Introduction

The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) is a unique multi-level consultative private-public partnership designed to regulate a natural resource (Kantz 2017). It covers 99.8% of rough diamond production, requiring participating states to maintain customs controls to track the trade of rough diamonds (US Department of State 2021). This paper seeks to answer why major diamond importing states created the KPCS for conflict diamonds, which are defined as “rough diamonds used to finance wars against governments” (ibid). This paper considers a case study of influences leading to the United States supporting the creation of this global institution. This state is an appropriate choice for detailed consideration because the characteristic foreign policy of the US at the time of the KPCS would typically be neoconservative (McGlinchey 2009), whereas this process demonstrates strong multilateralism, further adding to the puzzle of why diamond importing states created the KPCS. Existing research to date largely considers non-state actors and state actors generally, and studies of the US in the KPCS are broad; this research contributes a focused neoliberal explanation to the question at hand. Neoliberal international relations theory includes the state-society approach and institutionalism; these posit that a states’ foreign relations are the product of the national government’s translation of domestic actors’ interests and that states’ foreign relations are shaped by their desire for national security information coordination and thus create international institutions.

State of the art

Much of the research to date on the creation process of the KPCS emphasizes the dominant role of NGOs in agenda-setting the issue and influencing the diamond jewellery industry (Grant and Taylor 2004; Haufler 2009; Santiago 2014; Rina-Luoise 2011; Beiri 2010). Specifically, literature on US involvement in the negotiation process is considered tangentially to the negotiation process as a whole (Wright 2011). Additionally, some research focuses on the effectiveness of the implementation of the KPCS in the US (Petrova 2006). Finally, Thomas (2012) considers four main International Relations theoretical frameworks as applied to US support for the KPCS. In light of this prior literature, this paper seeks to highlight the US’s main reasons for supporting the KPCS. To these ends, this article hypothesizes that the US supported the creation of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme mainly due to (1) domestic pressure and (2) the idea that an international institution was the best solution to address conflict diamonds as a security issue.

Methodology

This work conducts a qualitative case study of the United States, drawing on relevant events leading to the KPCS’s enactment in 2003 and after the most recent Plenary meeting in 2021. These time periods were chosen because the pre-KP period captures the origin and progression of conflict diamonds through the US domestic and international agenda. The post-Plenary statements demonstrate ongoing negotiation positions of US interests in the KPCS, which reflect interests consistent with the creation of the initial KPCS.

Results and discussion

Response to domestic pressure
This article found support for the first part of its hypothesis, that the US supported the KPCS due to domestic pressure, by considering the effect of US-based domestic actors on state actors leading up to enactment of the KPCS.

Evidence of NGOs’ successful grassroots campaigning in the late 1990s and early 2000s suggests that the US supported the creation of the KPCS due to domestic pressure. Initially, human rights organisations brought consumer attention to human rights violations, civil war, and general atrocities in Africa while pointing to diamonds as propagating this conflict. A notable example of this is Global Witnesses’ publication of “A Rough Trade” (Thomas 2012). This report publicly surfaced the issue of Angolan rebel group UNITA’s avoidance of UN sanctions against rough diamonds which were funding the civil war (Ibid). There was a notable shift on Valentine’s Day 2001, when over seventy domestic groups, sponsored by a coalition of Amnesty International USA, World Vision, Physicians for Human Rights, Oxfam USA and World Relief, launched their campaign, called “The Campaign to Eliminate Conflict Diamonds” (Tamm 2004). The goal was to increase consumer concern over conflict diamonds and gain domestic support and increased pressure for conflict diamond foreign policy (Rappaport 2001). In particular, Amnesty International led an online campaign designed to
increase support for the Clean Diamonds Trade Act through directing consumers to their website, which provided sample scripts and contact information for grassroots Congressional lobbying (Ibid). The launch of the Valentine’s Day Campaign to Eliminate Conflict Diamonds, a year after the Kimberley Process meeting, “brought new force to the cause” (Tamm 2004, 693). This successful consumer awareness campaign formed just one part of the domestic support which translated into the US supporting the creation of the KPCS.

The campaign was particularly effective partly due to the nature of diamonds as having a socially constructed value. Common understanding of diamonds vary, but the traditional conception capitalized upon by the US jewellery industry is that of romance and love (Falls 2014). By launching on Valentine’s Day, the human rights organizations co-opted the most symbolic day for the diamond jewellery industry in a budding attempt to shift common conception of diamonds to conflict. One example of this weaponized social construction is given by Grant and Taylor (2004), highlighting an NGO campaign video which imitated a diamond industry advertisement; the video changed midway from a romantic engagement to an amputation, representing the violent measures taken by armed diamond extracting groups in African diamond-producing regions. As such, this social construction was weaponized by these human rights groups against the diamond jewellery industry. The domestic industry interest groups were under pressure to cooperate as a result of intense media scrutiny of its practices; the US was the biggest consumer market for diamond jewellery (Gooch 2008).

In response to NGO pressure, the US diamond jewellery industry joined the campaign, amplifying the impact of domestic groups on the US in relation to the KPCS. Four months after Valentine’s Day 2001, human rights groups and diamond jewellery industry groups struck a compromise regarding desired foreign policy measures to address conflict diamonds (Tamm 2004). At this point, both human rights groups and industry interest groups were campaigning to the public and lobbying Congress to find a solution. Five months after that, the Clean Diamond Trade Act (CDTA), which incorporated the Kimberley Process minimum legislative requirements, was passed in the House. The Senate made the bill stronger, and the final bill was passed and signed in April 2003. However, it was not implemented by President Bush for another three months. This timeline suggests the effect of domestic non-state actors towards the creation of the KPCS; further evidence will now be considered.

