Abstract

This paper critically examines the ‘spiral model’ of human rights diffusion with particular focus on post-civil war regimes. Utilising Sri Lanka as a case study, it argues that civil war victory grants states the unrestricted ability to propose an ‘official’ collective memory of war which sanctions human rights denial. This collective memory allows for a dismissal of ‘moral consciousness raising’ by transnational human rights networks as undue foreign interference. Additionally, civil war victory also allows for repression of a ‘strong and coordinated’ domestic opposition necessary for internalisation of human rights norms. This paper also explores how coordinated domestic demands for accountability may be contingent on economic grievances not moral persuasions. The findings suggest that human rights diffusion models, in PCW contexts, may be inadequate explainers of state behaviour. It proposes increased investigation into these unique contexts to arrive at a more revised explanatory framework.

Introduction
Ensuring compliance with internationally recognised human rights obligations is a thorny issue. International non-governmental organisations (INGOs) may—on account of the paucity of legal enforcement mechanisms—find it hard to keep repressive actors genuinely aligned with their human rights obligations. The ‘spiral model’ of international human rights norms (Risse and Sikkink, 2017) is often lauded as a seminal constructivist-driven explanation to this puzzle.

This paper adds nuance to the theory in order to address a previously unanswered question: what effect do civil wars have on the socialisation of human rights norms? Utilising Sri Lanka as the central case study, it will show that civil war victory often allows states to frame and condition ‘official’ collective memories of the war and its events, which helps sanction rhetoric of human rights deniability and is suggestive of a lack of actual norm internalization. Additionally, it allows for legislative repression of a “strong and coordinated domestic opposition” (Murdie and Davis, 2011, p. 3) and aids in delegitimizing transnational ‘moral consciousness raising’ (Risse and Sikkink, 2017). Finally, it will be posited that unified ‘demand’ for human rights accountability—in ethnically diverse states—may be conditional upon wider economic grievances.

Motivation for Study
Two dichotomous sentiments compete for relevance in a Post Civil War (PCW) atmosphere. In the first instance, the victors are eager to impress a sense of legitimacy upon the international community. This would explain why, after the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lankan president Mahinda Rajapaksa issued a joint statement with United Nations secretary Ban Ki-Moon on “accountability for violations of international humanitarian and human rights law” (Conte, 2012, p. 2). It also helps demystify the ‘official’ framing of the war’s final offensive by the Sinhala-dominated Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL)—after the breakdown of peace negotiations—as a “humanitarian operation” in which the army adhered to a “Zero Civilian Casualty” policy (Ministry of Defence: Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 2011, p. 3).

Opposingly, in a post-civil war situation, where future intentions of the adversary are unknown (Walter, 1997), anxiety over security prevails and may necessitate further repression. This helps illustrate why NGOs have often been portrayed by the GoSL and Sinhala nationalists as ‘imperial agents’ undermining state sovereignty (Barrett, Indi Ruwangi and Simpson, 2017) and why civil society and transnational groups who questioned the government’s ‘humanitarian’ narrative were labelled as ‘terrorists’ themselves (Bala, 2015). Such an atmosphere informed the cultivation of a new ‘Non-Governmental Organisations (Registration and Supervision) Act’ which, if passed, would “severely curtail civil society” (Human Rights Watch, 2024). It would allow GoSL to regulate and interfere with all non-governmental activity (Chamara, 2024). Such repression is potent because a vibrant, coordinated, and independent civil society is indispensable for checking government repression and fostering democracy (Diamond, 1994), and is a necessary tool for consolidating human rights pressure “from below” (Risse and Sikkink, 2017, p. 136). These dichotomous persuasions in PCW politics—outward legitimacy and inward repression—appear to vindicate a reappraisal of the parameters of the ‘spiral model’.

Problems with Existing Knowledge and Theoretical Justifications
Inherent in the development of human rights socialisation theory is the “empirical failure of approaches emphasising material structures as the primary determinants of state identities, interests and preferences” (Risse and Sikkink, 2017, p. 121). These constructivist-led explanations coalesce around the ‘moral force’ of rules (Janicka, 2013) and focus on how states are persuaded—by transnational and domestic advocacy networks—to adjust their value-structures (Risse and Sikkink, 2017). It locates in the “centrality of principled ideas or values” (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p. 89) the crucial explanatory mechanism driving states to alter their behaviours, and speaks particularly to the ‘pressuring’ or ‘leveraging’ of target states through publicly shaming their non-conformism (Janicka, 2013).

