The Widgery Report was described as a 'whitewash', concluding that almost no blame could be imparted on state forces for the deaths that occurred (Bell, 2003).

In 1974, the British Minister for Defence made a 'goodwill' reparation payment to the families of victims of Bloody Sunday, but did not recognise the payment as an admittance of guilt on the UK's part (BBC, 1974, December 18). It was not until the 1998 Saville Inquiry that the events were re-analysed. The Saville Report undercut the conclusions of the Widgery Report, finding that state forces were culpable for the killings, which prompted a public apology by Prime Minister David Cameron on behalf of the UK government.

This is not an isolated case of the difficulty of state accountability. The Victims Commission Report published in 1998 was criticised for insufficiently acknowledging the victims of state violence during the Troubles

[1] See Ireland v. United Kingdom, (5310/71) [1978] ECHR 1 and McCann v United Kingdom (21 ECHR 97 GC)

(Hamber, 1998). The 1999 Patton Commission on Police Reform was also criticised for its failure to address the RUC's past actions, thus limiting the capacity for institutional reform (Campbell & Ní Aoláin, 2002, 888).

The Good Friday Agreement stipulates that law enforcement reform should include stronger measures of accountability, "both under the law for its actions and to the community it serves" and that there are "open, accessible and independent means of investigating and adjudicating upon complaints against the police" (Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement 1998, section 9).

It is further submitted that the institutional reforms and the prisoner release scheme have improved state accountability in Northern Ireland. First, it is argued that law enforcement reform has acted as an implicit acknowledgment of the wrongs committed by state forces during the Troubles. Recognition of the need for change is the recognition of past structures and practices being unsatisfactory and inequitable in nature. However, this also highlights the emphasis that has been given to institutional reform, which has seemingly eclipsed explicit acknowledgement of past actions (Campbell & Ní Aoláin, 2002, p. 889).

Second, it is stated by many that the release of prisoners since 1998 has been implicit acknowledgement of the political dimension of such arrests, and that punitive measures during the Troubles may have strayed from rule of law norms (McEvoy, 1999, 1575). However, this has since been denied by the UK government (McEvoy, 1999, 1540).
Finally, the Report of the Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland briefly recognised the issue of state accountability when stating that "[t]he public have not been able to hold the police accountable through their democratically elected representatives, as should happen in a democratic society" (Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland, 199, 22).

Our submission is not founded in explicit official statement of the

political aspect of the Troubles, but instead on the subjective interpretations of these events through the eyes of those affected. For those of whom the Troubles was purely a political conflict, these developments have been significant in reaching some form of retribution

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE

Restorative justice differs from retributive justice in that its focus is orientated toward victimhood, truth, reconciliation and repairing relationships between individuals and the communities (Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T. & Huyse, L., 2003, 111). Restorative justice does not aim to attribute liability nor does it abide by strict legal norms, and therefore differs from traditional notions of justice.

This section will look at the restorative justice mechanisms relating to the Good Friday Agreement. It will then look at victim support following the Agreement, in a post-conflict situation where the distinction between perpetrator and victim is often unclear. Finally, the lack of an official, comprehensive truth commission under the Good Friday Agreement will be addressed.

Restorative Justice Mechanisms in the Good Friday Agreement

The conflict in Northern Ireland is characterised by historic cleavages across political, religious and socio-economic lines, and as such, it is difficult to reach a consensus about the most suitable means of reconciling relationships, addressing the past and supporting victims of conflict (Archick 2015, 16).

The Good Friday Agreement acknowledges the needs of victims under section 6, stating that "it is essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation". However, the Agreement provides no procedural mechanisms for realising this statement. Bell and Cavanaugh argue that the reasoning behind this omission is the "constructive ambiguity" of the Agreement. The Good Friday Agreement adopts language that is "vague and can, si-

multaneously, mean different things to different people" (Bell & Cavanaugh, 1998, 1356). This leaves the application of the Agreement open to interpretation, which can be altered to best fit the needs of the peace process.

This is not to forego the argument that the Agreement itself was inherently shaped by the preceding decades of violence (Bell, 2003, 1106). Holistically, the Good Friday Agreement is envisioned as a "fresh start", a method of resolving the issues of the past and preventing the same levels of tension arising in the future.

The decision to omit a procedure for restorative justice has not been without criticism. Some point to the fact that thousands of conflict-related deaths remain unsolved (Archick 2015, 16), while others argue that without a comprehensive framework, the piecemeal approach adopted has cost both time and money.[2] There are, however, several arguments in support of the approach to restorative justice taken by the Good Friday Agreement.

