Social & Political Review

Trinity College Dublin

Volume XXIV

Social & Political Review

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This edition of the *Social and Political Review* would not have been possible without the generous support of the following organisations:

Preface

Welcome to the twenty-fourth volume of Trinity College Dublin's *Social and Political Review*. The essays which grace the following pages of this journal range from those examining the Maoist insurgency in Nepal and its lessons for the future of that country, to an analysis of the psychological barriers to peacebuilding in Northern Ireland; from the role of France's *grand écoles* in training the political elites of tomorrow to an assessment of Turkey's potential membership of the European Union in the light of European perceptions of a Muslim 'other' – each of these essays demonstrates the talent, enthusiasm and commitment of Trinity's undergraduate students, from a wide range of disciplines, without whom this publication would not have been possible. I would like to thank them, on behalf of the board of the journal, for their hard work and patience.

Publishing the SPR requires the commitment of a team of editors and administrative officers who comprise the board of the journal; they have given too much of their time, energy and thought for me to properly pay tribute to their efforts; all I can do is to thank them once again for their tireless dedication throughout the long hours of selecting and editing essays. The Department of Political Science and the Department of Sociology have continued to give us their full support without which this publication simply would not be possible. I would like to thank in particular Dr. Jacqueline Hayden and Dr. Elaine Moriarty who have advised the board throughout the editing process, promoted the journal to undergraduates and staff in their respective departments and been a constant source of support and encouragement. Thanks are also are due to Trinity Publications for their generosity and kind assistance.

Next year is the 25th anniversary of the first edition of the *Social and Political Review*; a date which offers us the opportunity to reflect on the long road travelled and also that which is still to come. It will be an exciting year to be involved and I'd like to take this opportunity to wish next year's board all the very best of luck with the publication. I would encourage those reading this to give strong consideration to getting involved next year; either as a board member or by submitting your work for publication.

With our world changing like never before, the articles in this volume seek to give a much needed examination of the pressing social and political issues of our time. Enjoy.

Niall Murphy
Editor-in-chief
15th February 2014

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An analysis of the Maoist Armed Insurgency: Lessons for a Future Nepal

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Civil war has been the most destructive form of violent conflict in recent years. Defined as "a politically organised, large-scale, sustained, physically violent conflict that occurs within a country" (Gersovitz and Kriger, 2013, p. 3), a civil war ends lives, destroys infrastructure, cripples economies, and also tends to divide families and communities along political lines. Fearon and Laitin (2003) estimate that civil wars have resulted in three times as many deaths as inter-state wars since 1945. Given the severity of these impacts, it is not surprising that many scholars have sought to explain how and why civil conflict occurs. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to that endeavour with particular reference to civil unrest in Nepal.

Among the most violent civil conflicts have occurred in the past 20 years is the Nepali armed insurgency, which lasted from 1996 until a Peace Declaration was agreed in 2006. This conflict cost over 13,000 lives

and is estimated to have displaced up to 70,000 people (Shakya, 2009). The violence arose when a number of dissident communist factions combined to form the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) in order to overthrow the regime of the Nepali Monarchy, which had been in power for over two hundred years. Despite the Maoists' successful rise to power and the peace agreement of 2006, Nepal today faces a volatile political future. Without a ratified constitution at the time of writing, and facing increased scrutiny from the international political domain, the Nepali government could face the prospect of civil conflict re-emerging, particularly after long-delayed, turbulent elections in November 2013. As such, it is timely and pertinent to examine the causes of the Nepali civil conflict in the hope that future violence may be prevented.

This paper shall begin with a review of the various theories regarding the causes of civil conflict. In order to examine the causes of the Nepali civil war, the paper shall adopt the conceptual framework offered by Brown (2001). The paper shall then offer a brief account of Nepali culture, geography and some of the impacts of its civil war in order to clarify terms and contextualise the conflict for the purpose of this essay. It shall then apply each of Brown's analytical factors in order to identify some of the central causes of the Maoist armed insurgency, noting the uses and limitations of this conceptual framework in the process. The paper concludes with some modest policy recommendations for mitigating future violence in Nepal.

CAUSES OF CIVIL CONFLICT IN THEORY

There is no single standardised theory regarding the causes of intra-state conflict; rather a number of different theorists have attempted to identify the key preconditions that give rise to civil war. This body of research was borne out of the conviction that the traditional view on the causes of civil conflict was inadequate. The latter perspective saw age-old animosity between ethno-political groups within a state as the primary determinant. However, this simplistic post-Cold War view has been criticised because, as Brown (2001, p. 4) notes, "the single factor explanation cannot account for the significant variation in the incidence and intensity of internal

and ethnic conflict". Accordingly, a number of different theories have been posited to provide a more holistic way of studying the causes of civil conflict.

One such approach is offered by Posen (1993) who holds that the efforts of one group to enhance their own personal security in turn triggers reactions from other groups that, in the end, can make both groups more insecure as heightened tensions foster animosity. As Posen (1993, p. 32) notes, "some groups will have greater offensive capabilities because they will effectively surround some or all of the other groups". In contrast, Collier (2002, 2007) examines the causes of civil conflict from an economic perspective. Elaborating on his 'greed and grievance' theory, Collier argues that social grievances such as political repression, inequality and ethnic and religious divisions in fact provide little explanation for the outbreak of violence. However, "economic characteristics – dependence on primary commodity exports, low average incomes, slow growth and large Diasporas – are all significant and powerful predictors of civil war" (Collier, 2007, p. 216). Thus, according to Collier's theory, civil conflict can be seen as the result of the rational economic choices made by individuals within a group (greed) rather than the social problems that characterise their conditions of life (grievance).

A number of scholars have criticised this theory. For instance, Ballentine and Nitzshcke (2005) note that the simple classification of 'greed' is an inadequate indicator of why individuals participate in war. Collier's theory associates insurgency with criminal economic activity, ignoring the fact that many "combatant groups engage in economic activities to pursue military and political goals" (Ballentine & Nitzshcke, 2005, p. 4). Similarly, Murshed & Tadjoeddin (2009) argue that Collier's economic approach fails to recognise a key precondition of civil conflict, that of institutional breakdown. This is supported by an empirical study by Daxecker (2011) who finds that shocks to state capabilities such as leadership weakness and economic decline have greatly contributed to the onset of civil conflict.

However, while the theories outlined above have contributed significantly to knowledge concerning the causes of civil war, they fail to provide an all-encompassing framework within which to study the preconditions of a particular conflict. Gurr (2004) offers one such approach through his analytical framework for ethno-political violence, which is more holistic in its consideration of a variety of conflict determinants. However, its specific focus on tensions between ethnic groups renders it inappropriate in a study of Nepal because, as noted by Kaufman (2012), discrimination along ethnic lines did not occur in Nepal to an extent that could lead to conflict. Therefore, it is necessary to consider another avenue in order to examine this complex conflict.

Brown (2001) offers a more holistic account of the factors that give rise to internal conflict by identifying root causes – those underlying fundamental discrepancies that contribute to the tensions underpinning internal violence. The variables of structural factors, political factors, economic/social factors and cultural/perceptual factors in this framework provide a broad, all-encompassing approach with which to assess the root causes of internal conflict. It is not restricted to the consideration of only economic, geographical or ethno-political factors and therefore is appropriate to use in a study of civil conflict in Nepal. With an analytical framework defined, it is now necessary to provide a brief background of Nepal and its civil war in order to provide context for this essay.

NEPAL AND ITS CIVIL WAR

Nepal is a landlocked state bordered by India to the south and China to the north. It has an estimated population of just over 30 million and, with a GDP per capita of just $1,300 at purchasing power parity levels, it is consistently ranked as one of the poorest and least developed nations in the world (CIA World Factbook, 2013). With a lack of social infrastructure such as roads, telecommunications or a social welfare system, it has been difficult to implement development policy with the result that in 2010, a quarter of the country's population was living below the national poverty line (The World Bank, 2010). The backbone of the national economy is subsistence agriculture and the most prominent industries are tourism and textiles. However, the state lacks a viable tax base as 46% of the population was estimated to be unemployed in 2008 (CIA World Factbook, 2013). With low levels of adult literacy and high levels of infant mortality

(*Ibid.*), Nepal is an extremely underdeveloped country. These conditions can be seen as likely to give rise to social discord and could certainly give rise to the mobilisation of dissenting groups and in turn civil conflict.

With growing discontent at the monarchy and the emerging political system, various communist factions combined to form the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) who quickly gained popular support (Do & Iyer, 2009). In February 1996, the party embarked on a violent insurgency against government forces. All-out war was declared in 2001 and, following the death of over 13,000 people and the displacement of an estimated 70,000 through forced migration, peace talks began to take place in 2006. In November 2006, a Comprehensive Peace Accord was signed which saw the Maoists enter parliament as part of an interim government (Gobyn, 2009). In 2008, an election dissolved the monarchy and put the Maoists in power. Since then, instability has rocked Nepali politics. There were four different governments between 2008 and 2011 and the failure to ratify a constitution in May 2012 put Nepali politics in the international spotlight (BBC News, 2013). Still without a ratified constitution following the turbulent election of November 2013, and with more protests, bombings and violent clashes between civilians and the police, Nepal faces the possibility of political instability continuing and civil conflict re-emerging (Al Jazeera, 2013).

CAUSES OF THE MAOIST INSURGENCY

Structual Factors

Brown (2001) considers three structural factors within his framework of causes for intra-state conflict – weak states, intra-state security concerns and ethnic geography. With an absolute monarchy that lasted from the middle of the 18th century until 1990, Nepal's history of statehood could not be referred to as 'weak'. However, with the advent of democratisation came a number of frailties in Nepal's political system. The transition to a democracy is never straightforward (Heywood, 2011) and this is clearly evident in the case of Nepal. Gobyn (2009) notes that there was a rapid succession of governments and division within the newly founded political parties, while corruption, political manoeuvring and Supreme Court disputes significantly impeded the processes of governance. In addition to these forms of instability, Gobyn (2009, p. 421) highlights that, "market-oriented structural adjustment programs stimulated by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other donor agencies had the initial effect of upsetting the Nepalese economy". The combination of internal instability and external economic austerity during the period of democratic transition severely weakened Nepal's statehood.

In terms of intra-state security concerns, the growing instability in government led to a widespread sense of insecurity around the country. Dissident communist groups began to gain support as they criticised the friction within the democratic process. The National Congress party, known for its animosity towards the political left, was deeply troubled by this and responded by arresting, harassing and torturing left-wing activists, leading to violent clashes between police and communist party advocates in rural areas (*Ibid.*). This form of internal state insecurity was undoubtedly a factor that contributed to the escalation of the armed insurgency.

Finally, ethnic geography played a lesser, though still important, role than the other two structural factors. With 125 ethnic groups, 127 spoken languages, scores of castes and three distinct ecosystems, Nepal has an extremely diverse society (Harris, 2013). However, no single group has experienced exclusion to an extent that would lead to armed violence

violence (Kaufman, 2012). Instead, the oppression of the lower ethnic classes of the Nepali caste system by the government and local landlords, allowed the Maoist forces to garner support among poor communities, particularly in rural areas (Do & Iyer, 2009). The concentration of the oppressed ethnic underclass in the countryside gave the Maoists a solid support base for recruitment, which contributed to the launch of armed conflict.

Political Factors

Brown identifies four political factors within his framework – discriminatory political institutions, exclusionary national ideologies, inter-group politics and elite politics.

In terms of discriminatory political institutions, Nepal's government has been known for inefficiency in implementing development initiatives in rural areas (Pradhan, 2009). This has meant that peripheral communities have remained widely excluded from the benefits of education, tertiary employment and health services. This is due in part to the lack of government spending on infrastructure. With a vast proportion of the population living in secluded villages in the Himalayan foothills, the Nepali government has neglected public spending on roads, telecommunications and education, leaving these initiatives to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and bilateral aid donors (*Ibid.*). This can be seen as an indirect form of discrimination, as rural communities have been widely excluded from social policy.

The role of exclusionary national ideologies as an incitement to insurgency is apparent in the reasons given by the Maoists for going to war. The purpose of their insurgency was to overthrow "bourgeois democracy", defeat "imperialism", abolish the "feudal monarchy", and to establish a communist "people's republic" (Thapa, 2004, p. 42). This decree addresses one of the major drivers of inequality in Nepal – a 'feudal' system whereby the majority of the population is poor and works in agriculture, which sustains the economy. Thus, the view of the Maoists is that the Nepali monarchy fostered an exclusionary system of inequality. There is empirical evidence from Macours (2010) suggesting that increasing inequality can lead to civil conflict, particularly when the insurgent group

gains support by appealing to a minority group's experiences of injustice.

Thirdly, inter-group politics have played a role as a number of newly formed political parties scrambled for power with the advent of democracy. For instance, the United Left Front (ULF), the United National People's Movement (UNPM), and the Nepali Congress (NC) party all sought access to parliament, contributing to political instability. Finally, elite politics did not play a considerable role, as there was no explicit effort by the monarchy to aggravate inter-ethnic tensions. Nonetheless, it can be concluded that political factors were strong determinants of the Nepali civil war.

Economic/Social Factors

According to Brown's framework, economic/social factors include "economic problems" and "discriminatory economic systems". Nepal has had a significant share of economic problems. It is consistently included in the United Nations' list of least developed countries and in March 2013 was ranked in position 157 in the world for human development (UNDP, 2013). This is due to the fact that Nepal's economy had existed in self-imposed isolation from the advances of international industrialisation until the 1950s. As a result, Nepal entered the global trade market through the process of liberalisation without the provision of basic social services such as health, education nor infrastructure for its citizens. Compounding this problem, the political instability from 1990 onwards impeded a "coherent drive to promote economic development or to mobilise and utilise domestic revenues efficiently. The country is faced with low returns on public investments and inadequate government services" (Pradhan, 2009, p. 116). Such economic problems were undoubtedly a factor in contributing to the rural communities' sense of social exclusion.

Discriminatory economic systems can also be said to have contributed to the Maoist insurgency, as social inequality was prevalent in Nepal in terms of access to education, employment and land. These were luxuries of the urban elite classes while rural communities remained peripheral and in a state of poverty. The growing disillusionment of the Nepali people with the economic discrimination contributed significantly to the outbreak of civil war. Do & Iyer (2009) support this contention with

empirical evidence to show that poverty in Nepal contributed to the outbreak of violence, as there is a lower cost of recruiting rebels in such circumstances. As such, potential rebels are encouraged to fight against the forces that perpetuate their personal economic misfortune, while rebel groups benefit from cheap recruits. Indeed, the contribution of the economic/social factors to the outbreak of civil conflict is clearly exemplified by the case of Nepal.

Cultural/Perceptual Factors

Brown (2001, p. 12) identifies two factors that can be classified as cultural/ perceptual – 'cultural discrimination' and 'problematic group histories'. Examples of cultural discrimination include "inequitable educational opportunities, legal and political constraints on the use and teaching of minority languages, and constraints on religious freedom". However, as noted by Kaufman (2012, p. 93), Nepal is one of only four of the world's fifty biggest countries by population that does "not have at least one minority at risk" – that is, a group that suffers cultural, ethnic or social discrimination to such an extent that it may be mobilised into political violence.

Perhaps the fact that English and Nepali were the spoken languages in government served to exclude lower-class rural communities who spoke varying dialects of the Nepali language and little or no English. However, the outbreak of violence cannot be directly attributed to this. Similarly, the view that problematic group histories contribute to unrest – "that many groups have legitimate grievances against others for crimes … committed at some point in the … past" (Brown, 2001, p. 12) – is not directly applicable in this case, as the conflict in Nepal was between "a feudalist minority and a marginalised majority", rather than between many individual minority groups (Van Houten, 2010). Therefore, use of Brown's cultural/perceptual factors is limited in this instance. Notwithstanding this limitation, the other factors in Brown's framework have been helpful in analysing the root causes of the Nepali armed insurgency.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Nepal's Comprehensive Peace Accord of 2006 came about when several

parliamentary parties formed an alliance with the Maoists and forced King Gyanendra to relinquish his power. Following their successful rebellion, the Maoists agreed to a ceasefire whereby their arms and soldiers, along with those of the government forces, were kept under strict management and supervision by the United Nations (Pradhan, 2009). The peace process of 'conflict management' has been widely successful in limiting civilian suffering. However, as Nepal faces an increasingly uncertain political future, further preventive measures must be considered in order to restrict the re-emergence of violence. As Ramsbotham et al. (2011, p. 126) note, a preventive approach "is concerned with resolving conflicts before they become violent and creating contexts, structures and relations between parties that make violence less likely, and eventually inconceivable". Such an approach is appropriate in the case of Nepal, given the extensive contextual, structural and relational root causes that have been outlined in this paper. A preventive approach involves deep, structural prevention and light, operational prevention.

Deep, structural prevention is concerned with national and international-level measures such as democratisation and development. In order to prevent violence from erupting again, Nepal must pursue its current policy of democratisation, which has brought many benefits in the form of reducing animosity between pro-monarchy and pro-Maoist groups. As highlighted by Gobyn (2009, p. 420), "the actual participation of the former insurgents in democratic multi-party elections was a remarkable event in its own right", as communist factions are now expressing their views through voting rather than violence. To ensure that this process continues, Nepali state officials must successfully facilitate an increase in voter turnouts and, in turn, ratify a constitution. This would contribute significantly to the preservation of political stability and would strengthen Nepal's statehood in the eyes of the international community. A second structural approach must be to continue the development policies that have been implemented by the Maoist government, which have seen a number of successes in reducing poverty and improving education and health (Dhungana, 2008). To address Nepal's social problems through development would greatly reduce public disaffection with the government, thus mitigating the risk of violence in the future.

Light, operational prevention is associated with 'preventive diplomacy' (Ramsbotham et al., 2011) whereby efforts to foster cooperation and negotiation between groups are carried out through public discourse. Such policies in Nepal could contribute to preventing future violence. For instance, political debates addressing issues of public disaffection or educational programs to provide civilians with an objective account of the political situation could reduce animosity towards the government and between pro-monarchy and pro-Maoist groups. In addition, the process of army integration, whereby former government forces have been incorporated into the new Maoist army, has been very successful in fostering reconciliation and cooperation between the two forces (Singh, 2012). These processes must be continued to prevent the possibility of conflict re-emerging.

CONCLUSION

Max van der Stoel, the former High Commissioner of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, stated in 1994 that, "potential sources of conflict need to be identified and analysed with a view to their early resolution" (Ramsbotham et al., 2011, p. 123). This perspective underpins the endeavour of this paper. It began by reviewing the numerous theories regarding the causes of civil conflict, noting the strengths and weaknesses of the various approaches. It identified the framework offered by Brown (2001) as the most appropriate with which to analyse the Nepali armed insurgency. After providing a background of the history and current political situation in Nepal, the paper went on to identify the root causes of the conflict. Finally, the paper reviewed Nepal's peace process, modestly recommending the sustained pursuit of democracy, poverty-reducing development strategies and fostering mediation through public discourse. The case of Nepal highlights the importance of identifying the root causes, contexts and structures that underpin civil conflict with a view to preventing further violence.

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Are Muslim and Western European values generally incompatible? A discussion with reference to the possible accession of Turkey to the European Union

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Since the events of 9/11 and 7/7[1], much discourse has arisen as to what extent are 'Muslim values' generally inimical to the concept of 'Europe' and the 'Western' values it seeks to espouse. However, while this debate has perhaps centred around the threat which is posed towards western, 'European' values by Islam in general, it has also helped to instigate dialogue on what postcolonial Europe actually represents: has it lived up to its capacity of being a supra-national entity, founded on concepts of 'peace, justice and emancipation', or has it rather come to be defined as a 'fortress' Europe, premised on exclusionary or discriminatory attitudes towards those who do not conform to the Europe of 'Christian', 'whiteness' or 'memory' (Ponzanesi and Blaagard, 2011, p. 1).

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[1] Terrorist attacks against the USA and the UK on the 11th of September 2001 and the seventh of March 2005 respectively.

This debate has been accentuated with the possible accession of Turkey to the EU, and the fear that this accession would fatally dilute Europe's supposed 'European-ness'. While Turkey's entry into the EU may now be regarded as more of a possibility than an imminent event, the questions raised in debates around the 'Turkish question' still remain. The accession of a country with 70 million Muslim inhabitants, nearly fifty per cent of which are under 18, will not only create serious demographic changes within the European Union (EU), but also require the adaption of how the European establishment and citizens view Europe, what it represents, and how they relate to it (Benhabib and Isiksel, 2006, p. 220).

First, this article shall discuss the concept of Europe, outlining the difficulties faced in the creation of a 'European' identity, as well as the role played by Christianity and ethnicity in the formation of such an identity. The article shall then progress to question the extent to which the formation of such identities leads to the creation of 'others' who are excluded from the narrow identity framework, with special emphasis placed on clashes between the Muslim faith and French identity. The article will also refer to the case of Turkey, both to the extent to which the state and national identity of Turkey can be regarded as secular, and whether the differences between Turkish and 'Western' values pose a challenge to Turkey's possible accession to the EU. Finally, the article shall conclude with reference to the rigidity of religion and ethnicity as identities, and refer to the potential for less rigid constitutional patriotism in the European context.

THE IDEA OF EUROPE: FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS

Perhaps the most obvious concern to be raised is how an overwhelmingly Muslim country will adapt into a Union which, up to now, has been made up of largely Christian countries. To be sure, the present EU need not necessarily be seen as a homogenous entity, with many variations in values and religiosity, not to mention religions themselves, evident across Europe. The EU, abstract as it is, can perhaps be regarded as the most concrete example of such a 'European' entity and identity, with some commentators, such as Hayden White, going so far as to argue that 'Europe'

has never existed anywhere except in discourse (Bhambra, 2009, p. 1).

Despite this, commentators on the concept of a European identity, such as Frits Bolkestein, have given Europe a shared common identity of 'great developments': Christianity, Renaissance, Enlightenment, Democracy and Industrialisation to name but a few (Bolkenstein, 2006, p. 17); a portrayal of Europe as a "cradle of the Enlightenment and of scientific revolutions, and therefore of Western modernity and democracy" (Ponzanesi and Blaagard, 2011, p. 1). Among nations, specific events in historical pasts are often celebrated as an occasion that unifies the present nation in a sense of common heritage and shared past; a heritage which helps unify the nation in the present and build an identity towards the future (McLeod, 2000, p. 70). While variations exist within all the categories listed by Bolkestein as 'great developments', be it the multiple variations of Christianity observed (or increasingly not observed) across Europe, or the timelines of industrialisation and democratisation (late for Ireland in the former and for many Eastern-European members, late in the latter), applied loosely, the above categories can provide a very useful common heritage which the EU can use in the fostering of a cross-national identity. Even the large population of Muslims living in states such as France and Germany, not to mention Bulgaria, need not upset this identity, being part of the 'diversity' which makes up the EU. It is such an identity which people can relate to and call their own, regardless of other differences, which Deutsche believed could provide a horizontal kind of solidarity that would appeal beyond differences and offer a sense of solidarity that justifies producing a state to protect the 'nation' (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009, p. 6). Nations are not inherently "inscribed into the nature of things", rather, they are fabrications built on specific unifying foundations; capable of being built up, yet equally susceptible to being torn down (McLeod, 2000, p. 68). While the EU may not be intended to become a 'state' as such, or even evoke a sense of European 'nationhood', the opportunity to build a sense of identity beyond the national spectrum is evident.

