Introduction

The Korean saying ‘고래 싸움에 새우등 터진다’ encapsulates the belief that the fate of the Korean Peninsula is shaped or determined by the interplay between larger powers. The proverb carries with it an underlying negative connotation of weakness, vulnerability, and powerlessness attached to the ‘shrimp’. The peninsula is clearly associated with a ‘shrimp’ caught up in a whirlpool of fighting giants. It is at the mercy of its powerful neighbours, ‘the whales’, namely China, the United States, and Russia. Despite extensive use in media and literature, numerous observers have questioned this ‘shrimp’ categorisation on the grounds of major economic, political, and military change in status of the Korean Peninsula over the whole region and beyond.

Thus, to what extent can we say that the Korean Peninsula has been shaped and influenced by outside forces and larger powers? This paper will demonstrate that even though the fate and nature of the Korean Peninsula were primarily shaped by outside forces throughout its history, North Korea and South Korea have now been able to take their fate into their own hands. Today, Korea plays a major strategic role, having expanded beyond its regional influence to become a prominent member in world affairs. In recent years, it can be argued that the Peninsula transformed into a ‘dolphin swimming between the whales’. Historical ‘Shrimp’ Status of the Korean Peninsula.

The geographic position of Korea, located in the middle of powerful actors, is the foundation for the geopolitics of the region; the Peninsula is the central land point to control the region. Consequently, from the Tributary System to the Cold War, the Korean Peninsula has been seen both as “a ‘menace’ and an ‘opportunity’ by all regional great powers in Northeast Asia (Mansourov, 2000), leading to its emergence as a ‘small and profitable shrimp among powerful whales’.

From the Tributary System to the Japanese Colonisation

For many centuries, Korea was a member of China’s tributary system. This system was centered around the superiority of the Chinese emperor and the deference of his subjects; the emperor overrode the land and princes governing in their own fiefdoms. The Korean king therefore acknowledged the titular superiority of the Chinese emperor and had to pay a tribute in return for military protection, political legitimacy, and limited internal interference. Subject to strong imperial competition, this relatively isolated and weak Peninsula was successively conquered by more powerful powers in the region, which determined its fate and history. With the decline of the Chinese Empire, the hermit kingdom became the object of competing interests between the Japanese, Russian and the Western alternative ascendancy in East Asia (Kim, 2017). Finally, after the Sino-Japanese (1895) and the Russo-Japanese (1905) war defeats, the Japanese Empire became the predominant power in the region until

Japan controlled the Korean Peninsula before the 20th century and formally annexed it in 1910. With the continuous fight for the control of the region, notably owing to Korea’s central and strategic location, the domination over the Korean Peninsula became the symbol of the ascendancy of larger powers. Accordingly, the fate of the Korean Peninsula and its people became totally dependent on the evolution of the struggle for power led by its powerful neighbours.

The Korean War and Division of the Peninsula

After the Japanese surrender in 1945, the northeast Asian power struggle changed in nature with the emergence of the Cold War context; the Korean Peninsula power dynamic changed from a regional-centred struggle to a global-proxy competition between the Communist and the Western blocs. Without prior consultation with the Korean population, the Peninsula was divided along the 38th parallel by American soldiers. Later, two separate states were created in 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) occupied by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Republic of Korea (ROK) occupied by the US.

After the establishment of a pro-US South Korean government by the US and a Communist North Korean government by the USSR, the tension between the blocs heightened, and the Peninsula became the ground of confrontation between the two superpowers. On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army crossed the parallel and sparked the beginning of the Korean War. This proxy war was the scene of the confrontation between North Korea, backed by China, and the USSR and South Korea, supported by the UN . The Korean Peninsula therefore emerged as grounds for global-proxy competition between the two blocs. Even after the military confrontation stopped in July 1953, the Korean Peninsula remained the embodiment of the ideological cleavages of the Cold War, with constant military tension and occasional détente periods, notably due to negotiations between the two Koreas (Kim, 2017). The fading of the Cold War with the collapse of the Soviet Union did not ease the tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but rather froze the divide. Once again, Korea’s history became the result of power struggle and desire for domination. This time, what was a regional struggle became global. Due to its ‘sandwiched’ position – this time with China-Soviet Union on one side and Japan-US on the other side – Korea became one of the first grounds for proxy war between the superpowers.

The pivotal geo-strategic position of the Korean Peninsula between major powers has given Korea a crucial role in the international system. At its expense, this ‘land of desire’ became the ground for states to establish their dominance over the region. This regional dominance opportunity progressively emerged to become a global one, notably due to its ideal location between the two blocs. Consequently, the Peninsula’s fate has been shaped by the external forces and powers that have sought power and domination over the region, making the Peninsula and its people collateral damage. The fights among the whales have contributed to what the Peninsula has become today; more than just a broken back, the nation has entirely severed in two.

