
Ethnic Diversity and Ethnic Conflict: Security Risks, the Missing Link
Aoife Keogh
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Introduction
Ethnicity has been a common theme in conflict studies; data from Fearon and Laitin suggests that over half the civil wars since 1945 have been ethnic civil wars (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 75). However, ethnic diversity does not assume there will be ethnic conflict and there are examples of peaceful ethnic coexistence such as Switzerland and The Netherlands (Caselli & Coleman, 2013, p. 162) (Lijphart, 2019, p. 211). Furthermore, Montavlo and Raynal-Querol (2005, p. 798) argue that the existence of ethnic fractionalisation has no effect on the probability of the emergence of civil conflict. Therefore, one can infer that ethnic diversity, when considered in isolation, is not the main driver for civil conflict; however, the high levels of ethnic civil wars since 1945 must still be accounted for. This essay will focus on the external factor of security risks and its effect on ethnic group behaviour and its role in increasing the likelihood of ethnic civil conflict. Beginning with an analysis of ethnicity, it’s definition and functions, this essay will take a constructivist approach. The effect of security risks on the dynamics of an ethnic group will be examined including in-group behaviour, collective memory and the influence of ethnic elites; these factors will illustrate the importance of external factors on ethnic group motility which can lead to civil conflict. Yugoslavia, Northern Ireland and Rwanda will be used as examples of civil conflict in ethnically diverse regions.
Ethnicity in this context
Before the effects of security risks can be assessed, one must understand the definition and concept of ethnicity considered in this essay. The subject of ethnicity is widely debated in academia, and naturally one of the main discussion points is how to define the concept (Hale, 2004, p.458). It has been described as an emotional attachment to people, place and symbols, as well as a group of shared “social references,” among people (Hale, 2004, p. 463). The academic debate regarding ethnicity’s definition has resulted in two points of reference; the primordial view and the constructivist view (Hale, 2004, p. 460). The primordial theorists consider ethnicity to be the shared features of one’s identity which does not change over time and includes language, history, and traditions (Hale, 2004, p. 460). In contrast constructivist theorists argue ethnicity is much more fluid. They assert that ethnicity is created by the perceived boundaries which individuals create (Hale, 2004, 461). This essay will take a view on ethnicity which adopts the constructivist argument that ethnicity as a group identity is subject to change. By focusing on security risks as an external factor which changes group dynamics, collective memory and the behaviour of group leaders, the essay will illustrate how these influences increase the likelihood of ethnic civil conflict.
If ethnic diversity does not drive civil conflict, what does?
As discussed previously, peaceful ethnic co-existence is common in many parts of the world (Caselli and Coleman, 2013, p. 162) (Lijphart, 2019, p.211). Therefore, it’s clear that ethnic diversity alone is not a driver for civil war; the influence of external factors such as a security risk is worth examining as a driver in ethnic conflict. According to Posen, security risks have a significant impact on the dynamics of ethnic groups (Posen, 1993, p.29). Hale contends that the presence of a threat such as a security risk alters internal ethnic group dynamics in many different ways (Hale, 2004, p.469). These include increasing group cohesion, presenting group favouritism, easier group acceptance of leaders, a decrease in group communication and a focus on winning rather than the central issues involved (Hale, 2004, p.469). Authors often question why groups in civil conflict are divided on ethnic lines rather than class lines (Horowitz, 2000, p.56). Horowitz contends that membership to an ethnic group is mostly awarded at birth and therefore is only seldomly chosen (Horowitz, 2000, p.57). While ethnic membership may share commonalities with family membership, Horowitz argues these are tied to a shared sense of ancestry. Horowitz notes that this ancestry may be socially fabricated but still functions
to bring individuals together and to create unspoken mutual obligations (Horowitz, 2000, p.60). A threat to a member of an ethnic group may be felt as a threat to other members of the group, as would be with any family or kinship dynamic (Horowitz, 2000, p. 60). Ethnic affiliations may hold more merit and provoke more loyalty than other social affiliations (Horowitz, 2000, p.105). In today’s increasingly global society, where interactions with unknown individuals are frequent, Horowitz asserts that ethnic group members can anticipate the behaviour of an unknown individual within their ethnic group more easily, lowering the trust barrier (Horowitz, 2000, p.81). Therefore, the vulnerability individuals feel when security risks are present may drive them to seek protection within their ethnic group, in turn creating highly cohesive isolated groups in a state (Posen, 1993, p.30).
Drawing on an argument from Posen, which looks at the collapse of empires generating security risks for the ethnic groups within the former empire, the security risk creates solidarity among members of ethnic groups who seek to navigate the uncertainty (Posen, 1993, p. 31). This can be understood to be a defence mechanism; however, other neighbouring groups may interpret the newly found solidarity as a threat (Posen, 1993, p.29). This presents the realist theory “security dilemma” to be found in the study of International relations (Posen, 1993, p.29). Posen uses the break-down of Yugoslavia and the ethnic civil wars which ensued as an example of an inter-ethnic security dilemma (Posen, 1993, p.30). After the collapse of Yugoslavia, there was no central power controlling the various ethnic groups; people looked to their ethnic group for security and as a result, the importance of ethnic identity was viewed as threatening by the neighbouring ethnic groups which created a security dilemma (Posen, 1993, p.31). In this context, according to Posen, ethnic groups will more than likely consider other ethnic groups in the area to be dangerous (Posen, 1993, p.31). He asserts that an ethnic group will perceive other groups’ cohesion as equal to, or even more threatening than their military capabilities (Posen, 1993, p. 43). Security risk effects the behaviour of members of an ethnic group and the dynamics of the group as a whole which further influences other ethnic groups actions, as was the case in former Yugoslavia (Posen, 1993, p. 37). Therefore, the external context of security risk must be taken into consideration in the breakdown of former Yugoslavia; it could be considered a key factor in the likelihood of civil conflict.
