Abstract

This study examines how veto players’ ideological commitments influence peace negotiations in the Kashmir conflict. Drawing on veto player theory, the analysis identifies three key factors impeding successful conflict resolution: (1) the high number of veto players involved, (2) internal fragmentation within stakeholder groups, and (3) significant information asymmetries in assessing relative bargaining power. Through detailed case studies of the 2001 Agra Summit and 2004–2008 Composite Dialogues, the analysis demonstrates how multiple veto players—including state governments, military establishments, and militant groups—reduce the set of mutually acceptable agreements. The study reveals that while internal cohesion and clear negotiation frameworks can facilitate peace processes, the complex web of competing interests and ideological positions has led to significant information asymmetries and spoiler dynamics, consistently undermining peace initiatives. This research enriches the existing literature by examining the persistent Kashmir conflict through the analytical framework of veto player theory, addressing a notable gap as previous works on political violence theories have largely overlooked the later wars and unsuccessful negotiations in Kashmir’s modern political landscape.

Introduction 

 The Kashmir conflict remains one of the most intractable territorial disputes in modern history, characterized by cycles of violence and failed peace initiatives spanning over seven decades. While numerous attempts at resolution have been made, the complex web of actors involved has consistently complicated efforts to achieve lasting peace. Specifically, the presence of multiple veto players—actors whose agreement is necessary for changing the status quo—has created particular challenges in reaching successful negotiated settlements.

This analysis examines how veto players’ ideological commitments have influenced peace negotiations in Kashmir through two relatively recent case studies: the 2001 Agra Summit and the 2004–2008 Composite Dialogues. These cases were selected for their contemporary relevance and clear illustration of veto player dynamics in modern peace processes.

The research reveals three critical factors impeding successful conflict resolution: the high number of veto players involved, internal fragmentation within stakeholder groups, and significant information asymmetries in assessing relative bargaining power. Through a detailed examination of the selected case studies, this analysis demonstrates how multiple veto players—including state governments, military establishments, and militant groups—have consistently reduced the set of mutually acceptable agreements.

Understanding these dynamics is crucial for future peace initiatives in Kashmir and similar conflicts. The analysis at hand shows that successful conflict resolution requires not only addressing core territorial disputes but also managing the interplay of veto players’ ideological commitments and institutional relationships.

Background

 The Kashmir conflict emerged from the complex partition of British India in 1947 when princely states were given the choice to join either India or Pakistan. Despite Kashmir being a Muslim-majority state, its Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, chose to join India, leading to immediate conflict and the first Indo-Pakistan war over the territory (Malik, 2019).

The subsequent UN intervention in 1949 established a ceasefire line that later became the Line of Control (LOC), effectively dividing Kashmir between the Indian and Pakistani administrations (Malik, 2019). Nevertheless, the 1965 war broke out with Pakistan’s Operation Gibraltar, aimed at inciting rebellion in Kashmir. However, it escalated into a broader conflict when Indian forces crossed the international border (Malik, 2019). Subsequently, the 1971 war, while primarily focused on East Pakistan’s independence, added another layer of complexity to the Kashmir dispute and resulted in the Simla Accord, which established the Line of Control (Khan, 2009). In 1999, the Kargil War, though geographically limited, gained significant international attention due to nuclear concerns (Malik, 2019). Essentially, the failure to implement the UN-mandated plebiscite in 1948, initially agreed upon by both countries, has contributed to this cycle of conflicts, with each war further complicating the prospect of a peaceful resolution (Malik, 2019).

With regard to the socio-political context, the conflict evolved from a territorial dispute between nations to an internal insurgency within Indian-administered Kashmir by 1989 (Khan, 2009). The violence severely impacted Kashmir’s syncretic culture (Kashmiriyat), which had historically emphasized religious harmony and shared communal values. Specifically, the conflict resulted in the mass exodus of Kashmiri Pandits in 1990, fundamentally altering the region’s demographic composition (Khan, 2009). Though peace initiatives emerged in the 2000s, tensions persisted. In recent years, the region has experienced heightened tension due to surgical strikes following 2016 and skirmishes such as the Galwan Valley clash in 2020 (Gettleman, Kumar and Yasir, 2020; Malik, 2019).

Literature Review

Theory
Veto player theory provides a crucial framework for understanding peace negotiation dynamics and outcomes. In particular, Tsebelis’ seminal work on veto player theory (2011, p. 19) defines veto players as “individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change of the status quo”, whether through institutional or partisan positions. Subsequently, these actors significantly influence policy stability and negotiation success through their number, ideological positions, and internal cohesion.