First, it is argued that detailing a comprehensive mechanism of restorative justice in the Good Friday Agreement would have been built on an assumption that the conflict had been concluded, and that the past was firmly situated in 'the past'. Persisting tensions shadowed negotiations leading to the Agreement (Mulholland, 2003, 139), and therefore, probing into divisive issues at such an early stage of the peace process would have only further polarised the opposing parties.

An 'official' mechanism of restorative justice further risks homogenisation of disparate individual memories to create an 'official version' (Bell, 2003, 1141). The needs of victims and the narratives of the past vary greatly and so a 'comprehensive' mechanism would have great difficulty in satisfying the needs of both communities.

[2] For example, the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, charged with analysing the events on 30 January 1972, took 12 years to complete and cost over $300 million. See Archick 2015, 16.

The work of non-governmental, local and small-scale organisations is argued to be more effective in this respect, as "those with local credibility and organisational capacity are often best placed to lead the difficult conversations in past related work in diverse community and organisational settings" (McEvoy & Gormally, 2009, iii). This is reflectedn section 6 of the Good Friday Agreement, in which support is given for "the work being done by many organisations to develop reconciliation and mutual understanding and respect between and within communities and traditions".

Second, Bell argues that the refrain from establishing an official restorative justice mechanism under the Good Friday Agreement has allowed for more pragmatic responses to the demands of post-conflict resolution (Bell, 2003, 1098). Indeed, many legislative organs that aim to realise restorative justice have been established under the auspices of the Agreement. If such organs had been given explicit definition in the Agreement, it is argued that this would have risked limiting the scope for adaptability and expansion required to fit changing needs within the communities.

The Victims Liaison Institute (VLU) is an example of an institution that has benefitted from a wide scope. The VLU was established under the purview of the Minister of Victims (Victims Liaison Institute, 2002), tasked with implementing the recommendations of the Victims Commission. The Victims Commission was organised in 1997 with the aim of finding a suitable means of memorialising the victims of the Troubles, and was given explicit reference in the Good Friday Agreement (Bloomfield, 1998). The VLU expanded beyond these powers and created a number of victim-support and reconciliatory mechanisms for resolving past tensions: the Core Funding for Victims/Survivors Groups Grant Scheme, the Touchstone Group for Victims' interests, the Northern Ireland Memorial Fund, the Family Trauma Centre. By 2001, approximately £18.25 million had been given in funding to victim support measures in Northern Ireland (Victims Liaison Institute, 2002, 5).

Among other statutory organisations, Northern Ireland currently has a Commissioner for Victims and Survivors established under the Vic-

tims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006, and the Victims and Survivors Service, a delivery body charged with improving the structures of victims support in Northern Ireland. This is demonstrative of the benefits of a discrete, piecemeal approach. The ability to adapt, respond and remain current is important in the complexity of post-conflict resolution.

Victim/Perpetrator Distinction

One of major complexities of the Northern Irish conflict is the indistinction between perpetrators and victims. The Victims Commission report stated that there is "some substance in the argument that no one living in Northern Ireland through this most unhappy period will have escaped some degree of damage" (Bloomfield, 1998, section 2.13).

Unlike periods of violence in other regions, Northern Ireland did not experience a complete imbalance of power between the opposing sides. Between 1969 and 1994, 1,739 civilians were killed. 383 Republican paramilitaries, 103 Loyalist paramilitaries, and 995 security personnel were also killed during this period of bloodshed (Fay, Morrissey & Smyth, 1997, table 13). The data shows that losses were suffered by both sides, and indeed both sides would consider themselves victims of the conflict.

Each person experienced the Troubles in different ways, and therefore there is no general conceptualisation of victim, or indeed perpetrator, that can be applied to those involved in, or affected by, the conflict. Thus, the definition of 'victim' extends beyond those directly affected by attacks.[3] Likewise, the definition of perpetrator cannot be applied to the individuals of one particular party to the conflict. This was noted by Senator George Mitchell, who wrote that ex-combatants "are seen by some in their communities as heroes who fought to defend a way of life and an oppressed people" (Mitchell, 2001).

[3] Section 3 (1)(a) of the Victims and Survivors (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 gives a broad definition of 'victims' and 'survivor': "Someone who is or has been physically or psychologically injured as a result of or in consequence of a conflict-related incident; someone who provides a substantial amount of care on a regular basis for an individual mentioned in paragraph; or someone who has been bereaved as a result of or in consequence of a conflict-related incident."

