Introduction

The study of propaganda and its ability to motivate ordinary citizens to commit atrocities has long been prevalent in academic and popular discourse, particularly in the years following the Second World War and the Holocaust. Interest in the study of propaganda was renewed in the aftermath of the Rwandan Genocide in the 1990s and again with the rise to prominence of the so-called Islamic State (also known as ISIS, IS, and Da’esh) in the 2010s. The concerted, strategic use of media in these two cases in particular illustrate the perceived capacity of propaganda to mobilise citizens and enable them to partake in extreme violence. However, both cases differ substantially in their aims and structures, a difference which is reflected in the contrasting types of propaganda employed. This essay will offer a comparative analysis of the use of propaganda in both cases, illustrating the manner in which the differing aims, mobilising factors, justifications, and targets of those employing propaganda shaped the type of propaganda utilised.

While there were a number of common factors in the emergence of the groups responsible for directing the violence in both the Rwandan genocide and IS (such as the transfer of power to a previously subjugated group, which then created a repressive status quo), there are key differences between them that form the basis of this analysis. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, the overall aim was the preservation of the status quo through destructive violence. Participation in the genocide was motivated by fear of an ultimate threat to a community’s existence, justified by material benefit, and powered by mass activation. In contrast, the aim of IS was the radical transformation of the status quo through both destructive and constructive violence. Participation was motivated by power, justified by both a purported material necessity and apocalypticism, and powered by targeted activation. This essay will examine each of these contrasts in turn and illustrate the manner in which they influenced the propaganda employed in both cases.

Overall Aims: Preservation vs. Radical Transformation of the Status Quo

The overall aim of the violence conducted during the Rwandan Genocide was to eliminate a specific community in order to preserve the status quo. Violence was directed at a specific out-group – the Tutsi – and was, at least overtly, instrumentalised almost solely in relation to their elimination.

In other words, the overall aim of the genocide was destructive: as it was intent on maintaining the status quo of Hutu dominance, the organisation of the violence did not need to concern itself with institution-building or forging ties with local communities, as is the case with revolutionary or insurgent movements. This had a number of key effects on the propaganda utilised in the lead-up to and throughout the genocide. First, as noted by Heftie & Ausserladscheider (2020) among others, almost all propaganda was negative propaganda directed at a specific (if not always clearly defined) out-group: propaganda was anti-Tutsi propaganda. The key concern of the propaganda was to portray the Tutsi as a threat to the status quo and to psychologically prepare the population to enact violence against them (Kellow & Steeves, 2006). This was achieved on multiple levels, as illustrated by Baisley (2014): RTLM and Radio Rwanda portrayed the Tutsi as “living off the work of Hutu cultivators” (Baisley, 2014, p. 46), as a distinct racial group attempting to infiltrate the ranks of the Hutu and take over “their” country, and as synonymous with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and other groups threatening “infiltration” (Baisley, 2014, p. 49). The out-group of the Tutsi were further marginalised and dehumanised by repeated references to the Tutsi population as “cockroaches” (Hefti & Ausserladscheider, 2020; Eltringham, 2006). In this regard, it may be said that much of the propaganda in the lead-up to the genocide concentrated primarily on creating an enemy towards which violence would be directed, and readying civilians to enact this violence (Hefit & Ausserladscheider, 2020, p. 15).

While the promotion of destructive violence was also a key feature of propaganda produced by IS, the propaganda in this case served a dual purpose. Not only did IS’s propaganda seek to create an out-group and incite violence against this group, it also sought to create a distinct in-group identity and derive legitimacy for the caliphate. This dual purpose arose as a result of the overall aim of IS: that of constructing, consolidating, and expanding an absolutist Islamic state (Byman, 2016). Rather than seeking to protect an advantageous status quo, as was the case in the Rwandan genocide, IS sought to radically overthrow the status quo and create a new social, political, and economic order. Consequently, there was an additional burden on the group not only to characterise the enemy as threatening enough to warrant overthrowing (Walt, 2015), but also to construct a distinct in-group identity that would be used to form the new order. Additionally, it should be noted that the target of the destructive component of IS’s violence was far broader than in the case of the Rwandan genocide. As noted by Byman (2016, p. 152), “(…) any country that does not bow down to the Islamic State is, by definition, illegitimate.” Extending on this, any person or group of people that does not comply with IS’s conceptualisation of an absolutist Islamist identity or accept the legitimacy of its authority is, definitionally, the enemy of IS (Andersen & Samberg, 2018). As a result of this duality of sub-goals relating to IS’s overall aim, its propaganda performed a dual
purpose throughout IS’s activity in the 2010s. This is illustrated by Andersen & Samberg’s (2018, p. 1508) analysis of IS’s propaganda magazine, Dabiq:

“The magazine can generally be divided into two types of content. The first type covers reportages about state building, aid work, military successes, religious practice, and history. The second type involves images and texts about the destruction of historical artefacts, child soldiers, brutal murders, and executions.”

The goal of state-building, and the considerable force required to achieve this goal, necessitated the derivation of the legitimacy of and the construction of allegiance to the Islamic State, which is reflected in the propaganda produced by IS, particularly on social media (Gates & Podder, 2015). From the perspective of dramaturgical political sociology (Welsh, 1985), IS’s propaganda can be
seen as a technology by which the group sought to convert its power into authority and manage the political consciousness of its populace and potential recruits. It was a key means of performing the state, a performance designed to attract recruits and citizens who believed in its legitimacy. As argued by Anfinson (2019, p. 6), images used by IS in its propaganda acted “as “proof ” of a) a permanent population, b) a defined territory, c) government, and d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.” Additionally, there are clear instances where the constructive and destructive aspects of IS’s goals overlapped in its propaganda. For example, propagandistic material related to the use of counter-normative violence (most notably, the use of beheading) sought to create a distinct IS “brand” of violence, simultaneously psychologically preparing recruits to enact destructive violence themselves and contributing to in-group identity differentiating IS from competing jihadist groups (Zech & Kelly, 2015).

Emotional Motivation of Fighters and Recruits: Fear vs. Power

In order to incite civilians to participate in the genocide, the extreme Hutu within the government sought to create, reinforce, and capitalise upon a culture of fear among the Hutu population: namely, fear that their lives and livelihoods were in immediate danger from the “threat” posed by the Tutsi. This is related to the general aim of the genocide as a means of protecting the state and maintaining the status quo. For the genocide to occur, Hutu civilians had to be convinced that there was a pressing need to protect the state and themselves from an existential threat and had to be motivated by the fear that this threat caused. In the years leading up to the genocide, therefore, “…the media worked to instil a pronounced ethnic fear and hatred that previously had not been part of the everyday culture.” (Kellow & Steeves, 2006, p. 124) There were a number of components to this ethnic fear and hatred promoted by the Rwandan media, as noted previously. What is important to note in this context of motivating participation in the genocide, however, is the emphasis placed on the immediacy of the threat supposedly posed by the Tutsi. As Kellow & Steeves (2016, p. 120) note, “Throughout the genocide, the inkuruishushe (hot news) announcements emphasized a “risk and danger”, “kill or be killed” frame…[and] described alleged, and unsubstantiated, Tutsi atrocities against the Hutus.” In essence, radio was used to instil a sense of mass panic among civilians, which then made them more impressionable to calls for violence. This was not a new phenomenon, as illustrated by Cantril’s (1940) study of the mass panic induced by Orson Welles’ 1938 Halloween radio broadcast. The reach and the authority of radio in Rwanda made it a uniquely powerful motivating force – so much so that it was deemed to have incited the genocide (Hefti & Ausserladscheider, 2020). The atmosphere of fear constructed and promoted by the Rwandan media created “a state of mind where killings [were] accepted as ordinary and necessary actions.” (Hefti & Ausserladscheider, 2020) Additionally,
as the ultimate aim of the propaganda was to provoke the genocide, the fear and mass panic had to be directed at the Tutsi in general. It was not enough to say that certain Tutsi were to be feared: all Tutsi needed to be considered a threat to the Hutu. Therefore, propaganda promoted the idea that “[a]ll Tutsi…shared an ‘ineradicable vice’, a ‘thirst for blood and power’.” (Eltringham, 2006, p. 437) This furthered the sense of mass panic and deepened the fear felt by Hutu civilians, thus making them more easily susceptible to calls for participation in violence.

