
Defining Intersectionality in the Social
Sciences
Devin Liss
/
From a relatively obscure legal concept to a viral social justice buzzword, the term ‘intersectionality’ was originally coined by Kimberle Crenshaw thirty years ago. The first mention of the word in her article Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Gender is seen in this quote: “[b]ecause the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of racism and sexism, any analysis that does not
take intersectionality into account cannot sufficiently address the particular manner in which Black women are subordinated,” (1989 p. 140). By this definition, Crenshaw is proposing intersectionality as a framework through which to view inequality, one that asks us to rethink discrimination not as the sum of its parts (racism, sexism, etc.) but rather as a multitude of factors that must be critically
analysed at their intersections. However, as the term takes its place in academic discourse, there is a call for a firmer understanding of intersectionality’s intention and potential. Many scholars have debated whether it belongs to theory, method, or should be defined simply as a lens. “In scholarly work, ‘methods’ are practical hands-on steps for doing research,” (Schneider 2014) such as; coming up with a hypothesis, collecting data, and selecting an answer to the research question given that data. Whereas, a theory is “a set of ideas that provides an explanation for human society,” (Trueman 2015). These are chosen ideas, based on proposed significance, which offer a specific view of reality. Theory can be thought of as background knowledge for an experiment and method as how the experiment is conducted. Given intersectionality’s unresolved methodological issues, its simplification of power relations, and scholars’ tendency to stretch the term too thin, it is most reasonably argued that intersectionality is currently a lens that, through honing its methodology and praxis, has the potential to become a critical social theory.
Although the term intersectionality is relatively new, its concept is not. In the 19th century, Sojourner Truth’s experience as a woman and a black person during the time of slavery is summarized by her line “Ain’t I a Woman?” (1851). Speeches such as these would lead future feminists scholars to question the lack of anti-racist discord in their own field. It was time to let go of the ‘either/ or’ mentality – or in more academic terms, the unitary approach. Prior to intersectionality, researchers focused on one axis or another which didn’t provide a full picture. To remedy these holes, different approaches were adopted. In When Multiplication Doesn’t Equal Quick Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm, Hancock outlines these approaches (2007). She starts by criticising the multiple approach for locating categories as fixed and unchanging. Similarly, she claims the additive approach pits minorities against each other by constructing experiences as separate and summative. Moreover, each of these approaches fail to account for the possibility that someone’s social location could both empower and oppress them depending on the context. So what categories should social sciences consider? McCall (2013) answers this question by identifying approaches that help to further the intersectional goal of disrupting the belief that identities are static or perpetual (Hillsburg 2013). However, she recognizes that these approaches all present their own shortcomings. Anticategorical complexity, for example, aims to deconstruct categories as they are seen as too restrictive. Meanwhile, an intercategorical approach would argue identity categories need to be understood as long as they are recognized to be in flux. Lastly, intracategorical approach focuses on the dangers of categorizations while stopping short of dismissing them (McCall 2013). Clearly, the problem persists: “how to ask questions about experiences that are intersecting, interdependent, and mutually constitutive…” (Bowleg 2008, p.314).
This lack of a consensus on how to frame intersectional study is preventing it from being seriously considered as a critical social theory. Therefore its conflicts must be addressed, especially since conflict is how intersectionality came to be. Division was central to feminist analysis and therefore power relations were brought to the forefront. Salem notes how hiding intersectionality’s conflicts
also hides its analysis of power relations, and instead paints it as just a field of general diversity (2018). To remedy this, power relations must be consistently analysed through the theory of social stratification. Social stratification, as defined by Yuval-Davis, “relates to the differential hierarchical locations of individuals and groupings of people on society’s grids of power,” (2011 p.162). This falls on intersectionality as it must be recognized, like identity categories, to be constantly in flux. So not only must these inequalities be analysed on the national, international, and regional levels, but they must also be viewed at the intersections of time, of when the oppression was experienced. Hillsburg recognises some of the above problems as owing to the complexity of the multitude of categories and how to account for them in a research project. At the same time she recognizes that diffusing these categories can lead to further oppression of those currently marginalised (2013). To address this, she proposes three axioms to help guide researchers to find a middle ground. Firstly, it is important that the researcher, though they must define their project from the outset, does not imply or push identity categories onto the subject. Instead of isolating one facet of their identity, discuss which are most important to the research project in order to allow for self-identification. This will help researchers avoid falling back on preconceived ideas. For example, much of the research out there today places minority groups in the centre of majority spaces. Whereas in reality, the majority of black women, to provide an example, live in black societies. This is crucial to take into account since portraying black women as exclusively oppressed does not allow consideration of discrepancies in privilege within an ethnic or gender group (Nash 2008, p.12). Secondly, Hillsburg draws on Derrida’s idea of ‘différance’ to explain that these categories are not always fixed nor readily apparent – therefore they must be referred back to throughout the research process. One way to enforce this is through asking what Mari Matsuda calls ‘the other question’(1991 p. 1183). For example, Matsuda suggests if you see something that looks racist, look for the patriarchy within that, or the class interests in something that looks homophobic, and so on. This helps to clear up the often critiqued complexity of intersectionality while showing that it can still be studied critically. Lastly is to accept that every human is vulnerable, and to account for your own position of privilege. This allows each subject to be understood as belonging to an ‘interlocking network of oppression’, a concept that can dismantle harsh distinctions between oppressor and oppressed. These axioms are important guidelines to allow marginalised people their own voice, instead of speaking for them.
