Introduction

This paper will act as an explanation for why Marx and Engels described themselves as scientific socialists. Scientific socialism, also
known as Marxism, is the method forwarded by Marx and Engels for both scientifically examining existing societal structures, while also forwarding socialism as both necessitated by , and resulting from, existing social structures. The importance of Marx and Engels’ work derives from its systemic analysis of existing structures, while also positing an inevitable, new economic system from the internal logic of the capitalist economy.

Firstly, this paper will explain historical materialism and the Marxist view of economics. Consideration will then turn to the main influences on Marxist thought, namely Hegel, Feuerbach and the utopian socialists, showcasing how these ideologies were crucial to the development of the dialectical and scientific aspects of Marxism. This paper will then examine how Marx and Engels distinguished their ‘scientific’ brand of socialism from their contemporaries, namely the reformist socialists and anarchists, before outlining an argument for why modern Marxist functionalism is still scientific.

Historical Materialism

When Marx and Engels discuss ‘materialism’, they do so in two senses. Firstly, Marx (1875, Part one) is a materialist in the sense that
he sees man’s material needs as the basis for all social interaction. Marx notes that man has physical needs which may only be satisfied by the products of nature, thereby shaping society. Marxists are also philosophically materialist in that they disavow any non-observable phenomena such as religion (Engels 1892, introduction). These are synonymous for Marx and Engels; Man is both subjected to and relies on sensuous data (Engels 1892, Introduction). To understand why Marx and Engels saw their conception of materialism as ‘historical’, it is apt to examine an earlier form of materialism which Marx and Engels dub ‘mechanical materialism’.

Engels (1892, chapter 2) notes that 18th century metaphysics was materialist in an abstract sense – things either existed or did not exist. Material reality was fixed, or possibly cyclical, but while the notion of change existed to traditional materialists, history could not be said to have any concept of progress (Engels 1946, Part 2). Engels (1946, chapter 2) contends that such a rigid metaphysical stance permeated the scientific thinking of the period, seeing matter as fixed and the universe as essentially static. Engels thus credits the discovery of cells and particularly Darwinian selection as vindicating the Marxist position that material reality is in a constant state of flux, if not progressive.

Man, like nature, responds to his material setting – while individual humans may be sentient, societies are too complex to move intelligently, and are thus akin to natural, observable phenomena (Engels 1892, chapter 3). Marx and Engels saw these material changes in society resulting from class struggle throughout history, as opposed to traditional materialism that divorced ideas from their material ‘driving forces’ (Engels 1946, Part 4).

The modes of production provide us with an understanding of how material classes spur history. Marx (1859, preface) gives us the clearest espousal of how economies are structured. Marx divides all hitherto existing economic systems (modes of production) into two factors; the forces of production (FOP) and the relations of production (ROP). The forces of production equate to all the material resources within an economy, whereas the relations of production are the ‘definite’ economic relations between those who own the FOP and those who do not. Marx and Engels perceived the ROP as an economic, rather than exclusively cultural phenomena, and thus grounded class in a material reality, rather than a sociological perspective.

The capitalist mode of production

Engels (1892, introduction) believed that capitalist economics has two main classes – the Bourgeoisie who own ‘nature’ (the FOP) and the Proletariat who own nothing except their labour, and must sell themselves to survive. Marx and Engels (1848, chapter.1) argue that historically, changes in modes of production are usually ‘pregnant’ within the pre-existing society. The origins of the Bourgeoisie lay in the mercantile burghers of the feudal era as they expanded from private manufacturing of private business to social manufacturing of private business (1892, Chap.3). Marx and Engels perceived capitalism as a liberating force, radically simplifying the complex class structure of feudalism, and understood European society in 19th century to be composed of three major classes – Aristocracy, Bourgeoisie and Proletariat, the latter two having emerged from the economic base (1946, chapter 4). Marxists see capitalism as intensifying the collapse of other classes such as the aristocracy and middle class (Petit bourgeois) until these classes are subsumed into the other two major classes (Marx and Engels 1848, chapter 1).

Influences on Marxism

It is evident that Marx and Engels used class relations to analyse the past and present in a materialist sense. To understand how Marxists use this analysis to predict the future, one must first look at Hegel, Feuerbach and the utopian socialists.

Hegelian dialectic

Engels (1946, Chap.4) defines the Marxist position as distinct from Hegel and Feuerbach. From Hegel, Marxists borrow the idea of dialectics and reason as a process instead of a fixed metaphysical truth. For Hegel, unlike previous eighteenth-century metaphysicians, human history was constantly progressing towards an end point. This occurred via the dialectic – ideas would confront opposing ideas which would create better ideas. Hegel believed the endpoint of this process was the ‘absolute idea’ – in which human reason would reach absolute perfection. For Hegel, our ideas and understanding of reason was relative to the period we lived in. Hegel did not believe we had reached the absolute idea, however he believed that Prussian society in the 1830s was approaching it and therefore
conservatively protected it (Engels 1946, chapter 1). Engels (1946, Chapter 1) notes the paradox in Hegel’s thinking – conservative Hegelians upheld the ‘proposition’ that Prussia must be protected, while the Hegelian dialectic stressed constant change and destruction of outdated ideas. For Marx and Engels, it was therefore necessary to turn Hegel ‘right side up’ by seeing ideas as a product of material conditions rather than abstract ideas causing changes (Engels 1946, chapter 4).