The message of fear promoted by the Rwandan media before and during the genocide may be contrasted with that of power and might promoted by IS’s various propaganda machines, most notably its English and Arabic-language magazines Dabiq, Rumiyah and al-Naba’. As in the case of the Rwandan genocide, the motivating messages used in IS’s propaganda were derived from the overall goals of the group. In order to attract new recruits and citizens to the Islamic State, the recruits needed to believe that the creation and expansion of the caliphate were, at the very least, possible (indeed, in many cases, IS’s propaganda portrayed its eventual victory not only as possible but as inevitable (Gambhir, 2014; Walt, 2015)). As a result, much propaganda was directed at presenting IS as a powerful as well as a legitimate force. This is seen in its use of visual imagery throughout its magazines: as noted by Winkler et al. (2019, p. 9), “The group’s exaggerated emphasis on dynamic shots of its own militants photographed against dynamic backgrounds highlighted that the contemporary Arab context was changing and that ISIS militants were the ones responsible for making the changes.” Additionally, IS’s publications in both English and Arabic repeatedly emphasised the commitment and vigour of its recruits to the caliphate, along with the power of its militants (Winkler et al, 2019). It should be noted, however, that IS also created a sense of hatred towards those who did not conform with IS’s ideology, as seen in its recruitment and radicalisation strategies (Bagut & Neumann, 2020) and in articles published in Dabiq, such as “Why We Hate Them and Why We Fight Them.” (Azman, 2016). Much as in the case of the promotion of legitimacy, it may be argued that IS’s goal of the creation of an absolutist Islamist state placed an additional burden on the group to motivate recruits along multiple lines, which meant that its propaganda focused on the creation of multiple emotional or psychological states rather than one predominant state.

Justification: Material and Spiritual/Religious

In addition to motivating participation in the genocide through fear of a threat to the status quo, it was important for the Rwandan government to justify its preservation (a preservation which would involve extreme violence) by illustrating the material benefits it provided to the Hutu. However, the Civil War in the early 1990s had “taken its toll on an economy which had already been in a state of crisis when it started.” (Prunier, 1996, p. 159). Additionally, the collapse in coffee prices and the Structural Adjustment Programme introduced under Rwanda’s agreement with the World Bank placed further strain on the economy (Prunier, 1996) This limited the options available to propagandists in terms of convincing civilians of the material benefits of the status quo. Therefore, much of the propaganda in this regard was framed in relation to the supposed desire of the Tutsi to dominate the Hutu (Baisely, 2014, p. 52). No matter the economic hardships of the status quo, its material benefits were proclaimed to lie in the absence of Tutsi domination. The material justification for maintaining Hutu power in Rwanda was based largely, therefore, on the creation of a counterfactual of what a Rwanda controlled by the Tutsi would mean for Hutu civilians. This relates closely to the motivation through fear discussed earlier – it is a justification based largely on a perceived existential threat, and a desire to avoid the consequences of a change to the status quo. However, it should be noted that propaganda also made use of religion to justify attacks against the Tutsi and that “the policy of Tutsi extermination seemed to be tolerated and even endorsed by religion.” (Hefit & Ausserladschider, 2020, p. 16) This added an additional layer of legitimacy to the violence and enabled participants to justify their actions further.