But Bolkenstein also realised that such an identity would be incompatible with an accession of Turkey 'fatally diluting' what has at times been described as a 'White Christian club' (Benhabib and Isiksel, 2006,

p. 221).

The extent to which Christianity shaped the evolution of Europe throughout modern history can certainly not be discredited, with philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas going so far as to say that Europe is the 'Bible and the Greeks' (Maret, 2012, p. 606). While this is certainly an oversimplification of the numerous factors which have affected the development of the continent, Europe's historic association with Christianity is itself "unambiguous and strong; indeed it is the only part of the old world which has ever been integrated on the basis of adherence to a single world religion" (Faltin & Wright, 2011, p. 15). Even in the modern Europe, where Enlightenment liberalism has wiped religion out more thoroughly than almost anywhere else (Malik, 2001, p. 108), Christianity can still be regarded as the crucial element in shaping European identity, if only because it has become a "central factor of political and cultural unification" (Faltin & Wright, 2011, p. 15). Christian influences can themselves be seen in the very creation of the European project, with Christian Democratic influences and contributions among the 'founding fathers' bringing value-based principles into "a liberalistic realm of thought and practice in socio-economic interaction and consultation" (*Ibid*., p. 4).

Arguments abound both for and against the classification of Europe and the EU as Christian in nature, with Beck arguing against this notion, in that he regarded the representation of the EU as a Christian 'club' as a reversal of the progress made during the enlightenment (Bhambra, 2009, p. 8). Yet, the extent to which the EU can be regarded as a distinctively Christian entity is extensive, to a point where there was widespread disapproval from both governments and Pope John Paul II at the initial plan to leave out any reference to Christianity in the European Constitution. Such an omission was regarded as an attempt by the "European intellectuals and European political leaders to airbrush fifteen hundred years of Christian history from political memory", and "an exercise of self-afflicted amnesia" (Faltin & Wright, 2011, p. 168). However, while Christianity undoubtedly played a significant role in the creation of modern Europe, it is an unwieldy element by which to create a European identity; unlike languages, where more than one can be learnt and spoken at the same time, religions are mutually exclusive entities, to which one does

or does not belong. The difficulty with the place Christianity arguably holds in the identity of Europe is that, for those who 'do not belong', Europe will always remain a foreign entity to which they cannot relate. This can perhaps already be seen within some European countries among the Muslim minorities that live there. In countries such as France, where many second generation immigrants live, many are unable to relate to the dominant culture or values, and as such, come to see themselves as Muslims and identify with 'things Muslim' in a search for a sense of belonging (Foner and Alba, 2008, p. 373). In fact, evidence has shown that in some of these countries, second generation Muslim migrants are more likely to express more orthodox or fundamentalist Muslim ideas than their first generation parents did. Islam has evolved not only to become an identity in itself, but also as a way to mark their rejection of the European mainstream and the position to which it relegates them (*Ibid.*, p. 373).

Hypothetical parallels can perhaps be drawn between the predicament many Turkish migrant workers find themselves in in Germany, and the wider inability for 'Muslim' culture to integrate into the concept of Europe. In German, Turkish people invited to fill the labour shortages in post-war Germany were referred to as *Gastarbeiter*, or guest workers. Half a century on, and these migrants, as well as their German born children and grandchildren, are still often regarded as 'guests' to the German state; 'others' caught between not fitting into the dominant, sometimes hostile German culture, and likewise not being able to identify with a Turkey in which many have never lived, and which likewise often rejects them as 'traitors' to the nationalistic and patriotic cause (Seyhan, 2001, pp. 100-102) (Adelson, 2001, in Iftikhar and Salah, 2001, p. 244). The word *Gastarbeiter* can perhaps be understood as guest, invited by the host to work for him, to follow the ground rules laid out by the host and not to outstay his welcome. In this case, the 'guest' is not here to be welcomed, attended to or served by the host, but rather invited in order to fill a purpose for as long as the host deems fit, and not expected to become a permanent part of the household (Seyhan, 2001, p. 101). We must ask ourselves, is Turkey, Turkish and, in a broader sense, 'Muslim' culture just a 'guest' of Europe, incompatible to greater European culture and developments, rights and achievements? What role do the Muslim histories of parts of Europe, such as the Moorish past of Spain, play in the creation of Europe in the present? Furthermore, where does the legacy of Europe's colonial past, in countries such as Algeria or Egypt, fit into the exclusivity of the 'White Christian club' (McLeod, 2000, p. 74) (Benhabib and Isiksel, 2006, p. 221).

'OTHERNESS': CLASH OF IDENTITIES IN EUROPE

The conflict which has arisen between the Muslim values espoused by minorities across Europe and the dominant 'Western values', has also led to increased levels of distrust from both parties, with 'Muslimophobia' coined to describe the growing resentment towards Muslims among certain populations across Europe (Foner and Alba, 2008, p. 370). This can perhaps be put down to the rise of the right in Western Europe, often as a result of the threat which the majority population feels is coming from the culture of minorities (Seyhan, 2001, p. 100). With close to 3 million Turks now living in Germany alone, and significant migrant and Muslim communities living across Western Europe, there has been an increase in anti-immigration platforms, often highlighting post-9/11 fundamentalist atrocities in order to garner anti-Islamist support. Across Western Europe, hard stances upon the immigrant and minority communities are being taken by parties with increasing popular support, be it the British National Party in Britain, the National Front in France or the Northern League in Italy. What Stephen Castles termed 'new racism' is evident in this discourse; no longer are racial superiorities espoused, but rather there is an expression of immutable differences between the dominant and the minority cultural groups, differences which make co-existence between the groups impossible (Huggan, 2008, p. 243), a 'racism without race' which turns 'diversity into immutable difference' (Ponzanesi and Blaagard, 2011, p. 5). It is interesting to note that parties like the English Defence League (EDL) and Front National (FN) regard themselves as non-racist, yet the pressure from the right is influencing political discourse and attitudes to the extent that government decisions are increasingly taking a harder approach towards the integration of minorities. The apation of the host-society to incoming or minority communities seems to have been eclipsed

by a 'one-way street' emphasis on the minority communities adapting to the dominant social identity. In France, the ban on girls wearing the headscarf in public schools was explained as necessary; as headscarves were inimical to French culture and law as they violated the separation of Church and State, and differentiated between women and men in a republic premised on equality. However, it also been interpreted as an attempt to enact a particular version of reality, one which insisted on assimilation as the only way for Muslims to become French (Scott, 2007, p. 8). In France, the traditionally 'Republican' vision of national identity, premised on belonging to the French cultural identity (the dominant culture) of common historical ties and a shared memory, seems to have eclipsed the multiculturalist vision of a post-national, civic-based identity of coexistence, in that the assimilation model of citizenship appears to have emerged which requires immigrants and minorities to erase any differences between themselves and the dominant population (Oscherwitz, 2005, p. 189).

In France, the concept of national memory is an important factor with regards to the concept of national identity and its formation. Similar to the concept of Civilisation, it ties the French to common values and a common heritage, a memory of shared pasts and shared identities. Yet, fears have arisen that this self-same memory is weakening, due in part to the weakening of the French state, and institutions such as school, the Church and family, which transmitted this national memory (Oscherwitz, 2005, p. 190). This fear that the eroding of the national memory is in turn eroding the very concept of Frenchness, and thus, that both French culture and French identity are being lost, has led to a preoccupation with memory and collective identity in France and a search for the answer to the question *'Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?'* (*Ibid.*, p. 192). This discourse can trace its roots to the early 1980s, a time when a major national discourse also arose with regards immigration and the demographic changes which postcolonial France was experiencing at the time. The 1980s can be regarded as a watershed moment in France, with discourse on collective memory and identity arising as a result of a large influx of migrants from former colonies. The concept of *Francité*, or Frenchness, arose largely in response to this influx, in an attempt to build a distinctly French mental space which could not be overwritten by new cultures or people (*Ibid.*, p. 191). While French *Civilisation* was largely premised on the concepts of French values, Francité can be regarded as being a *retour en arrière* to a purely ethnic concept of Frenchness, based on the "direct blood connection to mythical ancestors … nationality as the product of a common history", and a romanticised history glorifying the nostalgia of a pastoral past, while forgetting the industrial chaos of the present (*Ibid.*, p. 192). Llobera distinguishes between civilisation and culture, defining the former as 'cumulative and progressive … transmissible, objective and universal', and the latter as 'the singularity, the subjectivity, the individuality, and the specificity of society' (Bhambra, 2009, p. 9). *Francité* stresses the cultural and ethnic nature of identity, an identity which must be constructed with relation to something else, to an 'other' which does not conform to that identity. Historically, this Western identity, be it in France or with regards the wider European project, has often sought to accentuate a difference between the civilised 'Occident' and the barbaric 'Orient', the 'other' inimical to Western identity (McLeod, 2000, p. 74). In many ways, the discourse in Europe on identity and values has reverted to this self-same portrayal of 'us' and 'them'.

TURKEY AND ISLAM

As such, this inability by many Muslims and 'others' in European countries to relate to the dominant culture of the societies they live in can lead us to question whether this is as a result of the incompatibility of Western and Muslim cultures and values, and if so, whether Turkey, being a predominantly Muslim country, would be inherently incapable of adopting the norms of the EU. Individualism, modernity, human rights, freedom of speech, gender equality and other modern values are often also regarded as part and parcel of what the modern EU stands for in the social and rights spectrum (Mihelj, 2007, p. 280). However, questions remain as to the extent to which Turkey, with an overwhelmingly Muslim population can successfully fit into these roles and values. In the context of free speech, the Turkish Penal Code still retains power to deal with provocations and threats to 'public security' from the advocacy of ethnic,

religious, linguistic or other differences. Coupled with other laws prohibiting the 'public degrading' of 'Turkishness' (such as government institutions and the army) these laws have been used to prosecute detractors of the state, or people who raise sensitive issues such as the Armenian genocide, which still remains a highly contestable issue in modern Turkey (Benhabib and Isiksel, 2006, p. 223). While some of these issues have been addressed and reformed in recent times, many paternalistic and authoritarian elements of Turkish law which would be regarded as inhibiting in Western European values still remain in Turkish law.

Despite Turkey being a secular state, major questions also remain as to the approach taken by the Turkish government both with regards minority religions and the minorities within Islam itself. While in accordance with its Ottoman heritage the Turkish state recognises non-Muslim religious communities as official minorities, and moves are being made to put minority religions such as Christianity on a par with Islam, certain property right restrictions on Catholic and Protestant religious institutions remain, in instances leading to the repossession of property owned by the denominations by the state (*Ibid.*, p. 227). This, coupled with the Turkish ban on the training of priests and clergy by religious communities, raise serious concerns among the European establishment as to the extent to which Turkey is committed to respecting and protecting minorities and religions. Similar concerns are also raised with the approach taken by the Turkish administration, in a largely Sunni Muslim country, to minorities within the Muslim faith. While Turkish law does recognise other religions, minorities within the Muslim faith are given no official recognition, with the Alevi community of above twenty million people still being refused recognition by the Turkish government (*Ibid.*, p. 227). The compulsory religious education system also ignores minority Alevi teaching in the favour of Sunni teaching, again highlighting the incompatibilities between the treatment dished out to the majority Sunni Muslim population of Turkey and the minority Muslim population. As with regards ethnic minorities, the on-going discrimination against the Kurdish population with regards cultural and language rights has also been pointed out by European commentators as something which needs to be addressed before Turkey can be successfully integrated into the EU (*Ibid.*,

p. 227). The Alevi and Kurdish communities within Turkey can also be interpreted as being 'others', this time in the Turkish context; not fitting into the dominant culture or interpretation of what being Turkish is. Likewise, the curtailment of free speech and expression through the likes of the Turkish Penal Code can be regarded as an attempt to create and maintain a delicate Turkish identity, with the likes of Ataturk perhaps becoming the Turkish equivalent to the glorified Revolution or Third Republic of Francité (Oscherwitz, 2005, p. 192).

It can certainly be argued that when viewed against the values publicly adhered to in Europe, major issues arise as to the compatibility of Turkey and its culture, to the values and cultures which the dominant discourse espouses in Western Europe.

DEFINING THE LIMITS OF 'EUROPE'

Similarly, the extent to which the highlighting of Europe's 'Christian' heritage locks out Muslim populations must also be addressed. In order for the successful integration of Muslim and other religious populations into a common European project, identity in Europe needs to be de-religionised, and a new identity to be created along lines which populations across Europe can relate to (Parekh, 2008, p. 128). Habermas outlined the virtues of constitutional patriotism as a solution to a predicament like this, where the shared past is not glorified, but rather the common present and the visions for the future are outlined (Checkel and Katzenstein, 2009, p. 8). A constitution can outline common beliefs, values and ideals, founding a supra-national identity on these elements as opposed to along the lines of a distinctly 'national' territorial or cultural model. Such a model will also allow for easier adaptability as new member states join the EU, including a possible accession by Turkey.

Benedict Anderson, in *Imagined Communities*, defined a need for a unitary language which all of the nation's members could understand as a defining feature of a nation (McLeod, 2000, p. 72). In Europe, the use of a single spoken or written language which everyone understands is a virtual impossibility, but the need to find a feature which all can relate to and understand each other by remains. The legacies of Europe are not

contained within the confines of the Atlantic to the West and the Urals to the East, but extend around the world through Europe's colonial past. Just as Europe's colonial powers influenced the formation of identities and nations across entire continents, so have the colonial legacies raised questions as to what postcolonial Europe actually represents. Likewise, in the present context, there is no actual certainty where Europe ends and where the 'otherness' starts. Turkey has historically played a role in the political system of Europe, despite perhaps not being recognised as culturally European, and throughout the history of both Europe and Turkey, it has stood on a platform of perpetual inclusion and exclusion with Europe 'proper' (Bhambra, 2009, p. 3). While the accession of Turkey to the EU could possibly fortify Turkey's position in Europe physically, it does not necessarily resolve the tensions between identities or material borders of 'otherness, foreignness, alienness' , nor does it provide an answer to whether 'Muslim' and Western European values are compatible (Ponzanesi and Blaagard, 2011, p. 3). Some would argue that Turkey is more likely to conform more to Western European values with accession to the EU. Others argue that all desire to adapt to these more liberal values will disappear once the goal of accession to the EU has been achieved. The capacity of Turkey of adapting further to Western European values, and if so which form this adaption is likely to take, provides ample material for debate. Likewise, the postcolonial nature of Europe does not necessarily imply that the imperial legacy of Europe is passed, but rather is an acknowledgement of the fact that Europe's idea of self and identity still struggles with colonialist and imperialist attitudes (*Ibid.*, p. 4). Whether the accession of Turkey to the EU would significantly alter how these identities are created and interpreted cannot be fully comprehended unless it comes to pass.

CONCLUSION

In a Europe comprising many different cultures and religions, the formation of an identity to which all inhabitants can relate is a highly ambitious project. The very nature of the religious diversity of Europe entails that any such identity ought to be secular in nature, yet an identity based solely on inclusive values and beliefs is unlikely to be able to compete for loyalties against exclusive ethnic and national identities. The very essence of identity is its construction in relation to something else which does not conform to the identity and which therefore provides its distinctness; with Europe already steeped in diversity and difference, expanding to include Turkey as a member of the EU would likely further complicate the creation of such an identity.

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Caviar Socialism: Has the French socialist elite succumbed to embourgeoisement?

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Francois Hollande became President of France in May 2012, deposing the incumbent Nicolas Sarkozy, and promising to bring an end to the austerity policies which had become commonplace in recession-hit Europe. Hollande's Socialist Party (PS) can reasonably be called the most influential left-wing party in Europe, with centre-right parties in power in the other two strongest European states, Germany and the United Kingdom. Rather than being led by members of the proletariat, however, the PS is dominated by France's elite, to an extent unimaginable in most European countries (Gumbels, 2013, p. 24). Sarkozy himself derogatively referred to "Caviar Socialists" entering office in the aftermath of Hollande's victory (Gumbels, 2013, p. 147). The PS conforms to Robert Putnam's Elite theory, being a prime illustration of his Model II, which states that "the impact of social origins on political status is indirect and is only mediated by education" (Putnam, 1976, p. 29). The French administrative and political system is dominated by those who have graduated from the prestigious and exclusive *grande écoles*, with the PS exemplifying the supremacy of this small caste. Students of the *grande écoles* account for a very low percentage of the French population, yet occupy a disproportionate number of the top positions in French life (Gumbels, 2013, p. 25). This link between education and elitism has defined Hollande's PS and the French political sphere in general.

The presence of a socialist party dominated by a socioeconomic elite in power in France would appear to fit the paradigm of Robert Michels' iron law of oligarchy. In his seminal work *Political Parties,* which became "an almost undisputed axiom" (Hands, 1971, p. 155), Michels proposes that left-wing leaders will become an elite oligarchy, subsequently abandoning the wishes of the working masses they allegedly represent, to promote their own, separate needs (Michels, 1915, p. 354). Whilst elite dominance of the PS corresponds with points made by Michels, the policies of the Hollande government have not pointed towards an abandonment of socialist policy. The man who once proclaimed that he doesn't "like rich people" (Gumbels, 2013, p. 147) has done little to win the support of the wealthy in his time in government. His policies and rhetoric have, undoubtedly, become less radical in his second year in power, yet this can be seen as an example of goal displacement within the state apparatus in reaction to stark political realities and not a process of embourgeoisement within the party as predicted by Michels.

This essay will first discuss the agglutination of elites, with particular focus being given to the insightful analysis of Michels which Robert Putnam provided in his work *The Comparative Study of Political Elites.* We will see how elite-domination is maintained by the education system. Second, the paper will examine the restrictive, elitist system of education which exists in France and through which the Socialist Party's elite have emerged, taking a common path into the party's upper echelons. The essay will then examine Michels' iron law of oligarchy and highlight how the left-wing policies of Hollande's first year in power do not correlate with Michels' thesis. Finally it will be observed that Hollande's policies have shifted toward the centre. It will be argued that this shift is simply an acceptance of political realities in response to record-low popular support

for his regime, rather than Hollande succumbing to embourgeoisement as Michels predicted of political elites.

AGGLUTINATION OF ELITES

Examining Michels' iron law, Robert Putnam speaks of the agglutination of elites. That is to say that the "socioeconomically privileged" gain a stranglehold over political power as a result of "several value rankings [being] fused together" (Putnam, 1976, p. 22). His study of parties in numerous Western democracies found that political leaders had backgrounds which were largely related to "upper status occupations and privileged family backgrounds", with upper and middle class children having "between 5 and 10 times as good a chance of entering the political elite" (Putnam, 1976, p. 23). Mosca had previously shown that the powerful elite "are distinguished from the mass of the governed by qualities that give them a certain material, intellectual, or even moral authority" (Mosca, 1939, p. 53). Elite theory highlights several categories which lead to the formation of this elitist domination, and that which is most relevant to the French system is undoubtedly education (*Ibid.*, p. 53). Mosca's theory states that the system is balanced in such a way that the elite are drawn disproportionately from a small number of prestigious educational institutions, and it will be argued that Hollande's PS certainly complies with this model.

INACCESSIBLE ELITE EDUCATION

L'Institut d'études politiques de Paris (*Sciences Po*), one of the most prestigious of the *grande ecoles* (GE), is "largely reserved for the sons of the bourgeoisie" stated political scientist Olivier Duhamels at the funeral of former head of the school Richard Descoings (Gumbels, 2013, p. 11). Duhamels could easily have been referring to any of the GE, given that "the correlation between social background and access to education is unusually high in France" (Putnam, 1976, p. 31). Entry to these schools is effectively reserved for those who attend expensive *classe prepartoire,* where they are trained to pass the GE entrance exams. Further, the GE are becoming more inaccessible. In 1950, 28% of the top four GE came from

a working class background. In 1998, this figure stood at 9%. Despite the working class comprising 68% of the French population, their access to elite education, and consequent positions of power, has become increasingly restricted (The Economist, 2012b). The "first among equals" in the GE system is the *École nationale d'administration* (ENA), the training school for top civil servants, whose graduates are known as enarques (Carreyron, 2006). The top 30 ENA graduates are co-opted into the *Conseil D'Etat* annually, the highest ranks of the civil service, from where they embark on an "elevator" to the top (Gumbels, 2013, p. 45). Increasingly, the children of the enarques are dominating the *Conseil D'Etat,* creating an increasingly closed elite; 83% of the children of enarques who attend ENA finish in the top 30, compared with 10.6% of other students. The domination of a small societal demographic in the French administrative system shows that "reliance on educational credentials for political recruitment by no means assures a socially representative elite" (Putnam, 1976, p. 32).

THE PATH OF THE *ENARQUES*

The effect of this exclusionary system on the PS is evident. Education is "highly correlated with political status". Putnam states that "the impact of social origins on political status is only indirect and is mediated by education" (Putnam, 1976, p. 32). Societal position simply opens the doors to an education which is crucial for success in the PS. Hollande may be the son of a doctor, but it is the fact that he achieved the "winning hat-trick of (attending) Sciences Po, the business school *Hautes études commerciales de Paris* [HEC] and ENA" which propelled him on a path towards the most powerful position in France, and not his familial privileges alone (Gumbels, 2013, p. 4). Ségolène Royal, ex-wife and classmate of Hollande and the PS's 2007 presidential candidate, came from a less privileged background, not attending a *classe preparatoire* and gaining entry to *Sciences Po* via a scholarship. Thereafter, however, she graduated to become an enarque and followed a path well-trodden to the top of the PS. It was her education, not social origins, which brought her to France's top table (Thornhill, 2006).

Royal's ascension is of course, the exception. "That special advantage in favour of certain individuals which the French call the advantage of *positions déjà prises*" [positions already acquired] is to the fore in the GE, and in the powerful positions which are reserved for their graduates (Mosca, 1939, p. 50). The statistics also highlight the disproportionate power graduates acquire. Hollande's presidency was met with an assumption that "the *enarques* are back" (Nouzille, 2012). Over 60% of his immediate Élysée Palace staff are graduates from ENA or the most prestigious engineering GE, *École Polytechnique* (The Independent, 2013). As much as 80% of French Prime Ministerial staff have been graduates of the GE at any one time. It is remiss, however, to state that Hollande's government marks a return of the elite, for it would be wrong to assume that they ever went away. Sarkozy railed against elitism, yet 55% of his immediate staff were either graduates of ENA or *École Polytechnique* (Gumbels, 2013, p.27). Putnam used the mandarins of China as an example of the model of education which predicates elitist status (Putnam, 1976, p. 29). Carreyron (2006) has compared the graduates of the GEs to the mandarins of medieval China due to the astonishing domination the closed meritocracy provides to such a small percentage of the populace in the allocation of positions of influence and power. The exclusivity of the ENA is unmatched amongst other elite Western institutions. In the United States, Ivy League schools provide 50 times more annual graduates than the institution attended by the PS's elite, whereas the UK's Oxbridge admits over 10 times as many students annually (Gumbels, 2013, p. 39).