Empirical studies have uncovered tangible, albeit contradictory, attestations of the success these networks enjoy. It has been demonstrated that ‘outing’ perpetrators for their abuses corresponds with an improvement in political rights (Hafner-Burton, 2008). Nonetheless, this improvement often holds company with an increase in certain types of violations (Hafner-Burton, 2008). Further studies have shown that internationalised human rights conventions improve some states’ human rights practices, yet other governments often ratify human rights treaties ‘as a matter of window dressing’ (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2005). It is also posited, in harmony with the spiral model, that the success of shaming by INGOs is conditional upon a strong domestic NGO presence (Murdie and Davis, 2011). Some studies, however, find more clearly delineated positive effects of human rights persuasion by INGOs, showing statistical proof that putting perpetrators in the spotlight reduces the severity of extreme atrocities (Krain, 2012).

What existing scholarship fails to account for, however, is the uniqueness of PCW regimes. This uniqueness stems from the ability of PCW regime leaders to manipulate the collective memory of recent conflict. This permits a deliberate and politicised obfuscation of the binary between wartime consequence and genuine human rights abuse, delegitimising the ‘moral consciousness raising’ of transnational advocacy networks.

Sri Lanka and the Spectrum of PCW Human Rights Deniability
With an estimated death toll of 70,000 (Matthews, 2009), the Sri Lankan civil war does not align with the humanitarian principle of “responsibility to protect” or R2P (Kurtz and Jaganathan, 2015). A UN panel of experts found both sides guilty of egregious human rights abuses, including indiscriminate shelling by the GoSL and civilian entrapment by the LTTE (Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 2011). Despite this, some commentators have eulogised the ‘Rajapaksa model’ of counterinsurgency (Kurtz and Jaganathan, 2015), inspiring arguments in favour of ‘all out war’ as a means of peace (Diaz and Murshed, 2013).

The cause of this ambivalence lies in the uniqueness of PCW politics and the opportunity for collective memory manipulation it offers. Post-Dayton Bosnia, for instance, saw only 4% of ethnic Serbs believing international trials were fair (Kostic, 2012); the government of Republika Srpska later annulled its 2004 report recognising Srebrenica as genocide (Subasic, 2021). Similarly, Lebanon institutionalised amnesty and silence (Abou Assi, 2011; Saadeh, 2021).

The Sri Lankan case follows this pattern. Emerging victorious allowed the GoSL to monopolise war memory into a binary of victims and perpetrators (Schubert, 2013). It exploited ‘war on terror’ rhetoric to frame the LTTE as ‘terrorists’ (Fernando, 2014). Successive presidents pledged to shield the military from international accountability (Seoighe, 2016; Schubert, 2013). This narrative transformed criticism into betrayal (Bala, 2015). Rajapaksa decried UN efforts as “unwarranted interference” (Cronin-Furman, 2020, p. 136). By branding foreign engagement as ‘Tiger sympathiser’ meddling (Amarasuriya, 2015), GoSL portrayed domestic solutions as the only legitimate ones.

Withdrawal from UNHRC commitments in 2020 (Subedi, 2022) and later denunciations of “propaganda campaigns” (Al Jazeera, 2021) highlight continued resistance. Repetition of identical UNHRC recommendations from 2014 to 2024 underscores the absence of internalisation. The domestic Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) avoided blame entirely (Government of Sri Lanka, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2011). In a climate of “ethnic outbidding” (DeVotta, 2002), accountability measures remain politically untenable.

Counter-tendencies, ‘Loser’ Agency, and the ‘Demand’ Side of Memory Construction
Despite the victor’s dominance, Tamil diaspora groups continue articulating grievances to international bodies, sustaining external pressure (Thurairajah, 2022). INGOs like Amnesty and Human Rights Watch amplify these voices, yet GoSL maintains control through laws such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (Castle, 2022), which has targeted Tamil memorials and witnesses.

The ‘spiral model’ predicts eventual persuasion through sustained shaming (Risse and Sikkink, 2017), but Sri Lanka shows little evidence of such transformation. The UNHRC still calls for “long overdue reforms” (UNHRC, 2024). If socialisation had occurred, genuine cooperation would have followed.

Recent protests, however, reveal shifting dynamics. The 2022 Aragalaya movement united citizens across ethnic lines against corruption and repression (Amnesty International, 2024). This suggests that collective demands for accountability may depend on shared economic grievances rather than moral awakening alone.

Conclusion
This paper appraised the applicability of human rights socialisation theory to post–civil war regimes. Using Sri Lanka, it showed that victory enables governments to cultivate official narratives legitimising denial, suppress domestic accountability efforts, and delegitimise foreign critique. The lack of norm internalisation and the contingent nature of unified demands on economic factors suggest that diffusion models alone cannot explain PCW behaviour.

The Sri Lankan experience demonstrates how easily international pressures for accountability can be reframed as infringements on sovereignty. The spiral model’s reliance on moral persuasion thus faces structural limits that future research must address. 

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