Moreover, peace negotiations become increasingly complex when multiple veto players are involved, as changing the status quo requires unanimous agreement from all parties. Cunningham (2006) demonstrates how this complexity manifests. First, the set of mutually acceptable agreements shrinks due to each veto player’s distinct preferences. Secondly, bargaining can break down if even one veto player overestimates their probability of victory.

Furthermore, ideological commitments play a central role in shaping negotiation outcomes. Specifically, as the ideological distance between veto players grows, policy stability increases, and the effectiveness of agenda-setting diminishes (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Choi, 2010). Consequently, countries with many veto players holding divergent ideological positions typically experience high policy stability, thus making it extremely difficult to alter existing arrangements.

In addition, internal fragmentation within movements creates additional challenges for peace processes. As a result, when groups fragment over dissatisfaction with organisational structure or internal competition, this often leads to “spoiler” dynamics where certain factions actively undermine negotiations to protect their interests (Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012). This fragmentation can create opportunities for states to strategically exploit divisions, sometimes co-opting rebel commanders individually (Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012). However, Findley and Rudloff’s research (2012) has shown that fragmentation can occasionally facilitate shorter conflicts since the resulting weaker combatants may be more conducive to cooperation.

In comparison, Nilsson’s bargaining theory (2008) suggests that actors behave strategically based on others’ actions, with warfare serving as a mechanism for revealing information about capabilities and resolve. However, actors consistently miscalculate both the capabilities and preferences of their opponents, leading to bargaining failures (Cunningham, 2013). Through this process of combat and negotiations, parties gradually discover each other’s minimum acceptable terms, thereby potentially enabling settlement rather than continued costly conflict. This process becomes more complicated when multiple veto players must evaluate outcomes not only against immediate opponents but also relative to other actors in the broader conflict (Cunningham, 2006).

Similarly, the effectiveness of peace negotiations often depends on institutional mechanisms that address security concerns. For instance, power-sharing arrangements serve as crucial tools by guaranteeing all groups a stake in state power and in theory minimize the risk of any party becoming dominant (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003).

Unfortunately, papers on political violence theories fail to adequately address the Kashmir conflict. While some mention the partition war and the subsequent negotiations (Cunningham, 2013; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012), they tend to overlook the later wars and unsuccessful negotiations surrounding the conflict – elements that are particularly salient in the current political landscape of Kashmir.

The Kashmir Context

  Building on these theoretical frameworks, an examination of the Kashmir conflict provides a concrete case study of how these dynamics manifest in practice. The period from the Agra Summit to the Composite Dialogues represents an evolution in India-Pakistan engagement on Kashmir—from single-event summits to sustained structured dialogue. Specifically, the 2001 Agra Summit represented an important post-Kargil War attempt at bilateral engagement between India and Pakistan. In this regard, Baral (2002) notes that while the summit failed to achieve a breakthrough, it succeeded in bringing the two adversaries to the negotiating table. Moreover, the key point of contention was Pakistan’s insistence on treating Kashmir as the “core issue”, while conversely, India preferred a composite dialogue approach addressing multiple issues simultaneously (Khan, 2009). As a result, this fundamental disconnect in approaches contributed to the summit’s failure to produce even a joint statement.

Subsequently, the period following the summit saw a transition to a more systematic dialogue process. In particular, as documented by Misra (2007), the Composite Dialogue Process (CDP) initiated in 2004 marked a significant shift from earlier issue-specific negotiations to a structured framework covering eight key areas, including Kashmir. Consequently, this new format helped make the dialogue more resistant to disruptions and setbacks.

Furthermore, a key development during the 2004–2008 period was Pakistan’s gradual move away from its traditional “Kashmir-first” stance. Pakistan demonstrated greater flexibility in discussing other bilateral issues while maintaining Kashmir’s importance (Gul, 2008). As a result, the dialogue produced several confidence-building measures (CBMs), including increased people-to-people contact and cross-LoC trade initiatives (Khan, 2009).

However, scholars note that fundamental differences persist. For instance, Yusuf and Najam (2009) argue that while there was growing convergence on elements like autonomy for Kashmir and “soft borders”, moving from broad agreement to specific solutions remained challenging. Additionally, the dialogue process also remained vulnerable to disruption from terrorist incidents, as evidenced by its suspension following the 2006 Mumbai train bombings (Malik, 2019).

As evident above, while numerous papers exist on each topic individually, there has yet to be a comprehensive analysis of the Kashmir conflict through the lens of veto player theory.