MICHEL'S IRON LAW

The presence of such an obviously 'superior' (in Mosca's parlance) elite in the PS, should, according to Michel's Iron Law, see an organised oligarchy dominate the party, to the detriment of its rank and file membership's needs. He believed that "democracy leads to oligarchy" within a party system (Michels, 1915, p. 6). Oligarchy is a system where "policies are determined by a small group of leaders" (Hands, 1971, p. 159), which could arguably be said to be a description of representative democracy. The problem with this oligarchy is that it leads to embourgeoisement. If

we take Weber's definition of the job of political parties as being to "attain ideal or material values for its active members", then embourgeoisement sees these leaders abandoning this ideal (Weber and Talcott, 1964, p. 146). Embourgeoisement sees socialist leaders cease to be "revolutionary in ideology, policy, tactics and social composition" (Medding, 1970, p. 6). Leaders develop interests which are "diametrically opposed" to those who they claim to represent as they become part of the bourgeoisie (Michels, 1915, p. 232). Socialist leaders are accused of developing "Bonapartism" by becoming vain, self-interested and self- important (Michels, 1915, p. 133). The removal of any leader who has betrayed the masses will not solve the problem of oligarchy, however. The *réunion des elites*, as Michels termed it, sees the creation of a "closed caste" of leadership. It is crucial to conform to the members of this caste to reach the position where you may challenge a leader. Therefore "the profit for democracy of such a substitution is practically nil" (Michels, 1915, p. 114). The elite have a monopoly of expertise, control over means of communication and are politically skilled. Their party needs them, and Michels sees this creating a never-ending cycle of exploitation and control (Lipset, 1969, p. 434).

HOLLANDE'S 75% 'SUPER TAX'

The elite status of Hollande's PS government is apparent. However, since gaining power, his policies cannot be said to show that the PS elites have, to use Michels' language, emancipated themselves from the party. Michels stated that leaders would adopt "defensive and reactionary policy" (Michels, 1915, p. 233), which is exactly what Hollande's detractors have criticised him for not doing (The Economist, 2013b). Hollande was elected with a promise to introduce a super-tax on the wealthy of 75% on income over €1 million. This was declared unconstitutional, and in response companies were forced to pay a tax of 75% on salaries over €1 million instead (Bremer and Vinour, 2013). Tax rises make up three-quarters of his 2013 budget savings (The Economist, 2013c). His cabinet took a 30% pay cut upon entering office (France 24, 2012). In his first few months in office, he implemented lower level socialist reforms including the lowering of certain pension ages, raising family benefit and capping petrol prices (The

Economist, 2013c). He instructed the Minister for Productive Recovery to fight factory closures and pledged an increased capital gains tax on the sale of shares (The Economist, 2013a). These policies have been criticised on many levels, but they cannot be said to point towards embourgeoisement on the part of Hollande's PS. Hollande's policies are consistent with the influence of the ENA, a "temple of *dirigisme*" which produces graduates who seem "allergic to money" (Gumbels, 2013, p. 150). Hollande's PS conforms to the statement by elite theorist C. Wright Mills that "we cannot infer the direction of policy from the social origins of the policy makers" (Mills, 1956, pp. 279-280). The social background of the elites is simply relevant "as an indication of the structures of social power" (Putnam, 1976, p. 43).

UNPRECEDENTED UNPOPULARITY

It must be acknowledged that Hollande's policies have become less radical as "a sense of urgency and realism begins to creep in" (The Economist, 2013c). Michels stated that a change in policies, referred to as "goal displacement," was inevitable in an oligarchically organised socialist party (Michels, 1915, p. 101). However, he was of the belief that the transformation of elite interests and embourgeoisement would cause the party's policies to shift, whilst any change in the Hollande government's policies would appear to point towards an acceptance of political reality and struggle for political survival. He has introduced numerous policies which seem out of place in his socialist manifesto, including the introduction of €20 billion in tax breaks for companies employing low-wage labour (The Economist, 2013c). This may be a brief and reactionary betrayal of his beliefs, however, in response to opinion polls giving him a satisfaction rating of 23%, the lowest recorded in French polling history (Bremer and Vinour, 2013). The case of the *Bonnet Rouges* exemplified the public dissatisfaction with his regime (Carnegy, 2013a). A mass protest in response to the introduction of an eco-tax for truckers saw the tax being suspended, the third such retreat in the autumn of 2013 (The Economist, 2013b). This is a response to public pressure with a *Le Monde* poll revealing that 70% of French people felt that the 84 new taxes implemented by his

regime were excessive (Moutet, 2013). PS Prime Minister, Jean-Marc Ayrault, has admitted that the French "think they pay too much tax" (Carnegy, 2013b). While Hollande can be accused of being an elite-trained populist who "pursues reform with one hand, while throwing meat to the left with the other" (The Economist, 2013b), he does not fit easily into Michels' oligarchical paradigm.

CONCLUSION

Francois Hollande's ascension to the peak of French politics highlights the restrictive and elitist system which exists within the country. The proliferation of members of the promotion Voltaire, those who, along with Hollande, graduated from ENA in 1980 in positions of power is remarkable, making Oxford's infamous Bullingdon Club seem tame in comparison (The Economist, 2012b). The domination of political life by graduates of this "immense machine for manufacturing clones" has not created a vacuum of representativeness in the way Michels predicted. His loyalty to the leftist ideals has been to his clear political detriment. Hollande has not abandoned his long-held socialist principles since coming to office, although he has begun to moderately compromise them. He has largely followed his pre-election promises, even when faced with difficulty in doing so (Bremer and Vinour, 2013). It has been the failure of his policies, and what some would call political incompetence, which has seen his popularity wane so spectacularly. "The tragedy of the PS is that it keeps putting off the rupture with the left" remarks Arnaud Leparmentier of *Le Monde* (The Economist, 2013b). If true embourgeoisement had taken place in the PS, this rupture would have occurred long ago.

This essay examined the question of whether the French socialist elite had succumbed to embourgeoisement, as Robert Michel's predicted all socialist elites would. First it considered the French educational system, which produces a perpetual elite, corresponding with elite theory such as that produced by Mosca. The PS has been shown to be an elite political institution, in which the obtaining of power depends on one being a graduate of a small number of elite educational institutions. This essay further investigated Hollande's policies in his first two years as President

of France and concluded that he, the most powerful of the French social-
ist elite, has not succumbed to embourgeoisement as Michels would have
predicted.

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Iran and China: An examination of international relations theory and its relevance in understanding change in today's world

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In explaining the recent actions of Iran and China, this essay will first demonstrate the importance of choosing a 'level of analysis' and then argue that the international relations theory of social constructivism is most relevant to understanding change in both Iranian and Chinese foreign policy. Second it will draw on constructivist insights into the end of the Cold War to explain Iran's about-turn in its nuclear policy. Finally it will argue that the ability of states to have multiple identities enables a reconciliation of China's aggressive foreign policy with its acceptance of established international institutions.

CHOOSING A 'LEVEL OF ANALYSIS'

As suggested by Singer, choosing a level of analysis is both significant and complex (Singer, 1961). By choosing the individual level, this paper necessarily neglects the insights provided by considering the system or state level. These levels are, broadly speaking, theorised by realism and liberalism respectively. Although this paper does not assert that these theories do not contribute to understanding global change, it does argue the individual level understood through the prism of constructivism most accurately reflects reality.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

This section will explore how the theory of constructivism allows the individual level of analysis provide such a fruitful understanding of change in global politics. Constructivism, as described by Ruggie, rests on an "irreducible inter-subjective dimension of human action" (Ruggie, 1998, p. 24). Thus, constructivism recognises that it is only through a social interpretation that humans can understand objects and events. This capacity, as Ruggie suggests, gives rise to 'social facts', which are facts that are contingent upon human consciousness: that a pine tree exists is a fact; whereas the existence of a Christmas tree is a 'social' fact. The ideas that we have and the shared understandings of those ideas underpin the concept of social facts. If society 'forgot' Christmas, Christmas trees would simply cease to exist. This has important consequences for international politics: constructivists argue anarchy is a social fact and thus, is defined by the ideas that are commonly shared about it. Wendt's radical statement, "anarchy is what states make of it" (Wendt, 1999, p. 139) concisely drives this point home; if actors no longer believe that self-help is the logical and necessary corollary of anarchy, then it no longer is. When an idea about a certain action becomes widely shared, it becomes a norm. Constructivism lends ideas and norms a good deal of significance due to their causal effects: "Without ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no meaningful material conditions" (Wendt, 1999, p. 139).

The importance of norms and ideas lies in their power to shape a shared understanding of the material world. Thus, if an actor becomes sufficiently powerful, it can discipline interpretation of reality: "making some interpretations of reality less likely to occur" (Hopf, 1998, p. 19). Ruggie (1998) provides an example to illustrate the point: the material

reality of chess is that of 32 irregularly shaped objects on a wooden board. However, the common social understanding of these objects lends them meaning such that they constitute the game of chess. It is the constitutive rules of the game of chess that transforms these objects from pieces of wood to Kings, Bishops and pawns. It is the social understanding and the shared ideas of the game of chess that create the possibility of chess.

Constructivism holds that reality is socially constructed and that that construction is fundamentally rooted in ideas. Ideas are the product of human consciousness, thus human beings are, as Ruggie notes, carriers of ideas (Ruggie, 1998). It is because ideas can be located only within the individual that makes this level of analysis most relevant to understanding political change. Moreover individuals, especially elites, play crucial roles in espousing new ideas, creating a new national identity and deriving interests and formulating policy.

Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue the main vehicles for system transformation are shifts in ideas and norms. Drawing on their conception of the three-stage 'norm life-cycle' they highlight the importance of the 'norm entrepreneur'. A norm entrepreneur begins the life cycle by attempting to convince actors of the value of her norm. It will be argued that when Hassan Rouhani opened dialogue with the West he acted as a norm entrepreneur who helped reconceptualise Iranian identity as a staunch and defiant adversary of the West to one that is capable of dialogue and interaction. Meyer describes this as a change in "strategic culture", which he defines as "the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms … that are shared among the most influential actors … within a given political community" (Meyer, 2011, p. 11). Norms within this context include beliefs not only about what is 'appropriate' but also about 'what works'. Thus, the role of individuals, specifically elite individuals, is critical for creating the norms that change national identity and the strategic culture of a state.

WHAT CHANGE?

Two examples will be considered when explaining the role of individuals in understanding change in today's world. The first will be the recent change in Iranian nuclear policy; the second will consider the 'rise of China'. These examples have been picked because they represent both a more immediate view and a broader view of change in today's world respectively. Moreover, as will be shown, the most intuitive level of analysis for understanding these changes is *not* the individual. Thus, the 'counter-intuitive' explanation of change given below is all the more noteworthy as it takes the alternative arguments 'at their strongest.'

PERESTROIKA IN IRAN

In August 2013 Hassan Rouhani was sworn in as Iran's new President; three months later Western powers and Iran reached an unexpected and ground-breaking agreement that curbs Iran's nuclear program. In explaining the changes that led to this dramatic about-turn in Iranian nuclear policy, this essay will draw on the constructivist interpretations of the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Specifically, it will follow English who analysed Mikhail Gorbachev's role in creating new thinking' within the USSR.

The parallels between Gorbachev and Rouhani are striking: they both had to contend with hard-line, conservative elements that rejected their change in policy. More importantly, they are both intellectuals who deeply immersed themselves in Western ideals. While Gorbachev studied the ideas of Churchill (English, 2005), Rouhani studied in Glasgow Caledonian University. Indeed, such is the influence of Western thought in Rouhani's government that his cabinet has more PhDs from US universities than Obama's administration (Naím, 2013). However, an important distinction between the Iranian case and the Soviet case is the office of the Supreme Leader of Iran. Ganji noted that "the dominant figure in Iranian politics is not the president but rather the supreme leader Ali Khamenei" (2013). However, it seems that the Supreme Leader has broadly welcomed Rouhani's ideas of moderation; even preaching that it was "quite all right" if Mr. Rouhani talked to the Americans (Bittner, 2013).

As in the Soviet case, the level of the individual is not the only level that can provide an explanation of the change. Realist analysis of the 1980s contends that Reagan's military build-up forced the USSR to bankruptcy (Kratochwill, 1993). Similarly, viewing the Iranian deal from the

systemic level leads to a realist conclusion: the crippling sanctions the West imposed on Iran since 2006 finally weakened Iran sufficiently to bring it to the negotiating table (Guardian, 2013).

Thus, the question is which level of analysis best explains the change in Iranian nuclear policy? Although the realist conception is certainly useful in emphasising the role of the sanctions, it is the constructivist account of Rouhani's leadership that provides a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding. English concludes that to show "beliefs … ultimately matter, we must demonstrate their impact on policy" (English, 2005, p. 23); returning to the concept of norm entrepreneur provides a clear account of how Rouhani's beliefs had a causal impact on policy. From the beginning of the presidential race in 2013 Rouhani was the 're-formist candidate'. He emphasised the necessity of prioritising the easing of tensions with the West and set a priority for the economy and diplomacy when he came to power (Naím, 2013). It should be noted that it is not contended here that Rouhani is some sort of clandestine liberal seeking to overthrow the Iranian state. It is clear that Rouhani remains a "revolutionary ideologue and defender of the Iranian system" (Ditto, 2013); however he has formulated a more enlightened conception of Iranian identity and interest. This has enabled him to pioneer a change in Iran's strategic culture. Thus, analysing the recent change in Iranian nuclear policy on the individual level is fruitful. Drawing on the analysis of Gorbachev's role in the Soviet collapse constructivism paints a far more nuanced picture that incorporates changes in the Iranian political structure, and how Rouhani has carried his ideas through to a radically altered foreign policy.

The most salient alternative explanation, realism, suggests that Iran was brought to its knees by crippling sanctions. In refuting the realist understanding of the Soviet collapse, English argues it is 'inconceivable that under any other leader the Cold War would have ended so rapidly and peacefully' (English, 2005, p. 29). It is equally inconceivable that under the leadership of anyone else that Iran would have signed the nuclear deal. Thus, the level of the individual is most appropriate in understanding the changes in Iran's nuclear policy.

THE RISING DRAGON: FIERY, FRIENDLY OR BOTH?

Scholars advocating all levels of analysis have used the 'rise of China' as an empirical linchpin: systemic authors such as Mearsheimer invoke 'balance of power' theory to explain the evidence that countries such as India and Japan are worried about China's ascendancy and are looking for ways to contain it (Mearsheimer, 2005). China's recent announcement of a new Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) seems to be captured well through neo-realism's structural level analysis. Mearsheimer suggests "China will seek to maximise the power gap between itself and its neighbours" thereby becoming the regional hegemon (*Ibid.*, 2005). In reaction to this, smaller powers will balance against China in a US led coalition. Again, this prediction seems to ring true; just days after China declared its new ADIZ zone South Korea, Japan and the US all defied the Chinese claims by flying into the zone (Al Jazeera, 2012).

Similarly, scholars who focus on the state level use China as a key example to prove their theory and predict China's peaceful rise. Bijian emphasises the strategic choice China made to embrace economic globalisation (Bijan, 2005). On the other hand, Breslin (2010) contends that China has been acquiescent in accepting the international order.

Thus, systemic level and state level analysis seem to lead to mutually exclusive predictions. However, by studying China's rise at the level of the individual, it is possible to reconcile both conclusions. Wendt (1992) argues actors have multiple identities: a man can at once be a brother, son, father, teacher and so on. At first glance, these identities may seem contradictory, but a moment's pause allows one to recognise the possibility of being both a father and a son at the same time. In a similar way a state may have different (and sometimes contradicting) identities depending on its role; China can simultaneously be an economic rule taker and an aggressive expansionist. According to Johnston, these multiple identities are the result of 'socialisation'. On the one hand, Chinese integration into global capitalist institutions and the growing rhetoric of a 'responsible major power' is the result of the socialisation of Chinese elites who participated in the ASEAN[1] regional forum. While on the other hand, the

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1 Association of South East Asian Countries.

socialisation of the national narrative of victimisation has led Chinese leaders to act aggressively in matters of territorial disputes.

Johnston concedes that there is a "firewall" (Wendt, 1999, p. 211) between integration into global institutions and the discourse of "territorial incompleteness". As a man acts differently to his father and his son, foreign policy can be different depending on which "concept of identity is salient in an issue" (Wendt, 1999, p. 211). The historical weight of Chinese identity and perceptions of Japan, combined with what Chinese elites see as an unnecessary provocation has led to increased tensions in recent months. In September 2012 Japan claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku' Islands (Perlez, 2012). Most commentators understand this as Japan attempting to balance against China and limit its territorial expansion. Thus, the systemic level, understood in a realist philosophy, seems to provide an intuitive understanding of the dispute. This becomes more convincing when the islands' vast deposits of oil and natural gas (Schiavenza, 2013) are added to the equation. China is therefore acting like a classic rising power, exactly as a realist would expect it to.

This analysis begs the question: what is it about China's increasing power that causes it to act in such an aggressive manner? Neo-realism cannot provide an answer. However, constructivism asserts it is the ideas that underpin the identity of China as a major power that produces its interests. The ideas of elites are rooted in historical grievances against Japan, which produce interests that lead to a realpolitik foreign policy. Japan is an emotional issue for China (Zhao, 2013): unacknowledged war atrocities combined with the aggressive and uncompromising rhetoric of the new Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, have re-opened scars in the Chinese national psyche (Shek, 2013). The meaning of the islands goes far beyond any economic value they may contain. Rather they embody and underpin important senses of national identities. It is this identity that has created the national interests of both states in claiming the islands. Although their economic value is a contributing factor, it is clear that this crisis is more fundamentally understood in the ideas of individuals who formulate policy based on their identity and interests.

CONCLUSION

The world is one of social construction: its existence is rooted in social facts that are contingent on human consciousness. Without the interpretation of human consciousness, objective material phenomena would be meaningless: just as chess pieces are given meaning by the existence of the game of chess, so too do tanks and soldiers derive their meaning in human consciousness. Individuals are the carriers of ideas. Therefore, they create the ideas, espouse new norms, build identities and derive interests.

This essay has argued that understanding change requires a focus on the individual level and has sought to justify this in describing the role of Hassan Rouhani in fundamentally altering Iranian identity and interests which allowed Iran to sign an historic nuclear deal with western powers. It then analysed the rise of China and argued that the process of socialisation of Chinese elites has led to a seemingly contradicting foreign policy. However, following Wendt, it showed how actors can have different identities depending on what role is being played. Thus, it was argued that China's seemingly contradictory rise is understandable only when looking at the socialisation of elite individuals through the prism of constructivism.

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'Everything That Isn't Me': Environmental sustainability as a model for human-environmental interaction, a socio-philosophical exploration

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Sustainability is a term familiar to most people through its tedious repetition in public policy debates. Politicians stress the need for sustainable taxation systems, banks speak of sustainable profitability, and even some scientists are planning a sustainable human presence on Mars. Sustainability is a buzzword used to such an extent that it has become difficult to grasp the complexity of the concept. In order to advocate a sustainable system it is important for policymakers to understand the substance of the term. Drawing on the theories of environmental philosopher Paul B. Thompson and the economic theories of Amartya Sen, this essay will examine sustainability as a framework for understanding human interaction with the natural environment, attempting to isolate the descriptive, normative, ethical and economic elements to a theory that is tasked with resolving the apparent paradox of enabling both the fullest level of human flourishing in society and the highest degree of environmental conservation. First this essay will critically consider various models of ecosystem management in order to locate sustainability as a balancing act between holism and productionism. Then the impact of informing the discourse with a normative dimension will be explored, before concluding by applying the model to a problem of economic development.

THE FUTILITY OF UTILITY

Garret Hardin's exposition of the *Tragedy of the Commons* is a useful place to begin the discussion. He wrote:

> "picture a pasture open to all … each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. Such an arrangement may work reasonably satisfactorily for centuries because tribal wars, poaching and disease keep the numbers of both man and beast well below the carrying capacity of the land. Finally, however… social stability becomes a reality. At this point the … commons remorselessly generates a tragedy. As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximise his gain … [by understanding the commons in terms of utility there is] one negative and one positive component: (1) the positive component is a function of the increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly + 1 (2) the negative component is a function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of – 1."
> (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244)

Thus we see the futility of utility. The herdsman concludes that the fractional utility versus the more defined utility leaves only the option of adding another animal to the herd. Every herdsman shares the same problem and, since they share the same rational capacities, they will gravitate

towards the same solution. The negative utility tells us that the commons is limited, however the rationality of the system dictates that, if he wishes to maximise only one variable, each herdsman must increase without limits. Hardin concludes 'ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all (*Ibid.*, p. 1244).'

DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE CONSIDERATIONS

But is this strong conclusion necessarily true? As this essay develops it will become apparent that freedom is precisely the value that can facilitate a sustainable model of human-environmental relations. Nevertheless, Hardin's is a useful point of departure (Norton, 2005, p. 233). It suggests that the rational tendency is towards growth and that, when resource allocation decisions are made on a primarily individual basis, the resource base will be destroyed (*Ibid.*, p. 242). Paul B. Thompson views unrestricted productionism as the root cause of this problem. For Thompson productionism lacks an ethic of care and preservation; as it stands, it is an irredeemably consequentialist theory (Blatz, 2001, pp. 443-435). Thompson borrows the concept that human beings are seamlessly interconnected with the natural world from the analyses of E.F. Schumacher. He therefore begins his examination of sustainability with the value judgement that human beings form part of the nature and are not above it. However, unlike ecophilosophers such as Shannon Jung and Philip Hefner, and conservationists like Aldo Leopold, Thompson's assumption does not lead him to argue for a stewardship model. This approach stresses the responsible use of natural resources, often from a deontological perspective frequently derived from religions (Worrell & Appelby, 2000, p. 263). Thompson regards the underlying presumptions of this theory as overly productionist and unreasonably anthropocentric (Norton, 2005, p. 89; Peterson, 2000). Although Leopold's 'land ethic' with its emphasis on the transcendent nurturing power of nature proves overly ecocentric, and therefore overly normative, Thompson does find some kernel of truth in his viewpoint. Leopold's assertion that we have been misled by an overemphasis on

economics is foundational to Thompson's rejection of productionist economics. Leopold advocates a new set of ethics and new set of scientific standards to facilitate a better method of ecosystem management (Knight, 1996, p. 472). His observation of existing ecosystem management methods, particularly agricultural practices, leads Thompson to conclude that agriculture is being treated as a means to a profit for a few rather than the base of life for all. Consequently, Thompson argues for an ethic that reveres the resource base and appreciates 'the spirit of the soil,' while still being pragmatic enough to appreciate the reality of human exploitation of natural resources as a means of survival and of well-being.

