Introduction

Freedom of information (FOI) laws have been ineffective at achieving their objectives. While countries adopt FOI to enhance positive accountability and long-run returns through increased public engagement with institutions, politicisation prevents stakeholders from obtaining the legislation’s benefits as politicians adopt defensive strategies to temper effective transparency and the costs of implementation. Hence, technical measurements are insufficient tools to determine FOI’s cross-country effectiveness as the satisfaction of requests is inequivalent to substantive implications that dismantle cultures of secrecy, thereby requiring nuanced analysis of individual laws to determine FOI’s effects. Resistance to the decentralisation of information in Canada has incentivised informalities within departments to limit potential releases and the discriminatory processing of politically sensitive requests to delay journalists’ translation of disclosures into transparency whilst non-binding appeals prevent adequate public safeguards. Furthermore, the absence of high- quality record management and diverse user experiences within the UK reduces the significance of provisions and the benefits that the public derives whereas threats to cabinet unanimity undermine the rationale of adoption. It shall become evident that the tempered effectiveness of rights to access has prevented transformative outcomes as FOI remains ineffective.

Freedom of Information’s Political Foundations

FOI represents political investments that provide long-run returns to governments and voters as transparency expands. FOI’s right to access permits stakeholders to monitor and scrutinise politicians through information obtained upon request regarding their behaviour and rationale within policymaking, reducing public ignorance as administrative barriers and cultures of secrecy are removed (Shepherd, 2015). Thus, one can infer that the private information that incumbents hold permits disclosures to be incorporated within subsequent electoral evaluations, thereby facilitating the selection of representatives characteristic of public interest. FOI’s objectives are therefore mutually reinforcing and compound to enhance institutional legitimacy as voters become empowered and actively engaged with policy processes. Consequently, FOI undermines corruption incentives and self-interested policies as the capacity to conceal information is eroded, successively facilitating good governance to avoid political repercussions (Vadlamannati & Cooray, 2017). One can discern incumbents’ exploitation of enhanced accountability and transparency to harbour support as the maintenance of robust reputations enhances re-election prospects relative to individuals that continually extract rents, permitting satisfaction of office-seeking interests. However, upon implementation, scrutiny and media reports facilitate scandals and increase public perceptions
of corruption by 0.26 points on a six-point scale (Vadlamannati & Cooray, 2017), undermining legitimacy. Nevertheless, as enhanced accountability alters the cost-benefit analysis of corruption, realised practices decline to retain electoral returns, thereby increasing the degree of benevolent information available and subsequently decreasing corruption perceptions by 0.61 points following
a one standard deviation in FOI’s age (Vadlamannati & Cooray, 2017). Accordingly, one can perceive FOI as a political investment that requires upfront reputational costs to develop sustained benefits through institutional legitimacy as transparency and accountability expand, facilitating good governance. FOI is, therefore, politically advantageous to politicians and stakeholders as returns are not isolated to single periods, incentivising adoption.

However, failure to incorporate FOI’s political obstacles into examinations of transparency implications hinder sincere evaluations of its effectiveness. Technical measurements facilitate empirical evaluations of success, including the capacity to provide information through reports, illustrating the removal of secrecy. Ergo, in contrast to Canada’s average complete approval of approximately 39% of access to information requests during its three first years of FOI, the UK’s satisfaction of approximately 64% (Hazell & Worthy, 2010) indicates its greater capacity to satisfy public desires and undermine information monopolies relative to Canada’s constrained success. Nevertheless, one can perceive that the volume of approved requests is inequivalent to the legislation’s capacity to satisfy its objectives. For example, in addition to political and public requests to analyse government behaviours, requests are frequently non-political and private as stakeholders obtain information for self-interested purposes that bear no policy implications, including market research (Michener & Worthy, 2018). Hence, raw technical measures improve the perceived effectiveness of FOI, notwithstanding the minimal legitimacy returns voters receive from non-political requests. The absence of nuance within such rudimentary measures distorts perceptions of accountability and public engagement within policy processes, failing to capture sincere implications. Furthermore, politicisation has altered FOI’s efficacy as restrictions regarding institutional secrecy create resistance to transparency as governments employ defensive tactics to hinder the liabilities derived from sensitive requests, altering effective disclosures (Michener & Worthy, 2018). Thus, one can surmise politicians’ active tempering of FOI’s associated adoption costs whilst endeavouring to maximise the reputational returns of perceived openness through the artificial reduction in damaging information disclosed. Accordingly, politicisation and enforcement concerns exacerbate discrepancies between FOI’s potential and realised effectiveness, subsequently undermining accountability and transparency. Hence, the examination of FOI in isolation from political environments constrains analysis, incentivising nuanced focus to determine its transformative effects.

