Introduction

In 1978, one political observer commented that “Tito has become the symbol of Yugoslav unity. His death could have severe and immediate repercussions on the stability of the country” (Seroka, 1978, p. 271). While repercussions were not immediate, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) disintegrated in the decade that followed the death of its leader Josip Broz Tito. By looking at the history of Yugoslavia, it becomes apparent that severe underlying issues were not addressed, and that although quelled during the Tito era, these eventually led to the radical disintegration of the state and antagonization of the groups that inhabited it. Historian Sabrina Ramet suggested that Yugoslavia suffered from and was ultimately the victim of a perennial ‘crisis of legitimacy’: unable to build a system that promoted support and allegiance to the state from citizens, the Yugoslav Communist Party (LCY) could not tackle the state’s innate illegitimacy and long-present problems (Ramet, 2002). This essay endeavours to take Ramet’s proposition a step further, suggesting that the Yugoslav break-up was primarily the result of a development parallel to the crisis of legitimacy, a ‘crisis of identity’, as will be demonstrated with the aid of constructivist theory on identity formation. First, it will define constructivist theory and examine how Tito’s Yugoslavia faced a multi-dimensional crisis of identity, being unable to create a pan Yugoslav identity and successfully eliminate ethnic nationalism among its constituent republics, resulting in trends of self victimisation. It will subsequently analyse the divergence of politico-economic interests between constituent republics in the 1960s economic crisis and its relevance in antagonising their relationships and leading to the revitalisation of repressed national sentiments and a politicisation of national pasts post-Tito. Finally, the essay will demonstrate how these resulted in the rise of Slobodan Milošević in Serbia and how his coup at the federal level stalemated the political system, which proved to be the tipping point in severing the links between the constituent republics and the federal system. The state was weak and divided as per Ramet’s legitimacy argument, and thus unable to reform itself, but what drove the system to disintegration were the centrifugal forces of nationalism, exacerbated by concerns of integrity and protection of national economic and political interests.

Constructivist theory: notions

Constructivist theory suggests that concepts such as nations and ethnicity are socially constructed phenomena and by essence both fluid and potentially reactionary in their development (Rocker, 1998). An ethnic group is no definitive entity: its identity is subject to change, in the sense that it may be altered or reinforced by external as well as internal pressures (Malešević, 2004). In this way, ethnic identity may be constructed as a result of reactionary behaviour and of internal forces: from below, by individuals and cultural institutions, and from above, as cultural differences and characteristics may be institutionalised by politicians and/or the establishment (Flere and Klanjšek, 2016). In the case of Yugoslavia, this theory entails a number of fundamental implications. First, identity may be purposefully constructed and maintained through states or “ethnic entrepreneurs’’ (Flere and Klanjšek, 2016, p. 842). Second, identity may be reactionary and thus based on opposition to other groups that pose a potential threat to one’s own group’s interests. These implications are central to understanding the fate of Yugoslavia, as state efforts to suppress national attachments and create a Yugoslav identity not only failed, but led to the exacerbation of localism and effectively, a crisis of identity. Attempts at imposing “brotherhood and unity” (Ramet, 2006, pp. 3-4), a central pillar of Yugoslav ideology, led to division and distrust.

Multi-dimensional crisis of identity

The first dimension of Communist Yugoslavia’s crisis of identity is that it sought to build a Yugoslav identity but failed in doing so:
“Yugoslavia is a country without Yugoslavs” (Lendvai and Parcell, 1991, p. 253). Only a small and mostly privileged group considered itself to be Yugoslav, with most individuals identifying as one of the many ethnicities that lived within the borders of the Yugoslav state (Oncioiu, 2016). The primary reason for this failure was that from its foundation, the Yugoslav state attempted to bring together people that had different expectations and interests both in their internal developments as well as in their relationships vis-à-vis other groups (Ramet, 2006). Indeed, many of these groups wished to maximise their relative power and influence in the Balkans. In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Serbs enjoyed a privileged status both socially and politically at the expense of non-Serbs. The ethnic resentments that emerged in that era were expressed through the creation of various national and xenophobic fascist organisations during World War II, such as the Croatian Ustaše and the Serbian Chetniks, and the genocides they carried out against other national groups (Hoare, 2010). Under Tito and Communism, an attempt was made at creating a political formula built on the principle of parity of all constituent republics and the achievements of the Partisans (Flere and Klanjšek, 2016). However, until the expulsion of Serbian centralist Aleksandar Ranković from the leadership of the LCY in 1966, Serbs were systematically overrepresented in the League of Communists and republic party apparatus in Kosovo, Croatia and Bosnia. This alienated non-Serbs and along with wartime memories, impeded the creation of a pan-Yugoslav identity. The sole exception were the Muslim Bosnians, who identified as Yugoslavs en masse until the recognition of the Muslim identity in 1966, to avoid having to identify as Serbs or Croats (Judt, 2005). This exception however proves the rule, as once given the opportunity, most Muslim Bosnians identified as ethnic Muslims rather than Yugoslavs.