Factors Hindering Negotiation

High Number of Veto Players
The presence of multiple veto players is the primary factor that complicates civil war negotiations. Specifically, each additional veto player brings distinct preferences to the table, which consequently reduces the set of mutually acceptable agreements and shrinks the bargaining range. Cunningham (2006) argues that this challenge is compounded by strategic behaviours, as each veto player has an incentive to hold out and be the last to sign an agreement, allowing them to secure better terms. Statistical evidence strongly supports these theoretical expectations, with analysis showing that conflicts containing more veto players are harder to resolve – notably, adding one veto player under strict criteria leads to a 0.66% decrease in the probability of conflict ending in any given month (Cunningham, 2006). This suggests that the effect is significant as increasing the number of veto players notably decreases the probability of war ending in any given month, leading to considerably longer civil wars. Thus, veto players’ ideological commitments create fundamental barriers to peace negotiations.

Internal Fragmentation
At the member level, internal fragmentation—operationalised by satisfaction with organizational structure—influences how different factions approach negotiations. Specifically, Pearlman and Cunningham (2012) explain that when they are satisfied with existing organizational arrangements, they unite to overcome challenges. However, when dissatisfied with institutional structures, they may use external pressures as opportunities to challenge the status quo. Consequently, this creates varying levels of commitment to peace processes. This is evident in Northern Ireland, where the IRA split into multiple factions, including the “Official”, “Provisional”, “Continuity”, and “Real” IRA, due to perceived imbalances in authority and representation (Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012). Additionally, when examining fragmentation specifically, computational models demonstrate that as the probability of fragmentation increases, the duration of wars ending in settlement decreases (Findley and Rudloff, 2012). Therefore, each splinter group brings its own modified ideological position to the negotiating table.

Subsequently, “spoiler” behaviour complicates negotiations when certain factions actively undermine peace efforts to protect their interests. The relationship between internal fragmentation and “spoilers” is bidirectional—fragmentation can create conditions for spoiling, while anticipated spoiling can drive fragmentation (Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012). This dynamic is particularly challenging as the incentive to act as a spoiler can arise from both defensive and offensive motivations—defensively protecting existing power or offensively seeking to expand influence (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). Therefore, peace processes need to account for both structural fragmentation and strategic spoiling.

Information Asymmetries
Cunningham (2013) builds on the above point by stating that internal divisions in opposition movements create significant information asymmetries by generating multiple competing claims about what the movement wants, ultimately hampering effective negotiation and increasing uncertainty about potential settlements. As a result, such an information asymmetry makes it difficult for veto players to determine the true capabilities, preferences, and reversion points of the opposition. Moreover, in this “fog of war”, combatants struggle to obtain reliable estimates of their opponents’ troops and capabilities (Findley and Rudloff, 2012). This uncertainty makes it difficult for veto players to agree on relative bargaining power.

Additionally, when beliefs about capability distribution diverge significantly, the duration until settlement increases, as veto players cannot easily determine whether they should settle or continue fighting. Furthermore, Cunningham (2006) reveals that the dyadic nature of battles means veto players must interpret outcomes not only against immediate opponents but also relative to other actors in the broader conflict. This establishes that, since only one veto player needs to overestimate their probability of victory, the risk of bargaining breakdown increases with more parties.

Factors that Facilitate Negotiations

Power-Sharing Arrangements

Power-sharing arrangements play a crucial role in facilitating negotiations by providing multiple layers of security and protection for all veto players involved. Specifically, Hartzel and Hoddie (2003) assert that the arrangements ensure that no single veto player can dominate state power after the conflict by distributing control across political, territorial, military, and economic dimensions. Consequently, this multidimensional approach creates mutually reinforcing safeguards that enhance overall security and protect against the failure of any single provision. Moreover, the effectiveness of power-sharing is evident in its widespread adoption, with 97% of studied settlements including some form of these arrangements and each additional power-sharing provision reduced settlement failure probability by 53% (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). This demonstrates that these institutions are particularly valuable because they address core security concerns that bring veto players to the negotiating table and help move discussions through various phases, from initial talks to implementation.

Clear Negotiation Framework

Clear negotiation frameworks facilitate negotiations by providing a structured, phased approach to conflict resolution. In particular, according to Hartzel and Hoddie’s (2003) research, peace agreements typically progress through three distinct phases: pre-negotiation to bring parties to the table, framework development for resolving core issues, and implementation planning. This systematic approach helps parties navigate complex negotiations by establishing clear objectives and progression paths.