Freedom of Information in Canada

Canadian politicians’ limited support for openness during FOI’s inception has incentivised actions to mitigate its significance and retain policymaking secrecy in contrast to sincere transparency investments. Following resentment regarding the federal government’s centrality of information, the 1982 Access to Information Act, ATIA, was implemented to enhance legislative and public checks notwithstanding its perceived decision-making disruptions that created hostility amongst ministers. The act was designed to dismantle secrecy and empower citizens through accessed information, subsequently supporting understandings of government decisions (Roberts, 2005). Thus, one can infer the ATIA’s political adoption to maintain the legitimacy of democratic institutions and outputs as voters assess the incorporation of their interests within policy construction, thereby facilitating the employment of this knowledge within voting behaviour and enhancing effective accountability. The ATIA’s significance is therefore derived from diminished alienation between government and stakeholders, thus promoting active political engagement and good governance incentives. However, while supportive of openness when in opposition, politicians actively resist FOI upon entering government to limit accountability to opposition and retain information advantages. Ergo the visibility of formal policymaking incentivises informal consultations and decisions to limit insight into department operations, hindering effective inquiries into policies and associated motivations (Gingras, 2012). Correspondingly, one can infer that the politicisation of information hinders effective openness as governments oppose the cost of FOI’s implementation, thereby creating heterogeneous support amongst politicians according to the threat transparency presents to political ends. Furthermore, the voluntary documentation of decisions and discussions incentivises officials to communicate through Blackberry messaging to prevent their recovery and subsequent release following deletion (Kazmierski, 2016), exacerbating informalities through technological innovations. One can perceive that the perpetuation of communications loopholes undermines stakeholders’ evaluations of policies as the rationale of decisions and the inclusion of public interest remains ambiguous, preventing transformative transparency effects relative to pre-adoption periods. As a result, the evolution of practices has retained information’s centrality, undermining the significance of the right to access.

Furthermore, discriminatory responses to sensitive requests exacerbate delays and subsequently prevent journalists’ effective dissemination of information. The inclusion of applicants’ occupation within requests permits governments to tailor processing per the threat disclosures present. Accordingly, within the amber lighting process, internal reviews evaluate sensitive information requested by opposition and journalists to determine potential repercussions and prepare ministerial responses before releases to mitigate backlash (Roberts, 2005). Hence, one can surmise that while the ATIA permits equal access to information, responses are conducted with prejudice as information is increasing politicised to prevent the aggravation of FOI’s costs. Consequently, amber lighting’s additional processing requirements substantially increased the probability of opposition and journalists’ requests exceeding deadlines in six of eight analysed institutions respectively. Moreover, the proportion of their requests delayed relative to total requests expanded to 39.7% and 36.3% respectively in contrast to 17.4% for all other categories. Subsequently, as news cycles progress to alternative topics before delayed information can be employed within reports on salient issues (Roberts, 2005) discrepancies between disclosures and effective transparency are perceived as journalists’ inability to employ information to assist voters’ evaluations undermines the effectiveness of satisfying requests as they lack transformative implications. Thus, amber lighting processes permit the retention of effective information monopolies, notwithstanding greater access, through perpetual ignorance, limiting the ATIA’s returns. Moreover, minimal enforcement of the duty to assist mandating support of applicants through complete and timely request satisfaction irrespective of identity (Roziere & Walby, 2020) sustains discriminatory practices. Ergo, FOI’s positive implications are eroded by political agendas, insulating governments from openness costs through limited public engagement. Therefore, the ATIA lacks substantive ramifications for transparency and accountability as officials undermine disclosures’ adverse effects to protect political ends, dynamics technical measures exclude.