Thompson does not reject economics out of hand. Economic theory is tremendously valuable as a cognate field. However, economics does not in itself complete the reconstruction of a stewardship model to create an adequate philosophy of environmental management. Economics must be included in environmental ethics as part of the pragmatic effort to make such ethics realistic. It explains the rational actions of land users under various exigencies. It can help to analyse systemic failures and highlight the values that inform behaviour within such systems. However, resource economics is only a tool of analysis: "Actual economic analysis must be informed by values, it will not give us the values we seek" (Thompson, 1995, p. 116).

Discussing Leopoldian holism as an alternative system, Thompson argues it is overly moralistic (Thompson, 1995, p. 145). The major contribution of holism is in its ability to humble farmers by reminding them that agriculture is a productivity-oriented intervention in the ecological system. Holists like Joanna Macy argue that holism ought to be the moral conscience that can inform science and agriculture. Thompson rejects this position, saying that it has no credibility in current research and policy (Gottlieb, 1999, p. 156). Values are, of course, essential in the resolution of the problem, but they cannot be idealistic to the point where they lack any framework for their realistic implementation. While holism can be the source of individual inspiration, stressing its capacity for societal transformation is naïve as it requires some sort of revolution or mass conversion in public morality its emphasis on a one-size-fits-all morality may well divide rather than unite environmental ethics. While values are

important, finding the right balance of values that facilitates sustainable development in particular contexts is paramount.

Thompson seeks a middle way between ecocentric holism and productionist anthropocentrism, which must also strike a balance between intrinsic and instrumental value. He sees this as necessary since the anthropocentric model specifies our duty to conserve resources for future generations but does not create a concept of ecosystem integrity, while ecocentrism can specify our duties to preserve nature, but it is not pragmatic enough to give a guide as to how to deal with situations where human interference has usurped the natural symbiosis of nature. Thompson advocates sustainability as the concept of convergence.

Thompson encounters an initial difficulty with the term since 'sustainability' has acquired various meanings in diverse settings. In its typical usage 'sustainability' is a matter of fact; a system is either deemed sustainable or unsustainable. However, he notes that whenever 'sustainability is sought or questioned, it is almost always with respect to something human beings value, strive for, or hope to attain' (Thompson, 1997, p. 75). There is a need, therefore, to articulate the descriptive and normative aspects to this theory that has gained such popular currency in social, political, economic and environmental rhetoric.

David Pearce and Edward Barbier have given a definition of sustainable development which Thompson builds upon. They state that the first act is to define a development vector D, which may include social objectives, consequently 'sustainable development is then a situation where the development vector D does not decrease over time' (Thompson, 1995, p. 149). Both Pearce and Barbier are strong advocates of the value of applying economic theory in the quest for sustainability (Norton, 2005, p. 311). In terms of a philosophy of agriculture however, their definition does little to advance beyond straightforward utilitarianism, especially since outside factors influencing the system may cause there to be an ethical imperative to avoid or mitigate the required approaches. In such situations the language of sustainability does nothing to create the imperative since, as Peace and Barbier construct it, it is a purely economic or descriptive theory with no space for moral values.

ARTICULATING THE SYSTEM

To create a more refined definition, Thompson turns to the anthropological vocabulary of emic and etic. The emic describes the internal functioning of the system independent of the external schema. The etic, on the other hand concerns itself with describing the system in its general, non-structural and objective dimensions. This analysis can be of use to environmental ethics inasmuch as the emic perspective reflects the situation whereby agricultural exploitation has become the norm in certain circumstances. For example a farmer may have an emic objective of maintaining yields, while the etic perspective will show that the farmer is part of a farming system of which the farmer may show little awareness. Thompson summarises 'whether production and maintenance of yields contributes to the proper functioning of the farm system depends upon an analysis of the farm system that may or may not correspond with the farmer's goals' (Thompson, 1995, p. 151).

The emic/etic distinction helps to describe the system to a fuller extent. For instance, the emic perspective shows us the values and norms that cause a farmer to choose sustainable practices. It shows that the aim of the farmer need not have anything to do with supporting sustainability. The etic perspective describes how the system is sustainable but does not describe the underlying values which motivate such systems. The analysis shows the 'philosophic problem with sustainability is that we need two very different kinds of criteria for knowing how to use the concept … system describing (etic) and goal prescribing (emic)' (Thompson, 1995, p. 153). Through this combination of perspectives it may be possible to strike a balance between production and ethical imperative.

Thompson offers four qualifications that must be considered when assessing the sustainability of systems:

1) Systems do not have natural borders, they are defined by perspective.
2) Sustainable systems can be dependent on multiple sub-systems and processes.
3) Sustainable systems by definition are subject to dysfunctions that push performance criteria out of the desired range. If a

system is logically or physically incapable of failure the term 'sustainable' should be avoided.

4) Sustainable systems are subject to internal and external threats. External threats are not evidence of unsustainability, although an inability to account for such threats may be evidence of an incomprehensive system (Thompson, 1995, pp. 164-167).

It is not so simple as to apply these qualifications to human action and consequently apply ethical significance to the etic system analysis. This is for two reasons of logic. First the problem of reflexivity requires the observer to be external to the system because an etic model "cannot self-referentially include itself" (Thompson, 1995, p. 157). This leads to the second problem; the etic perspective is logically incomplete and consequently cannot be treated as complete.

Given the lack of completeness with an etic perspective it is important to understand what an emic analysis can show. Thompson illustrates the incompleteness of the etic perspective through reference to the slave agricultures of the ancient world. He says that Egyptian and Sumerian slave agricultures were sustainable with respect to certain production and resource criteria. The system-describing analysis shows the system to have been sustainable however it does not prescribe the moral norms to condemn slavery. However, there is a further complication because we sacrifice our philosophical neutrality and integrity by selecting borders which make oppressive systems – such as slavery – de facto unsustainable systems. This is a "nefarious obfuscation" because "a normative…judgement is being smuggled into the analysis without argument" (Thompson, 1995, p. 159).

Thompson examines two strategies for including a normative aspect in sustainability. First, he suggests viewing sustainability as a value lying alongside justice, peace and other ethical norms. In this analysis a social system could be judged valuable because of its justice, fairness and sustainability. Second, he looks at sustainability as an intrinsic value. In this analysis the slave agricultures deserve praise for their sustainability, if nothing else. However, the according of intrinsic value is problematic for two reasons. First, no amount of sustainability should be allowed to outweigh an advance in an overriding value, such as human rights.

Thompson does not articulate an adequate set of criteria for establishing a hierarchy of values or rights, which causes him to make the same 'nefarious obfuscation' he has already condemned. Second, systems boundaries are properly influenced by considerations of rights, efficiency or justice but improperly influenced by an intrinsically valuable sustainability. This is because in our shifting of the borders to label systems that are otherwise morally questionable as sustainable systems, the intrinsic value of sustainability becomes a fairly empty intrinsic value (Thompson, 1995, p. 164). Thompson thus concludes his argument by stating that the system-describing sense of sustainability must be given an implicit priority over the goal-describing sense. Although the calls for sustainability evoke moral sensitivities they need not be moral imperatives in themselves (Norton, 2005, p. 304). Thompson does not methodically dissect each of the available definitions of sustainability (see Jacobs & Jones, 2007, p. 85). His purpose is not to create a new definition of sustainability or even to show ways to reach sustainability. His purpose is to respect the 'spirit of the soil' and he recommends systems which are sustainable as one way of achieving this.

RECONCEIVING GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

Having analysed the philosophical background of sustainability and prepared a case for it as system-describing, the concluding section of this essay will examine a practical framework for realising Thompson's theory. Wolfgang Sachs approves Thompson's distinction between emic and etic perspectives (Jacobs & Jones, 2007, p. 185). Unlike Thompson, however, Sachs' analysis highlights the interconnectedness between ecological destruction and social development. Roger Jacobs and Peter Jones use the example of global warming to show the social implications of the problem: while farmers in Senegal and La Paz are not the cause of global warming they will be the first victims of it (Jacobs & Jones, 2007, p. 192). Consequently a practical effort needs to be made to ensure that the sustainable systems are comprehensive enough to bring about positive change.

The interest in sustainable development first came to light in 1971 with the publication of the "Limits to Growth" study by the Club of Rome

(Club of Rome, 1971). Through a combination of neo-Malthusian principles and apocalyptic shock tactics they warned that the earth's natural resources were unsustainable at the current rates of usage (De Schrijver, 2006). They claimed that at current rates the world's resources would peak and collapse before 2100, the corollary of this is that progress is negative (Jacobs & Jones, 2007, p. 179). This situation was one of the first times since the Enlightenment that blind faith in progress was questioned from a scientific point of view (Jacobs & Jones, 2007, p. 180). Sustainable development emerged as an answer to the question of how to reinterpret 'progress' in light of the limitation of resources. At this point it is useful to reintroduce Thompson's rhetoric of systems analysis. Herman Daly and Kenneth Townsend write:

> "… the earth's ecosystem develops (evolves) but does not grow. Its subsystem, the economy, must eventually stop growing, but can continue to develop. The term sustainable development therefore makes sense for the economy, but only if it is understood as "development without growth" [in relation to destructive use of non-renewables] i.e. qualitative improvement of a physical economic base that is maintained in a steady state by a throughput of matter-energy that is within the regenerative and assimilative capacities of the ecosystem. Currently the term sustainable development is used as a synonym for the oxymoronic sustainable growth … a culture dependent on exponential growth for its economic stability."
>
> (Daly & Townsend, 1993, p. 267)

Thus we can conceive of the environment as a model for development without growth and view the economy as a sub-system of the environment. Consequently, by Thompson's definitions, the sub-system needs to respect the overall system otherwise it becomes an internal threat and the sustainability of the system fails. Respecting the structure of the system requires a critical re-conception of growth and development.

Sachs shows how the question of economic and social development is intricately linked with the question of the environment: "whoever demands more agricultural land, energy … purchasing power for the poor finds himself in conflict with those who would like to protect the soils, animals, forests, human health or atmosphere" (De Schrijver, 2006, p. 34). Sachs' description places us back on the commons, awaiting the tragedy. The only solution, he believes, is the articulation of a development model that is not growth oriented. It is in this light that Amartya Sen's theory of 'development as freedom' gains currency in the sustainability debate. Sen argues that economics are a factor, but not *the* factor in development. He argues with reference to Kerala and Tamil Nadu that there can be a systematic variation in the relationship between income and substantive freedoms (Sen, 1999, p. 109). Sen overcomes the questions of intrinsic and instrumental value which cause Thompson so much trouble by defining poverty as capability deprivation rather than income deprivation (Sen, 1999, p. 87; De Schrijver, 2006, p. 42). Conversely, capability is viewed as the system which enables individuals to lead lives that have reason to be valued. Thus socio-economic growth is seen in relative terms to socio-economic development. Sen sees freedom as "the primary object of development" and also "its principle means" (Sen, 1999, p. 291). This is the basis for his concept of instrumental freedoms. In this scheme an action such as the abolition of the slave trade enables people to have a higher sense of being human and this capability fuels the recognition of other development opportunities. These instrumental freedoms cover the realms of the political, economic, social, protective and citizenship. Sen's model, which tries to be comprehensive in encompassing a diversity of freedoms and a multiplicity of systems and subsystems, shows that it is possible to improve people's quality of life without requiring a spectacular increase in prosperity, measured in the traditional way (De Schrijver, 2006, pp. 42-43). Growth is thus reinterpreted as positively horizontal, while still allowing progress, albeit in a linear format.

Thompson's analysis of sustainable systems has given a philosophically sound picture of what a sustainable system ought to look like. Through the limitations and caveats he highlights it becomes apparent that sustainability involves a reinterpretation of progress and growth. Sen's theory fits neatly with Thompson's, especially when we consider Thompson's guiding influences. Although Thompson suggests that

society must make compromises with the environment in its ecosystem management policies, he does not articulate what practical adjustments the compromise would involve. His fear of dealing with questions of intrinsic value deters him from this line of enquiry. However, through Sen's theory that income is only instrumentally valuable while capability is intrinsically valuable it becomes clear that the proposition of compromise is unnecessary (Sen, 1999, p. 87). By arguing that through a reconfigured model development can continue in a sustainable manner, Sen plugs the gap left by Thompson and offers a theory of practical sustainability which appreciates Thompson's caveats, especially the suggestion that sustainable systems ought to be comprehensive, and manages to present a theory that account for both the descriptive and normative dimensions to sustainability.

CONCLUSION

In summary, this essay has examined the genesis of sustainability rhetoric by considering its place in ecosystem management. It was noted that productionist ethics are at the heart of the problem with economic and stewardship ethics, while holism is hopelessly idealistic. Consequently it became apparent that in any theory of sustainability a productionist ethic must be avoided. The second section of this essay examined Paul B. Thompson's observations of sustainability and concluded that sustainability, although incomplete, is a method of systems analysis which can bring about a positive end. In the final section, Thompson's theory was combined with the perspective of Amartya Sen to demonstrate that development is possible without a productionist ethic as its guiding force. Sen's solution is the designation of capability as an intrinsic value. Through the combination of Thompson and Sen's insights a richer synthesis is created which enables the articulation of a sustainable system from both an etic and an emic perspective, thus overcoming the reflexivity problem. This synthesis forms a system that is grounded in the values of human freedom and appreciation for human potential. It sees sustainability as an attempt to balance freedom with responsibility. In concluding we see that Hardin's pessimistic conclusion that 'freedom in a commons brings ruin to all' is

overstated since, when it is properly construed, it is freedom that which can enable a sustainable future where social responsibility for environmental care and human freedoms can converge.

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Democratic Dreaming, Disenchanted Reality: Afrobarometer and the quality of democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa

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The 'third wave' of democratisation in Africa has had mixed results, with democratisation in stalling in some states while others have regressed into authoritarianism. These problems are not just institutional; as the Afrobarometer surveys of the last decade have shown, citizens in these countries also have mixed feelings, seeing democracy as a good concept, yet increasingly not supporting their own democracies. Even in countries generally viewed as democratic success stories, such as South Africa, the citizens themselves have a very low regard for the quality and the strength of their democratic system. What might account for this democratic disconnect? One reason for this dissatisfaction with the state of democracy lies in the neopatrimonial nature of many African states, with the clientelistic tendencies of elites interfering with the functioning of important democratic institutions. Another reason is the failure of democratisation to provide the economic growth that was expected to follow the transition. This paper seeks to understand how these connected issues affect public opinion towards democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, by examining the survey results from the last decade of Afrobarometer research in the context of the wider literature on the quality of African democracy. First, this paper will address corruption and neopatrimonialism as a cause for democratic dissatisfaction. Secondly, it will consider the role of economic growth in legitimising democracy in Africa. Finally, it will examine briefly a third aspect of democratic success that is not so easily captured in the survey data, the role of the international community.

The Afrobarometer surveys provide a useful overview of the substantial range of opinions throughout Africa. In the most recent survey round, conducted from 2010-2012, 73% of those sampled believed that "democracy is preferable to any other kind of government", and yet only 19% believed that they lived in a full democracy (Afrobarometer, 2012). These values have held relatively stable in the decade since the inception of the Afrobarometer surveys (2001). In 1999-2001, 57% of Namibian respondents, 76% of Ghanaian respondents, and 84% of respondents in Tanzania believed that democracy was preferable; in 2010-2012, those values were 64%, 82%, and 84%, respectively. While the values for democratisation as an optimal form of government appear to be trending positively across sub-Saharan Africa, the values for satisfaction with the current state of democracy has actually decreased overall since 1999-2001, from 61% surveyed being fairly or very satisfied with democracy to just 50% in 2010-2012. Clearly, despite the best hopes of citizens across sub-Saharan Africa, there are still great problems with the quality of democracy in the region.

CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT

What accounts for this widespread and deeply rooted disappointment with democracy in practice? On one level, the low satisfaction with democracy could be due to fundamental flaws in the democratic nature of the regimes themselves. There is a large body of research arguing that democracy in Africa is made up of a superstructure of formally democratic

institutions built on a base of informal institutions frequently categorised as neopatrimonialism (Van de Walle, 2007). These informal institutions include a wide range of the pathologies that appear to impact negatively on the quality of democracy in Africa. These range from simple corruption, to more organised systems of patronage and clientelism, to so-called "Big Man" politics (Bratton, 2007, p. 98). Specifically, there is evidence that the nature of presidential systems in Africa make them more likely to succumb to neopatrimonial instincts. As Van de Walle (2003) argues, power in most African presidential regimes is highly centralised. This concentrates the clientelistic access to state resources directly in the office of the President, even in the more liberal democratic regimes. Diamond (2008) argues that this centralisation leads not only to corruption and clientelism, but also to the political violence that has become endemic in the less stable democracies. Specifically, he points towards Kenya after the presidential election of 2007, where the zero-sum game that the neopatrimonial presidency creates can help to "explain how a single rigged election can ignite the paroxysms of violence and ethnic cleansing" (Diamond, 2008, p. 146) that occurred there. These "Big Man" political arrangements have a great deal more in common with the autocracies and one party states that they replaced than with true democratic regimes.

Following on from Guillermo O'Donnell's argument (1996) that the rules actually being followed are often more important than formal institutions that are ignored, it is possible that the election of legislatures in Africa may actually have a detrimental effect on the quality of democracy. In fact, there is evidence that democratisation, instead of decreasing clientelism and patronage by taking power away from authoritarian rulers, has in fact increased corruption by widening the base of the population requiring patronage in return for support. Case studies in Ghana (Lindberg, 2003) and Benin (Wantchekon, 2003) show the pervasive nature of these clientelist systems even in moderately successful democracies, over a decade after the initial transition to democracy. Both of these studies examined the role of legislators in continuing the patronage streams, also expanding the number of actors having to provide patronage to secure power. The capture of institutions by neopatrimonial elements across the range of democratic institutions severely hampers the functioning of the state, contributing to dissatisfaction across the region.

The Afrobarometer surveys are useful in attempting to discover the effects of corruption and clientelism on democracy. There are several questions relating to perceived corruption in numerous state organs, ranging from the office of the President to civil servants. In the first Afrobarometer (2001), 52% of respondents (excluding Nigeria and Ghana, where the question was not asked) believed that most or all of their members of parliament were involved in corruption. That same value in the latest survey (Afrobarometer, 2012) shows just 29% believing that most or all of parliamentarians engage in corruption. Both Ghana and Benin, however, report higher than average levels of parliamentary corruption, with 32% and 40% respectively responding that most or all parliamentarians engage in corruption. This appears to indicate that the case studies conducted by Lindberg and Wantchekon are less representative of the whole African experience than they would appear.

The level of perceived corruption in the office of the President, however, has increased over the past decade; in the first survey where the question was asked (Afrobarometer, 2003), 57% of respondents thought that at least some of the officials in the President's office were corrupt. This number grows to 68% by the latest Afrobarometer round (2012). There is variation within the results by country, however, even the best performing democracies appear to suffer from substantial corruption. In the most recent survey round, 61% of respondents in Botswana believed that there was at least some corruption in the office of the President. This is highly significant as Botswana has long been regarded as one of the strongest democracies in Africa. Since gaining independence, its President is directly responsible to parliament, a constraint almost unique among African presidencies. When these corruption responses are viewed in conjunction with responses pertaining to satisfaction with democracy, an intuitive relationship develops. Among respondents who believed that there was no corruption in the office of the President, 67% were satisfied to some degree with democracy, while among respondents believing that all officials involved were corrupt, 62% of respondents were not very or not at all satisfied with democracy in their countries (Afrobarometer, 2012). Overall, corruption and clientelism seem to have a negative effect on the

quality of democracy across Africa, and it may be that in certain arenas, particularly the presidency, this impact has been increasing since democratisation. In this scenario, then, the decrease in perceptions of legislative corruption could stem from the decreasing power of the legislatures as Presidents resume control over the state's resources. In any case, it seems logical that there is at least a correlation between the growth of the democratic neopatrimonial state, and the decreasing satisfaction with democratic performance across the region.

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEMOCRACY

The quality of democracy in Africa has long been tied to the economic strengths of the regime. It was widespread economic protests that initially sparked the latest wave of democratisation in the early 1990s, with political changes called for after linking corruption and mismanagement to economic decline (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, pp. 102-105). Popular support for democracy in Africa can be broadly divided into two categories, defined by Bratton and Mattes (2000) as 'intrinsic' and 'instrumental' support, with the former being related to political freedoms, and the latter connected to the democratic regime as a means to other ends, such as the alleviation of poverty. Certainly, in this conception, democratisation, even with its flaws, has brought more 'intrinsic' good, with nearly all states being freer than in the 1980s. In 'instrumental' terms, however, democracy in Africa has been more flawed. One of the more troubling developments of the last two decades has been what Lewis (2008) describes as "growth without prosperity". In many African states, while growth rates have been strong over the last few decades, income levels and poverty measurements have not kept pace. Lewis demonstrates that while democracies certainly perform better than autocracies in overall economic growth through the last decade, democracy's ranking in terms of the Human Development Index has grown at a much more anaemic rate (2008, pp. 99-100). Economic growth, in this case, cannot be seen as providing any additional democratic legitimacy on governments, at least not with the vast majority of the population. Much of the poverty reduction, even in economically successful regimes such as in Ghana, has come

from what Lynch and Crawford (2011, p. 294) describe as making "the relatively rich richer, and (some of) the poor poorer", highlighting the often large discrepancies within states. The connection of democracy to growing economic prosperity at the very beginning of the process of democratisation in the 1990s is a major factor in the increasing dissatisfaction with democratic performance, in an atmosphere where what economic growth does occur results only in greater inequality.

To look again at the Afrobarometer results, there does appear to be a strong connection between economic success and democratic success. In the most recent survey round, respondents ranked job opportunities for all above law and order, a free media, and multiparty elections as an essential characteristic of democracy (Afrobarometer, 2012). 53% of respondents overall believed that the current national economic condition in their country was fairly bad or very bad, compared with 45% of respondents who were dissatisfied with the state of democracy. When compared more directly, the connection between perceived democratic and economic success is even starker: among respondents who believed that their national economic condition was "very bad", only 41% were fairly or very satisfied with democracy, compared to 63% of respondents who believed that their national economic condition was fairly good. The temporal trends for economic satisfaction follow the trend for democracy: since the question was standardised in the second round of the surveys (Afrobarometer, 2003), the number of respondents who believe that the national economy is either very or fairly bad has grown from 48% to 53%, mirroring the increase in democratic dissatisfaction mentioned above. The economic failures of the new African democracies has clearly had a negative impact on the public's perception of their democratic credentials.