Subsequently, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) break down the framework of successful negotiations into three critical frameworks: local source of hostility, local capacities for change, and international commitment available to assist. As a result, the framework allows for evaluating key factors like faction characteristics and hostility levels to design the right negotiation approach. For cases with high hostility or multiple factions, more intensive international coordination and assistance may be required to overcome implementation challenges.

Internal Cohesion

Internal cohesion among veto players significantly enhances the prospects for successful peace negotiations through several key mechanisms. First, cohesive veto players are better positioned to make credible commitments and implement agreements. For collective groups to function effectively as veto players, they must possess mechanisms to overcome internal collective action problems and maintain consistent positions at the bargaining table (Cunningham, 2006). Subsequently, strong internal cohesion enables parties to credibly commit to and carry out any promises or threats made during negotiations (Cunningham, 2006).

Second, greater cohesion reduces informational asymmetries that can derail negotiations. In multiparty conflicts, individual battles are typically dyadic, making it difficult for parties to interpret battlefield information and form realistic assessments of their probability of victory (Cunningham, 2006). When groups are internally cohesive, they can more effectively process and respond to this information.

Third, cohesive movements are more likely to receive substantive concessions from states. Research shows that unified movements tend to present stronger challenges to states and thus can secure larger concessions (Cunningham, 2011). In contrast, internal divisions often weaken movements by diverting resources to internal conflicts rather than advancing their broader objectives (Cunningham, 2011).

Finally, internal cohesion helps prevent the emergence of spoilers who might undermine peace processes. When movements are fragmented, excluded factions may continue fighting even after others sign agreements (Nilsson, 2008). Strong institutional structures that coordinate different factions reduce this risk by enabling more comprehensive participation in peace processes (Nilsson, 2008).

Case Studies

The following analysis examines two critical junctures in Indo-Pakistani diplomatic relations: the 2001 Agra Summit and the 2004–2008 Composite Dialogues. The first case demonstrates how the absence of a clear negotiating framework and conflicting views on fundamental issues led to diplomatic failure, culminating in the 2001 Indian parliament attack. In contrast, the second case reveals how aligned ideological positions and stronger internal cohesion during the Composite Dialogues facilitated more productive negotiations, though not without their own challenges.

Case Study 1: The 2001 Agra Summit

The Indo-Pak Agra Summit, held on July 15–16, 2001, was a significant diplomatic meeting between Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee and Pakistani President Musharraf. Though it generated optimism as the first major dialogue after the Kargil War, the summit ultimately failed to achieve a breakthrough. The influence of competing ideological commitments among veto players is clearly demonstrated by this summit’s failure in two distinct ways. First, the summit ended without a formal agreement due to the absence of a clear negotiating framework. Specifically, Pakistan rejected India’s request for ministerial-level preparatory talks and agenda-setting before the summit, instead insisting on an open-ended summit format, thereby departing from normal diplomatic practice (Baral, 2002). Moreover, India and Pakistan had conflicting views on the “primary source of hostility” (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000). In particular, Pakistan insisted that Kashmir was the “core” issue central to Indo-Pak relations, while conversely, India maintained that cross-border terrorism was the primary problem that needed addressing (Baral, 2002). In addition to this, the summit failed to adequately address “local capacities for change” (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000), as there was no substantial discussion of nuclear security matters. Instead, the focus remained on historical grievances rather than contemporary security challenges (Gupta, 2002). Therefore, the veto players’ different commitments hindered negotiations.

Second, the 2001 Indian parliament attack revealed how competing ideological commitments can manifest in violent outcomes. While some scholars acknowledge the success of the summit in bringing veto players to the negotiating table, the attack ultimately sealed its failure. Specifically, groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, blamed for the attack, showed a willingness to act independently of state preferences. This undermined official Pakistani interests, making them a veto player in these negotiations despite their absence at the summit.
Moreover, this internal fragmentation within Pakistani veto players proved to be a significant obstacle to successful negotiations. The timing of the attack (December 2001) immediately following the failed Agra Summit suggested these veto players felt excluded from the political process. Subsequently, literature on “terrorism” suggests that attacks on civilians serve as a way to signal through surprise violence (Cronin, 2009). In this case, Pakistan’s military establishment, as a direct veto player, had vested interests in perpetuating conflict with India (Baral, 2002), thus creating tension between military objectives and diplomatic initiatives.