Much of today’s confusion surrounding intersectionality stems from an initial misunderstanding of its objectives. Some scholars thought it meant to privilege certain minorities over others or simply point out existing areas of limitation within the field. In reality, intersectionality serves to provide a whole new perspective of identity, or at least to bring to light the experiences of unrepresented voices. This is why it is crucial to clear up any remaining confusion on intersectionality’s aims. Its methods must be standardised in order to utilise it to its fullest capacity, as a critical social theory. However, there are fears that broadening intersectionality’s scope to account for its potential will take away from those who currently benefit from its popularity. Specifically, Alexander-Floyd noted how black women are subject to a paradox of invisibility; they are often viewed as prominent cultural symbols but are simultaneously seriously underrepresented in research and social policy. In fact, from 1970 to 1985 no full length political science journals with titles or abstracts relating to black women were published (2018 p.9).
Progressing from this exclusionary history, intersectionality has helped black women advance from visible symbols to having visible needs. Further conceptualising intersectionality could prove exclusionary. Not only this, but trying to understand all of intersectionality’s potential instead of focusing on its success with raising black female voices, could render it ambiguous and therefore less appealing to academia. “It is these moves to stretch intersectionality and make it an approach that fits all feminist ontologies that has undermined its radical potential,” (Salem 2018). Rather than continuing to stretch out the term, perhaps it is best to see the power it already wields. It is thus far an internationally recognized term, with sweeping acceptance from feminist scholars. Using its quick success in social justice efforts may be the real key in progressing intersectionality from a lens to a theory employed in practice. For example, with the recent state-wide abortion ban in Texas, intersectionality activists would consider how particular communities, take Mexican-American women, would be impacted by these new barriers. In this example alone so many factors from the affordability of driving out of state to receive care, to hesitancy to ask for help depending on citizenship status – require looking at intersecting barriers as well as their solutions. Concerns regarding over-conceptualising intersectionality, along with a focus on achievability and value, have led some to argue that the debate should centre wholly around what intersectionality does rather than what it is.
From this perspective, focusing on intersectionalities’ performativity may do more than probing at concepts and theories. Such probing also causes fear over erasing intersectionality’s beginnings in black feminism, or, in other words, whitening it. This sort of political side-lining, seen through voter suppression and keeping black women from office, as well as taking credit from black thinkers and activists, is still common and should be watched out for. Intersectionality has exposed some of these atrocities and has the power to keep the focus on multiply marginalised people. The aforementioned caution is especially relevant given that intersectionality first emerged as a response to Eurocentric feminist studies centred around white middle class women. It proposed a solution, or an attempt rather, to make feminism a more complete movement. However, while intersectionality has tackled some structural oppression in the US through passing the microphone to black women, it also has the potential to predict changes through its unique perspective of looking at identity in flux. By placing intersectionality in different contexts, amongst different groups in different parts of the world, it can uproot micro and macro systems of oppression through its variability.
In the spirit of defining intersectionality through what it does rather than what it is, Sara Salem (2018) took on the role of tracing how the concept has moved from its origins in the United States. Firstly, through its travel to Europe, Salem argues that intersectionality’s critical potential diminished due to Britain and Germany’s decoupling of the term from its anti-racist roots, employing a Eurocentric understanding of race. Of course, anywhere you travel will have different ideas of race, gender, and class but the case of Germany is especially harmful where there was a tendency to silence women of colour within feminist discourse. To account for these differences shaped by geography, intersectionality risks being turned into a ‘catch-all’ approach. Salem proposes the field reclaims its radical beginnings by focusing on what change intersectionality can and has enacted in the US instead of delving into its methods and getting caught up in academic language. However, inequalities in the US and elsewhere necessitate greater attention to intersecting experiences of diversity. More than just daily interactions, people are embedded in multiple systems and each layer requires evaluation. Despite its complexity, it is not impossible to hone intersectionality’s methodology to standardise it for practice. For example, determining how groups utilise technology and control in both legal and cultural domains is one way to understand exclusion and marginalisation. Given that identity is interconnected with power, this could be a crucial first step toward challenging institutions and politics. Along with this, answering key questions about who is included within a study, what role does inequality play, and looking at similarities and differences, intersectionality can be applied to developmental science while still being careful to rightfully credit black feminists for its origin (Santos and Toomey 2018).
With the aforementioned tweaks to intersectionality’s methods of analysis, it could be considered a critical social theory with the potential to influence policy through its praxis. That being said, intersectionality as it stands now as a lens, is asked to do a lot. From an aspiration to a movement, Crenshaw’s term has given hope to many in its quest to redefine identity and inequality. There are so many spheres of being, it only makes sense to have a theory that examines every intersection of those spheres. Humans are complex, multifaceted beings that cannot be understood from unitary and additive approaches employed by the social sciences previously. Intersectionality as a theory can illuminate difference, sameness, oppression, and power, in cultural, legal, economic, and social systems. Intersectionality put into practice can build coalitions, set agendas, and change policies. In other words, by resolving intersectionality’s methodological issues, its simplification of power relations, and truly focusing the term within the social sciences, what is now a lens can quickly develop into critical social theory.
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