CONCLUSION

There are other factors impacting on African democratic consolidation that are less easily quantified in opinion surveys. Despite rhetoric from international donors and aid agencies about 'democracy promotion', most international actors have shown a remarkable willingness to accept

political stability and economic growth over actual democratic reforms, for example in Uganda and Rwanda (Lynch and Crawford, 2011, p. 294). Lynch and Crawford also make the case that donor conditions have limited the capacity of democratic governments in Africa to be accountable to the local electorate. Bratton and Van de Walle (1997, p. 241) outline some instances where international action helped to curb potential anti-democratic action, such as in Zambia, where Western diplomatic influence was used to permit the former dictator, Kenneth Kaunda, to contest the 1996 presidential election. Overall, the majority of international action in terms of African democracy seems to be at best neutral, limiting the most egregious violations of democratic norms while accepting more subtle forms of manipulation in the name of political stability.

The Afrobarometer surveys are a very useful resource for examining the process of democratisation in Africa over the last decade. Through examining citizens' satisfaction with democracy both over time and across the region, some of the deep-seated problems with democratic politics in the region become apparent. To begin, the neopatrimonialist nature of much of African politics ensures that even in states that are formally very democratic, leaders are still able to subvert the system through informal, patron-client relationships. The failure of the promise of economic growth under democratic regimes also negatively affects overall perceptions of democratic success. Because many in the region see the provision of employment as a major element of democracy, any difficulties in providing equitable economic growth can, and does, reflect poorly on the state of democracy. There is, however, an important caveat to keep in mind when considering the evidence presented above. The Afrobarometer surveys, while growing, are still only active in 29 sub-Saharan African countries, and as Erdmann notes, these tend to be only the most open societies in Africa (Erdmann, 2013). This could mean that even these quite pessimistic results could be skewed in favour of the most open, democratic cases. In conclusion, African democratic regimes have a number of steps to take in order to improve public satisfaction in democracy, including providing more equitable economic growth, and decreasing corruption and clientelism throughout the political structures. There remains hope, however; despite the setbacks of the last two decades, the vast majority of Africans still see democracy as the only solution. With some difficult institutional reforms, it is possible that eventually, democracy will live up to their hopes for it.

This paper sought to explain the low levels of public support for democracy in sub-Saharan Africa, with relation to the Afrobarometer series of public opinion surveys. It examined first, the relevance of corruption and neopatrimonialist regimes on democratic support. Second, it addressed the role that economic growth plays in legitimising democratic regimes in the region. Finally, it suggested a potential alternate factor impacting consolidation not represented in the survey data, the role of the international community.

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Human security in decline? Addressing conceptual ambiguities and difficulties

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"The world cannot be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives"

(United Nations Human Development Report, 1994, p. 1)

Human security can be understood as "safety from chronic threats and protection from the sudden hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life" (United Nations Human Development Report, 1994, p. 3). Following this definition, it is here proposed that while it could be argued that human security as a concept and framework for practices has largely disappeared from the international agenda, such a viewpoint ignores the work done by various agencies in the name of human security and the relatively recent resurgence of interest internationally in human security. The reasons for the apparent decline of human security are examined, namely, conceptual ambiguities, resulting framework difficulties and the apparent misuse and failure of human security interventions by international institutions. In contrast, the advances of the human security approach and the recent resurgence of interest in human security in the United Nations (UN) are examined in order to argue to argue that the ideals of human security are, and will remain to be active.

First, this paper will consider the conceptual ambiguities of human security and the difficulties that arise from such ambiguities. Following on from this, human security frameworks and their apparent failure and misuse are examined. In response to such problems, the paper concludes by highlighting the relatively recent resurgence in human security with reference to the UN and the on-going Syrian crisis.

THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN SECURITY

When discussing human security, the most contentious issue surrounds its definition. While this paper uses a simple definition, scholars and policymakers rarely agree on what human security constitutes (Paris, 2001). The concept of human security as outlined in 1994 by the UN Human Development Report divided human security into several categories, ranging from economic to environmental security (UN Human Development Report, 1994). Such a sweeping definition caused problems for scholars; Khong argued that by prioritising everything, human security has prioritised nothing due to the difficulty it creates in dealing with specific issues (Khong, 2001, p. 232). Once an issue is 'securitised', it gains priority among policymakers (Newman, 2010). However, if everything is prioritised, what gets preference? In response to this criticism, human security advocates have grouped the original definition into two categories; namely, a 'narrow' view, constituting 'freedom from fear' (violence) and a 'broad' view constituting 'freedom from want' (economic and personal) (Owen, 2004). Whilst significant convergence between these two groupings exists, scholars are still faced with difficulty prioritising 'freedom from fear' or 'freedom from want' (Owen, 2004). Perhaps the conceptual difficulty of human security has contributed to its apparent decline, as

agents are unsure of its meaning. Lakhdar Brahimi, a former UN official, allegedly told Martin and Owen, "I don't use the term human security because I don't know exactly what I mean, and I worry that someone will come up and contradict me" (Martin and Owen, 2010, p. 216).

Another conceptual issue related to human security's apparent decline is its radical nature. Throughout the Cold War, the international community's conception of security was embedded within the nation-state model, wherein the primary security objective was related to defending state sovereignty. States exercised a dual role as internal provider of citizens' security and as an external source of security threats to others. In line with this approach, the international community adhered resolutely to the principles of sovereignty in approaching intra-state conflicts. Even in cases of severe human rights abuses, most states formally rejected the idea of intervening in another state (McCormack, 2008). Alternatively, human security aimed to empower individuals by providing a two-part support system, comprised of both the state, and, should individual security be compromised, the international community (McCormack, 2008). In effect, state security became one option among many others, and state sovereignty became flexible (Oberleitner, 2005). This concept has provoked the ire of commentators, such as Chappuis, who argued that taking human security seriously would require a total change in the international community's structure (Chappuis, 2011). Others have argued that human security violates national sovereignty. Chandler, in his dismissive review of human security as *The Dog that Didn't Bark*, argued that human security provides stronger states an excuse to intervene in the sovereignty of others (2008). It could be postulated that human security makes intervention following human security abuses seem apolitical, when intervening in another state's affairs is fundamentally a political act. Thus, critics of human security have presented the concept as a neo-imperial tool and attempted to tarnish it, thereby contributing to the apparent decline of human security. Whether this is the case will be examined, but, first, this paper deals with framework disagreements stemming from the conceptual difficulties.

HUMAN SECURITY FRAMEWORKS

Understanding the concept of a framework as "a set of ideas or facts that provide support for something" (Merriam-Webster, 2013), this section examines human security frameworks in international relations and how they have contributed to its apparent disappearance. There are two frameworks of note: frameworks built on 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want' (Owen, 2004). Frameworks built on 'freedom from fear' have perhaps been the most effective and popular approach among states. Historically, Canada has been at the forefront of such an approach, but in 2005 a UN initiative labelled "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) was established which broadened its advocacy base (McCormack, 2008). The essence of R2P is that sovereignty is not a right, but entails responsibilities for states to provide protection and security for citizens (McCormack, 2008). In many senses, therefore, R2P replaced human security as a framework based on 'freedom from fear'. The gross misuse of R2P, which will be discussed later, may have led to a growing uneasiness about using such a framework.

The second policy framework adopted by states has been based on 'freedom from want'. Traditionally, Norway and Japan have been great proponents of such an approach, but the European Union (EU) and the UN have also been involved (Martin, 2013). This framework attempts to extend the 'threat' agenda to include hunger, disease and natural disasters, as they are seen as inseparable concepts in addressing human insecurity (UN Human Development Report, 1994, p. 20). However, such a framework suffers from many of human security's conceptual weaknesses. Where do States intervene first? What takes precedence; a famine or a tsunami? Compared to R2P, a framework based on 'freedom from want' appears at first glance to be a much more abstract and fluid concept; something which is of little use to policymakers. Another issue is that a considerable level of funding is required for 'freedom from want' frameworks. Indeed, a UN initiative to develop regions has been funded primarily by Japan for over a decade (Ogata, 2013). This perhaps makes such a framework at times unattractive for states.

FRAMEWORK FAILURE AND MISUSE

Implementation of both frameworks by international institutions has unfortunately left much to be desired. The current UN Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, which began in 2004, demonstrates many of the problems of human security frameworks in international relations (United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti, 2012). The mission was mandated with a comparatively narrow interpretation of human security primarily based on ensuring 'freedom from fear' (Muggagh and Krause, 2006). Emphasis was on creating a secure domestic environment explicitly for the purpose of enabling human rights, preventing "the loss of human life," and restoring national "peace and security". Yet the mission was also tasked with improving Haitian economic conditions (Muggagh and Krause, 2006). Thus, the mission exemplifies a neat combination of a narrow 'freedom from fear' framework influenced by 'freedom from want' concerns. The results of the framework were mixed. Muggah argued that the mission's beginning was seen by some to represent a new reality based on human security peacekeeping (Muggagh and Krause, 2006). Unfortunately the UN's human security concept appeared to be well ahead of the realities on the ground. Haiti's security situation deteriorated after UN intervention and eventually it was decided that a human security framework was not sufficient to deal with on-the-ground violence (Chandler, 2008). Put simply, a more traditional peacekeeping method was needed. While the Haitian mission was not a complete failure for human security, it did expose its weakness, for instance, that it could not stand alone without a traditional security force.

While the UN human security intervention in Haiti is seen as benign in intent, NATO's 2011 Libyan incursion was viewed as anything but. NATO undertook military intervention in terms of human security ('R2P'), citing Libyan dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi's planned air attacks upon civilians (Kaldor, 2013). Thus, it was a 'freedom from fear' concern. However, having neutralised Libyan air capabilities, NATO continued targeting Gaddafi's compound, prompting critics to note that regime change, rather than protecting citizens, appeared to be NATO's primary concern (Modeme, 2011). Depicting human security as a neo-imperialist tool,

critics alleged that, contrary to the principles of human security, diplomatic means had not been exhausted prior to NATO's deployment (Modeme, 2011, p. 13). Gaddafi's genocidal language prior to the intervention seemed to indicate that mass violence against civilians was imminent. Yet sustained NATO attacks against Gaddafi cast human security interventions in a negative light, as it appeared that the West used human security as a smokescreen for intervention (Dembinsku and Reinold, 2011, p. 6). Perhaps most damaging were reports that NATO was responsible for twice as many civilian deaths as Gaddafi (Ostroumova, 2012). This was not the first time that human security language had been used to overstep boundaries. Gilmore noted that the US employed human security language in its 'War on Terror' even though the 'war' was anathema to human security (Gilmore, 2011, p. 29). Human security as a concept may have 'disappeared' from political discourse because it has been manipulated to serve specific political agendas. Interestingly, in 2010 the Canadian Government effectively blacklisted 'human security' from its communications, possibly indicating the tarnished image of the concept (Martin and Owen, 2010, p. 211).

THE DISAPPERANCE OF HUMAN SECURITY?

So has human security disappeared? The answer appears to be no. Those who argue otherwise ignore the vast advances made in peacekeeping thanks to human security, such as the Ottawa Treaty (banning anti-personnel mines), the Rome Treaty (creating the International Criminal Court), the UN Security Council resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict and Women, Peace and Security, and, of course, R2P (Rock, 2013). While human security is not as popular a concept as in its heyday in the early 1990s, its essence has continued through a number of political institutions. Dealing with 'freedom from want', the UN Trust Fund for Human Security has funded over 200 projects since 1999 (Ogata, 2013). This has included a vast array of issues, from Cambodian drug counselling to supporting Sudanese agricultural investment. Dealing with 'freedom from fear', the EU has largely built its common foreign policy around issues of human security (Martin and Owen, 2010). And while discourses

on human security in the UN were scarce for many years, a 2012 debate in the UN focused on coming to agreement over what human security constitutes (UN General Assembly, 2012). Whether or not this will be successful is yet unknown, however, its presence indicates that human security has not disappeared from the international agenda.

HUMAN SECURITY AND SYRIA

The Syrian crisis and debates over intervention during 2013 marked an interesting example of the longevity of human security. In late August and September 2013, Western military strikes were contemplated in response to the alleged chemical weapons use against civilians near Damascus constituting a violation of human security. While negotiations over military intervention were eventually vetoed, the Syrian Regime cooperated with the international community to destroy its chemical weapons (Stahn, 2013, p. 955). This may seem like a small victory until one recalls McCormack's assertion that previously in cases of severe human rights abuses, most states formally rejected the idea that states could intervene in other states (McCormack, 2008). It appears that human security has allowed at least some cooperation between States in trying to lessen the damage of internal strife. This is progress. While human security was not invoked as a concept during the Syrian crisis, its ideals certainly were.

CONCLUSION

While it could be argued that human security as a concept and framework for action has largely disappeared from the international agenda, such a viewpoint ignores the work done by various agencies in the name of human security and the relatively recent resurgence of interest in human security. In doing this, the reasons for the apparent decline of human security were examined before the paper went on to discuss the advances of the human security approach, along with recent resurgence of interest in human security internationally. While critics such as Chandler may view the relative disappearance of the term human security as a victory, the victory appears to have been pyrrhic. Human security continues to be

an important aspect of international relations, and will continue to affect the intentions of many political actors.

In conclusion, this paper first considered the conceptual ambiguities of human security and the difficulties that arise from such ambiguities. Following on from this, human security frameworks and their apparent failure and misuse were examined. In response to such problems the paper concluded by highlighting the relatively recent resurgence in human security with reference to the UN and the on-going Syrian crisis.

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Smart weapons or smart soldiers? A critique of the 'cultural turn' in US intervention in Iraq

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The publication of the *Counterinsurgency Army Field Manual* in December 2006 was indicative of a shift in the United States (US) Army's approach to defeating Iraqi insurgents towards a 'knowledge is power' frame of mind, as it paid close attention to what Gregory (2008, p. 8) refers to as the "hermeneutics of counterinsurgency" – ethnicity, religion, behaviour, gender and the other social processes that shape the cultural context of conflict. This field manual was part of what is termed 'the cultural turn' in American intervention in Iraq. In addition to the increased funding given to social scientists by the US Army and the employment of anthropologists in acquiring and disseminating cultural knowledge of Iraq for the US Army, this development symbolised a shift in the approach from smart weapons to smart soldiers. It assumes that "different ways of life produce different ways of war" (Porter, 2007, p. 45) and that gaining cultural knowledge of the adversary is key to overcoming the challenges presented by difference in the conflict arena. An analysis of Mamdami (2012), however, reveals that such a culturally sensitive military strategy is no new phenomenon, but can be traced back as far as the British reaction to the Indian Mutiny of 1857 and is inextricably linked to imperial governance. Therefore, it is pertinent that one should question what is new about 'the cultural turn.'

This paper argues that 'the cultural turn' in American military strategy would be better thought of as "the cultural return" (Gregory, 2008, p. 17); the re-emergence of a focus on local social processes that is grounded in the colonial legacy and has been concerned with the preservation of empires for centuries. The paper is divided into three sections. First, key features of 'the cultural turn' will be explained and identified in past military regimes from Ancient Rome to the British Empire. Second, a critique of 'the cultural turn' will analyse how the categorisation of non-Western identities serves to reduce identity to a mere matter of governance, continuing a colonial tradition of debasing the 'other'. Finally, it is argued that the shortcomings of 'the cultural turn' highlight the limitations of a cultural approach in other realms of Western influence such as conflict resolution and global development, calling into question the usefulness of Western notions of 'progress'. Overall, the paper holds that 'the cultural turn' is not a new phenomenon. Rather it is the technology that sustains it and the actors that perform it that have changed.

THE 'CULTURAL TURN' THROUGH HISTORY

There is a growing trend in contemporary military strategy to favour cultural sensitivity over force. Emile Simpson, a former British Infantry officer in the Royal Gurkha Rifles, wrote in *War From the Ground Up* (2012) of the dangers of 'shoehorning' Western understanding of war and peace into the Helmand province of Afghanistan without due consideration of local power structures, community relations and ethno-tribal divisions. Simpson argues that in addition to acquiring military intelligence on local warlords, drug dealers and corrupt politicians, it is of equal importance that strategists have an understanding of the cultural context in which they operate. Similarly, the US Department of the Army (2006) called for

an ethnographic survey of conflict – the mapping of the human as well as physical terrain in Iraq, including factors such as ethnicity, tribal affiliations and language. In other words, a shift towards the personal, human processes that surround conflict.

These proponents of 'the cultural turn' borrow heavily from methods used by military strategists of the past. Simpson's (2012) focus on the culture of the 'enemy' is deeply rooted in ancient Chinese's strategist Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* (1971, p. 8), which advises soldiers to "know your enemy and know yourself". It also appropriates the work of Carl von Clausewitz, who categorises war as a fundamentally social process rather than as a science (Klinger, 2008, p. 85).

The conflict ethnography carried out by the US Army in Iraq is not a new feature of military strategy. Some of the earliest geographic writings were produced by Strabo of Amaseia, a Greek philosopher under the patronage of the Roman Empire whose work contributed greatly to the development of human geography as a discipline. Strabo described the Empire at a time when it was at its limits, paying close attention to the peoples and cultures of its lands. This work focused on how the Romans might exert and maintain their power over these territories and peoples. The use of anthropology in military strategy can also be seen in Sir Richard Burton's ethnographic accounts (1856, 1890) of his explorations in the British colonies in East Africa and India on behalf of the Royal Geographical Society (RGS), which was itself a branch of the imperial state (Driver, 2001). Burton identified weaknesses and possibilities for economic exploitation in the 'uncivilised' local cultures and his ethnographies were used through RGS policies as a mode of colonial out-thrust.

Similarly, Mamdami (2012, p. 20) cites the work of Henry Maine, a British colonial administrator in India, who called for "a shift of focus, away from the Orientalist preoccupation with sacred and secular texts to the study of daily life. The logic of native institutions … was to be found in local customs and traditions." Based on these comparisons, the shift towards the social processes of conflict in 'the cultural turn' appears to be more of a *regressive* shift back in military strategy than a shift forward – a 'cultural *re*turn' to the anthropologically sensitive approaches of the past.

THE COLONIAL REDUCTION OF CULTURE

As part of 'the cultural turn', Gregory (2008) notes, US military operations in Iraq since the mid-2000s have sought to map regions according to the ethnic, religious and tribal groups that exist in specific areas and to measure the population according to a set of cultural criteria. This was carried out primarily by Montgomery McFate's "Human Terrain System" (HTS), which anatomised the Iraqi population by studying ethnic and tribal landscapes. While this effort might appear as the progressive embracing of anthropological considerations of culture in order to combat insurgency, it in fact serves to reduce identity to a mere matter of governance. Such measurement of a population and categorisation of personal identity is symptomatic of an inherently racialised process of classification that is steeped in colonial history.

Anderson (1991, p. 164) wrote of the "Census, Map [and] Museum" as the three institutions that shaped how the colonial state conceptualised its dominion – censuses, it is argued, construct identity categories that are "continuously agglomerated, disaggregated, recombined, intermixed, and reordered" by the arbitrary, classifying mind of the colonial. By ticking a box on a census form, one is adhering to the pre-conceived Western stereotypes of identity that reduce, essentialise, naturalise and fix difference (Hall, 1997). As such, an Iraqi living in Basra may be categorised as Shia or Sunni in the HTS with consideration of the tribal affiliations or kinship relations of the individual (Al-Mohammad, 2010). The reasons *why* or *how* an individual becomes part of a tribe are not taken into account. This is due in part, according to Gonzalez (2009, p. 15), to a fundamental inability of Western military strategists to distinguish 'tribe' as a contemporary Iraqi supportive community from 'tribe' as a unit of colonial administration associated with pre-modern savagery.

Indeed, there are a number of dangers in using the 'tribe' as a unit of analysis for military strategy. First, by seeking to strengthen tribes against the Taliban, the US and UK militaries risk an increase in warlordism and sectarianism that may result in further inter-tribe conflict (*Ibid.*). Secondly, by continuously conceptualising 'tribes' in a colonial fashion, military strategists simply reproduce a language of imperalism that serves

to solidify the binary oppositions of 'us' versus 'them' – of developed versus traditional, civilisation versus barbarism (Mamdami, 2012), and West versus the 'other'. As such, local peoples may also experience what Galtung (1969) referred to as "structural violence" at the hands of the dominant invader, as they become marginalised, their identities diminished and their personal autonomy compromised. Thirdly, by imagining ways of culture and ways of conflict in such a West-East paradigm, military strategists ignore the use of Western-style unsophisticated force by the 'other' itself – consider the death squads and reprisal killings used by the Sri Lankan government against the Tamil Tigers or the brutal counterinsurgency efforts of the Nepalese state against Maoist rebels. As Porter (2007, p. 55) puts it, "the temptation to smash a rebellion – with the raw use of power and unsophisticated techniques – transcends culture." The issue here is that despite efforts to acquire knowledge of the local, 'the cultural turn' still operates from a perspective that differentiates the West from the 'other' and holds the 'other' as deviant and inferior.

As with the Census, characteristics of the 'other' are denigrated through the map. Colonial-style maps were based on totalising classification criteria that depicted subordinate territories as pieces in a jigsaw puzzle (Anderson, 1991). Latitudes and longitudes denoted borders and shaped colonies according to population structures, industries, and the location of valuable resources. For the colonial power, everything about the geography of its dominion had to be surveyable, navigable and visible. This tradition has been reproduced in 'the cultural turn' through the US Army's preoccupation with the electronic mapping of cities for military training purposes. Gregory (2008, p. 9) highlights that "air operations belittled enemy cities to strings of coordinates and constellations of pixels on visual displays, and ground operations reduced cities to three-dimensional object-spaces of buildings and physical networks". As such, the cities of Iraq are electronically mapped in an inhuman way - as data representing an uninhabited space. As a result, the soldiers who use such maps in training may come to think of the physical and human geography of the urban space as two mutually exclusive realms. The reduction of the city ultimately contributes to the reduction of the humans that live there. This is reminiscent of the mapping of Belfast during the Northern Ireland

conflict according to religious criteria whereby Catholic neighbourhoods were clearly delineated as utterly separate from Protestant neighbourhoods (Brunn et al., 2010), thus denying the possibilities for movement within or between these communities. As such, maps produced by the dominant social order come to be a model for rather than a model of what exists. It is a strikingly ironic feature of 'the cultural turn' that the processes of conflict that pertain to culture (ethnicity, religion, tribal identity etc.) are reduced to quantifiable data and presented as statistics, Venn diagrams and grid references. These efforts to measure and map culture in fact desensitise society to the human aspects of conflict.