Moreover, the ATIA’s insufficient appeal system fails to protect stakeholders as governments retain control of final verdicts. To protect requestors against unfair denials of valid FOI requests Information Commissioners investigate the decisions of officials and determine if withholding desired information was justified, providing neutral protection within the politicised system. However, the non-binding recommendations made by the Commissioners are incapable of mandating the release of withheld information as authorities maintain power to alter disclosures (Kazmierski, 2016), thereby failing to ensure satisfaction of requests irrespective of identified noncompliance. Therefore, one can infer that reliance upon governments resistant to transparency to comply with verdicts is counterintuitive to investigations’ neutrality as the protection of legal rights is not guaranteed and becomes partisan a decision, undermining effective enforcement. Governments correspondingly maintain the capacity to artificially restrict disclosures to those supportive of reduced corruption perceptions, ergo enhancing returns whilst minimising reputational losses. Furthermore, the Commissioners’ sustained budgetary dependence constrains investigations as the time required to respond to FOI complaints increased from four to five months from 1992-1993 to 1996-997 following reductions in federal funding to reduce budget deficits (Roberts, 2000). One can discern that exacerbated appeal times limit the effective employment of information to scrutinise and hold the government to account through media reports, subsequently insulating the costs governments endure from greater openness. In contrast, UK Commissioners hold substantial power, irrespective of delays, through decision notices mandating alterations to disclosures following failure to satisfy valid requests, whilst individuals retain the capacity to further appeal to the Information Tribunal (Hazell, Worthy, & Glover, 2010). Perceptions of Canadian Commissioners’ absolute and relative deficiencies are apparent as the satisfaction of legitimate appeals is uncertain, undermining the significance of their inclusion within the act. Politicisation threatens neutrality as officials determine who holds the right to access.

Freedom of Information in the UK

The absence of enforced record management compromises the capacity to guarantee access to information, thereby hampering public insight through institutional practices. The UK’s 2000 Freedom of Information Act, FOIA, sought the removal of secrecy within British politics through enhanced transparency and public understanding of government decisions and associated processes, thus permitting accountability. Consequently, Section 46’s Code of Practice on Records Management requires detailed record keeping to ensure effective access to and dissemination of information upon request to enhance transparency relative to pre-adoption periods (Shepherd, 2015). Therefore, one can surmise the significance of provisions to prevent mismanagement inhibitive of public engagement as the inability to assuredly provide requested information hampers the consequences of legally providing access. Ergo, the archiving of information for subsequent use facilitates robust foundations to enhance the FOIA’s effectiveness through mutually reinforcing outcomes as institutional openness begets good governance and public evaluations. However, failure to rigorously enforce and maintain the Code’s standards across institutions compromises the provision’s significance. For instance, physical record safekeeping is inadequate as fires, flooding, and dampness within storage facilities damage files whilst digital backups are consistently missing or incorrectly stored within servers (Shepherd, Stevenson, & Flinn, 2011b), thereby compounding the risk of irreparable information losses. Therefore, the inability of the FOIA to ensure the satisfaction of valid requests derived from institutional incompetence and inefficiencies, undermining stakeholders’ right to access and consequently accountability through constrained scrutiny. The absence of incentives to support transparency ,therefore, facilitates relaxed attitudes to record keeping, limiting effective evaluations when vital information is unlocatable. Whilst the FOIA places greater importance upon record keeping relative to the ATIA, limited enforcement undermines its foundational strength and consequently the provision’s weight.