Religious justification for extreme violence was more prevalent in the propaganda produced by Islamic State than in that of the Rwandan genocide. As noted by Mahood & Rane (2017), IS drew heavily on extreme interpretations of Islamic narratives in order to enable recruits to justify their actions. These narratives – such as those of the crusaders and the hypocrites – conferred on IS
“a degree of legitimacy reinforced by the historical experiences of Islam…exacerbate[d] historical and political grievances and… harness[ed] feelings of personal victimisation and discrimination experienced by Western Muslims.” (Mahood & Rane, 2017, p. 31). This religious justification is further evidenced by IS’s use of apocalyptic language in its propaganda (Byman, 2016), along with its frequent use of scripture to justify violence. Boutz et al. (2018) illustrate that IS’s use of hadith quotations differed across its English and Arabic-language publications, with those produced in English drawing more heavily on apocalyptic prophecies than those produced in Arabic. This indicates that IS tailored its religious justification to match the experiences of those targeted by its propaganda: it may have been easier for those living in English-speaking countries to engage with apocalyptic prophecies than crusader narratives, for example, as they may not have had first or second-hand knowledge of the experience of occupation or colonialism. This illustrates the manner in which religious narratives were strategically instrumentalised by IS in order to justify violence to different groups of potential and actual recruits. Additionally, however, IS propaganda made reference to material justifications for participating in the violence it promoted. Propaganda used during radicalisation focused heavily on the oppression experienced by Muslims in the West (Bagut & Neumann, 2020) and the oppression of the Sunni in Iraq. Participation in the violence promoted by IS was justified, therefore, by recourse to material need and the overthrowing of unjust systems under the status quo. In many instances, material and religious justifications overlapped: the religious narrative of the crusaders, for example, appealed to the logic of fulfilling God’s will and to the logic of defeating an unjust enemy. The varying justifications, therefore, complemented and reinforced each other, and enabled recruits to rationalise their actions on multiple levels.

Recruitment: Mass Activation and Targeted Radicalisation

The operation of the genocide in Rwanda necessitated the mass activation of civilians to partake in, or at least accept, the killings. Additionally, the use of radio as one of the primary dispensers of propaganda meant that the propaganda produced would indiscriminately reach a broad segment of the population. Both of these factors meant that the propaganda employed before and during the genocide needed to be widely accessible and engaging for a general Hutu audience. This was achieved in a number of ways. Stations such as RTLM sought to engage general audiences of young people through broadcasting popular music between its “ethnic commentaries and news.” (Kellow & Steeves, 1998, p. 118) General audiences were further attracted to RTLM by its mixture of lighthearted stories, political gossip, and inkuruishushe, or “hot news” (Kellow & Steeves, 1998). As time went on, the media intensified the urgency and extremity of its messages, before open calls for genocide began. By this time, the general Hutu public was primed to be receptive to the messages from the media and willing to accept the calls for violence against the Tutsi.

While there were certainly elements of attracting popular support in the case of Islamic State, reflected in its similar use of the “wolf in-sheep’s-clothing” method (Bagut & Neumann, 2020), there was also a great deal of emphasis placed on targeted radicalisation – particularly of foreign fighters, as seen in the discussion of hadith quotations above (Boutz et al., 2018; Gates & Podder, 2015). Additionally, the growth of social media and communication technologies allowed for far greater personalisation of targeted content and direct communication with potential recruits. Bagut & Neumann (2020) illustrate the manner in which the process of radicalisation often combined the proliferation of propaganda gradually increasing in extremity (as was the case with the propaganda produced in the lead-up to the Rwandan genocide) with personal talks with preachers and other Islamists and social groups in which potential recruits could meet with each other. The aim of attracting foreign fighters, therefore, necessitated additional investment of time, resources, and effort into the recruitment process, investment which was heavily directed towards IS’s propaganda, both in terms of its content and its proliferation online.

Conclusion

The common trend evident throughout the contrasts that have been drawn in this essay is the additional burden placed on IS and its propaganda as a result of its aims of state-building and its use of foreign fighters. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, it was necessary and sufficient for propaganda to create an enemy at which the violence would be directed and mobilise civilians to enact it. In contrast, the creation of the enemy was a necessary but not sufficient component of IS’s propaganda. There was an additional onus on IS’s propaganda to create an image of IS itself as a legitimate and powerful actor, the “one true way” of creating the utopian society it promoted. This necessitated additional justification, emotional motivation, and techniques of activation, which were illustrated in this essay. While there were a number of common tropes employed in the propaganda used in both cases, the clearest contrast may be seen between the emotional states that the propaganda attempted to create in potential recruits and participants. Again, however, it is evident that this contrast arose from the difference between the overall aims of the Rwandan genocide compared with that of Islamic State and the means by which civilians would be mobilised to engage with each of these aims.

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