Anderson (1991) notes that a final important aspect of the colonial condition was a preoccupation with monuments as symbols of power. Tearing down the statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad was symbolic not only of the removal of the dictator but also of the insertion of a new force of power in Iraq – Western civilisation. The colonial focus on exploring native cultures through the preservation of antiques is also replicated in Iraq as " the increasing collaboration of many archaeologists with the invading militaries and occupation authorities since 2003, assisted by the 'cultural turn' especially within the US military, have laid the foundations for an emerging military-archaeology complex" (Hamilakis, 2009, p. 39). The colonial roots of 'the cultural turn' are undeniable. Quantifying, mapping and exploring culture are not new to military strategy; it is only the technology behind these processes that has changed. Computers and GPS-systems now calculate what was once measured by pencil and quadrant. 'The cultural turn' has in fact reduced culture.

THE USEFULNESS OF CULTURE

It has been established that 'the cultural turn's' use of anthropology and its efforts to map and measure the cultures of populations are not new but are rooted in the colonial legacy. Thus it must be questioned as to whether there is anything new about it? Porter (2007) argues that 'the cultural turn' in counterinsurgency grew from lessons learned from American failures to prevent rebel attacks in the Vietnam War. Napalm bombs and Agent Orange had limited effect on an enemy that knew the terrain and used

Guerrilla warfare against an ill-informed invader. The lesson learned was that after the drone strikes and targeted assassinations of the initial invasion of Iraq, the US needed a more refined approach to maintain power (Hudson, 2013). The 'kill 'em all' mentality, which was exercised from the flattening of Hiroshima to the missiles of Operation Desert Storm, became a thing of the past. As such, 'the cultural turn' should not be seen as 'new' but as 'new for America' (Gregory, 2008). The US Army is the latest actor to make use of culture as an instrument of warfare that has existed for centuries. Soldiers on the ground are now being trained to use a cultural approach, whereas before culture was used by high-ranking colonial administrators.

Perhaps another lesson can be learned from the memories of Vietnam. Price (2007) recalls the work of George Condominas, a French anthropologist whose ethnographies of highland villages in Vietnam were used by the US Green Berets years later to target and assassinate village leaders. This misuse of anthropology raises a wider question – is military strategy compatible with ethical anthropology? Does the use of 'culture' facilitate an understanding of local communities or is it damaging? In the 21st century, is it effective to use an anthropological approach that is bound in colonialism? The limitations of 'the cultural turn' are clear and may act as a caveat for the use of culture in other spheres of Western intervention around the world.

Avruch (2007) calls for a greater attention to culture in conflict resolution. Liberal intervention, Avruch argues, lacks an anthropological sensitivity that considers local cultural needs and values. By conceptualising these needs and values from a Western perspective, there is a risk that they could in fact become reduced. For example, MacGinty (2008) distinguishes liberal, Western forms of peacemaking from "indigenous/traditional" forms. By categorising ritual reconciliation ceremonies, consultative peace meetings and non-violent defiance as "indigenous", the classifying mindset of the Westerner is reproduced. Cultural considerations may help to strike a balance between 'Western' and 'traditional' forms of peacemaking but by viewing them as mutually exclusive binary oppositions merely continues the colonial separation of 'us' and 'them'. The accommodation of local cultural practices in conflict resolution is

important in preserving the autonomy of local peoples, however it is important that these cultural practices are not warped by Western pre-conceptions.

Similarly, in the realm of global development practice, the accommodation of local cultural norms is widely viewed as important to promoting ethical, effective change in a developing community. Nanda Shrestha, however, in a personal narrative of "undergoing development" in Nepal (1995, p. 266), holds that Western intervention in a developmental capacity serves to disrupt and undermine the cultural life of local people:

> "The discourse of development, with the help of foreign aid, solidifies the colonial mindset in the post-imperial world, crafting cultural values, thinking, behaviour and actions. This is how, under the guise of development, the culture of imperialism is methodically reproduced in order to maintain continued Western dominance."

For Shrestha, the Nepali people were not considered 'underdeveloped' before the arrival of the concept of 'development.' Only with the advent of Western 'progress' did local people become labelled as 'backward.' This raises a question asked by Mamdami (2012, p. 22) – did tribes exist before colonialism?

> "If by 'tribe' we understand an ethnic group with a common language, the answer is yes. But tribe as an administrative entity, which discriminates in favor of 'natives' against 'non-natives', most certainly did not exist before colonialism" (*Ibid.*).

This shows the capacity that Western notions of 'progress' have to corrupt local ideologies and again highlights the limitations of imposing Western understandings of culture at the expense of the local.

There is a danger in comparing global development and conflict resolution – two non-violent processes – with colonialism – an inherently damaging, exploitative practice. To refer to the use of culture in Western

intervention as a form of neo-colonialism is to overlook the actual human suffering that occurred at the hands of the colonial powers. As such, it is necessary to make this comparison from a perspective of relative proportionality that distinguishes Western intervention from repressive imperialism.

CONCLUSION

This paper began by tracing the 'the cultural turn' through a brief history of anthropological studies aimed at maintaining the power of empires, arguing that a cultural approach has been used in military strategy for centuries. Second, it outlined the similarities between 'the cultural turn' in Iraq and the reduction of culture and identity in colonial dominions through the measurement and mapping of populations. Finally, it has argued that the shortcomings of 'the cultural turn' highlight the limitations of a cultural approach in two other spheres of Western intervention – conflict resolution and global development. The purpose of this paper has not been to dismiss the use of culture as a fundamentally harmful process; rather, to demonstrate the fact that the concept of a 'cultural turn' is not a new phenomenon, and that it might be better thought of as a 'cultural return.' The paper has also drawn links between 'the cultural turn' in US intervention in Iraq and the colonial use of culture to objectify and control populations so that lessons might be learned about the damaging capacity of a cultural approach when used inappropriately.

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Death by Demographics: Hispanic immigration and the end of the southern strategy in US Politics

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"The demographics race we're losing badly, we're not generating enough angry white guys to stay in business for the long term."
      – Sen. Lindsay Graham (Republican – South Carolina), (Boyle, 2012).

The passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 marked a decisive moment in US politics. Since the end of the Civil War a century earlier, white southern voters had comprised the core of the Democratic party's vote. So complete was the Democrats' hold on the Deep South that the states south of the Mason-Dixon Line became known colloquially as the 'Solid South'. Thus the passage of the Civil Rights Act by a Democratic President had deep ramifications for the Democrats' support in those states. The risks were all too apparent to President Lyndon B. Johnson, a Texan himself, who famously remarked to an aide upon signing the bill; "We have just lost the South for a generation" (Noah, 2004). He was to be proved correct. Richard Nixon's 'southern strategy' of 1968 was to become the blueprint for Republican success in presidential elections for the next 20 years. Appealing to southern conservative's distrust of the Federal Government and tapping into the ingrained racism of the South became cornerstones of Republican campaigns. In 1988, as a manager of George Bush Sr's presidential campaign, Lee Atwater commissioned the famous 'Willie Horton' attack advertisements against Michael Dukakis. Atwater explained the philosophy behind the 'southern strategy':

> "You start out in 1954 by saying, "Nigger, nigger, nigger." By 1968 you can't say "nigger" — that hurts you … So you say stuff like forced busing, states' rights and all that stuff. You're getting so abstract now you're talking about cutting taxes … sitting around saying, "We want to cut this," is much more abstract than even the busing thing, and a hell of a lot more abstract than "Nigger, nigger"
>   (Herbert, 2005)

This essay will first seek to show how securing the South's electoral votes has in the past allowed Republican campaigns to concentrate on the key Midwestern battleground states, safe in the knowledge that their core vote is secure. Second, it will be argued that this strategy is coming under increasing threat from demographic changes, specifically the growth in the Hispanic population of states along the US-Mexico border. Third, it will examine how the Republican party has reacted to these changes, using as an example the Republican response in the state of Arizona. Fourth, we will look at George W. Bush's presidential campaigns of 2000 and 2004 to demonstrate how Republican candidates can successfully appeal to Hispanic voters while not alienating their white, southern base. Finally, this essay will illustrate why there is urgent need for the Republican party to start making inroads into the Hispanic vote if they are to remain viable in future elections.

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY: A GEOGRAPHIC AND RACIAL PROFILE

The Republican party has, since the late 1960s, relied on white voters in the southern and border states to form its electoral base of support. The desertion of the Democratic party by southern whites occurred in the aftermath of a decade of Civil Rights legislation pushed by Democratic Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. The 'Great Southern Flip' turned the once 'Solid South' into a solid base of Republican support. In the twelve presidential elections since 1968 the Republican candidate has won almost all of these states on each occasion. Only Jimmy Carter in 1976 and Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1996 (both former Governors of southern states) have managed to make any dent in the Republican stranglehold on the South. With voting participation among whites far outstripping that of African-Americans, the demographics of the South have ensured that this Republican lock on the South's Electoral College votes has remained firm (Lublin, 2004). Clinton's ability to mobilise African-American voters was critical to victories in states like Louisiana and Georgia in 1992 and Louisiana again in 1996. Without that minority enthusiasm, Democratic candidates have been swamped by the overwhelming majority of white voters who vote Republican. Coupled with traditionally strong support in the Mountain West States (Utah, the Dakotas, Montana etc.), Republican presidential candidates have long had strong Electoral College support locked in, allowing them to focus on the key swing states of the Mid-West (Burmila, 2009, p. 835 - 837).

HISPANIC IMMIGRATION TRENDS

Of all the minority groups in the United States, Hispanics constitute the fastest growing (United States Census, 2010). In 2000, Hispanics overtook African-Americans as the largest minority group in the country (Philpot, 2007, p. 164). This mass influx is most clearly reflected in the southern border states and how their populations have exploded in the last 30 years. Florida, a state which in 1980 had a population of 858,000 now has a population of over 4.2 million. In that time, the share of the population

that is Hispanic has jumped from 8.8% to 22.5% (United States Census, 1980 – 2010). In California, a population of 4.544 million in 1980 has risen to 14 million, with the Hispanic share of the population now over 37% (United States Census, 2010). As the census figures show, all of the states along the Mexican border have seen enormous jumps in their population, much of it driven by cross-border immigration.

THE ELECTORAL SIGNIFICANCE OF HISPANIC IMMIGRATION

The electoral consequences of the growth in the Hispanic population are wide ranging. Perhaps most crucially, considerations as to where to campaign in presidential elections is becoming more complicated. The role of the traditional swing states in the Midwest as key electoral bellwethers is increasingly under threat. The southern states are growing in population much more rapidly than the northern states. The consequence is that northern states are losing votes in the Electoral College to states further south. Ohio, which has been vital to every election for the last twenty years, has lost 7 Electoral College votes since 1980, falling from 23 to 16 (Office of the Federal Register, Electoral College, 1980 – 2012). Similarly, New York, which was worth 39 votes in 1980, is worth 27 today (Office of the Federal Register, U.S. National Archives and Records Section, Electoral College, 1980 – 2012). As noted earlier, the system has favoured candidates who devoted much of their attention to Ohio, Florida, Michigan and others. With those states now declining in significance in presidential elections, the task for Democrats and Republicans is to try and tap the new Hispanic voters in the southern states who are going to become increasingly influential.

In her analysis of the role of political parties in incorporating immigrants into society, Andersen states that the primary role of parties "is to win elections, and parties will attempt to activate voters only when it is in their interest to do so" (2008, p. 17). Given the general trend for Hispanic voters to support Democratic candidates, the increase in the Hispanic population would seem to suggest that southern states are likely to become more contested in future elections. In 2000, Hispanic voters favoured the Democrats in 8 of the 9 states where they constituted a large

(5% +) share of the vote (Kenski and Kenski, 2005, p. 324). The same results occurred in 2004 (Kenski, 2005, p. 324). In 2008, Barack Obama beat John McCain nationwide among Hispanic voters by 67% to 31% according to research conducted by the Pew Research Centre. Democrats are already looking to expand the party's support among these new voters in an effort to compete in traditionally Republican states. This new demographic reality causes real problems for a Republican party that relies on overwhelming white support to win elections. To see how Republicans are confronting this new reality it is instructive to look at the state of Arizona, a state which is both solidly Republican and which has experienced a surge in Hispanic immigration over the last 30 years.

ARIZONA: A CASE STUDY

The case of Arizona is a prime example of the demographic shift taking place in border states and how this changing reality has affected local politics. Arizona has voted Republican in every presidential election since 1976 (Office of the Federal Register, 1976 - 2008). The raw numbers bear witness to the demographic changes it has experienced[1]. In the 1980 census, Arizona had a population of 2.718 million. By 1990, this had grown to 3.685 million, by 2000 the figure was 5.131 million and most recently, in 2010, it rose to 6.392 million. In this time, it went from being the 29th most populous state in the USA to the 16th. It is not hard to see what the main driver of such growth was. In 1980, Hispanics accounted for 16.2% of the state-wide population. The subsequent census figures were 18.7%, 25.3% and most recently 29.6% (or 1, 895, 144 persons). Hispanics have thus grown exponentially as a share of Arizona's population. This population explosion becomes relevant in presidential elections when we consider that Arizona's number of Electoral College votes has grown from 5 in 1980 to a not insignificant 9 in 2012 (Office of the Federal Register, U.S. National Archives and Records Section).

Given the state's large Hispanic community and proximity to the

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1 All figures quoted hereafter are from the U.S. Census for Arizona for the years 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010. The census for these years can be viewed at http://www.census.gov.

border, immigration is naturally an important issue in both local and national elections. Not surprisingly, immigration has been a major pre-occupation of the senior Senator from Arizona, John McCain. He was the leading Republican sponsor of attempts to get immigration reform legislation passed through the Senate during the presidency of George W. Bush. This legislation would have combined increased security on the border with a temporary work programme which would allow a path to citizenship for illegal aliens (MSNBC, 2007). Had McCain succeeded in getting such legislation passed, legislation that was hugely popular with Latinos in his state, it is easy to see how he could have stood to benefit politically. Instead, with the measure's collapse, McCain failed to win any credit from the Latino population of the state. Moreover, his championing of immigration reform became a political liability for him amongst the Republican party base. Throughout his 2008 presidential campaign, McCain had to constantly battle accusations of being 'soft' on immigration. He proceeded to row back on his earlier positions, saying it was a 'lesson learned' and that the priority for people was border security (MSNBC, 2007). When it came to polling day, McCain's share of the Latino vote in Arizona actually fell by 2% on what George W. Bush had managed four years previously (Lopez, 2008a). In his 2010 Senate re-election campaign he was opposed by J. D Hayward, who ran attack advertisements throughout the campaign denouncing McCain as the man who 'wrote the amnesty bill'. One attack advertisement accused McCain of facilitating 'the illegal alien invasion' and of making the problem worse (Seligman, 2010). The whole affair undermined McCain's ability to reach out to Hispanic voters while simultaneously making him an object of deep suspicion amongst the hardcore Republican base.

More broadly, the Republican establishment in Arizona has been generally hostile in its approach to dealing with the immigration issue. Governor Jan Brewer was in 2011 taken to the United States Supreme Court by the Department of Justice over a controversial law that would make it a crime for illegal immigrants to seek employment. A further provision of the law would allow police officers to determine the immigration status of anyone they arrested where they suspected the person may be an illegal immigrant. This measure was particularly criticised by

the bill's opponents who said it would naturally lead to racial profiling of Hispanics (Liptak, 2011). If this attitude continues to prevail in the Republican party then it is going to find it increasingly difficult to find Hispanic voters willing to engage with their message, thus making it more difficult to maintain their electoral success in the southern states.

THE EXAMPLE TO FOLLOW: GEORGE W. BUSH

Republicans do, however, have a recent example of how to successfully court Latino voters while maintaining the support and enthusiasm of their white base. George W. Bush made winning a larger slice of the Hispanic vote a key part of his election strategies in 2000 and 2004. He was to prove successful in this effort. In 1996, Bob Dole received 18% of the Latino vote. Bush in 2000 managed to win 35% (Philpot, 2007, p. 165). Alex Castellanos, a Bush campaign media advisor, notes that while Republican candidates cannot attract Hispanics from the poorest backgrounds, they have had some success in attracting those who are over 35, married or who have some college education (Kenski, 2005, p. 325). Bush's campaign emphasised his own Latino links, with his Hispanic nephew, George P. Bush, used as a conduit between the Hispanic community and the Bush campaign (Lublin, 2004, p. 228). Bush was particularly successful in emphasising issues relevant to middle-class Latinos. Home buying was prioritised as an electoral issue, given that 9.4% of Hispanics bought a home in 2003 compared with 6.6% of the rest of the population (Kenski, 2005, p. 325). If Republicans are to reach the level of support among Hispanics needed to maintain their electoral dominance, a Bush-type 'compassionate conservative' campaign may be successful. However if the Republican party continues to use immigration as a 'red meat' issue to stir up the white base, the electoral consequences could be dire.

THE CHALLENGE TO THE PARTIES

The danger inherent in continuing to ignore the growing Hispanic constituency in the southern states is clear. David Lublin in his book *The Republican South* calculates that even if Republicans could win 40% of the Latino vote in a presidential election in each state in the South, they would still need their share of the white vote to increase in order to avoid losing several states in the future (2004, p 229). As the Hispanic population has grown in all states, so the white share of the population has decreased. Republican dominance of states like Texas is coming under increasing threat from the shifting demographic trends as the border counties of the state are flooded with new Hispanic voters, most of whom favour Democratic candidates (Lublin, 2004, p. 230). Edward M. Burmila offers a counter-argument to the forecasts of doom. He argues that internal migration from north to south, as members of the 'baby boomer' generation retire and relocate to the warmer South, will benefit Republican candidates (2009, p. 837). This is due to the tendency of older, white voters to vote Republican and the fact that they are more likely to vote than minorities. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how this can offer anything other than only temporary solace to Republican strategists. Even if those retirees vote Republican they are not likely to offset the rise in the number of Hispanic voters taking part in presidential elections. The Hispanic population is much younger, with 30.9 million Hispanics being of voting age in 2008, and with a further 10 million or so under-age but soon to be eligible (US Statistical Abstract, 2011, p. 260). This would suggest that while the weight of new arrivals may be temporarily negated in electoral terms by the presence of so many white retirees this will only mask the problems that will face the Republicans in the near future.

For the Democratic party to harness these potentially beneficial Demographic trends, they must increase levels of voter participation among Hispanics. In 2008, only 36.1% of eligible Hispanic voters actually cast a ballot compared to 64% of eligible white voters (Statistical Abstract 2011, p. 260). For Republicans, making inroads into the Democrat's stranglehold on the Hispanic vote is an absolute necessity. If they fail to adapt to the new demographic realities of the United States then they risk being shrinking in electoral size.

CONCLUSION

"Obama wins because it's not a traditional America any more … the white

establishment is in the minority". Fox News host Bill O'Reilly's remarks on election night 2012 capture the mood of fear felt by many amongst the Republican party's white base. Conservatives see an America that has changed beyond recognition and fear for the future. For the future viability of the Republican party it is vital that they start to change their rhetoric on immigration and the status of minorities. Appeals to white resentment, particularly in the South, worked for so many years as whites formed an overwhelming majority of the electorate. In 1988, 87% of the total national vote was white and the majority of the other 13% was black (Lopez, 2008b). In 2012 only 72% of the national vote was white and Hispanics form the fastest growing minority voting bloc (Oliver and Palmer, 2012). Latinos are a 'sleeping giant' in U.S. electoral politics with 'the potential to become a major influence' (Soto and Merolla, 2008, p. 114). The Hispanic population is young and growing while the white population is aging and is shrinking as a share of the overall population. The Republicans now survey a country that is more ethnically diverse than ever before in its history. Embrace this change and they can maintain their relevance in presidential elections and continue to hold their southern electoral base. Continue to appeal to white voters based on a 'siege' mentality and it risks becoming irrelevant to a rapidly diversifying electorate.

This essay has shown how securing the South's electoral votes has in the past allowed Republican campaigns to concentrate on the key Midwestern battleground states, however this strategy is coming under increasing threat from demographic changes, specifically the growth in the Hispanic population of states along the US-Mexico border. How the Republican party has reacted to these changes was then examined using as an example the Republican response in the state of Arizona. The presidential campaigns of George W. Bush in 2000 and 2004 were then used to show how Republican candidates can successfully appeal to Hispanic voters while not alienating their white, southern base. Finally it was illustrated why there is an urgent need for the Republican party to start making inroads into the Hispanic vote if they are to remain viable in future elections.

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Assessing the state and nature of democracy and democratisation in Latin America

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In recent years, theories of democratisation have been forced to evolve (Schdeler, 2009). While the traditional theories continue to explain democratisation within a Western context, the same cannot be said when applied to the sudden transitions witnessed during the third wave of democratisation[1]. The collapse of authoritarian regimes, particularly in Latin America, was unanticipated, and the governments which have emerged in the decades since, unexpected (Whitehead, 2010). While there are numerous competing definitions of democratisation, this essay contends that Whitehead's view of democracy as "anchored but floating" bests complements the emerging, and established, democracies in Latin

America (Whitehead, 2002, pp. 6-7). There are multiple factors to consider when examining the process of democratisation, however institutions are of the first and foremost importance as they set out the societal "the rules of the game" (Rodrik et al., 2002, p. 1). By structuring all human interaction and behaviour (Levisky and Murillo, 2012), the multiple other factors which are believed to influence democratisation such as history, geography and culture, are all endogenous to modern day institutions in one form or another (Rodrik et al., 2002), and this is why institutions are essential to the process of democratisation.

The format of this essay is as follows. First, the concept and process of democratisation will be assessed. Second, the role of institutions – legal, political and informal - in Latin America will be discussed. Finally, the steps taken towards democratic reforms will be examined, recommendations for further change will be put forth, and conclusions drawn.

DEMOCRATISATION

Democratisation is defined by Whitehead as being a "complex, multi-ended process with no discernible end point" (2002, p. 7). It is the movement a state makes towards democratic governance and away from the authoritarian alternative. Democratisation is open ended in that democracy is "an essentially contested concept", to which there is no universal consensus or agreement over what state structure would be "maximally" democratic (Whitehead, 2002, pp. 8-10). Democracy itself is described by Whitehead as being a concept which is best understood as anchored in the minimal requirements for a democracy, and floating in that there is a degree of fluidity to the many forms that a democracy can take (Whitehead, 2002, pp. 6-7).

The main area of academic dispute is defining at what point in the democratisation process a state can be said to have become a *consolidated* democracy (Schedler, 1998). The classic dichotomy between being an authoritarian or democratic state falls apart after accepting that democratisation is a time intensive transitional process, and that many states in the modern post-Cold War era now fall somewhere between these two theoretical norms (Schedler, 1998). Furthermore, democracy is not a

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1 The 'third wave of democratisation', as set forth by Huntington (1991), refers to the third major surge of democracy in history, with multiple countries transitioning from non-democratic to democratic governance in the wake of the Cold War.

linear trajectory from dictatorship to democracy, but rather moves in "fits and starts" (Halperin et al., 2005). As such, there is a wide spectrum of regime types which might characterise the state. Thus while Chile can currently be described as a consolidated democracy in light of its free and fair elections, Mexico is classified as a 'competitive authoritarian regime' due to the enduring dominance of one political party, but with the presence of an opposition, in conjunction with the holding of questionable elections (Levitsky and Way, 2002).