The Good Friday Agreement implicitly recognises this fact in its omission of defining 'victims' of the Troubles. Section 6 guarantees support to victims in general, stating that it is "essential to acknowledge and address the suffering of the victims of violence as a necessary element of reconciliation". The Agreement goes on to recognise "the value the work being done by many organisations to develop reconciliation and mutual understanding and respect between and within communities and tradition", and that resources will be provided for both statutory and community-based organisations.

This has allowed the idea of victimhood to be interpreted in differing ways by the many victim-orientated organisations established since the Troubles. Many ex-combatants have been heavily involved in reconciliation procedures during the peace process, perhaps because as people who understand violence as a perpetrator, quite often they have been on the receiving end of violence, and therefore bring credibility and empathy to the process (Shirlow & McEvoy, 2008). Initiatives such as Community restorative Justice Ireland, the Loyalist Northern Ireland Alternatives and Greater Shankill Alternatives have involved ex-combatants in victim-dialogue and mediation, and evidence suggests these local, grassroots organisations have enjoyed success with both victims and former perpetrators alike (Aitken, 2013, 119).

Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Truth commissions are bodies established by the state that are more overtly political than public inquiries, have a more casual system of rules of procedure and evidence and usually examine a broad spectrum of events (Hegarty, 2003, 1151). The Northern Ireland peace process is unique in that an official truth and reconciliation commission was never established. Truth commissions have been a popular choice in post-conflict situations, the most notable being the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. While similarities can be drawn between the Northern Ireland and South African cases (McGarry, 2001, 276), it does not necessarily follow that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is

directly translatable into the Northern Ireland context. There are number of general and context-specific arguments that can be made as to why a state-organised truth commission in Northern Ireland may have been untenable.

Hamper argues that truth commission are focused more on political compromise than on the needs of the victims (Hamber, 2002, 1074). This can be harmful because truth commissions are veiled as a response to victims' needs, and therefore the expectations of those who have suffered can exceed the results of a commission. In the context of the Good Friday Agreement, it is argued that any establishment of a truth commission would have involved a high level of compromise between the polarised groups and the divisive issues that pervaded the conflict could have marred the work of a commission.

Furthermore, as an 'official' mechanism of restorative justice, a truth commission could have suffered from the aforementioned homogenisation of victims' experiences. Truth commissions were originally about establishing an accurate narrative of events (Hamber, 2002, 1074), but because of the complexity of the Troubles, an official narrative could have compromised on competing 'truths' (Hegarty, 2003, 1148) thus potentially alienating the experiences of those who have suffered. As an example, the Saville Inquiry has been accused of channelling victims' statements into a single narrative that does not reflect their experiences, failing to address specific needs, and imposing a State monopoly over the articulation of events (Hegarty, 2003, 1174).

However, fault cannot be solely attributed to the Inquiry. Hegarty argues that "it is sometimes the case that people call for public inquiries because they believe that they know the essential truth about a situation and simply want the State to 'own up'" (Hegarty, 2003, 1158). McAdams and Pals argue that in telling their narrative, people reconstruct their lives in stories which give coherence, purpose and significance to their lives (McAdams & Pals, 2006, 209). This is demonstrative of the varied understandings of 'truth-telling' between different victims and policy-makers,

and in the context of the Good Friday Agreement, the variety of differing and competing 'truths' is reflected in the 'constructive ambiguity' of its diplomatic language.

Such competing accounts of events persist long after 1998. Mechanisms comparable to truth commissions have been established, and their results have been criticised by either side of the conflict. The Consultative Group on the Past was organised in 2009 as a means of developing public strategies for confronting the most controversial actions of the Troubles, but its recommendations were slated for varying reasons from varying segments of society (Archick 2015, 16). In 2013, a series of talks under Dr Richard Haas were initiated aimed at resolving persisting issues of tension that were left unresolved by the Good Friday Agreement. While the parties agreed a number of steps to address the past, other steps proved beyond consensus and the talks failed to reach a conclusive agreement (BBC, 2013, December 31).

These cases are illustrative of the challenges in establishing a comprehensive and official truth and reconciliation commission. Efforts are still being made to address Northern Ireland's violent past; an agreement on two truth-seeking institutions emerged from the Haas talks: The Historical Investigations Unit, which will have criminal investigatory powers, and the Independent Commission on Information Retrieval. Nonetheless, the overarching process of restorative justice in Northern Ireland remains discrete and decentralised.

Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement

For years, the Good Friday Agreement was ''buggered" by excessively high expectations, by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) refusal to decommission weapons, by inadequate, one-sided policing, by persisting residential segregation, by ingrained habits of violence, by disconnected policy ideas, by neglect of root causes, by sectarian rigidity, by lack of a truth commission, and so on (Reilly, 2009). Although the Good Friday Agreement is heralded as a model form of conflict resolution around the

world, its implementation has proven to be problematic.

The twenty-nine page document is itself framed using what can understandably be described as first-hand diplomacy. The delicate use of language inscribes how all parties to the conflict can benefit from acceding to a document that consciously chooses peace over violence as the viable objective. The shaping and altering of an audience's interpretation to think, feel and ultimately decide a particular stance leaves little to the contrary for the settlement of the territorial dispute (Entman 2007, 164).

According to Heck (1974, 112), when a message is emitted it is not only what is said that has a significance but also the way it is said, and what is not said but could be said. Multi-party negotiations for a settlement to the conflict in Northern Ireland did not produce a content bias in favour of either unionists or nationalists. Instead, the Good Friday Agreement creates space for a situation that manifests into political stalemate for all that seek an end to the bloodshed and violence of Northern Ireland's tumultuous past. In analysing the agreement, it has become apparent that what was initially anticipated by its visionaries has not become a reality. Rather still, connotative elements produced throughout the document elicit an expected hope for peace in the public's psyche rather than peace as something more tangible.

Semantically, the agreement is full of promises, all parties pledging an honour for the reconciliation and restitution of region governing the 1.6 million individuals it claims to represent. To an observer, the establishment of the Northern Irish Assembly and the promises of the Agreement spelled an end to the Troubles. Nevertheless, it could be argued that the Good Friday Agreement is only but words on paper to prevent a society from devolving into violence.

Against the efforts of transitional justice there stands a large number of remaining areas of contention. Attempts at retribution, attempts at restoration and attempts at reform have seemingly failed to abate deep-seated grievances. Examples are the tempestuousness of the decom-

missioning of paramilitaries, the sporadic suspensions of government, and the occasions of civil unrest regarding the denominational divide.

AREAS OF CONTENTION:

Decommissioning

One of the problems of the Good Friday Agreement is the issue of decommissioning and the lack of a specific and comprehensive start date. Consequently, decommissioning became dependent upon the people's good will. Article 25 of the Agreement stipulates that decommissioning exclusively concerns politicians and does not set out any consequences should decommissioning not occur at the grassroots level (The Good Friday Agreement - An Overview 2013). Lack of mutual trust between unionists and nationalists coupled with an apprehensive approach to giving up arms led all parties into an state of affairs in which they were reluctant in making the first move to initiate proceedings for decommissioning.

Although the IRA had been observing a ceasefire since 1997, it was not until July 28 2005, seven years after signing the Good Friday Agreement, that the IRA ordered an end to its armed campaign, stating its commitment to using ''purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means" (The GFA – An Overview 2013).

Though not explicitly stated as such, the decommissioning of arms was strongly linked to the release of paramilitary prisoners. The fact that decommissioning remained a point of contention years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement undercuts efforts made through restorative means at the expense of retributive justice. The compromise agreed between officials and insurgents remained hollow for as long as the decommissioning of arms remained an issue.

Government Suspensions

After twenty-seven years of direct rule from London, authority

over local affairs was transferred to the Northern Ireland Executive on December 1, 1999 (Archick, 2015, 3). This was short-lived, as two months after Stormont resumed power and eight months after Assembly elections, London suspended Northern Ireland's devolved government until June 2000. Spanning seven years, beginning on February 11, 2000, Northern Ireland's institutions were suspended several times on the grounds of inability to reach a lasting compromise on the contentious issue of decommissioning.

The continued reluctance of IRA decommissioning led David Trimble, then Northern Ireland First Minister, to resign his post on 1 July 2001, citing the IRA's refusal to give up weapons and engage in the democratic peace process as legitimate reasons for stepping down. Six weeks after announcing his resignation, London resumed power for 24 hours on both August 10 and September 21, 2001, while negotiators, now intent on finding a solution, began bargaining in order to prevent a government from collapsing the entire peace process.