Furthermore, this fragmentation was evidenced by the fact that only about 18% of terrorist groups typically engage in negotiations, highlighting how most groups prefer to maintain their independent violent campaigns rather than submit to state authority or negotiate settlements (Cronin, 2009). Hence, the attack revealed the complex web of relationships between veto players where each pursued their own agenda, sometimes at cross-purposes with their nominal allies, thus complicating efforts at conflict resolution.
The Agra Summit ultimately failed due to competing ideological commitments, lack of structured negotiation frameworks, and internal fragmentation among Pakistan’s veto players. In contrast, the 2004–2008 Composite Dialogues would demonstrate how aligned positions and stronger internal cohesion could produce more promising results.

Case Study 2: The 2004–2008 Composite Dialogues

The 2004–2008 Composite Dialogues began when President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee met at the 2004 SAARC Summit in Islamabad. The process completed four rounds of talks, covering areas like peace and security, terrorism, Kashmir, and economic cooperation. The dialogues demonstrated how aligned ideological positions and strong internal cohesion among key veto players can facilitate negotiation success. First, the dialogue process benefited from strong leadership commitment between principal veto players, starting with President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee’s initial agreement at the 2004 SAARC Summit (Rashid, 2017). Subsequently, when the Indian government transitioned from BJP to Congress, there was remarkable continuity as the new administration “religiously followed” the agenda of 12 CBMs set by the previous government (Gul, 2008). Moreover, President Musharraf’s unique position as a military leader showed “extraordinary openness” and willingness to move beyond traditional Pakistani positions—with his military background providing stability and authority to the peace process (Rashid, 2017, p. 95). Furthermore, both sides demonstrated sustained commitment through multiple rounds of dialogue, completing four successful rounds despite occasional interruptions (Gul, 2008). The establishment of a formal mechanism like the Joint Anti-Terrorism Mechanism showed institutional buy-in from both sides (Gul, 2008).

However, while the success of the Composite Dialogues during this period is evidenced by several concrete achievements, such as the establishment of multiple transportation links and implementation of trade initiatives, major issues of Kashmir remained unsolved. Specifically, the dialogue process involved various veto players: government representatives from both India and Pakistan, military establishments, Kashmiri separatist groups including moderate elements like the Hurriyat Conference, and multiple political parties across both countries (Rashid, 2017). Consequently, while engaging in diplomatic dialogue, the Pakistani government maintained a complex position. Although it officially participated in peace talks and supported the dialogue process, it simultaneously continued supporting militant veto players, creating a “double-edged policy” (Misra, 2007). As a result, this created increased uncertainty in negotiations. For instance, in 2006, the Mumbai train bombings killed around 200 people, leading India to suspend foreign-secretary-level talks and expel diplomatic staff (Gul, 2008). While Pakistan officially condemned these attacks, India continued to accuse Pakistan’s ISI of involvement in subsequent incidents, including the Ajmer and Hyderabad bombings (Gul, 2008).

These incidents demonstrate how militant actors could effectively derail diplomatic progress, even as official channels remained nominally open. Ultimately, the complexity of having multiple actors led to a situation where progress became increasingly difficult as each party had to evaluate immediate bilateral gains against a broader constellation of involved parties and their potential reactions.

Conclusion

 The veto player theory provides a compelling framework for understanding the persistent challenges in Kashmir peace negotiations. Through this theoretical lens, we can identify several critical factors that have consistently impeded successful conflict resolution in the region.

First, the multiplicity of veto players—including India, Pakistan, various Kashmiri factions, military establishments, and militant groups—has significantly reduced the set of mutually acceptable agreements. As demonstrated in both the Agra Summit and Composite Dialogues, each additional veto player brings distinct preferences and ideological commitments, making consensus increasingly difficult to achieve.

Second, internal fragmentation within key stakeholders has created substantial barriers. Pakistan’s complex relationship with militant groups, as evidenced by the 2001 Parliament attack, demonstrates how fragmentation can undermine official diplomatic initiatives. The presence of multiple actors pursuing independent agendas has led to “spoiler” dynamics that frequently derail peace processes.

Third, information asymmetries arising from the dyadic nature of conflicts have complicated negotiations. The difficulty in interpreting battlefield outcomes and assessing relative bargaining power has made it challenging for parties to form realistic expectations about potential settlements.

These factors have created a situation where, despite numerous attempts at negotiation, achieving lasting peace remains elusive. While this analysis has focused primarily on veto player dynamics, the role of international actors—including the UN, the US, and China—presents a promising avenue for future research. Understanding their potential influence could offer new perspectives on resolving this enduring conflict.

Finally, the experience of Kashmir demonstrates that successful conflict resolution requires not only addressing the core territorial dispute but also managing the complex web of veto players’ ideological commitments and institutional relationships. Future peace initiatives must account for these dynamics to have any chance of success.

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