Additionally, Tito’s communists failed to effectively suppress nationalist attachments and loyalties – in fact, their efforts to do so exacerbated the differences between the many ethnicities of Yugoslavia (Oncioiu, 2016). This is the second dimension of Yugoslavia’s crisis of identity. All of the nations of Yugoslavia – except Montenegro – were, by the creation of the Yugoslav state, true national groups in nature (Flere and Klanjšek, 2016). To the Partisans, nationalism was the roots of the devastation which had struck Yugoslavia during World War II. It was thus necessary to eliminate such sentiments to create a harmonious Yugoslav society and stabilise the political scene. However, this took place through shaming and denial. For example, Croats and the Croatian Church were repeatedly shamed for the Ustaše genocide, while Serbs were made to feel guilty about their status in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Chetnik massacres (Hoare, 2010). Instead of addressing these issues and initiating constructive debates, the genocides and issues of nationalism in Yugoslavia were demonised (Ramet, 2006).

Efforts to undermine the integrity of national identities led to a sense of alienation among the constituent republics, in which national groups felt targeted by prejudice. Such sentiments of self-victimisation were common in Yugoslavia, as constituent republics and individuals increasingly felt that they were being wronged by the system in the favour of other ethnicities. Self-victimisation and manipulation by ethnic entrepreneurs of collective memory exaggerating wartime destruction and losses led to the developments of beliefs in which one’s nation became the recipient of discrimination and second-class treatment throughout the history of the Yugoslav state (Flere and Klanjšek, 2016). This resulted in efforts by intellectual nationalists to affirm the identity of their ethnic community and demarcate themselves from other Yugoslav people, such as the “Croatian Spring” (Ramet, 2006). The Croatian Spring was a wave of Croatian national enthusiasm that was the consequence of the rejection by Croat intellectuals of the 1967 Novi Sad agreements, which declared Serbo-Croatian a single language, being perceived as a threat to the integrity of the Croatian variant of the common language (Oncioiu, 2016). Other ethnicities, like the Muslim Bosnians, similarly experienced renewed waves of nationalism in the 1970s after having been, granted national recognition, as previously outlined. In both cases however, as well as in all other instances where nationalist sentiments were perceived to take primacy over the ideals of Yugoslav unity and parity under Tito, expressions of national pride and uniqueness were met with repression from the authorities.

Economic crisis: diverging interests and the beginning of decentralisation

While expressions of localism were repressed under Tito at the societal level, the economic crisis of the 1960s led to manifestations of
nationalism and protection of national interests from above, i.e., from the political representatives of the constituent republics, which were expressed at the political level in the form of federalism and drew the lines by which the fracturing of the Yugoslav state would occur. The question of federalisation over centralisation was a debate that occupied the LCY from the 1960s to the fall of Yugoslavia (Lendvai and Parcell, 1991). These debates divided the political scene, as they were ultimately seen as a way of establishing one particular republic’s national interests at the expense of others: attempts at centralisation were considered evidence of Serbian hegemony by non-Serbs, whereas attempts at decentralisation were experienced by Serbs as an attack on their national integrity. Demands for greater decentralisation emerged from the debate on economic reforms after the economic crisis that had struck the country by the 1960s. An obvious economic division existed between the wealthy north of Yugoslavia such as Slovenia and Croatia, and the poorer south. These wealthier republics believed that they were being exploited and cumbered by the federal system and were furious that certain important economic decisions were made on clearly political rather than economic grounds (Judt, 2005). In the face of the economic crisis, they thus demanded greater autonomy to protect their national political and economic interests, which increasingly diverged from those of the SFRY (Ramet, 2006). The earliest and most palpable of such conflicts was the Slovenian road affair of 1969, where the funds of a loan from the World Bank that had been made to improve its road networks between Slovenia and Austria were reallocated to meliorate the road infrastructures of other constituent republics. This angered the Slovenian communist branch which warned the LCY of potential damage to the relations between Slovenia and other republics – while having few effects, this was significantly the first time that a republic had protested against a federal decision (Ramet, 2006). Nevertheless, by empowering the national political systems from the 1963 constitution onwards (Ramet, 2002), decentralisation laid the foundations by which the fissuring of the Yugoslav state would occur, and made certain nations feel prejudiced against despite making the federal system more equitable. These steps felt most like a threat to Serbs, historically the champions of centralism: the dismissal of Ranković for example, was interpreted as evidence that the LCY had become anti-Serb (Ramet, 1996).