The struggle to restore devolution to Stormont amid persistent suspensions by the UK government continued between 2002 and 2007. An IRA backed initiative for decommissioning proved ineffective and inefficient on several occasions in building trust among parliamentarians, across communities and between the general public. IRA attachment to a bank robbery in Belfast in December 2004 alongside the murder of Belfast man Robert McCartney in January 2005 were counter-productive to negotiations in achieving a settlement to restore power to Northern Ireland (Archick, 2015, 5). It was not until March 26 2007, after the St. Andrews Agreement and a near decade after signing the Good Friday Agreement that power could be restored to Northern Ireland.

It is difficult to achieve a peaceful society when the institutions responsible fail to function. Though admirable efforts have been made between individuals and within localities, the persisting rivalry at a governmental level only exacerbates residual cross-community rivalry. Furthermore, recourse to Westminster only stems potential conversation between rival parties, conversation that has the potential to aid the un-

derstanding of one another and a convergence of competing truths.

Sovereignty, Orange Order & Civil Unrest

The Good Friday Agreement stipulates that if a majority in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland vote by referendum to remove themselves from the UK and unite with the Ireland, British sovereignty over Northern Ireland would in principle yield to Irish sovereignty (Good Friday Agreement – An Overview 2013). Of concern here is the inconsistency and ambiguity of conflict management in the short-medium term as opposed to genuine transitional justice. The determination of the question of sovereignty is made largely contingent upon demographic changes, illustrated by recent clashes in 2012 that erupted between unionists and nationalists over the changing of policies of displaying the Union flag outside Stormont's City Hall (Good Friday Agreement – An Overview 2013).

The annual 12 July Orange Order parade has proved to be a contentious event, with hostilities resulting from its rhetoric of Protestant supremacy in Northern Ireland. Persistent sectarian tensions, however limited, continue to act as a reminder that a Catholic minority at times feels subservient in many respects to the Protestant majority. The root causes of such often violent clashes are founded along ego-centrist lines of religious affiliation: the Orange Order proclaiming its one true ownership to the territory of Northern Ireland and its civil and conservative liberties against which its people need apparent protection. (Archick, 2015, 11).

AREAS OF PROMISE:

To suggest that such areas of contention indicate failure on the part of the peace process and the Good Friday Agreement would undermine the efforts made at individual and community levels. From the Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report, it is inferred that there has been significant development in resolving differences over the preceding years.

Statistically, there have been many positives since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. There has been a steep decline in 'single identity' wards (residential areas where 80% or more are of one religion) (Nolan, 2014, 115). Shuttleworth and Lloyd suggest that this development is attributable to immigration and globalisation, creating a more pluralised society (Shuttleworth & Lloyd, 2013, 64). Regardless, the decline of single identity wards, which for so long have epitomised community divide, is an important step for integration in other areas of society, such as education.

The Good Friday Agreement recognised the importance of integrated education for the future of Northern Ireland. In this area there have also been promising developments, with a steady increase in the number of students enrolled at schools integrated between the different communities. Additionally, 66% of people agree with the proposition that integration should be the main model for education, with only 18% in disagreement (Nolan, 2014, 120). There have also been initiatives aimed at greater cooperation between Protestants and Catholic educational institutions, for example the Queens University 'Sharing Education Programme' on inter-school cooperation.

A testament to cultural progress was the Derry/Londonderry UK City of Culture 2013, which proved to be a large success for the city itself and for reconciliation between the city's communities. The Northern Ireland Peace Mentoring Report credits several factors to the success of the events: a long-term vision and 'good relations strategy' by the city's council, the impact of the Saville Inquiry verdict, and the changing religious demography of the city (Nolan, 2013, 123). Individuals and organisation have also made significant efforts in the areas of arts, sports and language to create more inclusive environments for both communities.

A retrospective conducted on long-term inter-community relations suggests mostly positive developments since 1998 (Nolan, 2014, 134). There has been a broad improvement in relations, but "responses tend to be closely linked to political events and the presence of or absence

of violence and tensions at key flashpoints". This is extrapolated from the low-points of relations which correlate to the suspensions of the Northern Ireland Assembly on several occasions.

The Report concludes by stating that, in recent years, there have been many civil society organisation involved in various activities to promote peace and reconciliation. The Report further states that reconciliation at the community level is generally invisible to headlines and society-wide reports. Nonetheless, efforts are being made, incrementally but progressively.

Conclusion: Has Northern Ireland Achieved Peace?