Security risks as a factor
Security risks may also influence the production and manifestation of collective memory (Campbell, 2017, p. 100). Collective memory can be defined as the drawing on an experience of the past, which has relevance in the present and projected future. Campbell contends that collective memory is socially constructed and although a group of people may have access to the memory, it is the individual who connects with the memory (Campbell, 2017, p. 93). Collective Memory is important within an ethnic group, with certain events commemorated, glorified or mourned; it directs individual groups towards historical events and figures which are deemed important (Rydgren, 2007, p. 231). It is generally selective, emphasising vivid and emotive past occurrences whilst ignoring the everyday details (Rydgren, 2007, p. 231).
There are several ways in which security risks, as an external factor, may influence an ethnic group’s collective memory (Horowitz, 2000, p. 72). As discussed previously, when faced with a threat, there is increased solidarity between ethnic groups; collective memories may be employed as a tool for ethnic differentiation, recalling past ethnic clashes in order to rebrand the other ethnic group as dangerous. This can deter ethnic mixing and re-establish the importance of member’s ethnic identity (Horowitz, 2000, p. 72). Furthermore, when security risks are present and ethnic groups are feeling vulnerable, past victories may be recalled in order to legitimise and mobilise ethnic groups (Campbell, 2017, p. 98). Campbell uses the example of the Northern Irish civil conflict to demonstrate how collective memories of the past can mobilise ethnic groups in the present (Campbell, 2017, p. 100). Focusing on the Unionists of Northern Ireland, she examines the lead up to the 1974 Ulster Workers Council Strike (Campbell, 2017, p. 100). According to Campbell, in the lead up to the strike, the violence caused a crisis of confidence and collective memory played
an important role in consolidating the identity and mobilising Unionists (Campbell, 2017, p. 101). The violent clashes between Nationalists and Unionists can be considered a security risk; furthermore, Campbell asserts there was little confidence in the authority’s capabilities of protecting the Unionists (Campbell, 2017, p. 102). The strike was initiated as a response to the Sunningdale agreement, which proposed a power sharing arrangement and gave the Republic of Ireland’s government a role in the running of Northern Ireland (Campbell, 2017, p.102). Unionists viewed the Republic of Ireland’s potential influence in their government as an additional threat (Campbell, 2017, p. 102). The resistance to Home Rule in 1912 and the historical figure of James Carson were glorified in order to inspire confidence in the Unionist people and mobilise them to support the strike and fight the Sunningdale Agreement (Campbell, 2017, p.102). The strike was a victory for the Unionists, destroying the power sharing agreement and reinstalling direct rule from Britain (Campbell, 2017, p.102). This is an example of how collective memory can be adopted when security risks are present – these can be used to mobilise members of groups to engage in violence and in some cases increase the prospect of wider civil conflict.
Lastly, security risks can influence group actions and behaviour through the ethnic/political leader’s manipulation of the public’s fear, mobilising them to commit violent acts, framing them as self-defence mechanisms and making ethnic civil conflict more likely (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p.862). Ethnic leaders may use violence to solidify ethnic identity and eradicate interactions between ethnic groups (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p.862). In extreme cases, leaders may use violence to “purify” their society; in these cases, ethnic cleansing is common (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p. 863). Other ethnic leaders may use collective memories, as discussed above, to consolidate, mobilise and recruit members (Campbell, 2017, p. 98). Fearon and Laitin discuss how security risks may be used by ethnic/political leaders to abuse the vulnerability felt by the members of the group for political and personal gain (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p.863). Fearon and Laitin offer analysis of literature from Prunier about the civil war in Rwanda as an example of ethnic conflict. In this case, Rwandan extremist elites belonging to the Hutu ethnic group used their power to create doubt and fear regarding another ethnic group, the Tutsis (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p.864). The Hutus and the Tutsis had a complex relationship where Tutsis were the empowered ethnicity during the colonial period. In post-colonial revolution the Hutus took power, claiming the Tutsis were intruders who previously ruled their country with brute force (Fearon & Laitin, 2000 p.863). Despite monopolising power in the post-colonial era, Hutu people had an inferiority complex and lived with the constant security risk that the Tutsis would one day would reclaim their power (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p.863). The Hutu leaders used this fear to polarise the ethnic groups and mobilise Hutus to abolish the Tutsis (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p.863). Both political and personal gains were motivators in the actions of the political elites in Rwanda (Fearon & Laitin, 2000, p.863). In 1994, the tension in Rwanda eventually led to the Hutus committing acts of genocide against Tutsis. This is an example of a political elite manipulating group members’ fear over security risks for their own personal and political advantage.
Conclusion
To conclude, diversity alone is not enough to drive ethnic civil conflict; peaceful ethnic coexistence pertains in various locations around the world (Caselli & Coleman, 2013, p.162). This essay takes a constructivist approach to ethnicity, arguing that an external factor such as security risks can result in a change in the dynamics of ethnic groups. It was asserted that security risks increased in-group cohesion and suspicion of other groups; that it mobilised and legitimised ethnic groups through collective memory and that its abuse by elites manipulated ethnic fear for personal or political gain. Therefore, when considering ethnic civil conflict, one must look at the external factors such as security risks and their effect on ethnic groups.
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