Abstract

This paper examines the rapid mobilisation and subsequent decline of the May 1968 movement in France through the lens of two competing social movement theories: Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) and Political Process Theory (PPT). The movement’s initial success was driven by the state’s repressive response, which expanded political opportunities and fostered solidarity among students, workers, and unions. While RMT explains the rational aggregation of resources and initial mobilisation, it struggles to account for why workers continued striking despite material concessions. Instead, PPT provides a stronger framework by highlighting the perceived political instability that enabled continued mobilisation. However, the movement’s lack of internal organisation, as analysed using Tarrow’s framework, ultimately led to its rapid collapse once the state recalibrated its strategy. This case study suggests that RMT is more applicable in politically stable contexts, whereas PPT better explains mobilisation during generalised political instability.

The purpose of this paper is to adjudicate between two competing theories of movement mobilisation, using May 1968 as a case study. The paper analyses this movement with reference to (1) its rapid mobilisation, (2) its lack of organisation, and (3) the response of the state, which acted as a fulcrum around which the movement both rose and fell. The paper begins with an account of the background to May 1968. The paper continues by outlining contrasting theories about how movements mobilise and will show how Political Process Theory (PPT) and, to a lesser extent (until after May 30th, to be discussed later) Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) are supported by the mobilisation of social movement actors in May 1968. The paper then discusses the movement’s rapid decline as a function of its lack of organisation, using Tarrow’s (2011, pp. 123–124) three factors of movement organisation as an analytical framework. The essay outlines how the response from the state initially created political opportunities which enabled the rapid mobilisation of resources and created some sense of solidarity among movement actors. However, once the state had the opportunity to re-evaluate its strategy, particularly after receiving a relative vote of confidence from a countermovement (Meyer and Staggenborg, 1996; Reader and Wadia, 1993), it could effectively dismantle the social movement by exploiting the cracks in its organisational structure.

Background to May 1968
May 1968 was a social movement that took place in France, in May 1968. The movement followed years of discontent among students and workers in France (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 5). The student population increased by 224% between 1958 and 1968, but resources did not increase adequately (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 5). In 1966, at the University of Strasbourg, a radical group of students took over the students’ union, but this takeover was overturned in court (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 6). On the side of the workers, housing problems were rampant, and strikes, such as the January 1968 strike at the SAVIEM factory in Caen, increased in frequency and intensity (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 7).

The decisive moment for the movement occurred in March 1968, when the Minister for Youth and Sport visited the University of Nanterre to mark the opening of a swimming pool. He was accosted by student Daniel Cohn-Bendit for making no mention of sexual problems in his recently published book on French youth (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 8). Student protests and grievances were not exclusively related to the university system. The Vietnam War also acted as a point of contention for students in 1968 (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 8). Cohn-Bendit and other students, including Trotskyists of the Jeunesse Communiste Révolutionnaire (JCR), occupied the administrative block of Nanterre University, aiming to transform 22 March into a “day of anti-imperialist debate and struggle” (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 8).

When a committee was established to discipline the student protestors on 6 May, small-scale protests began in support of the students who had occupied Nanterre. When police violently repressed the protests on 7 May, using tear gas and batons, students fought back with stones and built the first barricade of May 1968 (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 10). Police brutality acted as an impetus for further protest action. Between 6 and 14 May 1968, these protests grew into a large-scale political movement. National student unions, the largest trade unions (CGT and CFDT), factory workers (Renault and Sud-Aviation), and left-wing politicians (Mitterrand, Mendès-France, etc.) became involved (Reader and Wadia, 1993).

At the height of the movement, millions of workers were on strike, the government had ceased to work effectively, and President De Gaulle had left the country (Reader and Wadia, 1993). Unions disliked students, students disliked politicians (Mann, 2011, pp. 210–211). A large group of Gaullists marched in Paris in a countermovement; De Gaulle returned on 30 May, vowing to regain control of France. Most unions accepted the Grenelle Agreement and workers returned to work (Seidman, 1993, p. 266). The movement ended within weeks of its beginning.

Can We Say that the Movement Failed?

The argument of this paper relies on a conception of May 1968 as a failed movement. Before it can be judged a failure, its goals must be considered. If May 1968 aimed to “smash capitalist society” (Reader and Wadia, 1993, p. 46), it unequivocally failed. If it sought to repair an “ossified university” (Fomerand, 1977), its success is debatable. Some (Domenach, 1968 as cited in Reader and Wadia, 1993) argued that the movement was a civilizational rather than political revolt. Here, it is taken that May 1968 expanded from a student strike into a broader political movement whose major aims were unfulfilled.

Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT)

Resource Mobilisation Theory (McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973) explains collective action through rational aggregation of resources and organisation. May 1968 fulfils criteria 1–3 (rational resource use, organisation, inclusion of outside actors) but not 4–5 (competition for resources, cost–reward sensitivity). If workers were rationally sensitive to costs and benefits, they would have accepted the Grenelle protocol, yet they continued to strike. This suggests RMT applies best to politically stable contexts (Landy, 2014) and institutionalised movements (Piven and Cloward, 1991), not moments of generalised political instability like May 1968.