Politics and identity: rise of nationalism post-Tito and the fall of Yugoslavia

The 1960s economic crisis exacerbated demands for greater autonomy by the constituent republics, leading to the development of decentralisation at the federal level – coinciding with the crisis of the late 1970s. However, nationalist tensions were manifested in novel overt ways after the death of Tito. Indeed, the effects of the 1973 oil crisis came late to Yugoslavia, but as in other countries, proved to be not only an economic but political crisis (Hobsbawm, 1995). As per Ramet’s argument of a crisis of legitimacy, the weakness and polarisation of the political system had left politicians unable to efficiently respond to Yugoslavia’s economic and political problems. This stimulated demands for even greater liberty from the constituent republics. As previously mentioned, nationalist behaviour coming from below was met with repression under Tito. Upon his death, however, there was no all-Yugoslav figure and political arbiter which could regulate the relations between the constituent republics and their citizens. Instead, he left behind a decentralised political legacy in which all six constituent republics and the two Serbian autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, enjoyed an equal say in federal matters as guaranteed by the 1974 constitution (Ramet, 2002). Just a year after his death, the Albanians of Kosovo took to the streets to protest against the discrimination they experienced by the Yugoslav and above all Serbian political system (Ramet, 2002). Albanians represented about 15% of the Yugoslav population by that time, as opposed to 3.6% in 1931 (Judt, 2005). Despite being the most rapidly growing ethnic group of Yugoslavia, they lived in conditions thoroughly inferior to the Yugoslav average. Their demands for a republic independent from Serbia felt like a threat to Serbs and as per constructivist theory reactionism, fuelled Serbian nationalism and Albanophobia, leading to mass demonstrations by Serbs in Belgrade and Pristina (Ramet, 2006). Indeed, Kosovo occupied a central place in Serbian history, as the 1389 battle of Kosovo stood in the conscience collective as the manifestation of Serbian unity and protection of its national integrity. Such politicisation of the past was omnipresent throughout the ethnicities of Yugoslavia, presenting an idealised conception of pre-Yugoslav national freedom and greatness and would be harnessed by ethnic entrepreneurs to fuel growing nationalist sentiments (Flere and Klanjšek, 2016).

The growth of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s and the political demands of the Serbian republic on the federal system led to the rise of Slobodan Milošević and the strengthening of national sentiments amongst other peoples of Yugoslavia as a reaction, eventually resulting in a political stalemate to which the constituent republics could only reply by seceding. Serbian nationalism was accentuated by both decentralisation, which was experienced as anti-Serb and to which political and economic faults were attributed, and the re emergence of Kosovar Albanian nationalism. Already in 1984, the Serbian party organisation called for reforms which would strengthen the federal government and undermine the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo. In 1985, the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts drafted a Memorandum which portrayed Serbs as the great victims of Tito and Communism and argued that Serbs were being utilised and exploited in the SFRY. It also contained an ideological program which would establish Serbian hegemony over non Serbs (Ramet, 2002). By 1987, Slobodan Milošević had risen to power and channelled Serbian nationalism first against Albanians and Tito’s legacy, and ultimately against the other people of the SFRY (Ramet, 1996). The strengthening of Serbian nationalism and
the Memorandum demands caused outrage in other constituent republics anxious to preserve their national integrity, leading to the election of other nationalist leaders such as the Croat Franjo Tudjman (Judt, 2005), which once again highlights the reactionary aspect of nationalism in Yugoslavia. More than simple demagogic talk however, Milošević was able to bring the autonomous provinces under the control of Belgrade but retaining their federal votes through a constitutional coup. By placing allies at the head of Montenegro, he secured half of the federal votes for Serbia, thus stalemating the political system by 1989 (Ramet, 2006). Up to this point, the Slovenes, among others, had used the threat of secession as a last resort, and were willing to work out compromises (Ramet, 2002). With the federal stalemate, the only solution was to secede, which brought Croatia and eventually Bosnia and Macedonia to secede too. Milošević was not the main actor in Yugoslavia’s disintegration, but rather, represented the political catalyst for nationalism to erupt and topple the federal system of the SFRY.

Conclusion

The Yugoslav political system was polarised, adversely affected by Ramet’s crisis of legitimacy, but the driving forces in the disintegration of Yugoslavia were nationalism and reactions to infringements on national integrity, as part of the state’s crisis of identity. Tito wished to create a pan-Yugoslav identity, but his failure in doing so and effectively quelling expressions of nationalism resulted in their exacerbation, as nationalism would eventually resurface in the wake of the political and economic problems that the SFRY faced – first at the political level in the form of decentralisation, and after Tito’s death, renewing itself at the societal level, first in Kosovo, then Serbia and the rest of Yugoslavia. The disintegration of Yugoslavia is best understood in the context of constructivist theory and a crisis of identity, as the issue of nationality and the protection of national interests lay at the heart of essential political conflict and debate of the federation. Nationalism was reactionary throughout its development and essentially constructed. Whether to centralise or decentralise the state and the emergence of self-victimisation antagonised constituent republics and their relations towards each other, whilst the demands for greater autonomy from the Albanian Kosovars led to a reinvigoration of Serbian nationalism which eventually resulted in the rise to power of Milošević and a political stalemate at the federal level. Sabrina Ramet proposed to allegorise the story of Yugoslavia with that of the Tower of Babel in that both are a story of failed cooperation. This myth however presupposes initial unity, which was absent in Yugoslavia from the very creation of the state. It is in this light perhaps more fitting to interpret the disintegration of Yugoslavia through George Steiner’s conception of the Babel problem: “New languages are not designed to improve communication, or to express things better, but to allow secrecy and maintain cultural isolation” (Web Archive: Powers of Literature). The people of Yugoslavia wished to affirm and demarcate their national
identities and interests against those of other national groups of Yugoslavia and the federation itself, a process which entailed the violent disintegration of the state and of the relations between ethnic groups.

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