In the aftermath of the Troubles, and over a decade since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, can it be said that Northern Ireland has achieved peace?

It is submitted that the region has achieved peace, but on two fronts. With regard to the state structures and politics, it is argued that the peace that has been achieved has been merely 'negative', according to Galtung's hypothesis. On a lower level, that of individuals, families and localities, Northern Ireland has achieved a sort of 'positive' peace.

With regard to the submission that main state actors have achieved only 'negative' peace, a number of points must be made. Violence has ended, paramilitary organisations have effectively disbanded, former combatants use political means to instigate change, and there is greater integration between Protestant and Catholics in state bodies. On the surface, therefore, it appears that Northern Ireland has achieved peace. But this peace is negative – while there is an absence of violence 'on the ground', structural violence still persists, illustrated by the sporadic and debilitating government suspensions that plague the Northern Ireland Assembly. Furthermore, the issue of decommissioning that persisted long after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement and the failure of the Richard Haas talks in 2013 support the argument that discord still exists

at the political level.

Although the Good Friday Agreement introduced new institutions and reformed existing ones, and although it was charged with statements of support and commitment by opposing parties, the state actors have seemingly failed to work beyond their ideological or religious differences. The Good Friday Agreement is itself not without fault – it is submitted that a failure to implement a concrete restorative justice mechanism (though not necessarily a truth commission) at the state level has been conducive to the existence of residual 'structural violence'. Systemic misunderstandings and failure to overcome differences, it is argued, has been the root cause of the inadequacies of the Northern Ireland peace process.

By contrast, transitional justice at the grassroots level, primarily restorative justice methods that encourage dialogue, have seemingly created a culture of casual openness. Individuals of formerly divided communities are more open to integration, cooperation and living together. What we posit is that, in this dimension, the 'cultural violence' that pervaded Northern Irish society has dispelled, leading to a culture of association and understanding. As communities draw closer together, and as conversation emerges between formerly opposed individuals, so too does the truth emerge. With such truth comes solace and closure.

Can such a development be credited to the Good Friday Agreement? The Agreement operated at a top-down level – institutions and state officials were tasked with breaking down cultural and structural violence that persisted after the Troubles. When those institutions and actors failed to overcome their own differences, it could be argued that the Good Friday Agreement thus failed in its task to create 'positive peace'.

However, on a symbolical level, it is argued that the Good Friday Agreement is more than the sum of its parts: the signing of the Agreement was the impetus needed for society to develop a culture of peace. Victims and affected individuals faced harsh realities precipated by transitional

justice mechanisms, notable examples being prisoner release schemes and victim/perpetrator dialogue, but were nonetheless able to overcome these ordeals in order to achieve wider societal peace or closure on a personal level. While there exists some cases of civil unrest and violence, it is a testament to the will of the people, against the failure of state structures, to be able to strive for positive peace through often piecemeal and decentralised means of transitional justice.

It could be submitted from these conclusions that restorative justice mechanisms have proven to be more successful than their retributive counterpart. Employing state-central restorative justice mechanisms could resolve the persisting discord that afflicts the Northern Ireland Assembly and many other institutions. However, such a statement presupposed that the 'peace' that these mechanisms achieve is the definitive understanding of peace for a post-conflict region.

The word 'peace', while used to describe Northern Ireland's journey from sustained violence to functioning society, does not reflect the slow and often painful fight for coexistence after 1998. Indeed the idea of peace is itself utopian – it is seldom the case that a state functions without instances of unrest or disquiet. The lack of a precise definition of peace leaves scholars conflicted as to how one should classify or categorise post-conflict regions. In the context of Northern Ireland, until a comprehensive definition of peace exists, it is impossible to definitively state whether the criteria for peace have been achieved.

The Good Friday Agreement is one of the fundamental mechanisms of transitional justice upon which the peace process finds its strength. It could be argued that the lack of a settlement over such issues as decommissioning, the release and reintegration of paramilitary prisoners, sovereignty, and a truth and reconciliation commission precludes Northern Ireland from achieving a lasting settlement. Furthermore, while the Agreement attempted to eradicate tensions that for so long defined the history of Northern Ireland, it instead created a political system marred by disagreement between divided parties.

It would be premature to state definitively whether the Good Friday Agreement has been a success or a failure. The peace process is not over, and it will not be over until the scars of the Troubles have healed. Inspiring efforts are being made at localised levels, and if Northern Ireland as a state can learn from the will of its people then perhaps a wholly peaceful society will be achieved.

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