This discussion assumes a state is democratic when it meets the minimal requirements for democratic governance as set out in Dahl's polyarchy. This requires that control over government decisions is vested in elected officials, that these officials are chosen and removed frequently in free and fair elections, that all citizens are enfranchised, elections are open to all individuals, citizens have the right to free speech, freedom of association, and political freedom, and that there is a free and independent media (Dahl, 1989). While the formation or shape of the institutions may vary depending on the context, these basic notions of democracy still remain "anchored" but are given a degree of flexibility around the classical definition of a democratic state structure (Whitehead, 2002).

THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS

Institutions fundamentally structure the political environment and culture of a state, setting forth "the rules of the game", in which all political interaction will take place (Rodrik et al., 2002). They are "the incentive systems which structure human interaction, reducing uncertainty by providing incentives and disincentives in order to make individual's reactions more predictable, ordered, and coherent" (North, 2003, p. 1). Institutional strength can be considered along two lines: enforcement and stability. Enforcement is the degree of compliance with formalised law, and stability is the endurance of institutions through both time and critical junctures, with some degree of adaptability to change (Hall, 2010; Levitsky and Murillo, 2009).

Democratic institutions in Latin America are systematically weak. Traditional democratisation theories put forth the idea that, following the

transitional period from authoritarianism to democracy, the institutions put in place largely determine the long term trajectory of the new regimes (Levitsky and Murillo, 2012). Rapid dismantling of these transitional institutions in most Latin American states, however, skewed these theoretical norms. What followed were institutions which became vulnerable; open to frequent and radical upheaval, known as 'serial replacement' (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009). Such inefficient and weak institutions lead to weak democracies (Shirley, 2008). In the absence of enforcement and stability, informal institutions and norms come to the fore and exert influence over the state (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). The implication of such actions are manifest and fundamentally alter how, and if, a state democratises. Thus, legal, political and informal institutions and the interactions between them are central to examining democratisation in the Latin American context. While many Latin American regimes did make democratic progress away from authoritarianism, several states fell short of a full democratic transition, as witnessed in Chile, Uruguay and Costa Rica (Vanden and Prevost, 2006). In order to overcome the legacies left by their previously authoritarian governments, each of these countries took measures in order to restructure or remove institutions which they perceived to be incompatible with their democratic aspirations. In Chile, democratic freedoms were slowly extended to all citizens towards the end of the regime of Augusto Pinochet. Contested, free and fair elections were held, and the electoral commission enshrined with significant enforcement powers. In Costa Rica, democratic institutions were also established, with the added caveat of the removal of the armed forces. Given the high number of coups the nation has experienced, all of which lead to undemocratic governments, this was seen as a pre-emptive measure, and as a sign of the new regime's commitment to democratic governance (Vanden and Prevost, 2006). The remaining Latin American states have failed to make these full transitions, or honour their previous democratic commitments (where made), and instead these states fall into the grey area between authoritarian and democratic (Whitehead, 2010). These states may demonstrate an 'anchoring' in some of the key democratic principles, but ultimately fail to overcome their authoritarian legacies due to institutional failings.

LEGAL INSTITUTIONS

Legal institutions provide the foundations for democratisation. Democratic accountability is fundamentally tied to the effective enforcement of the law and of a constitution which guarantees democratic governance. A democratic constitution is meaningless, however, if the executive does not abide by it, and the judiciary do not prosecute such infringements (Levitsky and Way, 2002). The Supreme Court in Mexico formally enjoys lifetime appointments, but is often filled with supporters of incumbents after each regime change (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009). Further, the police force in Brazil frequently takes part in extrajudicial enforcement, and loss of life is accepted as a norm (Vanden and Prevost, 2006). Constitutions in Latin America, which form the backbone of most legal systems, are the subject of frequent replacement or reform. Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador have all passed, or attempted to pass new constitutions in the last fifteen years which have attempted to disproportionately increase executive power (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Whitehead, 2010).

The legal and regulatory power of institutions is undermined if their enforcement is contrary to executive will and the judiciary is unwilling to uphold it (North, 1990). This creates a risk intensive environment, largely deterring citizen participation in politics. Consequently, the strength of these institutions is diminished making them more susceptible to disregard, manipulation and replacement. Enforcement of legal institutions also becomes more difficult as there is a perpetuating expectation that the institution is not permanent, and thus its regulations non-binding. Some institutions may be written off upon their creation and thus are seen as 'stillborn'. The party systems of Ecuador, Guatemala and Peru in the 2000s were effectively rebuilt or replaced with each consecutive election. This resulted in an electorate uncertain about their electoral system, who were suspicious, and disinterested, combined with unrepresentative, ineffective political parties. There was seen to be little point in engaging politically or voting for a particular party when it was likely to have disappeared by the time of the next election (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009). Thus, in such an environment democratic norms cannot take hold and state progress stagnates (Halperin et al., 2005).

Furthermore, upholding the rights and liberties of citizens is perilous if the separation of powers does not exist and the judiciary lacks independence, enabling the subversion of rights by the state (Levitsky and Way, 2002). While human rights and social welfare may be upheld to a higher degree under an emerging non-authoritarian regime, freedoms may decline elsewhere. Such is the case with the increase in indigenous rights and living standards under Evo Morales in Bolivia and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, but which are accompanied by decreasing freedom of the press across Latin America more broadly. In Bolivia, formal constitutional recognition of the rights of the indigenous population and their cultural heritage in 2007 was viewed as a major human rights victory. In Venezuela, indigenous people's languages were given special recognition in the new constitution, along with their inalienable, non-transferable right to indigenous land. Yet this was accompanied by new broadcasting restrictions in Bolivia, threats against journalists who criticised the regime in Venezuela and Mexico, and restrictions on the movement of foreign journalists in Colombia (Vanden and Prevost, 2006). Thus while democratisation occurs in some facets of governance, regression occurs elsewhere. Though the legal structures for democracy may formally exist, a failure to enforce these norms result in a political regime which can be classified as neither democratic nor authoritarian.

POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND INFORMAL NORMS

Political institutions structure the distribution of power within the state, and the accountability mechanisms of democratic representatives. However the manipulation of these institutions, entrenched institutional instability and the emergence of informal norms undermines these democratic processes. Institutions such as free and fair elections are seen as a key requisite of a functioning democracy (Schedler, 1998). They are intended to shape the probability of outcomes, stabilise and formalise political interactions, and induce patterns of representation. While all Latin American states in the modern era do hold elections, the integrity of the institution can be undermined for enumerate reasons. A lack of enforcement of constitutional rights, and the knowledge that the courts will not

prosecute them for infringements allowed the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) in Mexico to govern in a competitive authoritarian system for years. In elections in Mexico, the opposition were allowed to run but were subjected to harassment and intimidation (Levitsky and Way, 2002). Furthermore the informal '*Dedazo*' system of the incumbent President choosing his predecessor completely disregards the formal institutional conventions, and allows the incumbent to enjoy a wide range of powers beyond those specified in the constitution (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). While democratic progress has been made and the presidential elections have moved beyond the ordaining of predetermined successors, this system is still in place at a parochial level in the appointment of mayors and councillors.

Furthermore, electoral systems in Venezuela have changed 13 times between 1958 and 1998, while 34 electoral reforms at a provincial level took place in Argentina between 1983-2003 (Levitsky and Murillo, 2012). This frequency of institutional change prevents normalisation within the collective consciousness of the state, and instead perpetuates a mistrust and wariness among the citizens. The electorate becomes discouraged from engaging politically in the absence of recognisable institutions and norms (Vanden and Prevost, 2006). Thus, while the existence of formally democratic institutions are a positive movement towards democracy, they still fall short of their supposed full democratic intentions.

Informal institutions take root in the absence of enforced formal rules. Organisations which hold an informal veto over decisions, such as the Catholic Church in El Salvador, the military in pre-democratised Chile and the economic elite in pre-Chavez Venezuela, can gain disproportionate influence outside the official structures of the state (Levitsky and Murillo, 2012). In the absence of enforcement and effective representative institutions the economic elite can have veto power over economic policy, the military is free to exert its will upon the executive and the Church holds influence over the moral position of the state (Levitsky and Murillo, 2012). Amidst this political climate, nepotism and patronage become a legitimate means of solidifying a support base, while corruption can take root as rules are not enforced (Helmke and Levistky, 2004). Thus, the failure of formal political institutions allows for their

exploitation and replacement by informal norms and results in popular disengagement from the political and democratic processes, undermining any attempt at democratisation, or hindering the process entirely.

REFORM

After considering the effects of institutional change in Latin America, it is clear that the evolution of institutions need not be detrimental to democracy, nor should the failure of institutions to adhere to the Western model be overly concerning (Whitehead, 2010). According to Whitehead's definition of democracy, such institutional experimentation is possible once the ultimate result is a democratic outcome. Change can increase efficiency, aid democratisation, and encourage participation in the political process. Regression can be justified if the lessons learnt benefit future democratic endeavours. Issues arise when such change becomes too frequent and normalised (Hall, 2010). If this becomes the case, the institutions themselves become vulnerable to manipulation by the executive. Hence the reform of institutions is of primary importance in increasing their effectiveness.

Some institutions, however, may exist and endure precisely because they are not enforced. Rights may be enshrined in a state's constitution because there is a moral imperative to do so if the state wishes to garner democratic legitimacy at a global level, or because of citizen demands at a domestic level (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009). The creation of such institutions does not necessitate their enforcement. This is referred to as 'democratic window dressing' or 'façade democracy' (Levitsky and Way, 2002). This can, however, have unintended consequences. While both Mexico and Peru created a Human Rights Ombudsman (HRO) to appease international pressure, the outcomes in each country were strikingly different to each other. While Mexico's HRO continues to publish reports supportive of a government accused by Amnesty International of torture, the HRO in Peru was openly critical of then President Fujimori and could be considered to be the only functioning democratic institution under his regime (Levitsky and Murillo, 2012).

In order to try to create effective institutions, democratising states

are incentivised to copy existing models which have proven successful. The Anglo-Saxon institutional model present in the USA has been regularly mirrored by Latin American countries (Hall, 2010). But issues of cultural compatibility emerge. While the presidential system may seem compatible with the '*caudillo*[1]' culture in many states, this leaves the legislature and judiciary vulnerable to exploitation. Consequently, if a President goes unchecked, they may have a disproportionate share of political power, as in Venezuela and Colombia. A delegative democracy may emerge (Whitehead, 2010).

Additionally, favourable democratic reforms of institutions may be discouraged under the prevailing equilibriums within the state (Halperin et al., 2010). The executive and legislature may exist in a position they find favourable, and stand to lose under any reform. The cost of reform and replacement is high, and given the frequency with which it occurs, actors may be unwilling to bear the transaction costs of democratisation (Halperin et al., 2005). It thus falls to the willingness of the political elite, and the demands and pressures from below, or from pressure exerted externally on the state, to push for democratic reform.

Many of the institutions discussed previously were based on designs present, and effective, in a fully consolidated democracy. From this one could infer that existing models of democratic institutions are not alone sufficient to encourage democratisation in Latin America (Hall, 2010). Thus Whitehead's concept of democracy comes to the fore. While the anchoring concepts of democracy are present, they lack enforcement, stability or effectiveness in the Latin American context (Whitehead, 2010). There is a need for further adaption and fluidity of existing institutional frameworks to the local and regional demands of Latin America in order to further democratise the region.

CONCLUSION

Latin America's current process of democratisation after a prolonged period of oscillation between authoritarian and weakly democratised states makes this current era of change one of great interest to scholars of democracy. While the governance structures which emerge may not conform to preconceived Western views of democracy, given the unique nature and history of authoritarianism in the region, so long as the fundamental 'anchoring' concepts of democracy are met, the form future institutions will take is difficult to determine, as they will need to adapt to their specific, individual contexts in order to be maximally democratically effective.

This essay has argued that Whitehead's conception of democracy as "floating but anchored" is best suited to understanding democratisation in the Latin American context. The impact of concepts of democratisation on democracy in Latin America have been examined, the legal, political and informal institutions assessed, and the reform policies and recommendations made. After examining the functioning institutions in Latin America it becomes evident reform and re-evaluation is most needed if the region is to continue on a positive trajectory of democratisation.

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1 Strongman figures whose leadership style is largely populist and personality based.

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The closure of the *News of the World* and the non-realignment of the United Kingdom's tabloid audience

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In July 2011 the *News of the World* was closed following revelations of institutional phone hacking and the subsequent Leveson inquiry[1]. It was the UK's largest weekly newspaper by circulation with 2.7 million readers[2]. This essay examines where those readers went, and attempts to explain what influenced their decisions. In doing so this essay presents two arguments. First, that tabloid newspapers present a less extensive and less rational discussion of politics to their readers, who compared to the readers of broadsheets are less affluent, and consequently less politically sophisticated and less influential. Second, that the closure of the *News of the World* demonstrates that the readers of tabloids do not choose their newspaper based on the political slant and content of their coverage. The literature suggests several reasons for this to be the case.

The picture these two arguments jointly paint is one of a news media that is failing to adequately inform less affluent readers about their society in times when income and wealth inequality are steadily increasing. This should offer one part of an explanation of "the failings of citizens to act as an effective counterweight", and supports the notion of a biased stable equilibrium in the media (Campbell, 2010, p. 227; Druckman et al., 2012).

TABLOID POLITICS

Benson argues that a more commercial press leads to less rational discourse in society, as profit motives orient newspapers toward sensational and attention grabbing stories to sell more newspapers. This undermines the media's ability to operate as a public sphere; "that is to promote … public debate involving the widest possible citizen participation" (Benson, 2001, p. 2).

Ipsos-Mori (2005) stratifies newspaper readers into 4 categories; AB, C1, C2 and DE, with the AB category associated with higher levels of income, education and occupation, while DE is associated with lower levels of income, education and occupation. These stratifications are useful for showing the significant differences in readerships between tabloids and broadsheets. Each of the broadsheets except the *Independent* has a majority of AB readers, while only 6% of the readers of the *Financial Times* and the *Times* are classified as DE. In contrast the *Sun* and *Daily Star* have 8% and 5% AB readers respectively, and large pluralities of DE readers.

Solt (2008) argues that engaging in politics is a rational activity and that in societies where it seems as though engaging in politics holds no prospect of victory for the poor it becomes irrational to take part. Economic resources determine the ability to effect political change, with more affluent voters having more influence and money to contribute to

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1 The Leveson Inquiry was a judicial public inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the British press following the *News International* phone hacking scandal.
2 All of the data regarding paper circulations referred to hereafter is drawn from the ABC UK national circulations, compiled below in Table 1, unless otherwise stated.

political campaigns. Thus, as economic inequality increases; "all but those in the highest income quintile are less likely to engage in conversations about political issues" (Solt, 2008, p. 56). This effect is felt most significantly by the lower quintiles, where participation, interest and discussion are all negatively related to economic inequality. Discussion and interest are more significantly affected than participation, which lends credence to the idea that newspapers selling themselves to less well-off readers may not want to reduce political coverage, but do so because "the readers demand it" (Druckman and Parkin, 2005, p. 1032). Were any given tabloid to increase the scope and quality of their political coverage they would simply lose market share as politically disinterested voters migrated to their competitors. The overall structure of the UK newspaper market supports this claim. Sorting occurs as more affluent and more politically sophisticated readers choose broadsheets, and less affluent and less politically sophisticated readers choose tabloids (Ipsos-Mori, 2010).

THE CLOSURE OF THE *NEWS OF THE WORLD* AND THE OPENING OF THE *SUN ON SUNDAY*

In July 2011 the final issue of the *News of the World* was printed as part of the fallout from the phone hacking scandal and subsequent Leveson inquiry (BBC, 2011). The *News of the World* had at that time a regular readership of just over 2.7 million. Seven months later News Corporation printed the first issue of the *Sun on Sunday*, its replacement. In the meantime 2.7 million regular readers were without a Sunday newspaper, and approximately 2 million of them were redistributed amongst the other Sunday newspapers. This represented a significant shift in the influence readers were exposed to.

In the intervening period the readerships of the other major national tabloids increased significantly. While there were some gains in the middle-market tabloids and in some broadsheets, the vast majority of gains accrued to the other tabloids. The disappearance of the *News of the World* from the market clearly illustrates the distinction between broadsheet and tabloid readers. Only two broadsheets made net gains in the two months from June to August 2011 (*The Sunday Times* and *The Sunday*

Telegraph), which accounted for a little over 10% of the share between all newspapers. The style of the newspaper seems to have been decisive in where readers went. Of the tabloids the *Sunday Mirror* made the most significant gains. In June 2011 it had a circulation of 1,087,796; two months later this had risen to 1,900,460, an increase of almost 90%. Significantly the *Sunday Mirror* is the only major national tabloid that supports any left of centre political party, having supported the Labour party since 1945. 41% of *News of the World* readers who chose another national newspaper chose the *Sunday Mirror*. Of the other major national tabloids *The People* supported the Conservative party, with the *Daily Star Sunday* promoting a generally right-wing populist view. However they picked up 858,000 readers between them, marginally more than the *Sunday Mirror* by itself. A further 367,000 readers went to the middle-market newspapers; the *Sunday Express*, the *Mail on Sunday* and the *Sunday Mail*, all of which support the Conservative party.

At the end of February 2012 the *Sun on Sunday* was launched and immediately regained the top position in the UK market. It did not, however, achieve the readership of the *News of the World,* averaging 2.4 million readers in March 2012 falling to 2 million by January of this year. Strikingly almost all of the gains made by its rivals were lost. The circulation of the *Sunday Mirror* fell to 1,100,000, with the *People* and the *Daily Star* on Sunday losing 300,000 and 160,000 readers respectively.

READERSHIP ANALYSIS

There are several possible explanations for the distribution of gains amongst the newspapers. First, reading a daily newspaper is likely to reduce the effects on one's political alignment of changing ones weekly newspaper. Second, as the largest tabloid after the *News of the World,* the *Sunday Mirror* likely had more money to market during this window of opportunity, and was also more likely to be present in any given newsagents. Size, however, was not the conclusive factor; the *Mail on Sunday*, while categorised as middle market, had almost twice the readership of the *Mirror* and yet it only made modest gains. As such non-commercial explanations need to be sought.

Date	News of the World	Sunday Mirror	The People	Sunday Mail	Daily Star Sunday	Mail on Sunday	Sunday Express	Sunday Times	Sunday Tele-graph	The Ob-server	The Sun on Sunday
Jun 10	282800	1147926	519273	387367	352187	1908995	566934	1085724	508706	326821	
Mar 11	2664363	1063096	477815	365923	293489	1888040	533192	1031727	481941	296023	
Jun 11	2667428	1087796	474549	360475	305978	1927791	539478	1000848	474722	288928	
Aug 11		1900460	892033	419962	744981	2098244	677779	1011385	499612	274304	
Jan 12		1753202	770772	370355	644804	1921010	607894	967975	461772	264321	
Mar 12		1106259	463936	332372	483477	1824965	503985	928260	451731	251074	2426894
Jan 13		1039150	429167	283861	345885	1715707	471625	885612	435036	225194	2010826

Fig. 1: Weekly newspaper circulation June 2010- January 2013 (ABC)

There is also the theory that readers self-select their media to align it with their voting intentions and political stance more generally (Newton and Brynin, 2002). There are no figures available for voting intentions by readership of weekly newspapers, however there are figures linking most of the national dailies to voting intentions (Ipsos-Mori, 2010). From these figures we will take the *Sun* as a proxy. The *Sun* is owned by the same corporation, has the same editorial stance, and appeals to the same market of readers. As such it is a reasonable proxy to use for the *News of the World,* although there will be a significant margin of error in all extrapolated results.

The *Sun's* readers are relatively variable, in 1997 and 2001 they intended to vote 52% Labour, 30% Liberal Democrat and 29% Conservative. In 2005 only 45% supported Labour, and by 2010 that had reduced again to 28%, with Conservative support at 43% (Ipsos-Mori, 2010). This significant variability suggest that large portions of the readership of the

Sun are not strong partisans. These results appear to offer some limited support to the theory of self-selection. However significantly more readers migrated to the Labour-supporting *Mirror,* and less to Conservative supporting newspapers than would have been the case if self-selection was the dominant pattern. If the *Sun* readership is similar to that of the *News of the World* then proportionally less people than intended in 2010 to vote Conservative chose Conservative supporting newspapers, with more readers migrating to the Labour-supporting *Mirror.* Interestingly, the *Mirror* does have significantly higher intent to vote Labour amongst its readers, at 59% in 2010, which suggests that Labour voters know which newspapers match their viewpoint more closely (Ipsos-Mori, 2010). However, even if all 28% of those who intended to vote Labour did choose the *Mirror* because of its editorial slant there is the remaining 13% of *News of the World* readers to account for.

There are two related explanations as to why significant amounts of readers did not choose their newspaper in line with their voting intentions. The first is that they choose non-politically, based on the coverage of sports and scandals. The second is that because of a lack of political sophistication they were less likely to i) identify with a party at all, or to identify strongly with that party, and ii) less likely to interpret the political cues put out by these newspapers.

The first explanation is partly related to the first part of this essay. Tabloid newspapers are more likely to have larger non-political sections because their readers are less likely to be interested in politics. The larger the proportion of a newspaper taken up by apolitical content the more weight non-political considerations ought to have when deciding which newspaper to choose. That is if you are going to spend one pound sterling on a newspaper with 20% of content devoted to politics, its political slant is less salient to your decision than if 40% of content is political. This represents a vicious cycle. Newspapers reduce political content based on demand in competitive markets. This means that when readers come to choose again, politics is a smaller part of their consideration.

The second explanation is based on the lower political sophistication of the readers of tabloids. Lower political sophistication means that people are less set in their party identities and "those with weaker

attitudes may be more likely to read a newspaper with different leanings from their own" (Newton and Brynin, 2001, p. 280). This seems on one level as though they are simply less likely to mind reading political views other than their own. However due to their lower level of political sophistication they are also i) less likely to notice that views are counter to their own interest, and ii) more likely to be easily persuaded (Gilens, 2010). Gilens shows that the greater the level of political sophistication people have, the greater their ability to respond to policy specific information in a way which is in sync with their enlightened preferences, and consistent with their stated preferences. Inversely, politically unsophisticated individuals are less likely to make proper use of new information, and more likely to hold inconsistent views. This vulnerability is important. While there are already several reasons why readers may not have chosen in line with their political views, this suggests that there is little reason to believe that those who don't choose in line with their political views are able to detect it, or that those now exposed to views more in-line with their material interests noticed it.