Feuerbach

Feuerbach, by viewing religious belief materialistically as a product of internal human reason, also rejected Hegel’s idealism by focusing on the materialist basis of ideas. Engels (1946, chapter 3) notes that Hegel studied societal changes, as opposed to Feuerbach’s analysis of an abstracted individual. Marxists reject Feuerbach’s thinking just as they reject Hegel albeit for different reasons; Hegel had an idealist conception of humanity while Feuerbach had a materialist conception of an abstracted man. Historical materialism was thus a tool to predict dialectical movements via materialist, societal analysis , which was most evident in class struggle throughout historical epochs (Engels 1946, chapter 3).

Utopian socialists

Engels (1892, Part 1) discusses the weaknesses of previous ‘utopian’ socialists. Engels traces the origins of early socialists such as Fourier and Owens in bourgeois, Enlightenment ideas of reason. These intellectuals took the idea of political equality and extended it to economic equality – their analysis is not based upon liberating classes but emancipating humanity. To Engels, these thinkers are ‘idealist’ in the same sense as Hegel – their philosophy is not derived from materialist analysis but from philosophising a perfect society. Engels lambasts these thinkers for ignoring that ideas derive from materialist conditions therefore reason is relative, not fixed. These thinkers rejected revolution, seeing the merits of socialism as self-evident. Engels fundamentally rejects this idea, seeing a change in the mode of production as a necessarily violent act. This focus on dialectics leads naturally to the moniker of ‘scientific’ socialism.

Marxism as science

Dialectical analysis allows Marxists to do two things. Firstly, it facilitates the explanation of historical materialism in the context of economic class struggle, which moves dialectically. Secondly, this dialectical class movement allows Marxists to predict ensuing struggles. For Marx and Engels, historical materialism and class struggle are not just historical phenomena – they are current and constant phenomena that can be studied with the ‘precision of natural science’ (Marx 1859, preface).

Engels (1892, chapter 2) credits Darwin as the scientist who proved that matter operates dialectically as opposed to being metaphysically fixed. Marx and Engels believe that human society, like all phenomena, must move dialectically and that historical materialism is the mechanic by which society operates. History is therefore not random but governed by dialectical movements in the form of class struggle as the ‘inner, hidden laws’ of human history (Engels 1946, part 4). As noted above, Marx saw capitalism as simplifying class structure (Marx 1848, chapter 1). Engels (1892, chapter 3) gives the clearest expression of the scientific inevitability of the socialist revolution. Class simplification occurs as private industry outpaces and destroys the need for mercantile business, simplifying the classes within society while intensifying the division between bourgeoisie and Proletariat. Engels sees feudalism as individual producers producing for subsistence, whereas capitalist production has led to a revolution in economic production. Moreover, capitalism turns feudal producers into labourers within socialised factories. Marx and Engels therefore saw the nucleus of future socialist society as existing in the present society which will encourage class consciousness and eventually socialist revolution. Marx (1875, Part 1) explains how socialism will inevitably occupy two distinct stages – ‘lower’ and ‘upper’ communism. Later Marxists such as Lenin dub these stages ‘socialism’ and ‘communism’ respectively. The lower stage will make all labour equal and have some form of state-administered currency, although the workers’ state will gradually wither away as it becomes occupied with purely administrative tasks. The higher stage will be classless and stateless and governed by the maxim ‘from each according to his ability to each to this need’. Engels (1892, chapter 3) saw this process as the inevitable outcome of the seizing of socialised production by the workers. The newly founded socialist state will immediately begin to wither away and end class struggle, as the relations of production will be equalised, and all people will be provided with their material needs. Communism thus achieves the ‘end of history’ by abolishing the material conditions necessary for class struggle.

Reformism and Anarchism

‘Scientific socialism’ may also be distinguished from so-called ‘reformist’ socialism on the issue of revolution. Marx and Engels (1848,
chapter 1) believe that all of history is class struggle, and the resolution of class struggle is via revolution and the ushering of a new mode of production. In contrast, other socialist movements borrowed from Marx but believed that socialism may be achieved by reforms within the political and legal system. An example of such a movement is the S.P.D’s proposed ‘Gotha’ programme, which was meticulously scrutinised by Marx (Marx 1875, Chapter 1).