The effect of domestic interest groups on foreign policy relating to conflict diamonds is evidenced by Thomas’ voting reference model of Congressmen supporting the Clean Diamond Trade Act in the 107th and 108th sessions (2012). In these two sessions, Congressmen mentioned supporting the Clean Diamond Trade Act for human rights reasons 98 times, nearly three times more than mentions of the world economy or national security (ibid). The end of the 107th session evoked criticism of the weakness of the Act in stemming the flow of conflict diamonds; the 108th session provided a stronger version of the bill. Notably, between these sessions, the ratio of mentions of human rights and the world economy grew in proportion to mentions of national security (ibid), suggesting that both human rights and diamond jewellery industry interest groups also exerted influence in the intermediary period.

Additionally, the effect of domestic pressure is further demonstrated by the Bush administration’s initial hostility to the scheme. Smillie (2005) provides the US’s reservations about affecting the law, which include the issues of workload, cost, and trade law implications. None of these factors changed in the intermediary period between when the delay began and when the CDTA was enacted by Executive Order 13312 (2013).

Institutional solution to security issue

The second finding of this article is that the US supported the creation of the KPCS because of the idea that an international institution was the best solution to address conflict diamonds as a security issue. Grant and Taylor (2004) suggest that al-Qaeda, who launched a terrorist attack against the US on the 11th of September, 2001, were using diamonds to fund themselves. The chief prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone has stressed the link between al-Qaeda and Sierra Leone’s diamonds (ibid). Le Billon (2006) suggests that conflict diamonds became a security issue for the US due to its attention towards reports and studies of terrorist finance after 9/11. As previously stated, the US was the biggest retail market for diamond jewellery. So, during a crucial time period in the creation of the KPCS, the US had a unique security motivation and responsibility for stemming the conflict diamond financing flow.

Moreover, the timing of implementing the CDTA correlates with a new report on conflict diamonds as a source of funding for 9/11. The US ultimately effected the CDTA into law three months after the deadline, despite the Congressional effort made to have the bill passed and signed before the deadline. The Bush administration said its hesitance was due to WTO compliance and concerns over loopholes (Grant and Taylor 2004). Notably, the Executive Order that implemented the CDTA was issued a week after Global Witness published another report which focused on al-Qaeda’s use of conflict diamonds to fund 9/11.

Additionally, comments made by US policy-makers reflect institutionalist behaviours in world politics. An example of this is in the discourse surrounding the definition of conflict diamonds within the KP organization. The definition of a conflict diamond in the KP is “rough diamonds used to finance wars against legitimate governments’’ (US Department of State 2021). This definition encompasses conflict diamonds that were shown to fund the terrorist attack on 9/11 against the United States. However, it is an arguably narrow definition because it does not cover polished diamonds, or diamonds fastened to jewellery. The nearly-unanimous number of signatory parties from both diamond producing and diamond importing states suggests that compromise was made in this definition. In the wake of this agreement, the US has demonstrated a consistent desire for a more broad definition in order to regulate more diamond trade. This suggests that when negotiating the initial KPCS included, the US was interested in effective institutional regulation of diamonds. For example, the November 2021 post-Plenary statement reflects a desire for the organization to expand the definition. In particular, the post-Plenary statement “expressed concern [that] the Kimberley Process of a conflict diamond does not sufficiently address consumer concerns related to human rights and other important standards” (US Department of State 2021). This statement demonstrates a desire to cooperate in global policy-making through institutions, contradictory to its otherwise neoconservative policy. In light of its explicit concern for the consumer, this statement further supports the claim that US participation in the KPCS is due to domestic pressure. Furthermore, comments made in the 107th and 108th sessions reflect a desire to supplement the KPCS definition in the CDTA, and also wanting to be a leader in the institution (Thomas 2012).

Furthermore, the organizational design of the KPCS further supports the institutionalist explanation towards the international political response to conflict diamonds. As noted previously, the KPCS has a unique, tripartite structure which receives significant academic attention for its model of global institutional governance. LeBillon (2006) highlights the significant role of NGOs in surfacing and educating policy-makers on this security issue. The necessary role of NGOs in socializing the public, industry groups, and state actors could suggest one main reason why the US thought international institutions were the best solution for governing conflict diamonds.

Finally, the previous case study by Thomas (2012) of the US’s support for the KPCS provides alternate perspectives on why the KPCS was created by considering the applicability of realism, classical liberalism, neoliberalism, and constructivism to the KPCS creation process. She concludes that no theoretical framework can fully explain the reasons for joining the KPCS, a perspective with which this paper also agrees. However, this paper maintains, and has shown, that the neoliberal approach to explaining the US’s behavior in regards to the KPCS accounts for the most significant factors in the process. The role of NGOs’ widespread sociopolitical effect is evident from historical accounts of the creation process, which describe wide public engagement with these causes; this effect is also reflected in NGOs’ policymaking role on equal footing with states in the KPCS, which is unique in terms of international institution structures. Furthermore, the creation of an international institution is a solution which the US was predisposed to politically oppose at the time, yet broke with this expectation to create the KPCS. Alternate theories lack an account for these extraordinary factors, thus they cannot adequately explain the question at hand.

Conclusion

Considering the role of domestic and state actors in the creation of the KPCS demonstrates the main reason why the US joined the organization. It did so because domestic human rights NGOs successfully influenced the public and the domestic diamond jewellery industry to have an interest in finding a solution to the trade of conflict diamonds. From this broad base of support, these interests were translated into foreign policy by domestic institutions. Furthermore, these interests were reflected through the creation of the KPCS, which was the institutional response to the security issue posed by conflict diamonds.

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