Heterogeneous user experiences have compromised aggregate access to information in conjunction with minimal returns. The FOIA has enhanced transparency perceptions amongst 60% of requesters surveyed using links provided in FOI responses and department websites relative to 20% that experienced no alterations (Worthy, 2010). Thus, one can surmise the erosion of secrecy as institutional openness and monitoring expand. However, the legislation’s returns are hindered by assorted experiences. In contrast to knowledgeable requesters that comprehend the specificity required to successfully file requests, inexperienced users rely upon support from requestees through the duty to assist. However, resembling the ATIA, the principle’s enforcement is variable and derivative of authorities’ motivations to communicate and clarify requests, thereby facilitating incorrect disclosures and denials because of requests’ generality and inaccuracies (Shepherd, Stevenson, & Flinn, 2011a). Ergo, perceptions remain that irrespective of equal opportunity to file requests, access to information is inherently unequal as authorities disadvantage individuals without a robust knowledge of application processes to limit disclosures, discouraging reiterated use following dissatisfaction. As repeated users were more likely to file requests and therefore be surveyed, one can infer that transparency increases predominantly reflect the experiences of requesters capable of successfully invoking the legislation, ergo inflating the FOIA’s perceived effectiveness relative to its heterogeneous accessibility. However, the FOIA has failed to enlighten successful individuals as 40% did not understand policy processes nor motivations relative to 30% and 22%, which did respectively, consequently limiting increased accountability perceptions to 20% of respondents while 30% incurred no change (Worthy, 2010). Correspondingly weaknesses exist within technical measurements as the UK’s high approval rate has failed to yield substantive returns whilst unknowledgeable individuals are continually alienated, restricting cumulative benefits. Accordingly, power imbalances are consistent relative to pre-adoption periods.

The FOIA threatens perceptions of government unity in absence of cabinet paper exemptions. Individual ministers are solely accountable to parliament for their department’s actions, preventing deferral of culpability to civil servants and incentivising good governance. Whilst the FOIA permits requests regarding civil servants’ involvement within policymaking, their coverage within approximately 1% of media articles prevents the dilution of focus upon ministers, thereby retaining parliament’s checks whilst permitting FOI to complement parliamentary questions and monitor department outputs (Hazell & Glover, 2011), perpetuating incentives for due diligence. Therefore, one can infer that the FOIA has neither substantially enhanced nor detracted from ministers’ accountability to voters and opposition, perpetuating minimal effects. However, the act limits ministers’ capacity to effectively debate policies during cabinet discussions as potential releases of cabinet papers deemed in the public interest by the Information Commissioner and Tribunal in the absence of explicit exemptions, contrary to the ATIA, retain the capacity to undermine perceptions of government unity. Hence, whilst collective cabinet responsibility commits all cabinet members to claim authority for enacted policies irrespective of personal beliefs, revelations of government incoherence challenge confidence, consequently motivating executive vetoes to prevent disclosures on matters including the 2003 papers discussing deployments to Iraq perceived to threaten political stability (Hazell & Glover, 2011). Moreover, while the necessity of transparency regarding the motivations of collective decisions to facilitate public engagement can be perceived, the inability to effectively debate and incorporate alternative perspectives as ministers focus upon stability repercussions of potential disclosures hinders effective policymaking. Ergo, the absence of amendments to exempt cabinet discussions from release shall restrain discussions through the threat of retracted legitimacy bestowed to feuding governments, thus solely motivating disclosures of the cabinet’s final outputs in contrast to its intermediary process to prevent sustained reputational losses and the exacerbation of FOI’s costs.

Conclusion

In conclusion, one can observe that FOI laws have been ineffective in achieving their objectives. Notwithstanding their adoption to implement mutually beneficial outcomes for politicians and stakeholders through enhanced accountability and public engagement with institutions, the politicisation of the right to access information has eroded public returns in favour of reduced government costs, consequently limiting the sufficiency of technical measurements to determine FOI’s implications. Irrespective of its objectives to reduce information centrality, the ATIA has facilitated informalities and discriminatory request processing to undermine the significance of transparency constraints whilst retaining power within authorities to determine the success of valid appeals. Furthermore, breached provisions within the FOIA through insufficient record keeping and the alienation of inexperienced users compromise requesters’ returns whilst the potential disclosure of cabinet papers constrains government discussions. FOI’s failures are accordingly perceived through the inability to produce transformative effects as realised returns are constrained by political environments, mitigating the significance of differences in mechanical measurements between Canada and the UK. The absence of alternative practices, including enforcing duty to assist and granting exceptions to cabinet papers, shall accordingly perpetuate the insignificance of the right to access.

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