Marx (1875, Part 4) argues that reforming the bourgeois state is impossible as the state is a super structural entity emanating from the
economic base and helping to uphold it. Reformists are therefore incorrect to conceive the state as a neutral umpire; for Marx and Engels, the capitalist state is a bourgeois tool for class domination. Engels (1946, chapter 4) notes that common and civil law systems, despite their radically different origins, have coalesced in the modern bourgeois state to a near synonymous view on property rights. Engels argues this is because the legal system merely codifies and legitimises the status quo via ideology (Engels 1946, chapter 4). We may be granted ‘legal equality’ but as noted by the utopian socialists we have no material equality (Engels, 1946, chap 3). The ‘superstructure’ of countries may thus reflect a plethora of different cultural and societal values, but it only has one purpose- to empower the ruling class (Marx 1875 part 4).

This does not mean that scientific socialism rejects the use of states entirely, rather the opposite is true. Marx (1875, part 4) argues it is necessary for the workers to create their own state which they will use to crush the bourgeoisie. Marx believes the various bourgeois revolutions of the 1800s merely refined the bourgeois state, however the goal of the socialist revolution is to build a new state (Lenin 1917, Chapter 2.3). The proletariat state should be designed as a democratic institution which will quickly allow the coercive apparatus to wither away and achieve communism (Lenin 1917, chapter 3.3).

Scientific socialists thus distinguish their ideology from anarchists, who want to bypass the state and achieve communism immediately, on three grounds. Firstly, scientific socialists disagree with the anarchist rejection of all ‘authority’ as idealism similar to Utopian socialists, instead arguing that a revolution is inevitably authoritarian against opposing classes (Engels, 1872). Secondly, scientific socialists reject the anarchist belief that oppression derives from states per se, instead arguing that the state merely enforces pre-existing class antagonisms from the relations of production (Lenin 1917, Chapter 1.1). Finally, scientific socialists reject the anarchist absolutism against state participation, arguing socialists should use states (including the bourgeois state) if it benefits class struggle (Lenin 1917, chapter 3.1).

Marxism as functionalist

Elster (1982, pg.455) critiques the functionalist nature of much of Marxist theory. Elster argues Marxists generally look at the existence of social phenomena as explaining its consequences, seeing this as a logical fallacy. Elster (1982) argues that functionalist explanations cannot explain individual behaviour, but that game theory can. Engels (1892, chapter 4) notes that scientific socialism is not interested in rationalised, individual actors but the broad movements of social history. Cohen (1982, Pg.485) argues that all of Marxism is built on functionalist arguments of the superstructural legal and political system. Returning to an example used above, Marxist functionalism may be highlighted in Engel’s argument that common and civil law have reached similar conceptions of property rights because capitalist economics (Engels 1946, chapter 4). For a critic of Marxism, such functionalism is unfalsifiable and teleologically necessitates its own conclusion. Capitalism is both the result and the source of all societal changes.

This argument is quite strong, however it presupposes a rigid obstinacy not found in Marx and Engels’ writings. While Engels claims
that the goal of scientific socialism and historical materialism is to find the ‘inner, hidden laws’ that spur social history, neither Marx nor Engels claim that their method is unfalsifiable or not subject to scientific rejection. Engels instead believes that Marxism, and particularly dialectical materialism, must always be updated with new scientific advances (Engels 1946, chapter 4). An example of falsification and modification of early Marxism was that Marx’s theory of history was constantly expanded upon – Marx initially believed in an ‘Asiatic’ mode of production but rejected this upon new evidence and instead subsumed ‘Asiatic’ societies into an enlarged and modified understanding of ‘feudal’ societies (Marx 1859, introduction). Cohen (1982, Pg. 489) posits that some form of functionalism is necessary for scientific socialism, but such functionalism does not detract from its scientific validity, as Marx did not believe he necessarily had to uncover every causal mechanism in order to predict the course of history or class struggle. It is contended that some form of functionalism will undoubtedly arise throughout all the social sciences, simply because evidence must be understood in light of the function it plays in a particular model or theory.

The viability of Marxist functionalism for explaining our increasingly complex society in the 21st century remains to be seen, and it is contended that its validity as a scientific method may only be proven or falsified if its functionalist approach ceases to produce any compelling understanding of modern society, or if the world economy were to move past both socialism and capitalism. Similarly, drawing upon the dialectical understanding of history as expounded by Marx and Engels, scientific socialism would also be falsified if global economies ‘regress’ into a feudal structure, as this would be anathema to the Marxist understanding of a progressive history.

Conclusion

This paper has explained why Marx and Engels distinguished their conception of socialism as ‘scientific’ by firstly explaining historical materialism and its progressive view of history. Marxism relies on an economic, materialist analysis of society, which is distinguishable from previous philosophers and socialists. Marxism attempts to be analogous to nineteenth-century science in its emphasis on dialectical progress, most notably in the concept of class struggle.

This paper has shown how Marx and Engels came to believe that socialism is the inevitable result of their conception of history and
necessary to abolish class struggle entirely. It has distinguished this scientific outlook from other forms of socialism and considered how the super structural nature of the state in Marxist theory gives them a radically different viewpoint of the state as a tool for class domination than other socialists. Marxism is undoubtedly a functionalist philosophy, but it has been contended that functionalism does not prove or disprove its place amongst the social sciences, as all social sciences necessitate some form of functionalist perspective.

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