Political Process Theory (PPT)
Political Process Theory (McAdam, 1999) stresses political opportunities and leverage. Police repression increased students’ legitimacy and undermined the state (Joffrin, 1988 as cited in Reader and Wadia, 1993). Unions joined after seeing violence (Zancarini-Fournel, 2016 as cited in Davis, 2018). This matches Tarrow’s (2011, p. 33) view that contentious politics arises when opportunities and vulnerabilities are perceived. Subjective perceptions of instability (Kurzman, 1996) enabled mobilisation beyond rational cost–benefit logic. Expanded opportunities from repression created a positive-feedback loop.

Lack of Organisation and Movement Failure

Tarrow (2011, pp. 123–124) defines organisation through collective action, advocacy, and connective structures. While May 1968 succeeded in collective action, it lacked advocacy coherence and inter-group connection. Coalition members disagreed ideologically; the CGT and PCF viewed students as “sons of bourgeois” (Mann, 2011, pp. 210–211). When De Gaulle returned on 30 May and unions accepted Grenelle, the coalition fractured (Seidman, 1993, p. 266). Without internal cohesion, the state exploited these divisions and restored order (Meyer, 2004).

Conclusion

The state acted as the fulcrum around which May 1968 both rose and fell. RMT explains mobilisation in stable contexts; PPT explains mobilisation in instability. May 1968 reveals that political instability mediates between these theories. The movement’s lack of organisation and the state’s adaptive response precipitated its collapse.

Bibliography

Davis, O. (2018). ‘The anti-police of Mai ’68 fifty years on’. Modern and Contemporary France, 26(2), pp. 107–114.

Fomerand, J. (1977). ‘The French University: What Happened after the Revolution?’. Higher Education, 6(1), pp. 93–116.

Kurzman, C. (1996). ‘Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979’. American Sociological Review, 61(1), pp. 153–170.

Landy, D. (2014). ‘Challengers in the migrant field: pro-migrant Irish NGO responses to the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 38(6), pp. 927–942.

Mann, K. (2011). ‘A Revival of Labor and Social Protest Research in France: Recent Scholarship on May 1968’. International Labour and Working-Class History, 80(1), pp. 203–214.

McAdam, D. (1999). Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. (1977). ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’. American Journal of Sociology, 82(6), pp. 1212–1241.

Meyer, D. S. (2004). ‘Protest and Political Opportunities’. Annual Review of Sociology, 30(1), pp. 125–145.

Meyer, D. S. and Staggenborg, S. (1996). ‘Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity’. American Journal of Sociology, 101(6), pp. 1628–1660.

Molnárfi, L. (2023). ‘Photo-ops and Goodie Bags: Co-Optation of Student Unions’. Social and Political Review, 33(1), pp. 92–106.

Oberschall, A. (1973). Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Piven, F. F. and Cloward, R. A. (1991 [1979]). Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail. New York: Vintage Books.

Reader, K. and Wadia, K. (1993). The May 1968 Events in France: Reproductions and Interpretations. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Seidman, M. (1993). ‘The French Working Class and the Strikes of May 1968’. French Historical Studies, 17(1), pp. 255–285.

Tarrow, S. (2011). Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Bibliography

Davis, O. (2018). ‘The anti-police of Mai ‘68 fifty years on’. Modern and Contemporary France, 26(2), pp. 107–114.

Fomerand, J. (1977). ‘The French University: What Happened after the Revolution?’. Higher Education, 6(1), pp. 93–116.

Kurzman, C. (1996). ‘Structural Opportunity and Perceived Opportunity in Social-Movement Theory: The Iranian Revolution of 1979’. American Sociological Review, 61(1), pp. 153–170.

Landy, D. (2014). ‘Challengers in the migrant field: pro-migrant Irish NGO responses to the Immigration, Residence and Protection Bill’. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 38(6), pp. 927–942.

Mann, K. (2011). ‘Review: A Revival of Labor and Social Protest Research in France: Recent Scholarship on May 1968’. International Labour and Working-Class History, 80(1), pp. 203–214.

McAdam, D. (1999). Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. (1977). ‘Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory’. American Journal of Sociology, 82(6), pp. 1212–1241.

Meyer, D. S. (2004). ‘Protest and Political Opportunities’. Annual Review of Sociology, 30(1), pp. 125–145.

Meyer, D. S. and Staggenborg, S. (1996). ‘Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity’. American Journal of Sociology, 101(6), pp. 1628–1660.

Molnárfi, L. (2023). ‘Photo-ops and Goodie Bags: Co-Optation of Student Unions’. Social and Political Review, 33(1), pp. 92–106.

Oberschall, A. (1973). Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Piven, F. F. and Cloward, R. A. (1979). Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail. New York: Random House Vintage Books.

Piven, F. F. and Cloward, R. A. (1991). ‘Collective Protest: A Critique of Resource Mobilization Theory’. International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 4(4), pp. 435–458.

Reader, K. A. and Wadia, K. (1993). The May 1968 Events in France: Reproductions and Interpretations. 1st ed. London: Macmillan Press.

Seidman, M. (1993). ‘Workers in a Repressive Society of Seductions: Parisian Metallurgists in May-June 1968’. French Historical Studies, 18(1), pp. 255–278.Tarrow, S. G. (2011). Power in Social Movements: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. 3rd ed. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.