Moving From a ‘Shrimp’ Into a ‘Dolphin’ Symbolism

The emergence of China on the global scene and the threat it represents to the American power has contributed to the escalation of
tensions on the Korea Peninsula in this ‘new Cold War context’ (Armstrong, 2019). Even if the traditional alliances persist, the
relationships inside and outside of the blocs seem to have changed. Rather than being collateral damages, North Korea and South Korea have progressively succeeded in taking their fate into their own hands. Still influenced by the whales, the Peninsula has nevertheless emerged to become a ‘dolphin’ swimming between the whales.

South Korea: Hedging Strategy

South Korea has become a wealthy democracy and a strong economic force in Asia, with its economy ranking fourth in the continent. Unable to rise without the economic giant of the region, China has become South Korea’s largest trading partner. Consequently, in the recent Sino-US competition, Seoul has played a dual balance game between the US, its traditional security ally, and China, its strategic economic partner (McGill, 2012; Lee, 2014). As Kim highlights, South Korea employs a hedging strategy. When the middle power is caught between representing the interests of the US and China, the government waits until the very last moment to make a choice that will seem inevitable to outsiders. This awaiting strategy enables South Korea to create ambiguity and decrease the apparent saliency of the choice. Thus, South Korea is able to reduce any negative effect of a decision caught in between the US and China’s hegemonic competition to maintain favourable relationships between both strategic partners. For instance, South Korea delayed its membership for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which was perceived by the US as a Chinese effort to undermine the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, until the latest application date. This late membership allowed South Korea to avoid offending the USA, considering that other US allies also decided to join in (Kim, 2017). This dual game has allowed South Korea to maintain a relatively neutral stance by not taking a clear side. Contrary to the pre-Cold War and Cold War era, South Korea, now often considered a middle power, has succeeded in creating its own strategic path and securing its own fate. Rather than completely depending on the US as was the case after WWII, this hedging strategy expresses a certain liberation and free will to act independently. This willingness has been reinforced in recent years due to Trump’s unilateral foreign policies which completely overlooked Korea on subjects such as security measures regarding North Korea (Norris, 2017). Thus, this middle power is still subject to waves created by the whales, however, it is able to move along with them and create its own path by balancing between the two predominant whale powers. We can now begin to see South Korea losing its weak power position as ‘the shrimp’ in exchange for its newfound role as the ‘agile dolphin’.

North Korea: China and Nuclear Program

On the communist side, North Korea’s relationship with its allies has also changed. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of China’s economic, political and military capacity, China has now become the main leader of the Communist faction. While China is a crucial ally for North Korea, the Mont Peaktu bloodline has never stopped implementing its Juche ideology, which is political, strategic, and economic self-reliance. In fact, after WWII and the division of the Korean Peninsula between the Soviet Union and the USA, Russia and China largely decided on the fate of North Korea by putting Kim Il Sung in the back seat. However, after the Korean War and Kim Il Sung power takeover, the latter established the Juche model with his famous speech delivered on the 28th of December 1955, where he sought independence from all other countries. Still reliant on the Soviet Union and (mainly) China, the Kim bloodline has been able to take the destiny of North Korea into their own hands, increase their self-reliance, and reduce their dependence on their traditional allies. Nowadays, North Korea’s nuclear program might be one of the most striking examples of this
independent decision-making. Pyongyang’s nuclear program has been publicly opposed by its long-time ally, China, as directly threatening its strategic interests (Kim, 2017). Even under this pressure, North Korea carried on with its nuclear program because it provided the latter highly beneficial unilateral diplomatic leverage. Thus, North Korea has succeeded in distancing itself from Chinese strategic interests to follow its own, even if it means occasionally breaking alliance pacts. Similarly to South Korea, the position of the Peninsula has changed from ‘game taker’ to ‘game maker’.

While traditional alliances remain, North and South Korea are no longer merely the collateral damages of the fight between the powerful whales. They are now the dolphins in control of their futures. Although the game has changed, the strategic value of the Korean Peninsula remains the same. Consequently, when the Sino-US competition gets fiercer, greater importance will be given to the Peninsula’s strategic decision. From the shrimp having its back broken, the whales are now trying to seduce the shrimp to gain power in this rivalry whale game. Accordingly, as a substitute for the shrimp imagery, it would be relevant to equate the Peninsula with a dolphin. And whilst the dolphin cannot match the predator whales, the dolphin is quick-witted and agile. It is able to adapt to the conflict and move along the waves created by the whales’ fight, swimming between them (Tudor, 2014 ; Kim, 2017).

Conclusion

ascendancy. This is how the peninsula, ‘the shrimp’, has often been collateral damage to those situations of rivalry. Yet, the evolutions and ever-changing shifts in the balance of power in East Asia are often overlooked. The dolphin symbolism has emerged as an alternative way of considering the control of both North and South Korea in taking their fate into their own hands. Consequently, it may be argued that the ‘shrimp’ concept seems outdated and flawed to describe the making of the fate of the Peninsula. Nevertheless, the Sino-American rivalries remain significantly influential in the decision-making and position-taking of both Koreas.

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