The analysis so far has focused on the immediate aftermath of the closure of the *News of the World.* The re-entry of News International into the Sunday market with the *Sun on Sunday* further serves to illustrate the lack of salience of politics in the tabloid market. Almost all of the gains of the *Sunday Mirror* were lost to the *Sun on Sunday* as soon as it arrived. Regardless of whether readers decided to choose the *Mirror* because i) they felt it better fitted their political preferences, ii) they preferred its non-political coverage, or iii) they didn't mind the political coverage, the vast majority of them chose to return to *News International*. This reinforces Gilens' point that people who are politically unsophisticated are less likely to understand the ramifications of political arguments even when given policy relevant information. Readers who switched to the *Mirror* were effectively exposed to a treatment of several months of an opposing viewpoint, but ultimately returned to the same newspaper as before. It is not just that these readers found an alternative viewpoint unpersuasive. Rather, what is important is that this viewpoint better fitted their economic material interests. If Gilens' inconsistency finding is true, readers could even think that both positions are true without noting or

understanding the inherent contradictions (Bartels, 2005; Gilens, 2010).

Despite seven months of exposure to a newspaper with a significantly more left leaning editorial stance, the arrival of the *Sun on Sunday* was able to draw readers away from the *Mirror* within weeks. This seems to underline the simple unimportance of political considerations to some readers in this most highly political of arenas. When there is significant evidence that newspaper choice affects voting choices it is disheartening to also find evidence that tabloid newspapers are neither chosen for their alignment with their readers' enlightened economic interests, nor their declared voting intentions (Ladd and Lenz, 2009).

CONCLUSION

This essay has argued that tabloid media generally is more irrational than broadsheets, and that the depressing effects of economic inequality on the political sophistication of those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds make this effect more pronounced. The case of the closure of the *News of the World* shows that politically unsophisticated readers are less likely to choose the newspaper that most closely fits their voting intentions. Ironically in this case a lack of political sophistication actually brought these readers on the whole closer to their enlightened interests than they would have if they had followed their voting intentions exactly. Most worryingly however the majority of these gains instantly slipped away. Readers exposed to new economic perspectives more in tune with their material interest for months weren't swayed. As has been shown, 41% of readers who migrated went to the *Mirror*, a newspaper far more likely to express views in line with what Gilens refers to as enlightened self-interest, yet they almost all returned (Gilens, 2001). The combination of the tabloids' less rational and less extensive coverage of politics, and the lower levels of political sophistication, interest, discussion and participation among less affluent individuals in unequal societies meant that a chance for significant realignment amongst readers was not successful.

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Trauma and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland:
How psychological effects interfere with peacebuilding

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For 30 years, from 1968 to the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in 1998, politics and everyday life in Northern Ireland were dominated by the ethno-nationalist conflict between Catholics and Protestants, colloquially known as 'the Troubles'. The conflict's key issue was the political question of Northern Ireland's constitutional status and the diverging positions of unionists and nationalists. However, the political confrontation was fuelled by historical and religious elements; economic disadvantage and discrimination against Catholics contributed to the outbreak of armed conflict. Several failed attempts to establish ceasefires are testament to the region's violent history. Altogether, the Troubles left around 3,700 dead and 48,000 people injured. 34,000 shootings and 14,000 bombings occurred between 1968 and 1998 (Bunting et al., 2013, p. 134).

This article focuses on the severe psychological impact the conflict has had on people's lives; violence committed and witnessed left deep psychological wounds. First, the current state and progress of Northern Ireland's peace process will be described. Second, the psychological consequences evolving from the Troubles will be reviewed. The evolution of pathological and non-pathological responses to traumatic events will be explained, as well as how such responses may lead to a resumption of violence. Third, it will be discussed how psychological wounds can be addressed to provide healing and to facilitate reconciliation. Professional therapy and community work will be presented as two approaches of psychosocial work that contribute to psychological recovery. Finally, the role of healing in the context of reconciliation and achieving sustainable peace will be addressed.

STATE OF THE PEACE PROCESS

Johan Galtung distinguishes 'negative peace' as the mere absence of direct violence and 'positive peace' as the absence of structural violence. Structural violence is further described as every form of social injustice (Galtung, 1969, p. 171), thus positive peace reflects the equality of rights and access to resources as well as harmony between diverse groups in society. In other words, it is the "integration of human society" (Galtung, 1964, p. 2).

In 1998, after several non-sustainable ceasefires, the GFA led to a local assembly and a power-sharing government (Campbell et al., 2004, p. 176). In an inclusive process, all of the political parties, paramilitary organisations and both the British and Irish governments came to a constitutional agreement (Byrne, 2001, p. 6). It was significantly driven by the desire for peace by most Northern Ireland's citizens and the United States President Bill Clinton's successful intervention (Byrne, 2001, p. 4). By ending most of the political violence, the GFA achieved negative peace. It also built the foundation for positive peace by creating a space where both sides work together on a governmental level.

Building trustful relationships requires contact and cooperation between Catholics and Protestants, but segregation at various levels is an

ongoing issue in Northern Ireland. Although in 1987 the Education for Mutual Understanding (EMU) programme was introduced to support cross-community school activities, educational segregation is still evident (Stringer et al., 2009, p. 241). With a history of separated housing affecting Northern Ireland's social geography, residential segregation is still commonplace (Schmid et al., 2010, p. 457), and even seems to have increased during recent years (Campbell et al., 2004, p. 180). Low numbers of cross-community friendships and marriages indicate ongoing segregation in personal relationships (Campbell et al., 2004, p. 180). Limited contact may hinder both groups from establishing greater mutual understanding, pointing to the notion that a peaceful coexistence has not been fully realised.

Nonetheless, even prior to the GFA, British policy supported bottom-up efforts in cross-community development (Byrne, 2001, p. 6). Both the International Fund for Ireland and the EU PEACE funds have been providing grassroots approaches financially. Nowadays, around 5000 nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (Thiessen et al., 2010, p. 41) contribute to Northern Ireland's social capital forming a vibrant civil society. Acheson and Milofsky (2008, pp. 66-67) argue that efforts by a strong civil society may make for a healthier political culture and allow for collective solutions to common problems. It is a consistent finding in peace studies that local participation leads to better outcomes during the peace process (Gizelis and Kosek, 2005, p. 380) thus pointing to the NGO sector's impact.

Overall, positive peace in terms of social justice and integration of both communities into a united society has yet to be achieved although civil society provides a good foundation for future efforts. Besides this macro-political valuation, there is an ongoing conflict between the two communities that leads to violence on a smaller scale than during the Troubles. Both cross and intra-community violence have not ended and include beatings, arson, pipe bombs (Campbell et al., 2004, p. 176), punishment, riots, feuds and intimidation (Dillenburger et al., 2008, p. 1312). This series series of street riots in 2005 in Belfast (Dillenburger et al., 2008, p. 1318) and ongoing conflict related murders documented by the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) are proof that violent acts may

still occur. However, in spite of these incidents the presence of negative peace in general should not be questioned. Resuming violence after official agreements is not unusual for conflictual contexts (Staub, 2006, p. 867). The desire for revenge may in fact be an understandable psychological response to re-establish one's sense of control and dignity (Noor et al., 2008b, p. 482). Therefore, reviewing the psychological effects of the Troubles may provide a better understanding of the resumption of violence during the peace process.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF THE TROUBLES

Political violence leads to psychological changes on cognitive, affective and behavioural levels in those people who are exposed to it (Pedersen, 2002, pp. 182-183). Reviewing around 100 studies in a meta-analysis, DiMaggio and Galea (2006, p. 546) found post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) to be a likely outcome of post-terrorism environments. This severe mental condition is mainly associated with hyperarousal, i.e. higher levels of anxiety, intrusion that includes distressing flashback memories, and avoidance of stimuli that are associated with the traumatic event (American Psychiatric Association, 2013, pp. 271-280).

Investigations on the Northern Irish population showed that 60% experienced a traumatic life event and around 40% reported a conflict-related traumatic event (Bunting et al., 2013, p. 136). The lifetime and the 12-month prevalence for PTSD were estimated to be 8.8% and 5.1%, respectively (Bunting et al., 2013, p. 136). The study concludes that experience of trouble-related traumatic events is linked to higher vulnerability for any mental disorder. This is consistent with findings showing the rates of mental disorder in Northern Ireland to lie towards the higher end of international rankings (Bunting et al., 2012, p. 1735). The most frequently reported experiences were being a civilian in a place of ongoing terror (19.5%) and having witnessed death or serious injury (16.9%; Bunting et al., 2013, p. 136). As a result, people are reported to suffer from nightmares, insomnia, anxiety, restlessness, memory flashbacks and suicidal thoughts (Dillenburger et al., 2008, p. 1315).

Generally, men are much more likely to experience traumatic

events whereas women are twice as likely to develop a clinical PTSD after having experienced trauma (Bunting et al., 2013, p. 138). Low socioeconomic status and direct exposure to trouble-related events are risk factors for developing PTSD whilst a high national identity decreases this risk (Muldoon and Downes, 2007, p. 148). These effects are consistent with international research on traumatisation (DiMaggio and Galea, 2006, p. 564) although causality between poverty and PTSD remains unclear. In fact, social disadvantage increased the risk of getting directly involved in the violence of the Troubles, therefore increasing the exposure to traumatic events and possibly being accountable for this significant association (Muldoon and Downes, 2007, p. 148). With regard to modern communication technologies there is evidence for an association between media exposure and PTSD symptoms (DiMaggio and Galea, 2006, p. 564) although no causation is reported. However, the closer people are to experiencing traumatic events, the more likely they are to develop clinical symptoms. After the Omagh bombing in 1998, involved health service staff suffered from severe traumatic conditions (Luce et al., 2002, p. 29) and around half of the Enniskillen bombing's survivors were diagnosed with PTSD (Curran et al., 1990, p. 480). Inhabitants of cities that were strongly affected by the Troubles reported lower mental and physical levels of health than people from less involved cities (Cairns and Wilson, 1984, p. 633).

To put emphasis on varying psychological effects, Staub (2006) describes them as dependent on one's role during a conflict. Survivors were devalued as victims, harmed and their basic needs for security and control over one's life were threatened. Their identity as well as their relationships with others may be affected negatively (Staub, 2006, p. 871). Perpetrators may also be traumatised by their violent actions (MacNair, 2002, p. 69). They are often defensive after violence and tend to minimise harm caused. Bystanders usually show similar patterns to perpetrators, though to a lesser extent. The views of both perpetrators and bystanders towards the other community make it difficult to acknowledge wrongdoings. Nevertheless, empathy and openness are important to facilitate the peace process (Staub, 2006, p. 872).

Coping With Traumatic Events

Turning to coping with traumatic events, it can be said that developing PTSD is a result of dysfunctional coping strategies. The majority of the Northern Irish population were able to cope with lower levels of stress caused by political violence, but this was not true for people directly exposed to serious incidents like the Enniskillen bombing (Campbell et al., 2004, p. 179). Denial, distancing and habituation are common responses to severe traumatic events though these passive strategies happen to be maladaptive and lead to symptom development (Olff et al., 2005, p. 976).

Consequences of Traumatisation

What are the resulting consequences of traumatisation and failed coping? The main argument is that traumatisation, and PTSD in particular, give way to violence. Trew and Muldoon (2000, p. 18) argue that traumatised children are likely to express delinquent behaviour by externalising their trauma. This finding should not be underestimated as around 60% of children between eight and eleven experienced a bomb scare (Campbell et al., 2004, p. 178). Also, traumatic experiences have economic and financial consequences, especially during the first years after the event (Dillenburger et al., 2008, p. 1316). As stated above, people experiencing PTSD show high levels of arousal and anxiety. Under these circumstances harmed individuals may strike out. Believing they need to defend themselves they may overreact, thus becoming perpetrators (Staub, 2006, p. 871). This effect may partly explain how tense and politically loaded situations like a flag raising escalate and lead to cross-community violence as it did in January 2013 in Belfast (NBC News, 2013). Despite this rather direct consequence of traumatisation, researchers have also investigated transgenerational effects. Transgenerational traumas are well investigated in Holocaust survivors (Scharf, 2007) and evidence seems to support these findings for example for Bloody Sunday in 1972 (Shevlin and McGuigan, 2003, p. 430). Presumably children cannot grow up "without absorbing some of the emotional scars of the parents" (Kellerman, 2001, p. 36) because traumatisation has negative effects on parenting (Scharf, 2007, p. 604), thus reproducing trauma in one's

offspring.

The metaphor of a "gaping, unhealed wound" (Montville, 1993, p. 112) may be suitable to describe these on-going negative effects due to the experience of political violence. In general, these psychological damages may interfere with efforts towards building better relationships between Catholics and Protestants (Staub, 2006, p. 867). Consequently, psychological wounds caused by past violence have to be dealt with appropriately. If not, they have the potential to jeopardise the peace process and lead to the resumption of violence (Noor et al., 2008a, p. 820). Therefore, it is important to assess the psychological situation of the groups involved when talking about reconciliation, healing and the peace process in Northern Ireland.

THE ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TREATMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS

With regard to peacebuilding as establishing social justice, Christie (2001, p. 279) claims the centrality of empowerment and argues that peacebuilding is underpinned by sustainable satisfaction of basic human needs. Not only do these include security and control over one's life, but also factors such as mental health may have been profoundly frustrated by political violence (Staub, 2006, p. 875). The metaphor of the "gaping, unhealed wound" points to the importance of rehabilitative processes. In other words, these needs have to be fulfilled to facilitate the peace process.

<u>Reconciliation, Forgiveness and Healing</u>
Peace studies often refer to three essential concepts to further describe peacebuilding processes: reconciliation, forgiveness and healing. However, they are overlapping concepts (Staub, 2006, p. 875) and sometimes confounded if not defined clearly. In this work, forgiveness is considered to be a change in the victim from negative emotions and thoughts about the perpetrator such as anger and revenge, towards more positive ones (Staub, 2006, p. 886). In that sense it is unilateral, thus fully under the victim's control and addresses past grievances in order to let them go.

Reconciliation means changed psychological orientation in terms of mutual acceptance (Noor et al., 2008a, p. 822) between conflicting parties. It implies not seeing the past as determining the future and includes expressing empathy for each other and considering constructive relationships to be possible (Staub, 2006, p. 868). It is therefore transactional and involves direct group engagement. Healing is considered to be psychological recovery (Staub, 2006, p. 868), for example from traumatisation, clinical symptoms and mental disorder. If the subject's own coping mechanisms do not provide recovery, this can be supported by psychosocial interventions. Healing is considered to be important to provide a closure of bad relationships (Galtung, 2001, p. 3), thus being an essential component of reconciliation (Staub, 2006, p. 867).

Noor et al. (2008b) developed the Reconciliation Orientation Model (ROM) that conceptualises how psychological factors contribute to the restoration of relationships between Catholics and Protestants. It highlights healing from past injuries as a major obstacle for the course of reconciliation and suggests forgiveness to overcome them (Noor et al., 2008a, p. 830). Forgiveness is important because traumas are associated with a decreased sense of control and forgiving is a response which is completely under the victim's control (Noor et al., 2008a, p. 831). Evidence shows that forgiving offenders can release psychological distress (Orcutt, 2006, p. 357). For that reason it can be seen as a pro-social facilitator for reconciliation (Noor et al., 2008b, p. 483). A number of predictors for forgiveness could be identified. While in-group identity and competitive victimhood (i.e. the assumption of having suffered more than the other group) decreased the likelihood of forgiveness; shared identity, empathy and trust facilitated it (Noor et al., 2008a, p. 819). Although the ROM considers forgiveness to be a key precursor of reconciliation (Noor et al., 2008a, p. 822), past wrongdoings are not easily excused. As long as strong feelings of anger remain, forgiveness might have little prospect of success (Hamber, 2007, p. 119). This is particularly true for pathological conditions and points to support healing as well by other means.

Psychological recovery and overcoming trauma strengthen the self, change the way of perceiving one's environment and therefore make it easier to detect positive changes in the other group (Staub, 2006, p. 873).

Bringing perpetrators to justice seems to be an important component of a victim's recovery (Hamber, 2007, p. 120). This appears to be difficult in the case of Northern Ireland where amnesty was crucial to the negotiations around the GFA. Yet, some victims do suffer from the circumstance that prisoners were set free (Dillenburger et al., 2008, pp. 1316-1317). If large political changes cannot provide the conditions for the psychological recovery of every individual, psychosocial care and work may be the way to support those individuals.

Approaches to Addressing Trauma: Treatment and Community Work
How can healing occur? With regard to the treatment of trauma, engagement in emotionally supportive conditions is needed (Staub, 2006, p. 873). Two different approaches are seen to be effective in providing these conditions and addressing manifested psychological wounds: professional therapeutic treatment and community work. In Cambodia, people who underwent cognitive behavioural therapy after experiencing political violence did not only show lesser PTSD symptoms, but also more positive and forgiving attitudes towards perpetrators and a decreased tendency to take revenge (Bockers et al., 2011, p. 80). A psycho-educational group intervention conducted in Rwanda led to lesser symptoms of traumatisation and greater readiness to reconcile (Staub et al., 2005, p. 324). For Northern Ireland, cognitive behavioural therapy has shown to be an effective treatment for PTSD caused by political violence (Duffy et al., 2007, p. 5). Therefore, therapeutic approaches are expected to produce effects on forgiveness and reconciliation that are comparable to those observed in Cambodia and Rwanda.

As regards to community work, the peace process benefits from Northern Ireland's vibrant civil society. Cross-community problem-solving workshops (Montville, 1993, pp. 114-115) create supervised environments for productive cooperation. Significant progress addressing hardened positions in general (Bar-On and Kassem, 2004, pp. 300-301), and in Northern Ireland in particular were made using a storytelling approach (Acheson and Milofsky, 2008, p. 68). Traumatisation makes it difficult for both Protestant and Catholic activists to interact, so storytelling first encourages individuals to tell their stories in a supportive environment to give them the chance to go further stepwise, finally telling their experiences to the out-group that underwent the same procedure. There is evidence that exposing perpetrators first to stories of people they have not harmed directly can facilitate contrition (Staub, 2006, p. 876). In general it is essential to create spaces like inter-community forums where exchange can take place (Noor et al., 2008b, p. 493).

Limitations of Psychosocial Care and Community Work
Both therapeutic and community approaches are confronted with specific challenges. Social work in conflict contexts is challenged by emotional stress, fear, and competing national and religious identities that test the social worker's loyalty to the values of their profession (Ramon et al., 2006, p. 435). While social workers reported high levels of stress and anxiety, only a minority of them received professional support or supervision after violent incidents (Ramon et al., 2006, p. 445). Although trouble-related problems challenged social work consistently there was little or no attention paid in terms of special training (Ramon et al., 2006, p. 446). This points to the importance of special training and supervision integrating the political and cultural specifics of Northern Ireland. Bunting et al. (2013, p. 140) state the need for special training and the development of effective trauma-focused interventions based on the specific stressors experienced during the Troubles. It should be taken into account that therapists and psychosocial workers as a whole are also part of the conflict-torn society. On one hand, this leads to specific challenges such as loyalty to the in-group. On the other hand, experienced involvement may provide service staff with greater insights and facilitate healing (Hardiman et al., 2005, pp. 118-119). However, community based approaches may not be suitable for pathological conditions like PTSD whilst professional therapeutic treatment cannot cover the quantity of traumatisation in Northern Ireland. Moreover, many severely traumatised people do not seek professional help. The low uptake may be caused by guilt, shame or fear of stigmatisation (Luce et al., 2002, p. 30). However, NGOs such as the Northern Ireland Association for Mental Health work to tackle this stigma trying to create a more open environment for people to seek treatment.

Transforming Healing to Political Change

Reconciliation has been focused on as a psychological process. Obviously, it has clear political prospects and finally depends on reciprocal contrition and forgiveness between victims and perpetrators. Montville (1993, p. 112) points out that successful reconciliation for building sustainable peace includes three elements: a joint analysis of the history and overcoming competing narratives; recognition of injustices and caused wounds; and the acceptance of moral responsibility. Psychosocial work and care may support the willingness for these steps to be taken and their healing function may prevent individuals and groups from falling back in the peace process by resuming violence. Nonetheless psychological changes will not occur, or at least not be maintained, without social justice and institutions making efforts to ensure it (Staub, 2006, p. 880).

There has been controversy surrounding the function of forgiveness and the role of reconciliation in establishing positive peace (Staub, 2006, p. 886). In fact, reconciliation in conflictual contexts faces three main paradoxes (Lederach, 1998, p. 20). First, it requires the expression of the painful past while searching for articulation for a long-term interdependent future. Second, large importance is placed on the need for truth and mercy to meet while leaving behind the past in favour of renewed relationships. Third, the need to give time and space for justice and peace is expressed while redressing wrongdoing is held together by envisioning a shared, connected future. This article states that psychosocial care and work can help to resolve these contradictions by empowering individuals to cope with their past. Events associated with the Troubles impaired mental health both in victims and perpetrators; these roles sometimes even changed across different situations. Therefore, while individuals suffering from mental stress deserve appropriate rehabilitative treatment, their behaviour can also influence the peace process onwards for better or worse. In the end, the people whose actions change society for the better hold the key for building a new culture of peace (Byrne, 2001, p. 9).

CONCLUSION

This article focused on the role of traumatisation in the context of reconciliation and peacebuilding after the GFA in Northern Ireland. First, the current state of Northern Ireland's peace process was described. Negative peace was broadly accomplished whilst segregation on different levels (Campbell et al., 2004, p. 179) shows that positive peace has yet to be achieved; even incidents of violence after the GFA have been documented. Second, the psychological consequences evolving from the Troubles were reviewed as well as how they may influence peacebuilding. The Troubles had a severe psychological impact on individuals and society. Northern Ireland's rates of PTSD lie at the top of international estimations (Bunting et al., 2012, p. 1735). Also, traumatisation may even manifest itself across generations (Shevlin and McGuigan, 2003, p. 430). The phenomenology and specific symptoms of traumatisation may lead to overreactions in tense situations (Staub, 2006, p. 871) and therefore be partly accountable for resuming violence in Northern Ireland (Noor et al., 2008a, p. 820). Psychological wounds due to past violence can interfere with efforts of peacebuilding. For that reason, they have to be taken into account when trying to push the process of positive peace forward. Third, it was discussed how psychological wounds can be addressed to provide healing and to facilitate reconciliation. In most cases two approaches are useful: psychotherapy, most suitable for pathological patterns like PTSD (Duffy et al., 2007, p. 5), and community work to deal with the large amount of traumatisation. As far as community work is concerned, Northern Ireland can benefit from its vibrant society (Thiessen et al., 2010, p. 41). Finally, the role of healing in the context of achieving positive peace was addressed. Psychological recovery is essential to the process of reconciliation and forgiveness (Staub, 2006, p. 867). It must be realised in the context of a conflict-torn society that tries to achieve a sustainable and peaceful coexistence. Psychosocial care and work can facilitate this process by empowering people to cope with their past experiences and fulfilling their basic need for mental health.

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